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
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
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THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1880.

ART. I.—MAURITIUS.

1. *Sub-Tropical Rambles in the Land of the Aphanapteryx.* Personal Experiences, &c., in and around the Island of Mauritius. By NICHOLAS PIKE. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle. 1873.
2. *An Account of the Island of Mauritius and its Dependencies.* By a late OFFICIAL RESIDENT. London: Published by the Author. 1842.

IT is proposed to describe an island belonging to the British Crown, which lies about twenty degrees south of the Equator and some five hundred miles eastward of Madagascar. It is a very small island; not forty miles at its greatest length, nor thirty-five at its greatest breadth; but for its fertility, wealth, large exports, dense population, and important naval position, it deserves to be considered by England as what its own inhabitants have long proudly styled it, "the gem of the Indian Ocean." It especially merits the regard of English Catholics. Here the Catholic religion was recognised, protected, and its ministers salaried by the English Government more than a quarter of a century before the Act of Emancipation gave the same religion, in England itself, permission to prosper, if it could. When the island was taken by the English in 1810, the language of the colonists and their customs were French: they themselves were mainly of French origin, and, it need scarcely be added, their religion was Catholic. In the supreme moment of surrender they were so far true to the traditions of their race, that they stipulated in Article VIII. of the Terms of Capitulation, for the preservation of "their religion, their laws, and their customs." And on their side, the

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captors granted the Article unconditionally, and have honestly abided by the concession. An account of this Anglo-French colony can scarcely fail to be interesting. The history of the vicissitudes and present state of religion will, however, be reserved for a succeeding article, and the present one will be devoted to a sketch of the island itself, physically and socially.

Of the two books at the head of the article, the second has been placed there because it affords a ready test of the marvellously rapid social and commercial improvement made in Mauritius during the thirty years since its publication, rather than for its present value. Mr. Pike's volume is the most recent if not the only one, entirely devoted to Mauritius, in the English book market. The more ancient of these two works is a thin, unambitious looking octavo of 180 pages, in plain, sombre, brown binding; the newer, a bright-covered volume of more than 500 pages, with a plentiful supply of good engravings; a difference typical, it is not fanciful to think, of the prosperity of the island when each author wrote of it. Mr. Pike, who was American Consul for some years at Port Louis, is a naturalist, and on the fauna and flora of the island and kindred subjects is a valuable informant. He is a facile, chatty writer, easy to read and generally well-informed, always well-intentioned, and without the suspicion of bigotry. He has made, however, several conspicuous omissions on the subject of the prevailing religion. At the proper place, one or two of his unintentional mistakes (none of them of grave moment) will be referred to and corrected.

As an introduction to the island and to Mr. Pike simultaneously, the reader will be pleased to arrive in the company of the latter at Port Louis, the capital.

Day dawned on January, 12, 1867, bright and clear, and the sun rose brilliantly in a cloudless sky, as we hove in sight of Mauritius. On nearing the land, the fields of waving canes, topes of cocoas, and groves of casaurinas, gave a pleasing impression of the place; but when approaching Port Louis harbour the beauty of the view is unsurpassed and no easy task to describe.

The varied character of the ranges of basaltic hills reminded me of the far-famed Organ Mountains in South America. The city of Port Louis lies in an extensive valley; and as we approached the Bell Buoy, the outermost anchorage for ships, a glorious scene presented itself. In the far distance was the world-known Pieter Both Mountain; just behind the city rose the bold sweep of the mountain peak called the Pouce, to the height of 2847 feet, wooded to its summit; to the east lay the gentle slopes of the Citadel Hill, bastion crowned; to the west, abrupt and rugged, the steep cliff called Long Mountain Bluff reared its

signal-topped head (whence vessels are seen and signalled far out at sea)—all formed an entourage few cities can boast, and rendered it, when viewed from the sea, the most picturesque in the world (p. 55).

Port Louis city covers an area of ten square miles, and has a population of 65,800 in round numbers. It is the capital; also the residence of the English Governor, of the Catholic Bishop of Port Louis, and of the Anglican Bishop of Mauritius; the centre of such life and activity as there is in the island, whether civil or military, commercial or fashionable. It is built, as has been said, in a valley, on either hand of which is a range of hills that runs eastward from the shore; these form together an irregular triangle with the base to the sea, and unite as at the apex in the lofty Pouce Mountain. This last has its name from a striking resemblance to an upturned thumb. The city lies in the plain below, in a compact mass of streets that run, American fashion, in straight lines and cross each other at right angles, and stretches its more well-to-do houses in straggling lines up the hill-sides around. Towards the sea it surrounds part of the large bay which forms its magnificent natural harbour, offering ample anchorage for the fleet of heavy-burdened ships of all nations that are constantly entering or leaving it. The harbour is entered through the coral reefs that surround the whole island by a channel of from 30 to 40 feet deep, and well marked out by buoys; and from its noble granite quay the sugar produce of the island is shipped to every quarter of the world, and exports from almost all parts are brought hither for the sustenance and comfort of its inhabitants. Lying, as Port Louis does, almost half-way across the vast Indian Ocean, its harbour is frequently sought by eastward or homeward bound vessels as a place of revictualling, or a refuge from the dreaded tropical hurricanes, or a dock for repairing actual injuries inflicted by them. And although the shorter route to India and the East by way of the Suez Canal has lessened both this commercial importance of Port Louis and the military value of the island as a fortress for guarding the water thoroughfare between Europe and the East, yet it has only lessened them. The importance of Mauritius in these respects remains such that it is still true, as it was formerly, that the island must always be the possession of the Power which is supreme at sea.

Only a few points of a specially characteristic nature concerning Port Louis need be mentioned here. When the untravelled Englishman first lands on its wide quay, the picture presented by the vast crowd of human beings is as new and fantastic to him as the *bizarre* outlines of the volcano-shaped mountains in the distance beyond: an active, busy, noisy mass of almost every colour, nationality, and costume under the sun;

French and English and their descendants, Creoles and Coolies, Arabs and Cinghalese, Africans and the Malagasy, Indians of every caste and race, and a plentiful sprinkling of quaint Chinese. This heterogeneous mixture obtains over all the island, and is a fact which should be borne in mind when we consider its social and religious condition. The streets of the city are macadamized and clean, with raised footpaths; several streams from the mountains behind run through some of them to the sea, small enough in dry weather, but when much overfilled after heavy rains often doing damage to property within reach. Mr. Pike complains very loudly of the nastiness to eye and nose of the drains which run through the streets uncovered, and makes the grave charge that they form germ beds of fever infection in dry, hot seasons. Mauritians deny the first accusation: but open drains can scarcely, on any supposition, be supposed conducive to health. Little can be said of the architectural beauties of any of the houses, churches, or public buildings on the island. Older structures are chiefly of wood, and were built with more reference to needs and means than to style. Many newer houses and churches are of stone or brick, and the universal Z-shaped bars to the hurricane shutters on the houses are a conspicuous object to a stranger's eye. The Catholic Cathedral, in Government Street, has a large clock, the finest in Port Louis, whose solemn striking can be heard to almost every limit of the great city.

The shops next attract notice. How can this little island provide purchasers and wealth to buy all the conveniences and luxuries of European produce here exposed to sale? There are several streets, but perhaps pre-eminently one, the *Chaussée*, where the shops look very gay and are elegantly fitted in French style, and contain valuable stores of goods; those of the jewellers are particularly resplendent with objects of *bijouterie*, gold, silver, gems, and, above all, the diamond, the darling ornament of the Creole. Here, also, may be bought dresses, silks, hosiery, and elegancies of the toilette in latest Parisian fashion, and plainer necessities of clothing and use down to common English calico. Pianos, latest-improved machinery, furniture, ornaments, toys—all are in Port Louis in abundance. Stores of various kinds are numerous, and some of them large, clean, and plentifully supplied; but many of the small provision stores are strangely dirty and odorous. Many of the stores offer a most amusing variety of goods; “for instance, in your ironmonger’s you may order a ream of writing-paper with your saucepans, and seeds for your garden with the spade to dig it.” In the Chinese stores any kind of provisions or drink may be bought, the former retailed in the smallest possible quantities to suit

small means; salt fish, wine, oil, rice, lard, and a thousand other domestic necessities. It is the fault of his goods, and not his own, that John's store is often unpleasantly strong to the nose of a passer-by. Out of these business localities, away in the more leisurely suburbs, in the newer streets at the west end, in the better-built and tree-shaded avenues that stretch up the hill-sides, "in every angle of every street you will find John Chinaman in his one or at most two rooms, which serve for house and shop, with the inevitable rows of sardines, olive oil, porter, and Warren's blacking."

Port Louis has a theatre, whither a French company comes once a year; and a race-course, where horse races are held also once a year, on three days during a week, and generally now in the month of July. The course is the large Champ de Mars, once a volcano crater, now a beautiful grassy plain extending to the mountains, and as circled within them, presenting somewhat the appearance of a gigantic amphitheatre. Pretty cottages and larger villas, the residences of officials, merchants, and others, are scattered over the declivities, nestling picturesquely among the numerous and beautiful tropical trees. The last day of the races is a great fête day of the city—the greatest after New Year's Day—and the animated, varied, strange scene which the gathering of that day presented to the observant eye of the American Consul forms very pleasant reading in his book. But he speaks disparagingly of the horses:—

I doubt if the racing was ever much to boast of. It is true that for years fresh blood from Europe, the Cape, and Australia, has been imported; but, like the human race, the equine degenerates rapidly here (p. 83). The jockeys (save the mark! for only one I have seen who knew anything about riding) are dressed in such fantastic colours, it is enough to make the quietest horse shy when he is mounted, in astonishment at such a flutter of silks and ribands (p. 85).

But these two are the only items in the festa which were disappointing; the gentry in their private carriages, towns-people in hired vehicles, Indians in donkey carts, the great mass of people of every sort on foot, all flocked to the great plain to see and to enjoy themselves. The great display of fashion among the ladies and "elegants of all colours," enforced his admiration. The scene of enjoyment was gay and noisy; confectioners, fruit-sellers, and vendors of ice were there in abundance, and a motley crowd of young and old "Indians in native costume," or sometimes no costume, or in a soldier's cast-off red coat, shrill-voiced women, policemen melting in the burning sun as they shouted or cleared the course. In the centre of the course all kinds of games, swings, merry-go-rounds, and even Aunt Sally of Western renown, amused the

pleasure-loving crowd ; and for the more prurient taste of the Indians, wretched Nautch girls sang and danced, whilst in the intervals of their song an old fakir related stories, which, fortunately for modest ears, were told in Hindu. The temperature at one of these festive scenes was at 90° in the day-time, falling to 75° in the evening !

Port Louis is well supplied with water ; and is now the centre of a well-laid and well-conducted line of railway, which crosses the island diagonally from west to east, and skirts the coast both northward and southward. There are in the island, altogether 77 miles of railway with numerous stations, 82 miles of telegraph wire, and no less than 34 post offices.* The railway is largely used by passengers of all classes, but especially by the Indians. The facilities it affords have had much to do with the large exodus of former city residents to houses in the interior, and have greatly improved the "planters'" prospects by the cheap and rapid transit of their sugar from the plantations to the city warehouses and quays.

The island is sometimes described as oval-shaped, but its outline is most irregular and very far from that of any geometrical figure ; it is, however, longer than broad, and lies lengthwise in the direction of north-east to south-west, the north-eastern extremity being somewhat attenuated with a much more irregular and broken coast than the southern half, which is broader, with precipitous shores and a more regular curve of outline. Two very large bays, or rather indentations of coast, containing several smaller bays, occupy opposite points, one on the north-west, the other on the south-east of the island. In a well-sheltered large bay in the former stands Port Louis, in the latter the old harbour of Grand Port. The latter was the first formed settlement and the chief town under the Dutch occupation, but was deserted by the French for the manifest advantages of the deep harboured Port Louis. The coral reefs around Grand Port Bay threaten, at no very distant period, to so fill it as that it will be unnavigable except by the smallest fishing craft. Masses of coral, sand, and shells drift in with every tide and south-eastern gale.

The contour of the island shows a large central plateau, rising to 1500 feet above the level of the sea, nearly surrounded by ranges of mountains ; on the south-western and middle portion of the eastern coast these mountains descend more or less precipitously to the sea ; on the remaining sides, however, they give place to lowlands and gently sloping plains of considerable extent. Out of the nine districts into which the island is

* "Whittaker's Almanack," 1879.

divided, three in the north and north-east (Pamplemousses, Riviere du Rempart, and Flacq), and two to the south (Savanne and Grand Port), give these outlying lowlands the great cane-growing districts. Two other districts, Plaines Wilhelms and Moka almost cover the area of the central table land. Over this last-named the temperature is several degrees cooler than at Port Louis or around the outlying coast. And upwards to this cool and healthy elevation, all those who can afford to leave Port Louis are coming to live; indeed, the city threatens to be ere long almost deserted of European residents. Plaines Wilhelms district has long had a greater proportion of European residents than any other part of the island. In it the nights are cool in summer, and it is stated that in winter, at Curepipe, for instance, a fire would be sometimes agreeable. *Would be*, generally; for it is said there are only one or two grates on the island. It would not pay to carry fire grates over 11,000 miles of sea for sale in a country where the annual mean temperature, from observations taken near Port Louis, was 86° in the day, and 72° at sunset, and the minimum thermometer height for the year $61^{\circ}5$. Mauritius, like most islands of the Indian Ocean, is of volcanic formation, although volcanic action has long ceased in it. Mr. Pike, who is very fond of these scientific matters, gives several arguments to show that the volcano was submarine, and the formation of the island, and its elevation above the sea level, slowly effected through successive ages. There are extinct craters of different periods over the island; one of them is the Champ de Mars already spoken of.

The mountains of the island generally, but especially those on the sea coast, point manifestly by their strange, abrupt outlines, rugged peaks, and rough heads of massive rock, by the frequent deep and straight clefts in their sides, to some convulsive formation. These Mauritian mountains may be divided into three straggling groups; the northern or Port Louis, the south-western, and the eastern group. The first group, with the city at its western extremity, stretches nearly across the island from west to east. The two best known peaks of this range are the Pouce, and the Pieter Both, both high and curiously shaped. The latter is perhaps the most remarkable on the island, and is formed of a mountainous spire, some 2840 feet high, "crowned by a dome of rock larger than the point on which it rests." How it came by its name is not recorded, but perhaps some brave Pieter Both, in the days when the Dutch held the land, climbed to its summit—or, perhaps, was the first who tried to do so, and failed; as did also one adventurous climber a few years ago. He had reached the projecting pinnacle and almost rounded it in safety when, weak or

dizzy, he lost his hold, and fell sheer into space, down to the bottom of the precipice, nearly two thousand feet below. No trace of him was ever found. A French mechanic, Claude Penthé, in 1790, scaled the formidable heights, reached the summit and planted the French flag there; and in 1832 a party of English officers with a large body of negros, plenty of scaling ladders, ropes, &c., essayed an ascent, and on the second day gained the head and triumphantly substituted the British flag. Since then two or three ascents have been made in spite of the danger and the utter fruitlessness of success. The southwestern group of hills occupies all that corner of the island and comprises several ranges running in curiously bent lines and in unordered arrangement. This group presents more features of interest and natural beauties than can even be mentioned here; a tour through it, such as that described by Mr. Pike, would well repay any one with a taste for beautiful scenery or natural science. Here are some of the highest and most picturesque mountains: the Piton, 2902 feet above the sea; the Trois Mamelles, so named from its triple peak of rock, rising almost perpendicularly and having "the appearance of being cut straight down from the summit to the shoulder," the highest ascendable point; the rugged square-topped Tamarind mountain. Well-wooded heights rise in the interior, but around the sea coast barren peaks and steep cliffs; the massive rugged Morne, that like a gigantic fort guards the extreme western point of the island, is nearly as difficult to climb as Pieter Both. In this district, too, are mysterious mountain caves, majestic waterfalls, and, lastly, charming lakes embosomed among the wooded uplands, their waters resplendent with reflected colours and outlines and alive with silver and golden fish. Grand Bassin, in Savanne, is one of these mountain lakes (another extinct crater) filled with the clearest, best spring water on the island, covering an area of 25 acres, and resting 2250 feet above the sea level. Of Chamarel, Tamarind, and Savanne Falls, each is supremely beautiful with its own special character and surroundings. Of the last, or Savanne Cascade, Mr. Pike says:

A wall of black basalt interrupts the course of the river of the same name, composed of the most regular geometrical prisms, by the action of the water separated and broken, and forming a thousand angular projections.

As the river surmounts the rocky barrier, and breaks into innumerable streams, flung back from point to point and sending up showers of spray, sparkling in the sun with rainbow rays, it equals in beauty any in the island, and even in the dry season is most romantic. As it descends into the basin below the waters meander peacefully along, bordered with the large-leaved *Nymphæas*, and overhung with

the elegant wild bananas, raffias, and bamboos, and the scene changes to one of the most perfect repose (p. 319).

The third or eastern—the Grand Port group of mountains—must be passed by with a mere mention. Like the last group, they are full of striking tableaux of great beauty and ever fresh variety.

It is interesting to know that one of the early French missionaries, the Abbé de la Caille, made the first geographical survey of the island on record, measured the mountain heights, and constructed the first map of Mauritius.

Some sixty rivers are counted on the island, but only two or three are large, and most of them mere streams or dry beds, except in the rainy season, when their sudden overflow does no little mischief. Many of them flow through precipitous ravines—deep clefts in the mountain ranges, sharp cut as by cyclopean hands in the days when volcanoes heaved upwards the island from beneath the sea. When, finally, the giant craters cooled and quiet reigned, some angel of plenty must have blessed the rocky mass. The ceaseless fertility of the land here is the source of Mauritian prosperity, and a wonder to all who first look on its stone-strewn fields. Rocks in smaller masses and stones are so plentiful on some of the sugar estates that they are heaped up in rows of three or four feet high and the sugar-cane planted in rows alternately with them; and when the land has borne a few crops of sugar, the lines of stones and sugar-canes change places. This abundance of scattered rocks has been an advantage; they have harboured the rains and preserved the ground moist beneath them.

Such is the island of Mauritius of marvellously beautiful scenery and wondrously fertile in every species of flower and plant and grain, blessed by God to please the eye and yield almost spontaneously the choicest foods for man. St. Patrick, too, might have visited and blessed this emerald isle, as he is said to have done his own northern one, for not any snake has ever been known here as native, though Long Island, not twenty-five miles distant, has them in abundance!

Early in the sixteenth century some bold Portuguese navigators, sailing for India, leaving the ordinary safer route around the coast of Africa, pushed out into the wide ocean, and on their way discovered this hitherto unknown and uninhabited island. They called it Cerné, it is supposed in reference to a strange bird they found here—the, now extinct, famous Dodo. They made little use of their acquisition and abandoned it about ninety years after. They left at least one trace of their presence—the fine deer which they introduced. These

graceful animals are still numerous in the jungles and woods over the island, and afford excellent sport. The hunting season is from May 15 to end of August, and the Mauritians are passionately fond of a *chasse*. The hunting grounds are strictly preserved, and each has its *hangar*, or hunting-box, which is the rendezvous for the hunters.

In 1593, the year in which the Portuguese deserted it, the Dutch took possession of the island, and named it Mauritius after their Stadtholder, Maurice of Nassau. Some years later they formed establishments at Grand Port and Flacq, both on the eastern coast. They left in 1712, doubtless to defend their more esteemed new possession at the Cape of Good Hope. But one account says they left it as unfit for colonization from the swarms of rats. Certainly rats are still too abundant, and a nuisance, eating out your larder, destroying the sugar-canes, and active at any other mischief, if not closely watched. You meet them in field, in house—even in church. It is not rare at High Mass to see them cross the sanctuary or altar steps to the great amusement of the little black choristers.*

The French took possession of Mauritius in 1712 and occupied it in 1722, calling it Isle de France, a name which it still bears as a sort of *alias*; though Mauritius is now its only official and recognized name. The effects of the French Revolution on the island colony will best be read in connection with religion. One guillotine was erected in Port Louis, but happily never stained with blood.

Although the island was thoroughly a French colony when the English took it in 1810, and had been so for some ninety years, the first settlers on it, between 1712 and 1722, though partly Frenchmen, were chiefly adventurers of every nationality, mostly pirates, who married the only women they could find hereabout—the negresses of Madagascar. The French East India Company encouraged French emigration to the new colony; but it did not prosper nor pay them until they sent out Mahé de Labourdonnais, the Peter the Great of Mauritius. This highly-gifted, patriotic man at once removed the seat of Government from Grand Port to Port Louis, planted sugar-cane, began manufactures and found a market for them

* One nuisance suggests another! In Mauritius, the lizard will watch you from the wall or roof at your dinner, and should you leave the room, scamper down and help himself to your delicacies. And then there are swarms of insatiable ants, always ready to march up your table legs and forage on sugar or whatever else you have in their line. The only way, indeed, to escape being plundered in places where they abound, is to set the legs of your dining-table in vessels of water: they do not understand fording dikes or swimming, and beat a retreat.

in Europe, roused the people to activity, cut and constructed roads, erected arsenals, fortifications, mills, offices, shops, aqueducts; made wet and dry docks, and built a ship of war at Port Louis and sent it to France to be admired. He was the founder of Mauritian prosperity. A local historian says (it is an anti-climax, but true), "His memory remains in every heart, his portrait in every house, his statue in the Place d'Armes." How highly the French came to esteem their distant colony may be learnt from M. de Cossigny, governor of it in 1791:—

I do declare it to be my opinion that the Isle of France will one day astonish Europe and Asia by its riches, the variety and abundance of its productions, and the resources of its numerous population: in the course of time it will have very great influence on the commerce of Europe in the Indies, and incalculably extend the advantages of the nation who possesses it, in that quarter of the globe.*

The Abbé Raynal had said that if the English obtained possession of it "they would drive all foreign nations out of the seas of Asia," and Frenchmen generally thought in the same strain. It is estimated that during ten years of the Anglo-French war, in midst of which this century opened, the value of British ships captured by cruisers from Mauritius amounted to two millions and a half sterling! In the face of this the French resigned it to the invaders almost without a struggle.

I am astonished at the ease with which it was conquered by the British—forts at every coin of vantage, men enough to man them, the prestige of the impregnability of the place in their favour, and hatred of the English supposed to inflame every breast, all make the nearly bloodless victory the more marvellous.†

The "Terms of Capitulation" proposed by General Decaën, stipulated for the return of French soldiers to their country, the continuance of property with its present owners, and, as has been seen, the preservation of their religion. The advent of the English to Port Louis was stained by no deeds of violence or plunder; and it brought freedom to the ships locked in the harbour, release to merchandise long stored unsaleable in warehouses and holds, peace to people tired of war, and a sudden return of occupation and prosperity. "Their flag was changed, but so little else for a long time that the change of masters was scarcely felt." The possession of the island was ratified to the English by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. There was a large section of inhabitants in Mauritius at that period to whom a change of masters brought no relief—the African slaves who worked the sugar estates and other industries. But for these,

* "An Account of the Mauritius," &c., p. 138.

† "Sub-Tropical Rambles," p. 292.

too, soon came the memorable Act of 1833, which was promulgated here the following year and came into operation Feb. 1, 1835. Counting from that date all slaves of six years old or more became apprenticed labourers until Feb. 1, 1841, if they were field labourers, but only until Feb., 1839, if unattached. And at that date there were on the island 39,464 men and boys, and 25,856 women and girls: a grand total of 65,320 slaves to be set free. The *classe affranchie* suddenly became a large factor for good or evil in Mauritian affairs. With the traditions of slavery and its horrors filling their memories, with the dazzling prospect of emancipation before them, and only the power—poor spirit-broken blacks, degraded by whippings and sellings—to half comprehend it, it is not surprising that they murmured and grew disaffected as the time of release grew near, and threatened they would not work for their former taskmasters. But it was, on their part, a great mistake and led to an act of their masters which has changed the social state of the island, and threatens still further to change it,—the importation of Coolies. Of this, however, more will be said presently.

The early French settlers had got slaves wherever they could procure them, but chiefly from the Mozambique coast; a race much superior to the other Africans from Madagascar, and not a few—the blackest of all—from the distant coast of Guinea. The descendants of these same settlers and slaves, and of their various intermarriages, the one with the other, still inhabit the colony. The elements of the Creole* composition are being further complicated by marriages with Chinese, and Indians, and different nationalities of Europe.

It will be interesting to point out the different social positions of the chief nationalities now resident here—English, French, African, Indian, and Chinese. The Englishman is either a Government official, soldier, or merchant. The Creoles, whether whites or *hommes de couleur*,† are to a large extent land and plantation owners; they are also the chief mechanics of the country, and their handicraft compares favourably with the best European specimens; and, finally, they are exclusively the working sugar planters and manufacturers. Englishmen may buy a sugar estate, but the management and administration is invariably entrusted to a Creole; he alone is “to the manner born” of its intricate working.

* It may be well to state that the term Creole signifies here, simply, one born on the island, whatever the race, complexion, or rank of the father or mother; and not necessarily the child of an European and an African, as some English books have it.

† Descendant of a white and black parent.

India supplies the large contingent of agricultural labourers, known as Coolies. They come chiefly from the districts of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta; those from the first two being preferred, as they are more healthy. Cholera is indigenous in the Delta of the Ganges; indeed, an immigrant ship from Calcutta in 1854 brought the cholera here, and it proved a dreadful scourge to the colony. At their first importation they came chiefly from the Malabar coast, and so on this island all Indians have come to be called Malabars. The Coolies dig the sugar fields, plant and tend the cane and cut it when ripe, pass it through the different processes of its manufacture into sugar, pack this into bags and cart them to the warehouses of Port Louis. When their five years' term of Coolie labour is over, some of them return home; a larger portion remain. They are intelligent, anxious to better themselves, and thrifty; vast numbers of them have bought small plots of land in the district around Port Louis, and also in other parts; built a hut, and cultivated the surrounding into a flourishing garden. Many of them are market-gardeners, some are cab-owners, a daily-increasing number are small shopkeepers, others again jobbers; some of these last commanding as many as 100 or 200 labourers each, whom they feed and lodge quite in the style of planters. The Indians formed at the close of 1877 more than two-thirds of the entire population of Mauritius. More Coolies are being yearly imported, and when once those who elect to remain buy a plot and settle, they are extremely tenacious of their hold. There are intelligent Creoles, who see clearly that eventually the island will become an Indian Colony. The Malabar appears content with his condition and treatment as a labourer; he certainly assumes for the first time a healthy, well-fed appearance during his Coolie engagement. The women are far from handsome according to Western standards, and, wherever they can afford it, seek borrowed charms in an absurd profusion of jewellery: rings through the lobe and at close intervals through all the border of each ear, necklaces of various sizes and patterns, armlets and bracelets, and, lastly—the finishing touch of elegance—a ring through one nostril of the nose. It is the height of feminine ambition to have one so large that the wearer can comfortably take her dinner through it. Malabar women do not work, but latterly some effort has been made to employ them in agricultural labour.

In treating of the African, it must be remembered that he is barely half a century emancipated: what civilization, education, and religion will do for the young generation remains to be seen. But the *classe affranchie* is by no means an uninteresting study. The negro has faults; but he has a good heart, and

much shrewdness and humour; he is sober, is gifted with an emotional nature and strong religious instincts. He works well, but is not so industrious as the Indian, and is not likely to win in the struggle with him; besides, he is inferior in numbers. The Indian, again, as has been said, is thrifty and anxious to accumulate wealth—the savings' banks are filled with his monies;* the African, on the contrary, has a gay carelessness of the morrow. He generally spends as fast as he earns, and sometimes has a propensity, not exclusively African, to spend even faster.

The Chinamen in the Mauritius are always of one of three trades—joiners, or pork-butchers, or shopkeepers (publican and grocer combined); generally the last. They are, in fact, pretty nearly the masters of the drink trade. Opium smoking and gambling, their two great temptations, are not entirely left behind. Reckless gambling at their festivals is the rule. The latter, indeed, is mentioned by almost every writer on Mauritius.

It is one of the boasts of Mauritius that it is as densely populated as the most flourishing spots on earth; and that of its large population many are very rich, and all comfortable. It has an area of only 676 square miles, and a population (1875) of 344,602—or the very large average of 509 inhabitants to the square-mile.† Belgium has only an average of 469, whilst the Chinese Empire proper in its whole extent has an average of less than 300 to the mile,‡ and only in the densely-populated plain of the lower Yang-tse, which contains nearly one-half the entire Chinese people, does the average rise to the enormous figure 851.

The annual exports of Mauritius to the United Kingdom (and the major portion of its sugar crop goes to Australia and the Cape), comparatively with its area, are as large, it may be asserted larger, than those of any other English Eastern posses-

* Many of the Indians are frugal and manage to save enough to remit home to India, either for investment in land there or for the support of aged relatives; to invest in small stores here or to return to India. In 1869, there were 69,032*l.* standing to the credit of Indians in the savings' bank, and this sum is yearly steadily increasing as they begin to have confidence in the security of the Bank. No less than 17,158*l.* were remitted last year on behalf of immigrants to Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. This does not include large sums sent home through merchants, or taken in specie by the immigrants themselves ("Sub-Tropical Rambles," p. 472).

† "Globe Encyclopædia." Edinburgh: Thos. C. Jack. 1878.

‡ Area of Chinese Empire, 1,533,991 square miles; population, 404,946,514. Area of the Yang-tse Basin, 210,000 square miles; population, 180,000,000 in round numbers ("Globe Encyclopædia," *sub voce* Chinese Empire).

sion ; while they are half a million sterling more than those of Jamaica. Jamaica and Mauritius present many points of resemblance. Jamaica lies about the same parallel of latitude north of the equator as Mauritius does south ; it has a similar disposition of central elevation, mountains, and coast plains, and is like it in temperature, rainfall, climate, and produce. But Jamaica has an area of 4256 square miles (six times that of Mauritius), and it has been an English possession for a much longer period.

The language of Mauritius is a very Babel of tongues. Besides French, English, and Creole, Tamil, Bengali, and Hindustani, and many other languages and dialects of India, Malagasy, and Chinese are spoken all over the island. English is naturally the language of all Government offices and courts, but is only *de rigueur* at trials in the criminal court. Here may be witnessed the amusing anomaly of a French judge who also speaks English, gravely listening to the testimony of a French witness as though his own language were utterly incomprehensible to him, and awaking to intelligence only when the testimony is repeated to him in the English of the official interpreter ! In the police courts, however, language is only a medium, and any tongue is heard or used that can be understood ; and the abolition of exclusive English in any court has long been mooted and is probably already effected. In passing, it may be observed that in accordance with the famous Article 8 already referred to, the basis of Mauritian law is French—is, indeed, the *Code Napoléon*, but with so complex a mixture of English alterations, precedents, and enactments, as to be a puzzle to all but the studious lawyer.

French is spoken everywhere by the landed proprietors and gentry of the island, who are mostly of French descent, in shops, offices, schools ; it is used for newspapers, books, trade documents and the like, and is the one language of the Catholic pulpit. Creole is the solution in which all these diverse lingual elements meet together and combine ; the common ground to which the ancient Indian or elegant European tongues descend for the necessities of working daily life. The Governor, the Bishop, the French lady, rule their households through it ; in Creole the Chinaman bargains with an Indian or an Englishman.

This Creole is a patois, or rather a corruption of French—corrupted in the mouths, chiefly, of the African slaves. The changes in the mother tongue, although they have produced a language strange to even provincial French ears, have been accomplished so far methodically, that the Creole, as yet without a literature, merits a grammar for the benefit of English

and Frenchmen who come hither to reside. None of the well-known English accounts of Mauritius make any reference to this important item of Mauritius life; it will be interesting, therefore, to give some idea of it.

The Creoles, then, who formed it, adopted systematic letter changes—thus, French *u* is always changed to *i*; *eu* and *œu*, to *é*; *ch*, to *ç*; *g* and *j*, to *z*. Systematically, too, and with few exceptions, they formed their nouns by an amalgamation of the French noun and its article: as for dog they say *licien* (= *le chien*), for death, *lámort* (= *la mort*).^{*} Nouns which they heard more frequently with the partitive article have been joined to it: as *dipain* (= *du pain*) bread, *dibois* (*du bois*), *difé* (*du feu*). Their own indefinite article is *enne*: thus, a loaf is *enne dipain*; a fire, *enne difé*; a rat, *enne lérat*; but a cat is *enne çatte*. The definite article referring to a class or generality is not expressed: as *liciens mords* (*le chien mord*), the dog bites; but “the dog” emphatic would be, *ça licien là*. Noun cases are not formed, either by prepositions or case-endings, a fact which sometimes begets confusion in their sentences. So, *lamain bon Dié* is, the hand of (the good) God, and *donne li ça licien la* is, give it to the dog. Many prepositions, however, such as *dans*, in; *lahait*, upon; *enbas*, under; are in frequent use. The Creole says *lacase* for house, and never *maison*; so, the Bishop’s house, *lacase Monseigneur*; a fine house, *enne zoli lacase*.

Verbs have very frequently been formed by adopting the corresponding French noun; to fight is *lagerre* (*la guerre*); to steal is *coquin*. The personal pronouns are formed from the disjunctive forms of the parent grammar: thus, from *moi* has come *mon* or *mo*, I; from *toi*, *to* thou; from *lui*, *li*, he or she; the French *nous* and *vous* remain unchanged, and the third person plural is *zotte*, they. So: I die, is *mo mort*; they die, *zotte mort*; he steals, *li coquin*; you talk, *vous causé*. Verbs are conjugated by the curious interposition of the particles *ti*, *va*, &c.: thus, I died, *mo ti mort*; I shall die, *mo va mort*; I should have died, *mo ti va fine mort*.†

^{*} The spelling of the Creole here given is tentative (there is yet no standard or recognized practice) and as far phonetical as it could be, but retaining French vowel sounds and forms to show more readily its derivation.

† The verb *causé*, to talk—conjugated throughout.

Indicative present.

Mon causé, I talk.
To causé, thou talkest.
Li causé, &c.
Nous causé.
Vous causé.
Zotte causé.

The final *e* not accented if anything follows in the same sentence.

These particles often make the sentence look as verbose as the elegant French, *Qu'est-ce que c'est que cela*: thus, I should have gone if he had given me my money, *mon ti va fine allé, si li ti fine donne mon largent*. Some may think this mere jargon, but it may be remarked that the sentence is expressed by twelve Creole words, and needs eleven in English. Again: I will break your head if you continually beat me every day, *Mo va casse vous latete si vous batte batte moi tous les zours*, instances a Creole practice of expressing frequency by repeating the verb. Another peculiarity of this corruption of French is that it has a special form of the verb (used with *apres*) exactly equivalent to the English, I am, or, I was, conjugated with the present participle: as *mon apres causé*, I am talking; *mon apres ti causé*, I was talking.

The piety of the Creoles, especially perhaps of the *affranchis*, shows itself in a multitude of expressions, such as: *Bon Dié na pas content* (God is not pleased), for the thing is wrong. Again, in an uncertainty whether there is injustice or mischief doing which evades detection, they comfort themselves: *si li coquin, na rien ça*; *bon Dié va trouve li*, literally, if he steals, never mind, God will find him out. *Mo laisse li dans lamain bon Dié*, I leave him to God, is another of a number of similarly minded expressions that are frequent with them. Their wit, too, has found vent in not a few proverbs more or less original. They say, *Zacot moque son laqué* (la queue), literally, the monkey laughs at his tail—that is, he does not see that it belongs to himself; and they apply it when a person ridicules in another a fault of his own.

These examples show how French, in the mouths of a strange race, has begotten a new but kindred tongue, and may illustrate the process by which, further back in history, the Latin of the Empire became in its turn, in the mouths of the old Franks, a

*Imperfect.**Mo ti causé.* I talked, &c.*Perfect.**Mon fine causé.**Pluperfect.**Mon ti fine causé.**Future present.**Mon va causé.* I shall talk.*Future past.**Mon va fine causé.* I shall have talked.*Conditional present.**Mon ti va causé.* I should talk.*Conditional past.**Mon ti va fine causé.* I should have talked.

new but related language—the French of modern Europe. They will serve the further purpose of showing how the labour of English-speaking priests (who must preach in French) is increased by the necessity of learning Creole; for, in instructing a Malabar Creole or Chinaman, it must be employed. And their difficulty is further increased by the changes introduced by each nationality in the Creole. The Tamil-speaking Indian, rolls the “r’s” strongly, changes “f’s” into “p’s,” and gives sentences a Latin-like construction more suiting the genius of his own tongue. The Mozambique, on the contrary, cannot pronounce the “r,” but substitutes the letter “l,” thus, he says *paladon* for pardon, *cloile* for croire. And finally, to complete the confusion, comes the yellow, small-eyed Chinese, quaint as if he had just stepped from an old China plate; neither can he pronounce the “r,” nor most of the final syllables: these he omits until Creole is nearly as monosyllabic as his own tongue. He says *Quetien*, for Chretien; *lafoti*, for lafortune; *bapté* for baptême. But the drollest feature of Creole by a Chinaman is that he chaunts it in a curious high-pitched sing-song, with frequent cadences, alternately about a sixth and a fourth above the general monotone. Sometimes John’s most violent attempts to speak clearly to you are simply enigmatical, except to one familiar with his ways. You are not one of these, and contemplate, for example, inviting a few friends to dinner, and you send to the nearest celestial shopkeeper to let you know what will be the cost of necessary articles for the feast. Ready and anxious, he at once waits on you bearing a written paper, from which he will read to you his choice of viands at lowest prices. He begins gaily with *folomá* at a marvellously cheap rate. But you ask, what is foloma at any price? And then with curious eye and mouth contortions and zealous effort, he endeavours to tell you more distinctly; but *folomá*, sung high and sung low is all your strained ears can catch. You try to read it on his paper—but the paper is in cursive Chinese. Shall you at a venture risk foloma for your friends? But there is danger in such blind trust—and your servant knows the man’s heathen ways, so he is brought in to your aid, and you learn that *folomá* was his best attempt to say fromage.

The heterogeneous mixture of money in use is in keeping with the variety of nationalities. The Government and standard reckoning is now in rupees, value about two shillings. But in daily dealings all manner of English coins, French livres and francs (though these are not now legal) gold doubloons and mohurs, silver dollars, cents, and among the Chinese a small thin coin, value three sous, called a marquee, are everywhere met with. You can buy at a Chinaman’s a

marquee's worth of anything that can be sufficiently subdivided.

It is needless to say much in description of the climate here below the line, with tropical heat and inverted seasons. It has already been said that the central plateau is cool enough generally to be pleasant, but the whole island round is, except for a month or two for some four hours from midday, endurable in the height of summer, and previously to the advent of yellow fever, was always mentioned as healthy to Europeans. Summer is from October to the following April; December when the sun is in the zenith of this island, being one of the dreadfully hot months. May is about the coolest of the year, indeed, cold sometimes on the highlands, and in July warm clothing is occasionally required. The south and south-east winds, prevalent for the greater part of the year, are cooling and agreeable; the north-west winds that set in generally about October are dry, hot, and disagreeable. The frequent rains both temper the heat and render the soil luxuriant; the sugar canes thrive on a fair general prevalence of showers, but too much rain, whilst it increases the quantity of juice deprives it of its proportion of saccharine. Two harvests of corn and most grains, vegetables, &c., can be grown in the year. Sugar canes, however, need from twelve to twenty months for their full growth.

The rainy season is from January to April, but showers fall any time; the hurricane and storm period nearly between the same months; the storms and heavy showers of the rainy season do for vegetation very much what the frosts and colds do in northern climes. As the trees here are not deciduous, it is only after a fierce hurricane that bare branches are to be seen. There is little difference in the length of the days all the year round; not more than two hours. In winter (the shortest days are at the June solstice) sun rises about 6 A.M., and sets about 5 P.M., which gives eleven hours of daylight; in summer (the longest days are at the December solstice) sun sets about 7 P.M., giving thirteen hours of day. There is no twilight, but the gorgeous magnificence of tropical sunsets, ever varying, are an unending delight for the observant eye and theme for poetical writers.

Hurricanes, regular visitants up to the end of the last century, are now rarer and less severe. But one of recent date—the cyclone of March, 1868—which raged for sixty hours will never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. Some 20,000 Malabar huts were carried away or blown down and thirteen hundred houses. Sixty-five bridges were destroyed; ninety human beings killed or fatally hurt. Thousands of buildings were injured,

warehouses unroofed, cattle carried away or killed, iron churches torn up and smashed to pieces; the Catholic church at Point aux Piments was terribly injured, as were others, and two iron girders of a bridge being built over Grand Riviere, each 200 feet long and nearly 300 tons weight, were blown off their columns into the river! The wind was as the fury of a god! It burst on the sea with the deafening report of near thunder-claps, drove the water in rapidly-revolving spirals high into the air; ships broke from their strong anchors and flew before the blast shuddering like stricken animals; Port Louis harbour was a scene of broken, ruined vessels, while on the land the securest, strongest works of man groaned and were torn like leaves from their fastenings, and terrified human beings trembled with awe of what might come. The epidemic was still rife, and wretched fever-stricken creatures, chiefly unhoused Malabars, crouched under rocks, or projecting storm *débris*, the victims of a double calamity. That dreadful epidemic of 1867 must now be briefly mentioned. Previously to it the climate was not prejudicial (as has been said) to the white population, but the fever has never since really left Port Louis—is, in fact, now endemic. Perhaps no less than 80 per cent. of the city residents now get the fever more or less severely. This is why all who can afford it are hurrying to the healthy inland elevation above the fatal fever zone; this is why city property has steadily depreciated in value since that year of infection and death.* The chief causes that led to the outburst of 1867 are generally said to have been overcrowding the island with Coolies—the Indians have a proclivity to febrile diseases and are of dirty habits; low-lying swamps, putrid stagnant waters, filth, emanations from open drains, and many other germ producers of malarial fever—many of these are complained of as being still rife, though remediable; and some add the over-extensive cutting down of the forests that once covered the island—but this has been perhaps of smaller influence, and has further, it is supposed, lessened the strength of hurricanes by diminishing the humidity of the atmosphere. The fever was actually severe in 1866, but in the early hot season of 1867 became a virulent epidemic. Port Louis was the most afflicted; population there had been 7413 to the square mile, and the death rate rose to 240 per day. The mortality of 1867 alone was nearly a decimation of the island, and taking the 36 months, 1866-8, the total deaths were 72,659

* A few years ago a large, good building was purchased for a Catholic school at a cost of 2600*l*. More money was after spent on repairs, &c. Enforced absence from the island obliged the proprietor, last year, to sell it, and it brought only 450*l*.

—a fifth of the entire population. The island became a vast pest-house; everywhere was death, or the fear of death or suffering worse than death. The fever brought dreadful complications, liver diseases, inflammation of stomach and lungs, and dropsy. Quinine was thought to be the grand specific, but its destructive action on the ague spores is equally destructive to muscles and mucous membranes when used in large quantities. The cure is as bad as the disease. Complete cinchonism, in fact, presents all the symptoms of a terrible malady. Quinine was then, and is yet, given here in doses of 10, 20, 30, even 50 grains daily. Irreparably injured stomachs, head affections, deafness, dropsy, are the frequent and often lasting results; and as a prophylactic (it is frequently used thus) it is said to be completely useless. The late lamented Bishop Hankinson was a victim to quinine; it is said that it was administered to him in as large doses as 80 grains a day! But the drug has an undoubted value at one stage of the fever, and in proper doses.

Almost every plant and herb which is indigenous to a tropical climate is to be found in Mauritius, and anything that will live in the tropics thrives on this marvellously fertile soil with the smallest amount of care. But the Mauritian neglects any cultivation for the market except that of sugar, and began to do so after the Act of Parliament of 1825 sanctioning the importation of colonial products into British markets. He now disdains any other as unworthy of a planter. Then it has brought the planters their great wealth: men are still making fortunes by it. All the elegancies, comforts, even luxuries of Europe are brought here, and find a ready market at an increase on their European price of at least 50 per cent.: sugar gives the wealth to buy them. The Creoles call it their *vache à lait*.

The Mauritius now produces annually more than two hundred million pounds of sugar. The crop is steadily increasing: in 1863, a period of prosperity, it was 122,432 tons; in 1868, the hurricane and fever year, it fell to 70,000 tons; the crop of 1878-9 was 168,303 tons.* It would be wrong to conclude from this enormous quantity that the whole island is under sugar cultivation. Cane is not seen for several miles around Port Louis: from Port Louis to Grand Baie there is hardly any; in the higher lands the virgin forests have not quite disappeared—some large plains lie uncultivated at all. Perhaps not more than a twentieth part of the island is under sugar. But the soil has lent itself

* Speaking roughly, two-fifths of this is exported to Australia and the Cape, a fifth goes to India, another fifth to England, and the remainder in decreasing proportions to France and various places.

favourably to the cane, and gives a very large average crop to the acre. The present average is one to three tons per acre, most frequently about 2900 lbs.; but in past times so much as 12,000 lbs. has been known. Such immense quantities are no longer yielded by a hard-worked, even over-taxed, soil.

To become a sugar planter, or *habitant*, is the highest ambition of a successful Mauritian. The planter, however, requires large capital; may indeed realize a quick and enormous fortune, but runs the risk of losses on an equally gigantic scale. These gloomy reverses sometimes come rapid and destroying as their own hurricanes.

The planters of Mauritius are also manufacturers of the sugar. This increases their risks, multiplies tenfold the difficulty of administering the estates, and, adds Mr. Pike, is as imperfect a system as if a farmer in Europe were his own miller and baker! But facts seem to tell against this strong opinion: the machinery used by the Mauritians is the best that British or foreign works can turn out, and the prizes and gold medals of the large exhibitions find their way largely to this island.

Many estates are of about 1800 acres each, but some larger ones are as extensive as 5000 acres. And there are some 225 estates now at work on the island. The oversight of one of them is an engrossing and anxious task. There is an almost bewildering multiplicity of things to be watched and directed: fields, houses, and mills; the five or six hundred labourers, their wives and children; large herds of cattle and beasts of burden, pigs, goats, oxen from Madagascar, mules from Monte Video or Buenos Ayres. Then there is the irrigation and digging and manuring of the soil, and the vexed problem of guanos *versus* home manures to be solved practically, and the procuring, planting, and careful constant tending of the canes. A supply of new varieties of canes from New Caledonia has of late been imported, and the fields are being replanted with them. Early in the morning a bell calls up the establishment—labourers, masons, carpenters, smiths, drivers, sirdars, and officers. The rolls are called and then Coolies are marched off under their sirdars to their respective fields; drivers harness oxen and mules, all begin their respective portions of the vast work. Work goes on briskly till 9.30, when the bell calls to breakfast—which to men in distant fields is carried by their wives and children. At 4 o'clock work is over; sometimes the men labour by the piece, and some of them then manage to finish as early as 12 o'clock; but they are then free for the day.

When the harvest or *coupe* time arrives, a sugar estate is all animation, work, excitement; canes being cut, machinery

going, Coolies busy, and all the air pervaded with the odour of boiling sugar. After the canes have been crushed between the rollers, and their juice extracted, the expert planter can then calculate, very nearly, the amount of sugar it will yield. It is then passed through all the processes; is clarified, concentrated, and finally becomes the sugar of commerce. This is packed in vacoa bags for export. The dregs are sent to the distiller to be manufactured into rum, or are used as the treacle of commerce. There are over forty distilleries on the island yielding an annual quantity of 500,000 gallons. The crushed, juiceless cane fibre is called *bagasse*, and no part of it or of the new cut cane is allowed to waste. The leaves feed oxen and mules: the bagasse is stacked and serves as fuel to the engines and furnaces. And even the ashes from this fuel when it has fed the fires are kept with care; mixed with coral they make a most excellent mortar—the best, indeed, that can be had here.

The Mauritian planters undoubtedly over-taxed the energies of even their generous land, and the noteworthy diminution of the crops for some years after the enormous crop of 1863-4 was partly due to this cause. Over-manuring with an inappropriate substance (guano) and neglect of the great axiom of cultivation all the world over—a rotation of crops, were also influential causes. Canes and canes and nothing but canes, made the once fertile lands on the sea shore a desert. In several parts, thirty years ago, reputed the most fertile, the cane will not grow. The ruined mill and tall empty chimney standing as the last tokens of former prosperity. Any variety of cane, however, is deteriorated by the propagation from cuttings—the only available mode, as the seeds rarely ripen. The recent new varieties have helped largely the increased crops of late years.

Every sugar estate has its “camp” attached where the Malabar labourers reside. The huts are thatched with various palm leaves, but are neither architectural or picturesque. There is always an hospital attached, where medical attendance and duly certificated nurses are provided for the sick Coolies. And both are annually examined by officials and their condition reported to Government. On many estates, too, schools have been built, and are kept in working by the proprietors, for the Indian children of the estate.

The system of recruiting for Coolies is probably little known in England; it is superintended by Government, and none but willing recruits are allowed to sail for Mauritius. An intelligent sirdar, one gifted with an eloquent tongue, is picked out, is dressed well and sent to the district he is acquainted with in India; he makes a tour through towns and villages. Doubtless he sets forth in glowing terms the beauties and the riches

of this gem of the sea ; and possibly not a little romantic exaggeration may be indulged in. The eyes of his audience are meanwhile carefully inspecting the comfortable and respectable appearance of the speaker. They note the real shillings sown on his vest for buttons, the massive silver rings around his neck and wrists ; and their confidence is won by his presents to their children. But a more powerful argument with many of them is the number of returned Coolies who have brought home means, and bright accounts of their success, and who have proved their sincerity by *going back again* voluntarily to settle in Mauritius.

Those who engage themselves are taken to the nearest port and cared for in Government depots until the time of embarkation. Whatever bright visions they may come with, and never realize, it is certain the Coolies are better off, better paid, better fed than they were or would have been at home. There is a system of payment which leaves him free to return to his home in India without expense to himself ; as has been seen, most of them choose to stay here, and more return again after leaving.

The Coolie learns on arriving here that Government is his protector, and that the Queen will redress all wrongs done to him. He knows where to complain if overworked, under-fed, or not paid according to agreement. There are magistrates especially for his benefit ; he engages to a planter in presence of one of them, to whom appeal may be made, and by whom punishment will be adjudged if he violates the terms of his engagement. If a sugar estate becomes bankrupt, the Indian labourers stand the first creditors ; to them banks, money-lenders, and what not, must all defer. In point of fact, the Indians rule the planter, rather than the planter the Indians. To the honour, however, of the Indian be it said that, as a rule, he is submissive, quiet, and hard-working, and thinks of his duties as much as of his rights. Often when the five years are over, and he is free to go, he prefers to remain under his master ; many may be met who have been 28 or 30 years on the same estate. And to the honour of the masters be it said, that, when the epidemic of 1867 fell on the island, and not a tithe of the men could muster for work, and large estates were standing untouched because the hands that should have tilled and reaped them were paralyzed by death or helpless in the sad fever, the uniform kindness, attention, and care of the masters for their afflicted men and their families was as devoted as it was spontaneous. One such fact speaks abundantly.

Perhaps there are some readers who would be disappointed with an account of the Mauritius that contained no men-

tion of Bernardin St. Pierre's charming story, which has thrown a halo over the island and made some of its lovely scenery familiar to countless European readers. To the east of Port Louis lies the Vallée des Prêtres, now covered with market gardens for city supply, where Paul and Virginia lived; and a few yards only from the railway station at Pamplémousses are the tombs of the two lovers. History is in this case the destroyer of a pathetic romance; but, in its own turn, is scarcely less touching. St. Pierre's foundation for his story was the loss of the ship, *St. Gérân*, in Tombeau Bay. This ship, laden with arms and provisions for the starving colonists, and having on board some 120 souls, left Lorient for Mauritius, March, 1744. She arrived within sight of Round Island in safety, but late in the evening; and after consultation, the captain, aware of the dangerous reefs, determined to tack about until morning. But at three o'clock in the morning the vessel struck the reefs outside Tombeau Bay, between land and the *Isle d'Ambre*, and the high sea drove it at once on the breakers. The masts came away with a crash and tore the bulwarks and carried off the boats. The keel soon snapped in two, and left the ship fixed on the reefs with her centre buried under water. Then, in the silent night, a cry of horror went up to the dark heavens, and men and women (most of them sick), some resigned, some murmuring, knelt down on deck and began to pray and to beg each other's pardon. At the captain's request, the chaplain on board gave them all the last absolution; and, amid the hissing and surging of the conquering waves, the doomed people sang together the *Ave Maris Stella*! It was their last earthly act, except silent, earnest prayer. A few men then tried to save themselves by swimming, or on rafts, but almost immediately perished. A painful suspense—and then the angry sea had washed down the last soul on board. Among the passengers were a young lady and her lover. They were to have been married on their arrival at Mauritius. He was agitated: she beautiful, calm, and resigned. He besought her to save herself on some frail spar with him; she preferred to await, in prayer, the doom that could not be averted. With his arm round her, as a fond but vain shield, he waited together with her the fate that soon overwhelmed them.

These are supposed to be the only historical foundations for Paul and Virginia. The rest is the writer's web of bright fancy. Much sentiment has been poured out over the tombs at Pamplémousses. That any bodies washed ashore could be recognized as those of the unfortunate lovers is unlikely; that any bodies at all were washed up from the wreck and received

sepulture on land is not recorded on any evidence: it is almost certain that at Pamplémousses no one is buried from the St. Gêran. One account of the island says: "Modern speculation has profited by the interest excited by their story, in the erection of two little monuments, entitled the tombs of Paul and Virginia." And another writer says that the tomb of Virginia was first erected, but the numerous pilgrims and visitors asking constantly for the other, not to disappoint them, the proprietor added that of Paul.

ART. II.—MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY."

(Being PART IX. of an *Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Psychology."*)

THE somewhat laborious task of minutely examining each section of every chapter* of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Psychology" is now happily at an end. What remains to be considered may be handled differently.

* For the convenience of readers who may not have read the antecedent papers, I append the following references to them and to the work examined by them. Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" is a work in two volumes and eight parts, four parts being contained in his first volume. His Second Edition (the one examined) was published in 1872. The first six of these eight parts have now been examined in eight Essays, which have from time to time appeared in this REVIEW. The first Essay appeared in the DUBLIN REVIEW for Oct. 1874, pp. 476—508, and was devoted to an examination of the first part and the first chapter of the second part of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology." The second Essay appeared in the number for July, 1875, pp. 143—172, and concluded the examination of Mr. Spencer's second part. The third Essay was published in the DUBLIN REVIEW for Jan. 1877, pp. 192—219. It treated of the third part and the first six chapters of the fourth part of the "Psychology." The fourth Essay came out in April, 1877, p. 479, and reviewed the rest of Mr. Spencer's fourth part and the whole of his fifth part. The fifth and sixth Essays appeared respectively in Jan. 1878, pp. 157—194, and in Oct. 1878, p. 412. They treated of the first thirteen chapters of Mr. Spencer's sixth part, the examination of the rest of his sixth part being continued and concluded in the seventh and eighth Essays which were published, respectively in Jan. 1879, pp. 141—163, and in April, 1879, pp. 368—396. Thus, four Essays and 132 pages have been devoted to the examination of Mr. Spencer's first volume, and four Essays and 118 pages to that of the first part of his second volume, i.e., to the sixth, and in many respects most important, part.

It has been deemed necessary so far to pursue the mode hitherto adopted, for two reasons: first, in order to guard as fully as possible against doing an injustice to the author criticized; secondly, because Mr. Spencer's whole metaphysical system avowedly reposes upon the special psychology he has developed, and no refutation of his philosophy could be satisfactory unless good evidence was given that his psychological views had been carefully considered and duly appreciated.

In the first six parts of his work all his fundamental principles are laid down, and all those facts and instances are given on which he relies for the support of his system. The various physiological and mental phenomena therein brought forward and his inferences from them have, therefore, seemed to require the most thorough and careful consideration possible.

In his seventh part, however, Mr. Spencer turns from considering the phenomena of animal life and of the human mind*

* As a new subject is thus entered upon it may be well to supply the reader with a brief enumeration of the contents of the earlier portions of Mr. Spencer's work.

The first part (*the Data of Psychology*) is an account of the essential and fundamental structure of the nervous system, with its supposed mode of action, together with the material conditions which influence such action, and contains statements as to the correlation of feeling and nervous conditions. Its contents may be thus summarized: Quantity and complexity of self-motion in animals vary with the mass and complexity of their nervous system (consisting of white conducting and grey quasi-explosive parts), which requires integrity, nutrition and warmth for its due action in pulsating intermittent nerve-reverberations—feelings running parallel to and follow the laws of nervous action.

His second part (*the Inductions of Psychology*) is an account of feelings from a subjective stand-point. The mind is therein represented as known only in states (each ultimately compound though seemingly simple), formed of feelings and relations (themselves feelings) between feelings segregated to their like in classes and sub-classes, according as they are simultaneous or successive, like or unlike—nothing being knowable except complexly segregated feelings transformed by repetition. A real objective cause, it is affirmed, is implied and must be assumed, but neither feelings nor relations are really equivalent to such objective nexus which is unknowable. Feelings and relations are said to be revivable and associable in the degree in which they are relational, and according to the conditions under which they are experienced. Pleasures and pains are represented as due to natural selection, which has evolved them in races which it has thus preserved.

His third part (*General Synthesis*) is an attempt, by a comparison of the phenomena of mind with those of organic life, to reinforce the argument of the two preceding parts. He attempts to show that all sense-springs from primitive organic sensibility; that all the several senses spring similarly from primitive feeling; that similarly each special sense becomes more and more differentiated; that as sense-response is a correspondence of inner with outer relations, so intellectual response is but a further carrying out of the same process, and is separated from the

to the "consideration of the nature of human knowledge," and to criticisms of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, to questions which admit of a more free mode of treatment, while, at the same time, they may not be without interest for the general reader.

former by no hiatus. Thus, he herein endeavours to show, by an elaborate comparison of Mind with Life, that the former, like the latter, is a correspondence between inner and outer relations, this correspondence increasing in speciality, generality, complexity, co-ordination and integration, as we advance from the lowest organisms up to civilized man—the highest mental acts arising by imperceptible gradations from primitive vital irritability.

In his fourth part (*Special Synthesis*) Mr. Spencer continues to apply his interpretation of mental states as phases and factors in the correspondence of inner to outer relations, to the various mental powers from reflex actions, through instinct and memory to reason, emotion and will. He tries to explain them as different degrees of such correspondence and different degrees and kinds of failure in adjustment, and so, from another point of view, to show that no hiatus exists between the lowest and the highest psychical states.

In his fifth part (*Physical Synthesis*) he tries to show that mental acts are interpretable in terms of matter and motion. He does so first by a sketch of a supposed mode of genesis of nervous systems, and then by showing how the various functions, translated into mental states, harmonize with the physical conception. The ultimate outcome of the teaching is that mental acts may be interpreted in terms of matter and motion, but that both these are alike unanalyzable, and are both caused by one inscrutable entity which is neither.

The gist of the five parts, which together form Mr. Spencer's first volume, may be shortly expressed thus :—

- I. Motion and feelings are parallelly correlated with nervous structure.
- II. Nothing is knowable but feelings which we must take as symbols of the unknowable, in the unanalyzable forms—mind, matter, motion.
- III. Mind is essentially the same as physiological activity.
- IV. There is no hiatus between the lowest and the highest psychical activities—the latter being the former; reiterated, accumulated, organized and inherited.
- V. Mental phenomena may be interpreted in terms of matter and motion—the latter being but symbols of the one unknowable cause of both mind and matter.

In the first volume, then, objective science is employed in attempting to explain the genesis and nature of the process of knowing.

In his sixth part (*Special Analysis*) Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine analytically the knowing process under all its forms, recognized by him, from the most complex to the most simple.

Thus, he therein treats of quantitative and qualitative reasoning and reasoning in general. Also classification, naming and recognition, the perception of objects, of space, of time, of motion, of resistance, and perception in general. This is followed by chapters on relations of similarity, co-intention, co-extension, connature and likeness, together with their opposites. Then follows a consideration of sequence and of consciousness in general, and the whole part concludes with a statement of what Mr. Spencer considers to be the legitimate results of what has preceded. The essence of this sixth part, then, is the contention that subjective psychology shows every thought or perception whatever to be a feeling of relations between relations, and all thoughts to be ultimately reducible to aggre-

But Mr. Spencer's philosophy has quite special claims on the interest and attention of Catholics, for there are many indications that it may be nothing less than the morning star heralding the dawn of a day of philosophical revival in England. Spencerism, like Lockism, may form a landmark in the history of Philosophy. Like Locke, Mr. Spencer has enunciated an ambiguous system—one capable of two distinct interpretations. It has been the fate of Locke to have been accepted and developed mainly in accordance with his negative and irrational side. It may be, and we trust it will be, Mr. Spencer's happier lot to be accepted and developed in harmony with those elements of truth which his system contains. Fatal and deplorable as are the errors he maintains, yet his inconsistencies may be so used as to neutralize each other, and the judicious application of a little "transverse vibration" to his system might rapidly and without violence convert it into an "allotropic state," in which its conspicuous characters would be startlingly diverse from those that it exhibits at present.

In fact, Mr. Spencer's system, by its inconsistencies and lacunæ, cries aloud for the scholastic philosophy to sustain and complete it, while it brings to the support of that philosophy a great variety of considerations, and helps to show how thoroughly it harmonizes with the most advanced science of the day—as fully with the science of the nineteenth century as with that of the thirteenth; indeed, in some respects, much more completely!

Spencerism also helps to refute and expose the shallowness of the philosophy of Descartes, and of all those who have followed in his footsteps (or in those of Locke) down to the present day; and so aids religion in another mode. For nothing is more common than to find religion assailed by means of attacks directed against views which the assailants believe to be essential to it; whereas, in truth, the views attacked are but philosophical errors which have descended from Descartes, but which may have been made use of, with more zeal than discretion, by some of the many

gated and segregated feelings of shock (supposed to be the psychical side of physiological nervous shocks), the ultimate psychical shock being either a feeling of unlikeness or of sequence, according to the direction taken by thought.

His seventh part (*General Analysis*), to the examination of which the present Essay is devoted, is occupied with an examination of different metaphysical systems and with the exposition of Mr. Spencer's own system.

In his eighth and last part (*Corollaries*) Mr. Spencer considers the classification of psychical powers and the development of conceptions, and treats of emotions and sentiments considered as preliminaries of the science of sociology.

good Christians who have adopted some or other form of Cartesianism instead of the older and emphatically Catholic philosophy.

Mr. Spencer, however, is evidently far from suspecting his own proximity to truth; and in the part of his psychology we are about to review, ignores in the most innocent way all philosophy save his own, and the various modified Cartesian philosophic heresies he attacks.

This mode of ignoring what it most behoves him to note, runs on all fours with the treatment he has again and again bestowed on psychological matters, as we have pointed out in the various preceding parts of this examination. Throughout, his fallacy has been that of presenting a part for the whole, and the part he has presented has ever been the part least important and significant. He is ever and again committing an error similar to that of describing "sculpture" as "stone breaking;" an ascent of Mont Blanc as composed of "a set of foot movements;" or "eating" as "muscular contractions."* His whole psychology is directed against the recognition of intellect and knowledge because he does not know how intellect and knowledge are possible, and because their unequivocal recognition would be fatal to his system. He therefore employs an exceptionally acute and powerful intellect, exceptionally stored with knowledge, in the task of proving we can neither acquire the latter nor employ the former since he thinks he has shown by the employment of both that neither have any existence. Thus, as has been again and again pointed out, he ignores our highest faculties altogether, and we have not yet met in his psychology with one explicit recognition of our power of apprehending truth, goodness, or beauty, or even with an apprehension of identity.

The recognition of such grave defects may seem inconsistent with what has been just said about the value of Mr. Spencer's system for Catholics,† and may support the question whether too much time and trouble is not being taken with the examination of his psychology. But in these defects our author does not stand alone; he inherits them from, and shares them with, the whole sensist school.‡ Mr. Herbert Spencer is the best representative man of a phase of modern philosophy, and his influence is extending not only throughout English-speaking countries—notably in the United States—but also in France. Mr. Spencer has been termed by Mr. Darwin "our great philosopher," and there is no doubt that he is regarded by many Darwinians and followers of Haeckel as the

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for Jan. 1879, p. 386.

† The writings of the late George Henry Lewes have perhaps even more value still for us, as justifying the scholastic philosophy.

‡ DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874, p. 476.

paramount authority on all philosophical questions. Nor am I disposed to question his intellectual achievements. Possessing as he does an acquaintance with almost all branches of physical science, together with a singular quickness in the detection of analogies, and much analytic power, he has the good fortune to be able to manifest his wealth of thought by a corresponding richness of diction, his style being clear and forcible, abounding in picturesque illustrations, aptly chosen for the purpose they are intended to subserve, and often possessing even a poetical beauty. Vigorous and well-exercised natural faculties have enabled him to gather up within his delicate yet nervous grasp, not only the multitudinous threads spun by the various discoverers in physical science, but also those more subtle fibres which our recent and best known psychologists have drawn forth; weaving the whole with dextrous skill into an intellectual fabric of great delicacy and apparent cohesion.

These great merits seem to call for recognition here and now, because we have been so long occupied in almost exclusive fault-finding (necessitated by the object and method pursued) that without such recognition the reader may go away with a false impression of Mr. Spencer's whole work, and commit the dangerous, no less than unjust, error of unduly despising a noble and powerful opponent.

Mr. Spencer has, indeed, so co-ordinated, supplemented, and developed the doctrines of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors that the philosophy he sets before us is the very culmination of their efforts—the bloom and fructification resulting from long-continued anterior processes of growth. Not only if his philosophy is true should we then be thankful to him for its promulgation, but also even though it be false, since we may be sure that if he fails to sustain his system his failure must be due to no deficiency on his part but to a fatal defect in his cause—a defect only made the more patent by the ability of its advocate.

In commencing his metaphysical controversy (his seventh part) he makes the statement that he has reached what he considers to be the "Final Question,"*—namely, the question as to

* This is the title of the first chapter of the seventh part, the contents of the sections of which may be thus shortly expressed:—§ 384. The problem to be investigated is that concerning the nature of human knowledge, a problem often dealt with first instead of last. § 385. A hopeless mode, since a true theory of knowledge involves a true theory of that which knows and a true theory of that which is known. § 386. The question is, can the ultimate assumptions which have been hitherto provisionally admitted, be verified with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance of them has led? § 387. In other words—is the relation assumed to exist between subject and object valid? If the idealist is right, the doctrine of evolution is a dream.

the possibility and validity of human knowledge,—the genesis and nature of the process of knowing, and the analytical examination of the knowing process having occupied the six preceding parts.*

* In order to be the better able to estimate the arguments "pro and con" which follow, it may be well to place before the reader a short re-statement of the contentions raised by me against the views propounded by Mr. Spencer in the six parts above referred to.

As to his first part I have (DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874) objected to some errors and inaccuracies of detail, and to some very important "beggings" of the main question as to the distinction between thought and feeling. Also to some defects of analysis and a mode of treatment tending, by implication, to prejudice readers who are not on their guard, against truths which are but directly attached or even explicitly referred to.

Against his second part I have contended (DUBLIN REVIEW, July, 1875) that external things as well as feelings are really knowable, and that objective truth is revealed to us through the self-conscious Ego, which also shows us that there *is* an essential difference between mind and matter; which two entities are known to us intellectually. Also that the First Cause must be of the nature of that one of these two which possesses the power to know. Further, that this "power to know" being a power of each of us who is at once soul and body in one (a body subject to the laws of matter and motion), is *hic et nunc* accidentally bound in our intellect, to follow the laws of the mere imagination (its instrument), though it can indefinitely transcend the latter in its range. Further, that the nature of the action of the human mind is fundamentally different from the highest brute psychosis; and, finally, that it is not only gratuitous but unreasonable to assume one underlying base of which matter and mind are diverging forms.

Against his third part I have argued (DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1877) that organic life, though it, of course, includes a series of correspondences between the organism and its environment, is something more than such correspondences themselves. That there is, of course, much analogy between mind and organic life, and that organic conditions supply the material of intellectual action, but that "sentience" really *is* more than "vital irritability," and that "intellect" is more than modified "sentience." That an ignorance of limits is no proof that limits do not exist; and that Mr. Spencer's inability to show the transitions he asserts, and his habit of silently introducing the very powers, the existence of which have to be explained, reinforce the other arguments in favour of the existence of a rational principle.

As to his fourth part, I say (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1877) that Mr. Spencer's attempt to bridge over the gulf between reason and sentience fails, because he takes no note of memory, reason, and will, as made known to us in their highest forms by our consciousness, although much that he advances may be usefully employed to elucidate the highest psychical powers of irrational animals, to elucidate the sensuous basis of true intellectual action, and intellectual action itself in so far as connected with the sensuous phantasmata of which it makes use. I contend that his law, or rule, of the growth of "intelligence" is in fact but a law, or rule of the growth of the imagination.

Against the attempt made by his fifth part to interpret mental phenomena in terms of matter and motion—symbols of an unknowable unity

The course which he has pursued in thus deferring to the last so fundamental a consideration as that of the validity of knowledge itself is, he contends, a most reasonable one, and is the one which mankind has unconsciously pursued. Knowledge, he says, truly enough, implies something known and something which knows, while a theory of knowledge must be a theory of the relation between these two. The first is objective science, the second subjective science, while the theory of the relation between them is a branch of metaphysics.

That the theories of the known and of the knowing have assumed their final shapes, and that a finished theory of knowing is now possible, Mr. Spencer deems an absurd assumption; but he considers that those who have followed him so far are in a better position for reconsidering the theory of knowledge, because the theories of things known and of the process of knowing have been reduced to a more systematic form.

The question before us is the question whether the ultimate dicta of reason, as reconsidered from the most advanced post gained by previous enquiries, can be harmonized into a consistent self-supporting doctrine, or whether we are compelled to entertain beliefs which contradict each other—whether, in a word, a

which is neither. I contend (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1877) that though sensation may be admitted to be a function of animated matter, and though mental phenomena cannot be experienced by us save through sensation, yet intellectual perceptions themselves are incapable of a material interpretation. That this is not at once evident in Mr. Spencer's book is due to the fact that he ignores our highest intellectual powers. I admit, however, that his account of the genesis of nervous structures of all degrees of complexity through physical agencies, and of the relations of sensitive functions to such structures, are most ingenious, instructive, and suggestive.

Against his sixth part I urge (DUBLIN REVIEW, Jan. 1879), that far from all our thoughts and perceptions being feelings—relations between relations—that intellect is occupied with the perception of facts and existences, and with relations cognised as facts real or ideal; that inference is a distinct process of which classing, naming, and recognition are not forms; that we have direct perceptions external and internal; that extension and duration are intuitions not to be analyzed into varied nervous shocks, and that our perceptions of likeness and sequence are not alone primordial, but our perceptions of identity, and of our own being are primordial also. I maintain that in all the illustrations used and in all representations given of our higher mental acts, the essential parts of the perceptions and thoughts are ever omitted, and the mere materials of thought represented as being the thought itself. Finally, I express my belief that the radical fault of Mr. Spencer's Psychology is his constant endeavour to resolve our higher faculties into our lower, an endeavour which necessarily results, if persevered in, in the misrepresentation of intellect, the ignoring of morality, and the denial and ultimate paralysis of the will.

consistent philosophy is possible, the reasonings of idealists and sceptics being proved fallacious.

To the task of showing that they are fallacious, he begins at once to address himself in his second chapter.* In taking this course, he, indeed, may be said to appear in the character of Satan casting out Satan; for (as we have partly seen already, and shall more clearly see later) his own system—apart from the transforming process we would apply to it—is as sceptical as need be, since (as will be ultimately pointed out) it logically involves the *denial of all truth whatever*.

He, however, begins his process of exorcism by taking idealist metaphysicians to task for preferring to trust to the long and complex mental processes he represents as "reason," rather than to the short and simple process of "perception," which ought to convince them of the existence of an external world; and he points out that the most fruitful reasoners (men of science) agree with the vulgar in preferring perception to reasoning, as is shown by their use of experimental verification to test the accuracy of their various calculations. He also justly remarks that metaphysicians can never argumentatively justify the validity of reason, since that must be already taken for granted in any argument by which the superior trustworthiness of reason is to be shown.

And here the utility—nay, the absolute need—of some such careful examination as we have made of Mr. Spencer's earlier parts will be at once apparent. For in his contention against the Idealists (in which he is both right and wrong) Mr. Spencer's errors spring in part from that misapprehension of his as to what the reasoning process is, which has been pointed out† in an earlier portion of this examination, to which earlier portion I must now refer the reader. I have there shown that he gives no evidence of either understanding the difference between ratiocination and direct intellectual apprehension, or of being

* The contents of the second chapter (entitled "The Assumptions of Metaphysicians") may be thus concisely represented. § 388. Why do metaphysicians trust their long and complex mental processes in preference to their short and simple mental processes? § 389. Because they tacitly assume the supreme authority of the reasoning process through which such marvellous results have been reached. § 390. This is a mere superstition, since "reasoning" is but the reco-ordinating of states of consciousness already co-ordinated in simple ways, and "reco-ordination" can give no more validity to its products than co-ordination can. § 391. But ordinary men and the most effective learners (men of science), both rather trust the short and simple process, as is shown by the practice of experimental verification; and metaphysicians can never justify their preference for reason rather than perception for the very validity of reason must be taken for granted in every argument about it.

† See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1878.

aware that no metaphysician worthy of the name considers the former of these processes to be higher or more valid than the latter, but that, on the contrary, such metaphysicians deem ratiocination to be an inferior process needed by the imperfection of our nature.

The true philosophy which he ignores (but into which his own, if it is to live, must be transformed) recognises the validity of *all* our faculties—sensitive, intuitive, and ratiocinative. Scepticism, indeed, necessarily results from the rejection of any one of them; that philosophy, then, supports him in his attack on those who would deny the validity of our perceptions (*e.g.*, of extension, duration, &c.) in favour of Idealism. But Mr. Spencer carries his attack too far, and unduly disparages reason. What else have we to trust to but our reason, and why should we distrust it? Although it would be, as he says, a *petitio principii* to attempt to prove its validity by argument, yet it is a reasonable course to endeavour to show that if all our ultimate powers are taken as co-ordinate, and all of them trusted, no self-contradiction ensues; but, on the contrary, that there results a mental harmony and a justification of that correspondence between our own perceptions and external things, for the existence of which our faculties spontaneously vouch—*i.e.*, for a true conformity between what our perceptions tell us are external things, and what our reflective self-consciousness tells us are our ideas of such things.

In examining such a question as the validity of our direct perception of external objects, it is impossible not to have recourse to reasoning. The question cannot be tested by what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls direct processes. To attempt to use such processes is to assume the very matter in dispute, and to be guilty of a *petitio principii* like that which would attend the argumentative proof of the validity of argument.

Moreover, Mr. Spencer himself attempts to subordinate the direct to the indirect process when he refuses to accept the objective reality of the shapes and densities of external objects, and still more so when he declines to admit the validity of our perception of our own being as a substance having "mental states," and uniting subject and object in one. He thus opens the door to all the very scepticism he reprobates.

But, as has been said, he unduly disparages reason when he represents our experimental verifications of our calculations, as an appeal from "reason" to something else. The fact is (as has been before shown) he not only, on the one hand, fails to distinguish between ratiocination and direct intellectual action, but he also, on the other hand, confounds the latter with sentience.

Now, in experimental verification the sensitive faculty is, of course, appealed to, but not as our really *ultimate* appeal. The ultimate appeal must be to reason acting in direct *intellectual* intuition. In such experiments, then, the ultimate appeal is not to sense, but to the *intellect*, which may doubt, and which criticizes and judges the actions and suggestions of the senses and the imagination. Though no knowledge is possible for us except as following upon sensation, yet the ground of all our developed knowledge is not sensational but intellectual, and its final justification depends, and *must* depend, not on "feelings," but on "thoughts"—that is, on our reason. "Certainty" does not exist at all *in feelings*, any more than doubt. Both belong to thought only. Reason, therefore, is our ultimate and absolute criterion. It is only by self-conscious thought that we *know* we have any feelings at all.

Much as we differ from the metaphysicians combated by Mr. Spencer, we must nevertheless affirm that he attacks them unjustly for making assumptions which no man who enters upon such a question at all can avoid making. Our reason is and must be an ultimate appeal both in its indirect process of ratiocination, "inference," and in its direct intellectual apprehensions, aided by sense presentations. These metaphysicians are not then to be blamed for their appeal to reason, though they are justly to be blamed for their distrust of the direct reports of their intellect acting through sense. A rational system of philosophy must recognise, as that of Balnes does, the fact of certainty from the beginning, and not only accept the validity of our ratiocinative processes as certain, but also accept the certainty of all our faculties of apprehension when acting normally and under normal circumstances. Thus, as we said before, Mr. Spencer is both right and wrong in this incipient portion of his attack on the Idealists.

Mr. Spencer next proceeds to consider the "Words of Metaphysicians,"* and contends that their very expositions of Idealism cannot be expressed without the use of terms which imply the very realism they deny. He quotes Berkeley's expression: "*By*

* In his third chapter, which bears the above title. The following is a short statement of its contents:—§ 392. Every word has, besides its intrinsic, many extrinsic connotations. § 393. It is impossible to construct a sentence the words of which shall not imply real objective existence, and the Idealist's explanation of any idea is a most involved and cumbrous pseudo-explanation in which the term to be explained has to be over and over again assumed, and the word idea becomes devoid of meaning. § 394. Also Hume's term "impression," if it be not taken to connote two distinct existences, deprives any words which may be used with it of their meanings. § 395. Thus, language absolutely refuses to express the idealistic and sceptical hypotheses.

sight I have the ideas of light and of colours;" and taking the words *seriatim*, shows that each connotes both objective and subjective existence, and he affirms that the sentence quoted is really equivalent to saying, "Through clustered and connected ideas, adjusted in a certain ideal way to something else which must be an idea, I have an idea of colour." He also represents the idealist explanation of a term (such, *e.g.*, as colour) by an intentionally absurd algebraic equation, which expresses the value of an unknown quantity, in terms of itself and of other unknown quantities which involve it, *ad infinitum*. He then attacks Hume, and shows that in his explanation of the faint states of consciousness as "impressions" (which with faint states of consciousness, or ideas, make up all our mental furniture, according to that author), he either by that very term "impressions" implies objective as well as subjective existences, or else the words which are used along with it become deprived of meaning, and thus "*language absolutely refuses to express the idealistic and sceptical hypotheses.*"

In these criticisms Mr. Spencer has both common sense and reason substantially on his side. Of course a word cannot be used without implying the various categories of existence it does imply. Moreover, he has a good *argumentum ad hominem* against Berkeley, whom he has quoted as saying, "Whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape or colour. . . . And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract ideas whatsoever." Thus, Berkeley, by always insisting on thus reducing the abstract to the concrete, himself fatally ties down intellect to mere sense. It is much to be regretted that Mr. Spencer has never become acquainted with Catholic philosophy. He speaks of examining "the language used by metaphysicians," as if all metaphysicians were of the schools whose teaching he here controverts.

In examining (in Berkeley's sentence before quoted) the word "I," Mr. Spencer says, "We need not go into the vexed question of personal identity;" a question which it is very convenient indeed for him to shirk, for its thorough examination would upset his whole system by showing the certainty of our knowledge of our own continued existence. By the use of the very same mode of analysis as Mr. Spencer has made use of against Berkeley—namely, by analyzing the words of a proposition—I have elsewhere* shown that the sentence "a state of consciousness exists," is either a meaningless jumble of sounds or of

* "Lessons from Nature," chap. i. Murray, 1876.

characters, or else is the implicit affirmation of that enduring Ego—that substance of mind—which Mr. Spencer does not recognise the existence of. If language refuses to conform to Idealism, it no less refuses to conform to unmodified Spencerism. The choice to which we are reduced in his case, no less than in that of the Idealists, may be expressed in his own words (p. 335): "The choice is, in every case, between self-contradiction, or entire absence of meaning, or complete inversion of meaning." It is strange that a man of Mr. Spencer's acuteness and ability should so clearly expose the folly of others, and not see the force and effect of the very same exposition when applied to his own folly.

But his attack on Idealism is not entirely happy or altogether forcible. Thus, to the obvious reply that Idealists by the expression "ideas of colours" mean the ideas belonging to the class of ideas distinguished as colours, and that what Berkeley means, is to state that he has various classes of ideas which he distinguishes as those of touch, of taste, of smell, of sound, &c., each of which when it occurs he distinguishes as of, or belonging to, its class, Mr. Spencer rejoins as follows (p. 325): "That this is not what the words mean will be obvious on taking a parallel case. Suppose, referring to oysters, I call them the animals of mollusca; will it be admitted that I have correctly expressed myself as meaning animals of the class mollusca?" Surely an Idealist might surrejoin, "By oysters I mean ideas belonging to the group of ideas which I class under the idea mollusca, which I again class under the still wider idea animal, and so on." Mr. Spencer therefore is somewhat too absolute in his denial of meaning to the words of Idealists. Their use of words outrages the common sense of mankind, and, as I believe, true philosophy also, and ends logically in absolute scepticism, as Mr. Spencer's own system also does. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a non-natural meaning to their words, nor could such acute minds so long have persisted, and still continue to persist in Idealism, if it were the pure and simple nonsense which he represents it to be.

In this chapter there occurs, by the way, a passage which may be used to almost a *reductio ad absurdum* of sensism, and as showing that a "perception" cannot possibly be a group of impressions or sensations of any kind, but is an intellectual act by which the essence of a thing is abstracted from its phantasmata.

In his opposition to Hume, Mr. Spencer supposes the approach from a great distance, to a man whose image at first appears as a mere black dot on a distant mountain side, but ultimately so enlarges as it is approached, that, ultimately, the image of one

button of his dress with a small portion of cloth round it excludes all other visual images from the vision of the person so approaching. Other successively changing images are supposed to appear as his different parts are explored in succession by the person who has approached him, moving round him, and, finally, a continuous retreat reduces his image, by infinitesimal gradations, once more to a black dot. Mr. Spencer then asks, "What is my visual impression of a man? Three imaginable answers only can be given. It is the state of consciousness existing at any moment during the time in which consciousness is undergoing these changes; or it is a certain set of such states that occur during a certain part of the time; or it is the sum of the series of states occurring during the time" (p. 332). He replies by showing the absurdity to which we should be reduced by regarding these impressions without the objective implications, but says that when the latter are added they become comprehensible "as caused by the changing relations between two existences."

But no "relations" between sensations, any more than the "impressions" on sentience, can themselves give rise to an "idea" (such, *e.g.*, as "a man") except to an intellect. The idea is "a unity," while the sensation felt or unconsciously remembered, together with the various relations between them, are a multiplicity, and this multiplicity persists and exists alongside of that unity which it has served to elicit from the intellect. Mr. Spencer objects to Hume's view that mere "impressions" can explain the idea "a man" the following remark (p. 334): "To say that the existence which I call the impression of a man is the totality of all these changing phases of my consciousness, is to say that by unity I mean multiplicity; as is also to say that by a thing which exists, I mean an almost infinite series, the remoter members of which are absolutely different and no two of which are present together." But this very objection applies with all its force against Mr. Spencer's representation of our idea of a man. The only way out of the various difficulties is to recognise the active intellect as extracting and apprehending the essential unity from the co-existing and successive multitude of sensuous impressions and relations.

Thanking Mr. Spencer for this apt illustration of the insufficiency of sensism to explain even our simplest ideas, he may also be thanked for the chapter containing it, which is, as a whole, a good one; and although, as has been said, he is somewhat too hard upon Idealists, he yet speaks truly when he says, as he does in conclusion: "Language has, in fact, been throughout its development moulded to express all things under the fundamental relation of subject and object, just as much as the hand has been moulded into fitness for manipulating things presented

under this same fundamental relation ; and if detached from this fundamental relation, language becomes as absolutely impotent as an amputated limb in empty space."

Having now criticized the assumptions and words of metaphysicians, he next* addresses himself to consider their reasonings, as so many elaborate methods of rejecting the fundamental dicta of consciousness and affirming what is contrary to universal belief. Justly does he criticize and blame the metaphysicians he attacks, but they do not represent the only school thus blameworthy, but all those who reject the material and spontaneous declaration of reason in favour of the existence of both mind and matter, either because they cannot explain *how* the knowledge we have of them is come by, or because they do not like the religious consequences which follow from the admission of such existences. Of the people who, not content with the spontaneous certainty their nature gives them, fall into the absurdity of denying the existence of either mind or matter—not only those who by extraordinary intellectual gymnastics succeed in spinning out fantastic idealistic systems, but also those who by a process of ignoring all that is highest in themselves construct degrading materialistic systems—most absurd of all, however, are those who upon an idealistic basis erect a materialistic system, thus realizing a double absurdity to their own temporary glory and the wondering admiration of the educated vulgar.

It is the Idealists, however, who come in for Mr. Spencer's objugation, and he naturally first attacks Berkeley, taking up his dialogue between *Hylas* and *Philonous*. Availing himself

* Chapter IV. "The Reasonings of Metaphysicians." The contents of this chapter may be thus summarized:—§ 396. Waiving the objections made as to words and assumptions, let us examine Berkeley's reasonings. § 397. His argument can be brought to a dead-lock at the outset, since he cannot argue against material substance without being forced to admit his consciousness of it; for to be conscious of an absurdity it is needful to be conscious of two incongruous things, alleged to be congruous. § 398. Hume's divisions (1) of the "perceptions of the mind," into "impressions" and "ideas," and (2) of "all objects of human reason or inquiry," into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact," and his mode of inquiry, which is in the teeth of his own principles, are both so illogical and incoherent that any conclusions he arrives at are invalidated by the badness of his principles. § 399. Similarly, Kant presents us with a doctrine which positively contradicts our primary cognitions, as a refuge from another doctrine which only doubts them. By a criticism of his doctrine as to Time and Space, we may see that a variety of impossibilities of thought are offered us to escape a supposed insurmountable, but really readily surmountable, difficulty of interpretation. § 400. The belief of Sir William Hamilton as to the subjectivity of space may be disproved by his own criterion. § 401. So worthless are the metaphysical reasonings of Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hamilton, who agree in rejecting some or many of the fundamental dicta of consciousness!

of Berkeley's position "that sensations are the only things immediately perceived," he shows that *Hylas* is over-hasty in admitting that "material substance is senseless without doubt;" and here we may quite agree with Mr. Spencer, for the living material substance of an animal is endowed with sense-perception. This, however, is not Mr. Spencer's point, but he endeavours to show that Berkeley's argument can be brought to a dead-lock at the outset, because he really recognises the existence of material substance in controverting its existence. A Berkeleyan, I think, would find little difficulty in disposing of Mr. Spencer's attack, but I am not called upon to take up the cudgels for the exemplary and acute Bishop whose system, however defensible, is, I conceive, fundamentally irrational and naturally leads to complete scepticism.

He next turns to Hume, and shows the imperfections of his classifications of "the perceptions of the mind," and "the objects of human reason and inquiry," and then considers his mode of arguing, making some remarks which may be usefully cited. He says (p. 347): "If, in a philosophical work, we come upon a chapter entitled 'Unhesitating faith in the operations of the understanding,' we should of course expect to find in it large claims. . . . Even in a chapter thus entitled, however, we should be taken aback by the assumption that we can know not only the ultimate truths presented by the universe as it exists, but also that we can know what would remain true if the universe did not exist. How, then, shall we express our amazement on finding such an assumption in a chapter entitled 'Sceptical doubts concerning the operation of the understanding?' Yet Hume makes this assumption. The test by which he professes to distinguish *relations of ideas* is, that their truth does not depend 'on what is anywhere existent in the universe'—they would remain true were there nothing in the universe. So that the understanding is supposed capable of perceiving what would hold under conditions which *do not exist*; while 'sceptical doubts' are entertained respecting its ability to perceive what holds under the conditions which *do exist*! And the marvellous fact is that this exalted faith in the understanding furnishes a *datum* for the argument which is to justify 'sceptical doubts' concerning it! On the belief in its transcendent power is based the proof of its utter impotence!" Mr. Spencer also asks a pertinent question. Hume teaches that the validity of any philosophical expression is to be tested by inquiring *from what impression it is derived*, and if it be impossible to assign any, the suspicion of its meaninglessness will be confirmed. Mr. Spencer asks from what "impression" is derived "the idea of a universe containing truths dependent on nothing in it."

He also attacks Hume's doctrine that our idea of *cause* is due to *habit*; and asks what is the "impression" from which the term "habit" is derived, and maintains that *experience* and *habit* cannot "be assigned as giving origin to the notion of *cause*, without involving the notion of cause in the explanation."

Mr. Spencer may be invited to ponder over this dilemma himself, as upon the evolutionary theory either (as we maintain) a rational nature suddenly appears in man with the idea of *cause* so latent that it springs into being on the occurrence of the perception of phenomenal changes, or else it must be latent in the "mind" of an "amoeba," nay, even in the spore of a fungus or a thread of conferva.

From Hume, Mr. Spencer proceeds to criticize Kant, especially attacking his doctrine that "Space" and "Time" are only subjective forms of intuition with which the mind clothes, as it were, the objects of its external perception. Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, contends (p. 352) that "consciousness of likeness and unlikeness is the only true 'form,' whether of intuition, or of understanding, or of reason; and that analysis shows it to be undeniable that subjective Time and Space are forms derived from this primordial form." . . . "Even when we reduce space-consciousness to its ultimate components, this necessary form of it is equally manifest, if not, indeed, more manifest. That two positions may be conceived as related, they must be conceived as like or unlike in distance, or direction, or both." It is strange that Mr. Spencer does not see that in his "ultimate components" we have already got that "Space" which he says is composed by them. To have the conception of two positions like or unlike "in distance or direction," the mind must already have either Kant's "form," or else have spontaneously abstracted the idea Space from the abstraction "extension," which it has at once abstracted in perceiving extended bodies.* Similarly with Time, it is impossible to be aware of Mr. Spencer's examples of the components of that "form," "the tickings of a clock or to feel one's pulse," without already either possessing it or else having abstracted the idea Time from the abstraction "duration," which the intellect has the power at once to abstract† in perceiving succeeding things.

Mr. Spencer then observes:‡ "The proposition on which the Kantian doctrine proceeds, that every sensation caused by an object is given in an intuition which has space for its form is not true;" and in a note he instances sound and odour, saying,

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 144.

† DUBLIN REVIEW, *l. c.* p. 149.

‡ "Psychology," vol. ii. p. 354.

"Whoever thinks that sound and odour have space for their form of intuition may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odour turned the other way upwards." Now, I take it, a Kantist would have little difficulty in replying to an objection such as this, which might have been brought against his system by a school-boy; but as I have before lately pointed out,* according to Mr. Spencer's own system, we ought to be able to perceive "an extended sound" and "a solid smell."

In another criticism however he is, I think, fully justified. He quotes Kant as saying, "We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it;" and Mr. Spencer then observes that this proposition may be disputed, saying: "The space which remains after we have conceived all things to disappear, is the space in which they were *imagined*—the ideal space in which they were *represented*, and not the real space in which they were *presented*. The space said to survive its contents is the form in which *re-intuition* takes place; not the form in which *intuition* takes place. Kant says that the *sensation* (mark the word) produced by an object is the matter of intuition, and that space in which we perceive this matter is the form of intuition. To prove this, he turns from the space known through our open eyes, and in which the said intuition occurs, to the space known when our eyes are closed, and in which the re-intuition or imagination of things occur; and having alleged that the ideal space survives its contents, and therefore must be a form, leaves it to be inferred that the real space has been shown to be a form which survives its contents." He then makes an analogous criticism as to Time. But I believe that the notion which I have advocated in this REVIEW meets all the difficulties of the case—the notion, namely, that "space" is a mere abstraction from "extension." "Extension" itself is, of course, an abstraction from extended things, but accompanying the idea of "extension," there is always a vague image of some extended body. When we speak of "space," however, we mean "the quality of extension as completely abstracted from all bodies whatever, and thought of purely by itself." "Extension" is real and objective as a quality of real extended objects; Space is altogether ideal; and when we speak of bodies as "occupying space," it is a mere *façon de parler*, denoting the exclusion of one extended body by another. In the same way the conception of Time is altogether "ideal," an abstraction from the objective quality "succession," and meaning "suc-

* DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1879, p. 384.

cession as completely abstracted from all objects and events, and thought of purely by itself," which is to a certain extent objective as "the *duration* of the mutual exclusions of all succeeding things."*

I think therefore that Mr. Spencer fails to reduce Kant's "form" to his own supposed primordial form. He is more successful, however, in his endeavour to show that a belief that "Space" and "Time" are nothing but subjective forms, or properties of the Ego is a belief which conflicts with our reason.†

The Kantian doctrine not only compels us to dissociate from the *non-ego* these forms as we know them, but practically forbids us to recognise or suppose *any* forms for the *non-ego*. Kant says that "Space is *nothing else* than the forms of all phenomena of the external senses—that is, the subjective conditions of the sensibility under which alone external intuition is possible." That is a tacit affirmation that there is no form of objective existence to which it corresponds; since, if there were, it would be *something else* than the subjective condition of the sensibility. He says, too, that "Time is *nothing but* the form of our internal intuition . . . it inheres not in the objects themselves, but *solely* in the subject (or mind) which intuits them." And he distinctly shuts out the supposition that there are forms of the *non-ego* to which these forms of the *ego* correspond, by saying that "Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences, . . . the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience." Let us observe, then, the two alternative conclusions respecting the *non-ego* between which we have to choose. The first is that the *non-ego* is formless. Though, as existing internally, the matter of every intuition has its form, yet, as existing externally, the object to which this intuition relates has no form. As we have seen, Kant defines *form* as "that which effects that the content . . . can be arranged under certain relations." Understanding form in this sense, then, we must say that the *non-ego* cannot have its content arranged under certain relations. But to say this is to say that the *non-ego* has no parts, since to have parts is to have content arranged in relations; and it is equally to say that it is not a whole, for a whole necessarily implies

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 150.

† Of course I shall not be suspected of the impertinent folly of implying by this any real disrespect for so great a thinker as Kant. But great as Kant was, he was in part the creation of his epoch, and was saturated with the poison of Cartesianism which had spread itself far and wide. Mr. Spencer's argument (p. 361) that "by no effort can any one separate, or think away, space and time from the objective world, and leave the objective world behind," and the other that "the implied statement that objects have an existence apart from space and time," is one which is "unthinkable and meaningless," is an argument which in one sense cannot fitly be addressed to Kant, because of course on Kant's hypothesis we *should* by no effort be able to do so, and the objective world, apart from these forms, *would* be unthinkable.

parts of which it is the sum. Whence the proposition amounts to this, that the *non-ego*, having neither whole nor parts, cannot be thought of as existing; and we are landed in Absolute Idealism, which is contrary to the hypothesis. The alternative proposition is that the *non-ego* has a form, but that this produces no effect on the *ego* in the act of experience. Though the objective existence contained under some objective forms is capable of impressing the subject, and producing sensation, yet this sensation is conditioned wholly by the subjective form: the objective form is completely inoperative. So that whatever arrangement there is in the content of the *non-ego*, the effect wrought on the *ego* has its content arranged purely according to the form of the *ego*. One arrangement of the *non-ego* is just as good as another, in so far as the *ego* is concerned. As it follows from this that no differences among our sensations are determined by any differences in the *non-ego* (for to say that they are so determined is to say that the form under which the *non-ego* exists produces an effect upon the *ego*); and as it similarly follows that the order of co-existence and sequence among these sensations is not determined by any order in the *non-ego*, we are compelled to conclude that all these differences and changes in the *ego* are self-determined. We are, as before, driven into Absolute Idealism, and the premises are contradicted.

Mr. Spencer then affirms that the facts of consciousness as to Space and Time are interpretable on the experience-hypothesis as modified by the doctrine of evolution. "If you suppose," he says (p. 363), "the modifications produced by experience to be inheritable, it must happen that if there are any universal forms of the *non-ego*, these must establish corresponding universal forms in the *ego*. These forms being embodied in the organization, will impress themselves on the first intuitions of the individual; and will thus appear to antecede all experience." Certainly it may be admitted cordially and willingly that this is so, and that thus brutes may acquire and have acquired a material apprehension (a sensuous cognition) of extended and succeeding things, but not *as* extended or *as* succeeding, and *à fortiori* not as existing (so to speak) in Space and Time. But if we grant this material apprehension to the merely sensitive nature, it will explain how the active intellect, with this as material, can abstract and intellectually apprehend things "as extended" and "as succeeding," and ultimately Space and Time. They are thus seen to be objective in one aspect, subjective in another; abstractions of abstractions, yet with a real foundation in things, which foundation we rational animals can intellectually apprehend as it really exists in things in themselves, and which foundation also acts on the sensitive nature of irrational animals so as to give them organized and co-ordinated series of sensations and groups of associations of sensations, amply sufficient for their needs.

Before concluding his criticisms of the reasonings of "meta-

physicians," Mr. Spencer has a word to say to Sir William Hamilton, and concisely shows that his belief as to the subjectivity of Space may be disproved by at least his own criterion. Sir William Hamilton had said in criticizing Brown, "*I cannot but believe that material things exist: I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception.*" The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in defending his system against the sceptic, *because irresistible, is true.* The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false.*"

This Mr. Spencer turns against Hamilton thus: "*I cannot but believe that material things exist: I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception: I cannot but believe that the space in which material realities are perceived is objectively real.*" The two former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Sir William Hamilton, in defending his system against the sceptic, *because irresistible, are true.* The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Sir William Hamilton, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false.*"

Mr. Spencer next* proceeds to his proof that Realism rests on evidence which has a greater validity than has the evidence of any counter-hypothesis. This he does by arguing from "priority," "simplicity," and "distinctness."

As to the first† he argues that the realistic conception is prior to the idealistic conception, so that in no mind whatever can the idealistic conception be reached except through the realistic one.

He begins his argument by calling attention to the ease with which microscopists acquire the power of so moving objects under a microscope as to neutralize the apparent inversions of their motions, so that when an erecting glass (which brings the visible motions into their ordinary relations with their tactual motions) has to be used, the microscopist is as much perplexed by the normal connection of the impressions as he originally was by the abnormal one. He compares this effect of habit with the attitude of mind generated by habit in "the metaphysician," whose postulate he tells us is (p. 369), "that we are primarily

* In Chapter V., entitled "Negative Justification of Realism," containing only one section. No. 402.

† This first argument occupies his Chapter VI., the contents of which may be put shortly thus: § 403. We can readily acquire the power of reversing the order in which we respond to our perceptions, as in viewing an object under the microscope. § 404. Our primary perceptions are not sensations, but objects. § 405. To have a sensation and to be conscious of having it are very different things. § 406. The realistic conception is everywhere, and always prior.

conscious of our sensations—that we certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything known beyond these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from them." He adds: "I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this."

I confess to no little feeling of astonishment (which I doubt not many of my readers will share) at Mr. Spencer's innocent belief that he is original in holding a doctrine held by the overwhelming majority of students and teachers of metaphysics, both as estimated by time and by extent of geographical range. His view is, I believe, correct, but it is really too bad that he should be so ignorant of his environment as to deem it to be also "original!"

It is certain that the very existence of sensations is an hypothesis which cannot be framed until external existence is known, and he is quite true to nature in representing the urchin from the nursery saying, "Give Georgy," instead of "Give me," the object of his desires, though I believe that in the "Georgy" the "me" is really contained. But Mr. Spencer goes on to deny a knowledge of personal identity to the adult savage, in which denial he is certainly mistaken, and he denies it on grounds which would equally justify the denial of it in the minds either of Mr. Spencer himself or of his present critic, as will, I think, appear to any unprejudiced reader. His reasons are the three following ones:—

(1) "The uncivilized man has, indeed, got the belief in another self that goes away in dreams, and leaves the body for a longer time at death; but this other self, as conceived by him, is simply a duplicate, visible and tangible as the body is." In other words, that the "soul" can only be imagined in terms of the "body." Mr. Spencer probably does not believe with certainty in the survival of the soul after death, yet he can at least apprehend the conception. But can he think of it without such images as the mind of the uncivilized man needs? We, who do believe in the survival, nevertheless require such phantasmata for the conception, and cannot think of it without. But this is no matter of wonder. Every one knows that we cannot by imagination transcend experience. We have no experience of the life of the soul out of the body, and therefore we cannot imagine it, though we may both conceive it and believe in it.

(2) His second reason is, that the uncivilized man "has no name for that which is conscious, or for that aggregate of thoughts and feelings called by us consciousness." But he has a name for that which is conscious—his own name, or perhaps the

phrase "the here." It is the living man himself who is conscious. "Consciousness" is a thing which by itself does not really exist at all; what need has uncivilized man for a term for such a mere abstraction? Heaps of men and women amongst us have no such conception as "consciousness," but could easily have it aroused in them and could easily be made to understand it.

(3) His last reason is, that if uncivilized man "wants to convey the fact that he perceives something not present to the senses, he can do it only by likening his perception to external vision, and his internal power to an eye." But who amongst us is not, in this respect, in the same case as uncivilized man? Do we not speak of "seeing" the force of an argument, and of mental "vision?" And is there a single term, however refined, used by us, which has not a simply sensuous basis?

Another illustration used by him (p. 371), apt for his *present* purpose, but having another application which he does not seem to see, but which it may be well to point out. He says that if we tell a farm labourer "that the sound he hears from the bell of the village church exists in himself; and that in the absence of all creatures having ears, there would be no sound. When his look of blank amazement has waned, try and make him understand this truth which is clear to you. Explain that the vibrations of the bell are communicated to the air; that the air conveys them as waves or pulses; that these pulses successively strike the membrane of his ear, causing it to vibrate; and that what exist in the air as mechanical movements become in him the sensation of sound, which varies in pitch as these movements vary in their rapidity of succession. And now ask yourself, what are these things you are telling him about? When you speak to him of the bell, of the air, of the mechanical motions, do you mean so many of his ideas? If you do, you fall into the absurdity of supposing that he already has the conception which you are trying to give him. By the bell, the air, the vibrations, then, you mean just what he means—so many objective existences and actions."

This is quite true, and when Mr. Spencer speaks of "molecular oscillations" he must mean "movements to and fro," such as he has felt or seen, only very much smaller. When he speaks of the cause of the sound of the bell being something altogether different from his auditory sensations, he really means* it is more like his "muscular sensations." But can

* This he has before admitted, for at page 238 he said: "The liberty we have to think of light, heat, sound, &c., as in themselves different from our sensations of them, is due to our possession of other sensations by which to symbolize them—namely, those of mechanical force . . . that is, in terms of our muscular sensations."

the objective cause be a bit more like the latter than the former? Is not the clodhopper quite as near the truth as Mr. Spencer himself? May not a Theist believe that he is vastly *nearer* the truth, and that our faculties are in no way mendacious though they do not (as they need not, and indeed *could* not) tell us the *whole* story. As I have before* urged: "By abandoning our natural belief as to these qualities, we do not really explain them a bit more, or get the least nearer to objective truth. Such natural belief cannot at least be proved false, while to think of them as caused by muscular tensions is a manifest absurdity."

But I have just tried the experiment suggested upon a Sussex rustic of the neighbourhood where I am writing this, with the following effect:—

Myself. Lacey! You often hear Sir Spencer Wilson's clock strike?

Lacey. Bless you, sir, very often.

M. What do you think that sound is, something in the bell, something in the air, or something in your head?

L. Why, something in the bell, sir, of course; but the air has got something to do with it too, I think.

M. But when the clapper hits the bell it sets the bell shaking, that sets the air next it shaking, and so on to your ear; where it sets a very thin bit of skin shaking, and so you hear the sound.

L. Yes, sir.

M. Is there anything, then, in the bell altogether the same as your feeling of sound?

L. Of course not, sir. Can't be.

M. And yet you say the sound is in the bell?

L. Yes, sir.

M. Suppose every man and animal were dead, and the wind set the bell shaking, with no ears to hear it; would there be any sound?

L. I can't answer that directly, sir; that wants thinking over.

M. What was in the bell when it shook before would be in the bell when it shook now, wouldn't it?

L. Of course it would, sir.

M. You say, then, that the sound is in the bell, yet nothing is there altogether the same as your feeling of sound?

L. That's what I say, sir.

M. You must mean, then, that the cause of the sound is in the bell, and that that cause is like, but not altogether the same as, your feeling of sound?

* DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 161.

L. Yes, sir, that's just it; but the air has something to do with it too.

It seems to me that this rustic would be recognised by Aristotle as perfectly right in his philosophy of sound, and I believe that he is far ahead of Berkeley, Kant, or any other Idealist, who has learnt to *s'égarer avec méthode*.

Returning from this digression of my own, I must advert to a digression of Mr. Spencer's (§ 405, p. 372), in which he points out the distinctness which exists between "having a sensation" and "being conscious of having a sensation." He says: "To be impressed by a colour, a sound, or an odour, and thereupon to perform some motion conducive to self-preservation, is a simple act perpetually performed by creatures of low grade—an act closely allied to reflex acts, and passing insensibly into these. We may figure its nature by imagining to ourselves, so far as we can, the process of sneezing, as occurring without a contemplating self to watch it and think about it." This is a true and useful representation. He goes on to say: "A sensation thus existing before there exists an introspective consciousness is a sensation of the kind spoken of by metaphysicians as being immediately given in consciousness, in contradistinction to the outer agent producing it, which can be but mediately given." But metaphysicians of the school I follow say nothing of the kind, but, on the contrary, that the outer agent itself is directly apprehended, and that even in animals their sensible cognition of objects is direct and immediate, and not by any process of inference—a process of which they are incapable. But the metaphysicians he attacks would not, I conceive, admit the validity of his representation of their views, and he should recollect that in such inquiries as they carry on, they *must* take the mind as it is in the inquirer himself—*i.e.*, in its fully-developed condition. What is either primary or ultimate (according to line of inquiry pursued) in our examination of the dicta of our own minds, is and must be developed thought, not the sensuous basis of such thought as existing in infants or the lower animals.

He continues: "Through immeasurably long and complex differentiations and integrations of such primordial sensations and derived ideas,* there develops a consciousness of self and a correlative not-self." Here, as in so many previous cases, the word "through" is ambiguous. If by "through" he meant

* It must not be forgotten that by an "idea" Mr. Spencer means only modified feelings which are distinguished from sensations by their faintness, but (as remarked in the very beginning of this examination) "ideas" are not recognised by us to be such by their *faintness* but by their representative character. They are reflexly recognised as making that which was past, present, ideally, once more.

"by means of"—such sensuous basis serving as material to the active intellect—then the assertion may pass; but if by "through" it be intended to imply that sensitivity with such differentiations and integrations is by itself sufficient, it must be strenuously denied. How can any amount of juggling with things of one kind produce a thing of an altogether different kind?

Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer's main contestation must be admitted—namely, that the realistic conception is everywhere and always, in child, in savage, in rustic, in the metaphysician himself, prior to the idealistic conception; and that in no mind whatever can the idealistic conception be reached except through the realistic one. Realism must be granted before a step can be taken towards the propounding of Idealism.

He next* argues for the truth of the realistic view, from its greater simplicity, saying: "If we compare the mental process which yields Realism with the mental process said to yield Idealism, or Scepticism, we see that, apart from other differences, the two differ immensely in their lengths. The one is so simple and direct as to appear at first sight undecomposable; while the other, long, involved and indirect, is not simply decomposable, but requires much ingenuity to compose it. Ought we then to hold that in the short and simple process there is less danger of going wrong than in the long and elaborate process, or the reverse?" To agree with "the metaphysician" in holding that there is less danger of error in the long and elaborate process is equivalent to holding that it is easier to hit a target at a thousand yards than at a hundred yards. The next argument† is one from distinctness, and is to the effect that as we trust our perceptions more than our recollections, *à fortiori* we should trust our direct perception of an external world rather than any involved process of reasoning (the very terms of which are necessarily but faintly apprehended) directed to shake our trust in that perception. An Idealist would of course reply that he did trust his perceptions,

* In Chapter VII., entitled "The Argument from Simplicity," which chapter consists of the three following sections:—§ 407. The process of direct perception is, apart from difference as to quality, enormously shorter than the idealistic inference. § 408. Idealist reasoning is complex and involved in the highest degree, yet Idealists object to realism on the ground that "perception" is an "inference." § 409. This amounts to saying that if there is doubtfulness in a single step of a given kind, there is less doubtfulness in many steps of this kind.

† In Chapter VIII., "The Argument from Distinctness." In this chapter it is urged—§ 410. That we trust our perceptions more than our recollections. § 411. That Idealism depends upon such imperfect symbols as words. And § 412. That the realistic deliverance is given in terms of the highest possible distinctness, while the idealistic affirms the things most faintly perceived to be the things most certainly known.

and so the argument would return to the question what "a perception" is—a question we lately considered.*

Moreover, Mr. Spencer speaks as if "sense" was more to be trusted than "reason," saying: "Deliverances of consciousness given in the vivid terms we call sensations, excite a confidence immeasurably exceeding the confidence excited by deliverances given in the faint terms we distinguish as ideas. If I think I left a book on the table in the next room, and on going to fetch it find it is not there, I do not suppose that the presence of the book on the table, as mentally represented, is comparable in certainty to its absence as actually observed." Of course not, but the conflict here is not between sensations and ideas, but between ideas which respectively have and have not the support of sensuous intuition. In recognising that the book *is not* on the table, the appeal is to sensation and thought, and the thought is ultimate and primary, as it is by thought I recognise the fact when I advert to it that I have the sensations I have; that I test them and satisfy myself that there is no sense-deception. With this passing remark we may proceed to Mr. Spencer's exposition† of the need of some criterion. He says (p. 385), there must be some flaw in the method pursued by "metaphysicians," since it is impossible to think that reason necessarily leads to unreasonable conclusions. "Clearly all metaphysics can be nothing but an analysis of our knowledge by means of our knowledge—an inquiry by our intelligence into the decisions of our intelligence. We cannot carry on such an inquiry without taking for granted the trustworthiness of our intelligence. . . . Intelligence cannot prove its own invalidity, because it must postulate its own validity in doing this." There must be, then, he contends, some primordial certainty greater than any reasoning can yield, some particular mode of perception which we may take as the guarantee of all other modes. Even those who deny the existence of anything innate, and refer the whole of every

* In the eighth part of this examination (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1879, p. 318), and also in the two antecedent parts.

† Forming his Chapter IX., entitled "A Criterion Wanted." The contents of this chapter may be thus summarized:—§ 413. The unreasonableness of Idealism as just shown makes it no wonder that unmetaphysical persons should feel contempt for metaphysics. § 414. But there must be some as yet unrecognised datum, the overlooking of which causes such a suicidal conflict. § 415. The assumption of the trustworthiness of consciousness in general is insufficient. § 416. Some particular mode of perception must be made the guarantee of all other modes. § 417. We must recognise some primordial certainty greater than any reasoning can yield. § 418. If no ultimate test of truth be recognised, then philosophy must confess itself baseless. § 419. Then some transcendent certainty must be found—a certainty which all sides will admit and accept.

mental phenomenon to experience, cannot escape "the conclusion that all rational thinking is governed by some principle which is established before rational thinking begins." This is, indeed, a true remark; intellectual faculties require to be innate and *in potentia* in order that sensations may excite them with acts, just as the various sensuous faculties require to be innate and their activities *in potentia*, in order that physical influences may excite sensations. He goes on (*l. c.* p. 390) to speak of experiences which accrue between birth and the age of introspection, and says of the associations thus induced: "Evidently, then, the natures of these, fixed long before the higher mental activities became possible, must govern the higher mental activities." But to say that our lower faculties govern our higher is in one sense true, in another false. It is only true in a sense similar to that in which we may say that the laws of physics and chemistry "govern" the functions of living organisms. Justly, however, does our author demand some criterion, and he rightly determines that it must be some pre-eminent form of direct perception. He does not, however, as we shall soon see, succeed in finding that of which he is in search, but in his pursuit strangely runs over it without seeming to see it. He carries on his search by examining* different "propositions," which he rightly treats as our intellectual units. And he classifies these as real or ideal, and as having the subject or object more or less permanently and completely united, and this introduces his "ultimate question," which is, how to ascertain the invariable existence of the predicates with their subjects in certain propositions. In a word, to find what propositions are, and must by all be admitted to be, absolute, certain, and primordial. To this question he addresses himself in his next chapter,† in which he asserts that "inconceiv-

* In his Chapter X., called "Propositions Qualitatively Distinguished." It contains:—§ 420. Exact comparisons are made by reducing things compared to a common denomination. § 421. Our units are propositions. § 422. Which, for our purpose, must each be resolved into the simpler propositions they may severally contain. § 423. We must also classify them according as their terms are real or ideal. § 424. In some cases the predicate never ceases to exist, while its subject is before consciousness, while in others it may cease to exist. § 425. The first class (which alone concerns us) consists of propositions we necessarily accept, and it contains two orders of propositions, (1) those in which the union of subject and object is but *temporarily* absolute, and (2) those in which the union of subject and object is *permanently* absolute.

† This is Chapter XI., entitled "The Universal Postulate." The following is a short statement of the contents of its sections:—§ 426. To ascertain whether with a certain subject, a certain predicate invariably exists, we must try to separate them—*i.e.*, try to conceive the negative of the proposition in question. Inconceivability of negation is what shows a cognition to possess the highest rank. § 427. An "inconceivable pro-

ability" is the ultimate and supreme test of truth—a proposition the contrary of which cannot be conceived is, he says, to be admitted as certain.

Thus, he very properly accepts as ultimate and supreme, not "sensations" but "thoughts," and acknowledges* that the ultimate appeal is not to what is objective but to what is subjective. He carefully distinguishes inconceivable propositions from those which are merely unbelievable, and justly contends that a test is not to be abandoned merely because it may be used carelessly, or may be above the capacity of certain persons to use. But though he thus distinguishes between "unbelievable" and "inconceivable" propositions, he really means by the latter term nothing more than "unimaginable;" for he defines an inconceivable proposition as "one of which the terms cannot by any effort be brought together before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them." He thus bases our supreme and ultimate certainty on mere mental impotence—a mere passive incapacity of the imagination. Now, fully agreeing with Mr. Spencer as to the necessity of the acceptance of certain propositions as absolutely true and beyond question, I differ from him *toto cœlo* as to the nature of such propositions. The propositions which I contend are to be taken as unquestionable are not those, the contraries of which are but negatively and passively inconceivable, but those which are evidently seen to be *positively* necessary, and the contraries of

position" is not a merely unbelievable one, but is one the subject and predicate of which cannot be united in the same intuition. § 428. Mill's objection (that propositions once accepted as of this kind have been since proved to be false) fails, because the propositions he refers to were complex ones. § 429. A test may fail from incapacity or carelessness on the part of those who use it, and if it were needful to abandon the test because an absolute guarantee against its misuse cannot be found, it would be still more needful to abandon logical principles. § 430. The laws of association must produce absolute relations between thoughts, and this *à fortiori* if the evolution of man be admitted, what is *à priori* in the individual being *à posteriori* in the race. Thus, inconceivableness of negation affords a far higher warrant for a cognition than does any enumeration of experiences. § 431. But Mill does really admit the test of inconceivableness after all. § 432. Sir William Hamilton's objections are valueless, because he uses language to express that to which no state of consciousness corresponds, and even he can be forced to admit inconceivableness as a test also. § 433. The summing-up of the foregoing arguments and representations shows that it is a corollary from the Experience-hypothesis, that an argument which questions the authority of such truths as mathematical axioms, can do so only by claiming for the less deeply-rooted necessities of thought, a validity which it denies to the more deeply-rooted necessities of thought.

* This he does expressly in the "Essays," vol. ii. p. 400. (Stereotyped edition.)

which are *actively* inconceivable because they are clearly known by the mind to be absolutely and universally impossible. The supreme propositions, therefore, are those which the mind sees to be everywhere and always, absolutely, *positively* necessary; and no one can deny that there are such propositions since so many men affirm that they have them, and even those who would deny them must implicitly assert them if they would argue against them. Yet propositions of this kind are not even referred to by Mr. Spencer, nor does he state the difference between propositions which are inconceivable and those which are unimaginable, which is very singular, since he can hardly have been ignorant of the controversy between Mill and Whewell on the subject.

And here we must not omit to notice another very important point. Mr. Spencer denies* the validity of the principle of contradiction as an ultimate truth. This is, indeed, a strange proceeding, since he cannot deny it without at the same time affirming it. He affirms it also in that which he represents to be absolutely fundamental and ultimate—namely, our inability to dis sever certain images. For, supposing we know that we *have* tried to dis sever them and *failed*, how can we be certain that at the very same time we have not tried and yet have *succeeded*? We can only be sure of it upon this very principle of contradiction.

I have elsewhere† gone at length into the question as to ultimate truths raised by Mr. Spencer in this chapter of his work, and I, to save space, must now refer my readers for further details‡ to my previous treatment of the matter, here confining myself to a summary of results:—

(1) Knowledge must rest on truths which are incapable of being proved, but are evident by their own intrinsic light.

* § 432, p. 425. "How do we *know* that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? what is our criterion for *this* impossibility?" It is strange that any one should think the law of contradiction is derivative, or that it reposes on anything stronger and more fundamental than itself.

† See "Lessons from Nature," chapter ii. pp. 34–48. Murray, 1876.

‡ In the controversy between Mr. Spencer and Mr. Mill, it appears to me that both are right and both are wrong. Mr. Mill is right in affirming that there are inconceivabilities which may yet be believed, but wrong in denying that our subjective judgments as to impossibility and necessity are both objectively valid and supreme criteria of truth. Mr. Spencer is right in affirming that the ultimate declarations of our intellect are such supreme criteria of truth, but wrong in declining to attribute to such declarations absolute necessity and universal objective validity. But both Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer err in failing to distinguish between (1) that negative inconceivability which comes from impotence or lack of experience; and (2) that positive, active perception of impossibility which comes from intellectual power and light.

(2) These fundamental truths must be subjectively evident.

(3) Such fundamental truths declare their objective, absolute, and universal truth.

(4) The intellect is thus carried by its own force from subjectivity to objectivity.

Mr. Spencer's examples of inconceivable propositions are unfortunate. Thus, he instances the offering resistance by what is unextended, a proposition which we Catholics have little difficulty indeed in conceiving, believing as we do in the action on matter of unextended spirits, and this is an example of how Revelation aids philosophy and supplements reason.

But the certainty which Mr. Spencer conceives as being induced by the incidence of cosmical activities on sentient organisms could evidently produce nothing but a blind instinct, and not even an apparent (even if mistaken) clear perception of positive universal and absolute necessity.

Mr. Spencer next considers* the test to be used in testing the validity of propositions, and contends that the conclusion is most certain which involves the assumption of the postulate the fewest times on account of the fallibility of our care, attention, &c., in carrying on our reasoning faculties. It may be noted in passing that Mr. Spencer admits (p. 430) that "from non-agreement between subject and object, the inconceivable and impossible may not correspond even within our mental range," and that it is possible to assume that the universal postulate may not be a perfect warrant for any one single act of thought. It is true, he says, that he admits this only "for argument's sake," but on his principles, that our thoughts are merely the results of incident forces on a sentient organism, and not the acts of an intellectual principle; he *cannot* refuse to admit the possibility of such non-conformity as a very real and true possibility, and not merely "for argument's sake."

He then enumerates certain corollaries.† Let any one contem-

* In his XIIth Chapter, on "The Test of Relative Validity." § 434. Conflicting arguments are to be appraised by resolving compound propositions into their constituents. § 435. Whether the universal postulate be absolutely trustworthy or not, that conclusion at which we arrive by the fewest assumptions of the postulate must be the most certain. § 436. On account of the treachery of thought as ordinarily carried on. § 437. Therefore the most certain conclusion is that which involves the postulate the fewest times.

† Chapter XIII., "Its Corollaries." The contents of this chapter are as follows:—§ 438. While we look at an object, our belief in its external reality possesses the highest validity possible. § 439. Our consciousness of subject and object are not absolutely simultaneous. Perception, however complex originally, has become simple to the developed intelligence. § 440. But the simplest propositions of even hypothetical Realism postulate not only an object, but also the subject and a relation

plate an object—e.g., a book—and he will find he is conscious of it as existing apart from himself without any notion about sensations or any "image" of the book—an undecomposable act which he cannot reverse. "Hence, while he continues looking at the book, his belief in it as an external reality possesses the highest validity possible." Mr. Spencer controverts Ferrier and Hamilton, and denies that the object of knowledge always is and must be the object with the addition of oneself, and regards the self and not-self as rather the elements of an unceasing rhythm in consciousness, adding that sometimes we may be absorbed entirely in the object or absorbed with self. This may be admitted, but it must be maintained that the object cannot be thought of as an object without a glance at the self as subject. He goes on to maintain that even hypothetical Realism and *à fortiori* Idealism and Scepticism must be regarded as unreasonable and invalid conceptions compared with Realism, since in them the universal postulate is assumed so many more times than in Realism,* and he concludes that reason is utterly incapable of showing the unreasonableness of those primary deliverances of consciousness which yield subject and object as independent existences. He contends that any doubtfulness which may exist in Realism must be greatly exceeded by the doubtfulness of every other system, and thus he deems Realism to be negatively justified. There is no need (though it would be very easy) to controvert this contention, although it is based on that misconception of the ultimate test of truth which consists in relying upon mental impotence instead of the subjective evidence of absolute and universal truth.

He next proceeds† to his positive justification of Realism, which he tells us will be obtained if we find it to be a necessary product of thought, proceeding according to laws of thought, which

between them, and depend on language, so that by it the universal postulate has to be assumed a number of times, and this is still more the case with Idealism and Scepticism. § 441. Therefore reason cannot show the unreasonableness of these primary deliverances of consciousness which yield subject and object as independent existences.

* In his contention he speaks of "that highly complex conception—self." This, however, is surely as "simple" to "the developed intelligence" as is the perception "a book."

† In his XIVth Chapter, entitled "Positive Justification of Realism," the sections of which are:—§ 442. If states of consciousness are held adequate to frame a disproof of objective existence, they must be held adequate to frame a proof of it. § 443. The absolute validity of Realism will be established, if we find it to be a necessary product of thought proceeding according to laws of thought which are universal. § 444. In examining the fabric of consciousness, to show this we must shut out (as far as we can do so) the realistic interpretation of our states of consciousness.

are universal. During the inquiry about to be undertaken we shall, he tells us, have to shut out, so far as may be, the ordinary implications of thought, and try to regard our states of consciousness merely as such carrying on the process from the subjective standpoint. In following out this inquiry* he finds that certain propositions can be torn asunder (the predicate and subject separated in thought) much more easily than others, and some cannot be so sundered; these latter are the propositions distinguished as necessary—thus still dwelling on mere mental impotence. He contends that reasoning is “a trial of strength between different connections in consciousness—a systematic struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness.” But this is a very inadequate account, and altogether omits the main element of ratiocination, which is the seeing that one proposition necessary follows from the junction of two others, making that truth explicit which was before implicit. From all this he draws as a corollary the identical proposition that for each man “if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, he is obliged to think them in those ways.” If Mr. Spencer means that what we see to be evidently true necessarily, we must believe to be true, he is of course right; but his whole line of argument shows that he really means that whatever is indissolubly united in any man’s imagination, that, such man must believe. This, however, I altogether deny. The outer boundary of anything is necessarily connected in my imagination with another thing bounding it, and this applies equally if that anything is the whole material universe or its abstract, space. Yet I for one have no difficulty in believing that space (or the material universe) is really finite and has terminations with nothing beyond, though I cannot picture to myself such a condition of things; and no wonder I cannot, since the requisite experience neither I nor any other man has ever had. This is an example

* Which he does in Chapter XV., entitled “The Dynamics of Consciousness,” the contents of which may be thus epitomized:—§ 445. Looking at propositions from the subjective side only, the observer sees that some states of consciousness are so welded together that all other links in the chain of consciousness will give way first. § 446. Reasoning is a systematic struggle to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness. § 447. Therefore, what we must think, we must think. § 448. Though we may not be able to say what objective existence is, yet we must be conscious of its reality, and this is the all-sufficient warrant for the assertion of its existence. § 449. While reasoning can neither verify nor falsify this deliverance of consciousness it can account for it. We must therefore examine the cohesions of consciousness to see if there are any absolute cohesions by which its elements are aggregated into two antithetical halves standing for subject and object.

of mental limitation and relative impotence. Similarly, I cannot of course imagine myself annihilated, but I can and do believe that Almighty God could annihilate me, though I see clearly that even He could not make two parallel straight lines meet from a *positive* intuition of absolute, universal, objective necessity. The slavery of sense is the lot of the mere animal—it is also no privation, it is its happiness; but *our* reason rises above the presentations of sense, which it makes use of, but at the same time criticizes and judges. Mr. Spencer's "dicta of consciousness" are nothing more than such presentations of sense surviving and recurring in complexly related clusters, and having no real hold on objectivity. No wonder, then, that Mr. Spencer says (p. 452), as to any rational conclusion at which any man may have arrived, "It matters not what name he gives to his conclusion—whether he calls it a belief, a theory, a fact, or a truth. *These words can be themselves only names for certain relations amongst his states of consciousness.*" (The italics are mine). Here we see plainly foreshadowed the desolate scepticism into which Mr. Spencer's "Realism" ultimately collapses. If "truth" and "fact" are "*only*" names for states of consciousness, we have no warrant for believing any truth or trusting any fact; we are in absolute Idealism after all, and one of the worst possible kind, an Idealism which denies ideas and affirms mere sensations and blind instincts alike unaccountable and untrustworthy.

But if there is no warrant for "truth" or "fact," what warrant can there be for Mr. Spencer's system, and how can a disciple of his, without intellectual suicide, believe it to be true? But every sane man who consents even to argue sincerely as to the trustworthiness of his faculties, thereby accepts the objective character of truth, and as Mr. Spencer has earlier said (§ 439, p. 437) of perception, whatever may have been its origin it has acquired a new significance to the developed intelligence which uses it. Starting, as Mr. Spencer here does, from pure subjectivity, nothing can be more certain than that the mind declares certain propositions to be "true" and to express "facts," and it is no less certain that the mind declares it means by those terms something more than that it has a certain state of consciousness to which it gives these names. Here we see the folly of all systems of metaphysics which do not begin with recognising our convictions of "truth" and "fact," and our evident certainty that they have real objective validity altogether beyond and independent of the mind which recognises and thinks about them.

Mr. Spencer then goes on to examine* the cohesions among the

* This he does in Chapter XVI., entitled "Partial Differentiation of Subject and Object." It contains the following sections:—§ 450. States

elements of consciousness with a view to elucidating the formation of the two conceptions called subject and object. For this purpose, he imagines himself sitting by the sea-shore and experiencing a number of simultaneous and successive states of consciousness, which looked at from the subjective standpoint arrange themselves as vivid (sensations from external objects) and faint (reminiscences, imagination, and thoughts). He finds successively that these two groups distinguish themselves not only as vivid and faint, but also as predecessors or originals, and as successors or copies; as unchangeable at will and as changeable at will; as parts of a whole vivid aggregate, and as parts of a faint aggregate whole; as one aggregate quite independent of the other, and as another only partially independent of the other; as having antecedents that may or may not be traceable, and as having antecedents that are always traceable; and, finally, as belonging to a whole of unknown extent, and as belonging to a whole restricted to what we call memory.

But Mr. Spencer would not, of course, deny that he cannot altogether succeed in restricting himself to a subjective world, but must be ever looking out on that objective world which for the time he is endeavouring to ignore. And in the pictures he draws of the vivid states of consciousness he supposes himself to experience—the sunlight, the smell of sea-weed, the sound of breakers, the distant headland “with its white cliff and sweep of green above,” the sea-fog, the stone thrown, the brayings of a three-boy band, &c.—he really means not sensations merely, but *perceptions*, and in these perceptions, even according to *his own system*, not merely vivid states enter as components, but faint states also—namely, variously aggregate and clustered feelings of relation. *A fortiori*, according to the philosophy which has been here defended, there is, indeed, more than sensations.* Moreover, it may be confidently denied that the

of consciousness divide themselves into the relatively vivid and the relatively faint. § 451. The former, are original; the latter, are derived. § 452. The former, can be altered by volition; the latter, cannot. § 453. The former, are parts of a vivid aggregate, never known to be broken; the latter, form parts of an aggregate also never known to be broken, but more or less pliable. § 454. The former, are completely independent of the latter; while the latter, are partially dependent on the former. § 455. Each aggregation has its own laws of co-existence and succession. § 456. The former, may or may not have antecedents within consciousness; the latter, always have. § 457. The former, are parts of a whole of unknown extent; the latter, belong to a restricted whole. § 458. Recapitulation. § 459. Thus all sensations and relations gravitate round two centres—the vivid round one centre, the faint round the other.

* See *ante*, the review of the Chapter on “Perception in General,” in the eighth part of this examination, published in the DUBLIN REVIEW for April, 1879.

imaginings, reminiscences, and ideas are always less vivid than the other series of states; he says himself (p. 459), "The sight of the lady with the book may rise into a predominance, and gain a momentum so great that the stream of vivid states scarcely affects it." But the mere thought of a lady which a tune played by the "three-boy band" calls up, may be so intensely vivid and absorbing as to cause temporary blindness and deafness to all surrounding objects.

Thus, perceptions and thoughts must ever be in danger of running, and must frequently run indistinguishably one into the other. But what, then, comes of Mr. Spencer's all-fundamental distinction? In fact, however, what Mr. Spencer really means is not to distinguish between "vividness and faintness" of "feeling," but between "clearness" and "obscurity" of "perceptions"—a widely different matter.

Nevertheless, I by no means intend to sneer at Mr. Spencer's sixteenth chapter, which is an able and clear exposition of the way in which a sensuous differentiation between itself and the surrounding world may take place in brutes. Such an unconscious, relatively passive differentiation and integration of feelings probably does take place in them.

Here, then, Mr. Spencer is only consistent with himself in ignoring the action of that intellect which he himself uses, but the existence of which he persistently refuses to recognise. Continuing his process of examination,* he proceeds to explain how, according to his system, subject and object become completely differentiated. But in the very beginning of this chapter his distinction between the two great series of states, the vivid and the faint, suddenly breaks down in considering emotions which he admits are some of them vivid and some of them faint. In calling attention, as I just now did, to the vividness of feeling

* He continues it in Chapter XVII., headed "Completed Differentiation of Subject and Object," which contains the following sections:—§ 460. Emotions, though vivid, belong to the faint series. § 461. A specially differentiated portion of the vivid aggregate (*i.e.*, the body) is somehow attached to the faint aggregate. § 462. This special part of the vivid aggregate becomes known as that through which the faint aggregate acts on the rest of the vivid aggregate, and the rest of the vivid aggregate, on the faint aggregate. § 463. Parts of this special part (*i.e.*, of the body) can be both simultaneously and successively generative and recipient of vivid states (*i.e.*, be active and passive), and so produce feelings of resistance and effort. § 464. The association thus produced gives rise to feelings of resistance and effort on the part of the rest of the vivid aggregate. § 465. The active energies of the latter make these feelings still stronger, and give rise to the ideas of power separated from, but in some way akin to, the power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within itself.

which a remembered melody may induce, I anticipate the admission he here makes. But I deny that emotions are the only mental states, properly so called, which may be vivid; for I might have instanced some purely intellectual problem which might be suggested by the chance juxtaposition of some pebbles, but which might take entire possession of consciousness and rise to a high degree of vividness. It is a singular and noteworthy thing, that after establishing vividness and faintness as the main distinguishing character of a complete division of all states of consciousness—a division giving rise to the primary distinction between subject and object—Mr. Spencer after all should have expressly to say (p. 468), "the classification by intensity here fails!" Hume seems, then, to have more reason on his side than Mr. Spencer in his classification of emotions and desires with the other vivid feelings which he calls impressions.

Mr. Spencer ranks vivid emotions, however, with the great mass of faint feelings, on the ground that they generally cohere rather with other faint states than with other vivid states; that, like the former, their antecedents are traceable; that they conform to the laws of the faint states and depend upon the latter, and are similarly limited. This classification of emotions, however, lends force to a suspicion which can hardly but have obtruded itself on the reader. It is this: Mr. Spencer knows as well as other men the difference between "thoughts and feelings" and "real objective material objects," and the suspicion can hardly be avoided that he has not really classified his "states of consciousness" from their subjective aspects, but rather according to this very clear and obvious knowledge. He goes on to endeavour to show how the perception of our own body and of its efforts and resistances gives rise to the ideas resistance and force, to the sense of power in ourselves, and to the idea of power in an external world. And here, again, this chapter may be warmly commended as an excellent exposition of what may be the mode of origin of such sensuous perceptions of external things as brutes possess. But here, as in so many other places, Mr. Spencer silently introduces those very conceptions the existence of which have to be explained. He appears to have no eyes for the abyss which yawns between the most complex associations of feelings of touch and resistance and an intellectual perception of solidity.* He represents us as becoming conscious,

* Thus, in his second part, Mr. Spencer confounded "the mental shock felt in passing from one feeling to another" with "the dissimilarity itself." This feeling of shock is one thing, the perception of dissimilarity is indeed another.

through mutual explorations of parts of our own body, of a power to effect changes in the external world. But how can we ever be so conscious without having the ideas "power," "substance," "existence of self," &c.?

Throughout, Mr. Spencer uses the expression, "states of consciousness," to denote such feelings as those of an *amœba* (which even he would admit to be unconscious feelings) as well as the perceptions of a distinctly self-conscious intellect; and having given the same name to both it becomes easy work to show that they are different forms of one mode of existence. But, in fact, it is necessary every time Mr. Spencer uses the delusive words "states of consciousness" to examine and see from the context what his real meaning is—whether he is referring to mere sensations and imaginations, or to intellectual activity. Evidently Mr. Spencer's Realism is fast slipping away into a most advanced Idealism—at least his explanation of our perceptions of external objects, their powers and properties, and even our perception of our own body, is such as any Idealist might perfectly accept, and is, in fact, but the old story of Locke and his successors elaborated and improved by a more advanced physiology. That touches and pressures, pinchings and finger-pullings, serve to elicit from animals a sensuous perception of their environment sufficient for their needs, and also serve to elicit from our intellect its latent perceptions and judgments as to objective being and its various categories, is most true, and we may see how, by the addition of a distinct recognition of the active sympathetic intellect, Mr. Spencer's system may be transformed from a contradictory jumble of inconsistent notions into a stable and valid system of realistic philosophy.

The same system of exposition he pursues still further, in a manner which, as usual, is superficially satisfactory but fundamentally erroneous, setting forth his views as to the nature and genesis of our ideas, "existence" and "matter."* As to the former, he tells us (p. 482) that the word existence

* In Chapter XVIII., entitled "Developed Conception of the Object," the contents of which may be summarized as follows:—§ 466. The root conception of existence beyond consciousness, becomes that of resistance plus some force which resistance measures. § 467. The idea, existence, becomes developed by distinguishing between the transitory and the permanent. § 468. All these experiences unite to form a conception of something beyond consciousness and uniting independence, permanence, and force—i.e., we get "matter." § 469. Similarly the subject is built up as the unknown permanent nexus which holds states of consciousness together, but the permanent existence of a substantial *ego* is an hypothesis without evidence. § 470. Thus the normal processes of thought inevitably originate a consciousness of something beyond consciousness symbolized by what is within it.

"has no other meaning" than "duration as distinguished from transitoriness." But the idea "existence" or "being," examined by the developed intellect, is seen to be clear, distinct, and unanalyzable, and one which must be present, though not necessarily be adverted to, in every perception whatever, and in every thought, whether of subject or object, of external things or of their quantities, qualities, or relations, and even in the thought of things not as existing actually but only potentially. Everything which has appeared to us, however instantaneously, is known by us to have "existed," and so is everything the rapidity of which is so great that no sense of ours can take cognizance of it, though our intellect tells us it must have been for an unimaginable moment. Moreover, it is obviously impossible to compare the relative duration of things without knowing that they exist, and therefore without our already having the idea of "existence." That sensations of different degrees of persistence may be the means of evoking into activity the idea of existence latent in our synthetic intellect is possible or probable, but that the idea when got "has no other meaning" than that here assigned to it will, I think, be recognised as an utter mistake by every unprejudiced and competent mind carefully examining its own ideas. He seems (§ 468) also unduly to regard "matter" and "the object" as equivalent terms, but on his own system we have no reason to regard the minds of others as more material than our own—not but that he represents, as alone permanent, the material substance of the body. He says (p. 485) of ideas, they "have no more a continued existence than we have found the impressions to have. They are like the successive chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die away as others are sounded. And it would be as proper to say that these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist in the piano, as it is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain. In the one case, as in the other, the actual existence is the structure which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations."

Now, of course we, no more than Mr. Spencer, would allow that mental states persist, but we affirm that a substantial *ego* persists, the mind which has the states. I do not recollect to have met elsewhere in Mr. Spencer's writings such an unequivocal declaration of materialism as the assertion that the "structure" ("piano" or "brain") is "the actual existence." I affirm, on the other hand, that "the actual existence" is the soul which gives form to the material structure, which, unlike the soul, does not even persist during life, but changes continually, and has neither "independence" nor "force" save as informed by the persisting soul.

We now reach the final result* and outcome of all the foregoing chapters of the seven parts through which we have followed Mr. Spencer's reasonings and expositions. After a recapitulation of the reasonings and conclusions of the preceding eighteen chapters, Mr. Spencer gives us a full explanation of his philosophy, to which he gives the name "Transfigured Realism," which we shall find to be marvellously like the Idealism he has combated. He asks (p. 493), what is the Realism at which we have arrived? "Is it the Realism of common life—the Realism of the child or the rustic? By no means." And he refers to his earlier chapters† as having shown that "what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistances, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable;" and he also tells us that his Realism "simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and independent of, subjective existence." How dare Mr. Spencer, then, attack Berkeley as unreasonable? He asserted that fully. The only difference between Berkeley's system and Spencerism, as thus stated, is that the latter commits the absurdity of calling his known objective reality "unknowable," while Berkeley, with far greater reason, concludes it to be Almighty God Himself. Mr. Spencer does not seem to know his own mind, but plays fast and loose, trying to obtain what he deems the advantages of both Idealism and Realism, while his system has really the merits of neither, though, as before said, it is capable of conversion into a Rational Realism.

By his contentions against the schools of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and his assertions that their very terms imply the Realism they deny, he has naturally led us to infer that the common belief that the numbers, shapes, solidities, and motions of bodies, really exist objectively as we understand them to exist. It must

* In Chapter XIX., "Transfigured Realism," the contents of which may be thus stated :—§ 471. Recapitulation of Mr. Spencer's seventh part. § 472. The Realism arrived at is "Transfigured Realism," which simply asserts an objective existence, but does not affirm that either any modes or connexions between modes in it, are objectively what they seem. § 473. A diagram representing the reflexion of a cube upon a convex surface may serve to explain the system of Transfigured Realism, and to show the folly of all other systems. § 474. The various idealist and sceptical systems have not been really held (because they could not be) by those who thought they held them. § 475. Thus the existence of subject and object originally assumed, has become a verified truth, and we are once more brought to the conclusion that behind all manifestations of inner and outer is the one permanent unknowable reality.

† On the "Relativity of Feelings," and of "Relations between Feelings," in the second part, in his first volume. I must here refer the reader to the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1875, where he will find my criticism of those earlier chapters of Mr. Spencer's work.


be so, since no system can be deemed either *primitive, simple, or distinct* which asserts that neither extension, nor figure, nor number is in reality what it appears, or which affirms (as Mr. Spencer does) that no perception of ours can resemble or be in any way akin to any external object or relation. Yet Mr. Spencer has denied the objective validity of our ideas of quantity, quality, and relation, even our perception of "difference;" and he tells us dogmatically (p. 494) that "no relation in consciousness can resemble or be in any way akin to its source beyond consciousness." Thus the universe, as we know it, disappears not merely from our gaze, but from our very thought. Not only the sights and sounds of Nature cease for us to be realities, but even the solidity of the very ground we tread on—nay, even the coherence and integrity of our own material frame—dissolve from us, and leave us vaguely floating in an insensible ocean of unknowable potentiality. And *this* is REALISM; this is what is justified to us as being primitive, simple, and distinct, as being prior to Idealism, "everywhere and always, in child, in savage, in rustic, in the metaphysician himself" (p. 374). Mr. Spencer may well call this "Transfigured Realism." If he were to invite hungry men to a feast, and having discoursed to them on the digestibility of sauces and meats, the relations of appetite, digestion, and nutrition, then led them into a room not furnished with tables supporting the meats themselves, but hung round instead with tables of the chemical formulæ of alimentary substances, the disappointment of his guests would hardly be greater than that of many readers who, having read his arguments from priority, simplicity, and distinctness, come finally upon "Transfigured Realism" as the result. Mr. Spencer can, of course, draw various distinctions* between what he calls "Crude Realism" and his own system, but he can urge nothing against the unquestionable fact that our reason assures us that the number, figure, and extension of objects are just as certainly real as is the existence of anything beyond consciousness at all.

But his own system need not by any means be so sceptical as he makes it. Let us first see his own exposition of it. He graphically represents it by a diagram (on p. 496), which he describes, after first recalling to his reader's recollection the explanation of the theory of perspective. He says his reader "remembers that, looking through the window at some object—say a trunk lying on the ground outside—he may, keeping his eye fixed, make dots with pen and ink on the glass so that each dot hides an angle of the trunk; and may then join these dots by

* For Mr. Spencer's self-defence against a charge of the nature here made, see the *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1873.

lines, each of which hides one of the edges of the trunk. This done, he has on the surface of the glass an outline representation such as we call a perspective view of the trunk—a representation of its form not as conceived,* but as actually seen. If now he considers the relation between this figure and the trunk itself, he finds the two variously contrasted. The one occupies space of three dimensions, and the other space of two dimensions; the lines of the one are far longer than those of the other; the ratios among the lines of the one are unlike the ratios among the lines of the other; the directions in space of the representative lines are wholly different from those of the actual lines; the angles they make with one another are dissimilar; and so on. Nevertheless, representation and reality are so connected that the positions of his eye, the glass, and the trunk, being given, no other figure is possible; and if the trunk is changed in altitude or distance, the changes in the figure are such that from them the changes in the trunk may be known. Here, then, he has a case of a symbolization such that, along with extreme unlikeness between the symbol and the actuality, there is an exact though indirect correspondence between the varying relations among the components of the one and the varying relations among the components of the other.

"A more involved case of the same general nature may now be taken. Suppose A B C D is the surface of a cylinder; suppose *x* is a cube, in front of it; and suppose that from some point



beyond *x* there radiate the lines shown, severally passing through the angles of the cube, as well as other lines not shown, passing through all the points which form the edges of the cube. Then

* Note this most important "word conceived," which contains a great admission.

these lines, when intercepted by the curved surface, will form a projected image of the cube, as shown at G. Then it is observable, as before, that the length, ratios, directions, &c., of the lines in the image are wholly different from those in the solid; that the angles also, both absolutely and in their relations to one another, are different; and that so, too, are the surfaces, both in their shapes and in their relative directions. But beyond this it is observable that lines which are straight in the cube are curved in its image; and that the flat surfaces of the one are represented by curved surfaces in the other. Yet further, it is to be noted that the laws of variation among the lines in the image here become greatly involved; if the cube be so moved laterally that the projected image falls very much on the retreating surface of the cylinder, some of the representative lines begin to elongate at much greater rates than the others; and even the remoter parts of each line elongate at greater rates than the nearer parts. Nevertheless, in this case, as in the simpler one first described, there is an absolutely definite system of correspondences. Given as fixed, the cylinder, the dimensions of the cube, and the point whence the lines radiate, and for every position, distance, or attitude of the cube, there is a corresponding figure on the cylinder; and no change in the place of the cube or in its attitude can be made but what has an exactly answering change in the figure—a change so exactly answering, that from the new figure the new place or attitude of the cube could be determined.

"Thus we have a symbolization in which neither the components of the symbol, nor their relations, nor the laws of variation among these relations, are in the least like the components, their relations, and the laws of variation among these relations, in the thing symbolized.* And yet reality and symbol are so connected that for every possible re-arrangement in the *plexus* constituting the one, there is an exactly equivalent re-arrangement in the *plexus* constituting the other.

"The analogy to be drawn is so obvious that it is scarcely needful to point it out in detail. The cube stands for the object of perception; the cylindrical surface stands for the receptive area of consciousness; the projected figure of the cube stands for that state of consciousness we call a perception of the object."

Now I must altogether deny that the "cylindrical surface" can "stand for the receptive area of consciousness." It must stand for the *organism*, and its *sense organs*, *internal and external*. If the organism be informed and vivified by an active

* Thus all, even our sensational, knowledge being "symbolical," according to Mr. Spencer, what becomes of the great distinction drawn by him (in his "First Principles") between "symbolical conceptions" and "real conceptions"?

intellect, that intellect it must at least be admitted *may* have the power of so reading the impressions made upon it as thereby to perceive external objects and the relations between them as they really are in themselves. Mr. Spencer admits that our ultimate appeal is to our subjective certainty, and our intellect affirms that it has that power which we see we cannot deny that it may have. It affirms by its most positive declarations the real objectivity, not only of an external world, but also the objectivity of the solidity, extension, number, figure, &c., of its several parts. To doubt this is to be logically an absolute sceptic. To accept its declarations, on the other hand, carries with such acceptance the affirmation of a power in us which can transcend subjectivity and know things as they really are in themselves, and the existence of such a power is congruous with and implies the existence of such an intellectual soul as that which theologians and rational philosophers affirm the existence of. What is the difficulty of accepting this at once natural and philosophic view? Let it be granted that in every perception there is not only the action of the object but also what poor Mr. Lewes calls "the greeting of the spirit," does any impossibility thence arise of our knowing things "in themselves"? Not a bit! Our intellect has the power of subtracting its own subjective element. Let the perception in its genesis be conceded to be $x + y$, x being the *ego* and y the object. The mind has the power of supplying its own $-x$, so we get through the conjunction of the mind and the object $x - x + y$, or y pure and simple. I repeat "What is the difficulty of accepting this view?" Is it more wonderful that the mind should be endowed with the power of truly perceiving, than that it should be endowed with the power of having sensations such as we know we have? What can be more wonderful than the phenomena of our vision, consider them how you may? Mr. Spencer admits we have the mental form "likeness" or "difference." What can be more amazing than that such "states of consciousness" should be at all? If those ideas, difference and likeness, have no objective validity, our whole knowledge is a dream; and if they have objective validity, they carry us at once out of mere subjectivity in one thing—why should not our faculties be enabled to carry us beyond it in other things?

Mr. Spencer goes on to point out how his diagram explains the errors of Crude Realism, Idealism, and Scepticism, and in so doing he tells us: "Crude Realism assumes that the lines and angles and areas on the curved surface are actually like the lines and angles and areas of the cube." All I can say is, I should like to meet with a "Crude Realist." It has never yet been my lot to find one. Mr. Spencer says: "There is no kinship of nature whatever between the cube and the projected image."

But who says there is any such kinship of nature? I have never known any one so to affirm.

Mr. Spencer goes on to say : "The projected figure contains no element, relation, or law, that is like any element, relation, or law in the cube." This is far too strong. How could Mr. Spencer call it an "image" of the cube if such were the case? A certain "likeness" he must admit. Again he says (p. 499) : "The projected figure can never have within it any trait whatever, either of the actual cube from which it is projected or the actual surface on which it is projected." But Mr. Spencer must admit that the parts of the image are curved like the surface on which it is projected. Thus, by his own illustration, the "image" has relations of real conformity both with the object and with the subject ; but, according to my philosophy, the living principle of the cylinder does not "know" the image at all (except by a process of complex reasoning) ; it knows directly the cube through its impressions—the image only represents it in the sense of *making it present* to the perceiving mind, which directly apprehends it, its real relations and its essential nature.

But this mere *relativity* of knowledge which Mr. Spencer here, as before in his second part, so unequivocally asserts, shows that, as I said in the beginning of this article, *his system involves the denial of all truth, and stultifies itself.*

As I have just said, he emphatically asserts again and again, at the end as at the beginning of his "Psychology," the *relativity*—the merely phenomenal character—of all our knowledge. That we can know nothing but phenomena, that everything absolute escapes us—as being for ever unknowable and beyond the ken of the human intellect—is a cardinal principle with him ; for he tells us (p. 493) that all "objective agencies" productive of "subjective affections," are not only "unknown" but also "unknowable."

But every philosophy, every system of *knowledge*, must start with the assumption (implied or expressed) that something is really "knowable"—that something is "absolutely true;" and Mr. Spencer evidently means us to understand that his doctrine of the "relativity of all our knowledge" is really and absolutely true. But if nothing that we can know corresponds with reality, if nothing we can assert has a more than relative or phenomenal value, why does not this character also appertain to the doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge? Either this system of philosophy itself is relative and phenomenal only, or it is absolutely and objectively true. But it must be merely phenomenal if everything known is merely phenomenal. Its value, then, can be only relative and phenomenal—that is, it has no absolute value, does not correspond with objective reality, and is there-

fore false. But if it is false that our knowledge is only relative, then some of our knowledge must be absolute ; but this negatives the fundamental position of the whole philosophy.

Any philosophy, then, which starts with the assertion that all our knowledge is merely phenomenal refutes itself, and is necessarily suicidal. Every asserter of such a philosophy must be in the position of a man who saws across the branch of a tree on which he actually sits, at a point between himself and the trunk. If he would save himself he must refrain from destroying that which alone sustains him in his elevated position. The validity of the human intellect then asserts itself by the very reasoning of those who would explicitly deny its competency to apprehend what is "absolutely true," and who would confine it to the "relative" and the "phenomenal"; by a just retribution they are hoisted with their own petard.

We may now summarize the results of our prolonged examination of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," and of the philosophy it is directed to support. In spite of the genius of its author it possesses, as expounded by himself, the following grave defects :—

(1) It fails to account for or harmonize with the dicta of consciousness as to the substantiality and persistence of the *ego*.

(2) It fails correctly to interpret the ultimate and fundamental declarations of consciousness as to necessary truth.

(3) It denies the validity of that power of intensifying a motive by a voluntary act of selective attention of which power our own minds are conscious.

(4) It does not accept as valid the principle of contradiction, deprived of which our intellectual state becomes necessarily chaotic.

(5) It negatives the declarations of idealist philosophers upon grounds which would justify the popular belief as to objectivity, and yet it denies to such belief all truth and reality.

(6) It makes no essential distinction between the self-conscious intellect of man, manifested by a language expressing general conceptions, and the acquisition of sensible perceptions, as cognized by the sentient faculties of animals which are capable of expressing themselves by emotional signs only.

(7) It takes no cognizance of our perception of truth, goodness, and beauty, as such, nor of our apprehension of the relatedness of relations.

(8) It is absolutely fatal to every germ of morality.

(9) It entirely negatives every form of religion.

(10) It absolutely stultifies itself by proclaiming its own untruth, as included in its operation that all our knowledge is but phenomenal and relative.

The philosophy which accepts the existence of a distinct intellectual principle in man, on the other hand—

(1) Accounts for and harmonizes with the dicta of consciousness as to the *ego*.

(2) It readily accepts the declaration of reason as to ultimate and necessary truths.

(3) It asserts that power of election which our reason and perception of responsibility make known to us.

(4) It accepts the principle of contradiction, and thereby induces order into our intellectual cognitions.

(5) It accords with the teaching of common sense, without being bound down within its limits.*

(6) It establishes the distinction between reason and instinct, and between language and emotional expressions.

(7) It takes cognizance of our highest perceptions, including those of truth, goodness, and beauty, as such.

(8) It supports and enforces moral teaching.

(9) It harmonizes with the declarations of religion, both natural and revealed.

(10) It asserts its own truth in affirming the validity of our primary intuitions.

With these summaries before his eyes, the reader may wonder what the meaning could have been of the declaration made in the beginning of the paper as to the value and importance of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Before concluding, then, I desire to point out that a variety of positions maintained by Mr. Spencer are not only both important and true, but may by a philosophical development consistent with them, transform his whole system into a satisfactory, intellectual Realism. Thus he makes his ultimate appeal to what can be shown to be really propositions seen by the intellect to be necessarily true. He admits the validity of our intuition of an external world. Also, in spite of his seeming denial of the substantial *ego*, he admits that we are compelled to think that something "persists in spite of all changes," and he "maintains the unity of the aggregate in spite of all efforts to divide it." Even as regards recognition of time relations, he admits (vol. i. p. 326) that these are "scarcely more than foreshadowed among the higher animals;" and as to acts in anticipation of future events he allows (*l. c.* p. 338) that "only when we come to the human race are correspondences of this degree of speciality exhibited with distinctness and frequency."

* The assertion that common sense is right, by no means carries with it the assertion that other things cannot be which common sense does not ordinarily or ever apprehend. It is enough that our faculties are not mendacious; no one pretends but that there may be existences of varied kinds which our faculties cannot perceive.

He thus approximates to that recognition of the difference between "sensuous perception" and "intellectual apprehension," the carrying out of which would change his philosophy into almost all that we could desire. Similarly, Mr. Spencer's theology has its hopeful side. He even refers to an "ultimate cause," most mysterious and incomprehensible, to which he gives the self-contradictory name "the unknowable." To this supreme and inscrutable Being we must assign no limits,* and (most important of all) if Mr. Spencer declines to affirm "personality" of this Being, it is because (p. 109) any conception we can form of "personality" is inadequate, because *below* the unspeakable reality.

A consideration of these favourable characteristics will commend not only Mr. Spencer's system, but Mr. Spencer himself, to the goodwill of Catholics. Would that he could be persuaded for a time, if only hypothetically, to believe in the "relativity" of his own system as he understands it, and to open his mind to an unprejudiced examination of philosophy, uncorrupted by the errors of Descartes and his successors! Far more still is it to be desired that he would open his mind to Catholic theology; therein he would find all that would reconcile the philosophic and scientific truths he holds, and would meet with that "universal congruity," which he says† is "the goal" which philosophy can alone aspire to reach, and which would lead him to join with us in the adoring exclamation: "*Ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia—Spes nostra, salus nostra, honor noster, ó beata Trinitas!*"

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

* "First Principles," vol. i. p. 99.

† "Psychology," vol. ii. p. 502.



ART. III.—THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

PART III.

1. *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*. Sixty-two Vols. Paris : chez Renouard, 1819-1822.
2. *Œuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau*. Thirty-eight Vols. Paris : chez Poinçot, 1788-1793.
3. *Mémoires de Madame du Hausset*. Paris, 1824.
4. *La Femme au Dix-huitième Siècle*. Par E. et J. DE GONCOURT. Paris, 1878.
5. *Rousseau*. By JOHN MORLEY. London, 1878.
6. *Voltaire*. By JOHN MORLEY. London, 1878.
7. *Works of John Locke, with Life*. Eleventh Edition. Ten Vols. London, 1812.

I PROPOSE in this Paper to offer some remarks upon the condition of European thought in the eighteenth century, and it will be necessary for me, by way of introduction, to refer to two Articles of mine which have already been published in this REVIEW. In the first, which appeared in April last, I observed that when I speak of the eighteenth century I must be understood to mean the century which intervenes between the English Revolution often—and, on the whole, I think, justly—designated glorious, and the great French Revolution, to which no such epithet is prefixed: the hundred years between 1688 and 1788. I further observed, “I regard that century as the closing years of a period in the history of Europe: as the years in which the ideas animating that period are to be seen in their ultimate development and final resolution: the period which began with the movement known, according as one or another of its aspects is contemplated, as the Protestant Reformation, the Revival of Letters, the Rise of the New Monarchy, and which may with much propriety be designated the Renaissance Epoch. For this movement was essentially a rebirth, and that which was reborn was Materialism.” I went on to remark how this character is written upon it, as in every other department of life, so in the intellectual province and in the political: how in the one its negation of the supernatural order centring round the Apostolic Chair, strips truth of its objective character, and throws men back upon the individual reason as the only arbiter: while in politics it is a reproduction of the ancient Cæsarism, whose only basis was brute force.

And then I went on to sketch, in outline, the action of Renaissance ideas both in the public order and in the philosophical. The first stage in their history, I pointed out, might be considered, roughly speaking, to terminate with the sixteenth century: the publication of Montaigne's *Essays* in 1580, and the ruin of the Catholic League by the battle of Ivry, marking their firm establishment. The seventeenth century I regarded as **their second stage**, the period of their systematic development, **of which the Monarchy of Louis XIV. and the philosophy of Locke might be taken as types.** And this brought me to the threshold of my proper subject—the eighteenth century. “I shall have to consider,” I wrote, “first the progress of the Renaissance political idea, next of the philosophical, in Continental Europe during the last century, and then I shall glance at our own country and try to indicate the position which it occupied with respect to those ideas, and the influence which it exercised upon their career.”* The first part of this task I endeavoured to accomplish in a Paper which appeared in the last number of this REVIEW. I shall now be occupied with the second portion of it. The third I must leave to a future occasion.

The eighteenth century is as emphatically “*le siècle Français*” in the intellectual order as in the political. It may be designated both conveniently and accurately, so far as its spiritual and moral characteristics are concerned, the age of the *philosophes*, for the school of French thinkers known by that name gave it its distinctive tone and colour. They were everywhere read and admired, and the whole Continent was penetrated by their ideas. Other countries exercised but little influence on the world's thought. Germany may be said to have been dumb from Leibnitz to Lessing, for the voices of Spener and Semler, of Wolf and Moses Mendelssohn, were not world voices: never penetrating beyond their narrow Teutonic range, their echoes soon died away. Leibnitz and Lessing are thinkers of a very different calibre, but of them it is not necessary for me to speak. The great opponent of Locke quite failed to check the progress of the tide of scepticism, and the precursor of the *Auf-Klärung* belongs to the new school whose beginnings must indeed be referred to the last century, but whose work has been done in this. The south of Europe was sunk in mental torpor. Intellectually considered, Italy and Spain were during the eighteenth century a great void. England, it is true, produced a school of writers whose influence upon European thought was of the greatest moment. It was, however, through the medium of the French intellect that this influence was

* DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1879, p. 330.

exercised. The doctrines dominant throughout Europe a hundred years ago may all be traced from Locke's famous Essay. But Europe learnt them, not from the English thinker, but from his French disciples, who bettered his instruction.

The name of Locke is one of great importance in the moral and spiritual history of our race. It is not that his personal endowments, natural or acquired, were transcendently great; far from it. But they were exactly of the kind required for the work which he performed. Dry, prosaic, unimaginative, of no wide culture, and indeed of a nature not susceptible of much culture, he was admirably fitted to become the oracle of a system of metaphysics built upon that side of human nature of which alone he had knowledge, and ignoring or denying the existence of any other side. Mr. Mill reckons him the founder of "the analytical philosophy of the human mind," meaning thereby, I suppose, pretty much what was meant by d'Alembert's assertion that "he reduced metaphysics to what it ought to be, the experimental physics of the mind." So Voltaire eulogizes him as having been the first to pursue the true method in treating of the soul. Great philosophers before him, in Voltaire's judgment, had given very positive decisions on the subject; but since they knew nothing whatever about it their conclusions were naturally widely divergent.

Tant de raisonneurs (he goes on) ayant fait le roman de l'âme, un sage est venu qui en a fait modestement l'histoire. Locke a développé à l'homme la raison humaine, comme un excellent anatomiste explique les ressorts du corps humain. Il s'aide partout par le flambeau de la physique; il ose quelquefois parler affirmativement, mais il ose aussi douter.

And again he writes:—

Locke, après avoir ruiné les idées innées, après avoir bien renoncé à la vanité de croire qu'on pense toujours, ayant bien établi que toutes nos idées nous viennent par les sens, ayant examiné nos idées simples, celles qui sont composées, ayant suivi l'esprit de l'homme dans toutes ses opérations, ayant fait voir combien les langues que les hommes parlent sont imparfaites, et quel abus nous faisons des termes à tout moment; Locke, dis-je, considère enfin l'étendue, ou plutôt le néant des connaissances humaines. C'est dans ce chapitre qu'il ose avancer modestement ces paroles: Nous ne serons peut-être jamais capables de connaître si un être purement matériel pense ou non.*

This is the account given of Locke by the chief of the *philosophes*, with his unfailing clearness, vigour, and incisiveness. And it is in the main a true account. Personally a religious man, according to the conceptions of religion in which he had

* "Lettres sur les Anglais," xiii. "Œuvres," t. xxiv. p. 63.

been reared, Locke must be held to be the initiator of the sceptical movement in the ultimate phase which bolder and more logical minds worked out. No doubt earlier thinkers held many or all of the opinions which were most distinctive of him. But Locke was the first to formulate, systematize, and popularize the theory which we find in the "Essay on the Human Understanding." His system is the logical embodiment of the principle of self; of that doctrine of the independence and all-sufficiency of the human reason which is the *raison d'être*, the soul of Protestantism. He claims that the individual—the centre of his system—shall comprehend and explain everything, and accept no principles until "fully convinced of their certainty;" and in this, as he judges, "consists the freedom of the understanding." With him the senses are all in all. They are not merely the windows through which the soul looks out on the external world, but the actual sources of cognition. The mind is not the active judge, but the passive recipient of their impressions. The will is not, in truth, free* for him, nor is it an instrument of knowledge; neither is faith an intellectual act, its object truth, its result certitude. His method is purely physical, and everything in our compound nature which does not come within its scope—the immaterial, the supersensual, the mysterious—he ignores. That there is any sentient power in man, inherent and independent of sensation, any *αἰσθήσις τῆς ψυχῆς*, any *sensus intimus* our first and surest source of knowledge, he does not understand. He puts aside those "prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata"† of which S. Thomas speaks; he knows nothing of what a grave author of his own age denominates "rational instincts," "anticipations,

* I mean he does not recognize freewill as "a spiritual supersensuous force in man."

† "Prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata sunt quædam similitudines increatæ veritatis, unde secundum quod per eas de aliis judicamus, dicimur judicare de rebus per rationes immutabiles vel veritatem increatam."—De Mente, Art. 6. ad 6m. I think it right to add that these words, which are part of an answer to an objection No. 6, taken from St. Augustine, do not fully represent St. Thomas's doctrine as it is set forth in the body of the article to which they are subjoined, and which concludes as follows:—"Scientiam a sensibilibus mens nostra accipit: nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format in quantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formæ a sensibilibus abstractæ intelligibiles actu, ut in intellectu possibili recipi possint. Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodammodo omnei scientia originaliter indita, mediantibus uni versalibus conceptionibus, quæ statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per quas sicut per universalia principia judicamus de aliis et ea præcognoscimus in ipsis. Et secundum hoc illa opinio veritatem habet, quæ ponit nos ea quæ addiscimus ante in notitia habuisse."

prenotions, or sentiments, characterized and engraven in the soul, born with it, and growing up with it."* These things belong to a region of our nature which he did not frequent, and he dismisses them as dreams, not understanding that, in truth—

We are such stuff
As dreams are made of.

And thus, the ideal and spiritual world shut off, he conceives of man (to use Coleridge's words) "as an animal endowed with a memory of appearances and facts," and from that point of view unfolds his theory of the Human Understanding. He is the S. Thomas of *Renaissance* thought. Nor could the radical differences between the philosophical systems of Catholicism and Protestantism be better illustrated than by a comparison between the founder of the school of experimental psychologists and the Angelic Doctor.

Locke's application of his own method was partial and inconsistent, nor was it in this country that it received its full development. Its effects upon English thought were indeed of very great importance, but with these I am not now concerned. At present I turn to France, where it was carried with ruthless logic to its necessary consequences, and whence it penetrated the European mind. The wide difference between the tone of French speculation in the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth is very striking. In the former the Cartesian influence is predominant, and philosophy is essentially metaphysical and idealistic. In the latter it is essentially naturalistic and materialistic. And to Locke this change is mainly due. The *philosophes* of the eighteenth century were doubtless to some extent influenced by earlier writers of their own country, and especially by Montaigne and Bayle: but Locke was their great master, as they were never tired of confessing. The only difference between him and those of them whose teaching would have filled him with the most dismay, is

* Sir Matthew Hale's "Primitive Origination of Mankind," a book which, however antiquated in parts, deserves a better fate than the oblivion into which it has fallen. The following is the passage from which my citation is taken:—I come now to consider of those rational Instincts as I call them, the connate Principles engraven in the human Soul; which though they are Truths acquirable and deducible by rational consequence and argumentation, yet they seem to be inscribed in the very crasis and texture of the Soul antecedent to any acquisition by industry or the exercise of the discursive faculty in man, and therefore they may be well called anticipations, prenotions, or sentiments characterized and engraven in the Soul, born with it, and growing up with it till they receive a check by ill customs or educations, or an improvement and advancement by the due exercise of the faculties. I shall shew first what they are: secondly, what moves me to think that such are connatural.—p. 66.

that he less consistently expounds his own principles. For Locke, man is still a being endowed with reflection and sensibility, and although he reckons passive sensation the common source of our ideas, he judges that the mind is the chief agent in their development. Before a hundred years have passed away, Condillac, taxing him with inexactness—because reflection on his own showing is nothing in its principle, but sensation itself, and because it is less a source of ideas than a canal through which they flow from sense—boldly reduces all our knowledge to sensation. Condillac does indeed maintain in theory a distinction between soul and body; but he holds that sensation envelops all the faculties of the soul, that the judgment, reflection, the passions, are only sensation transforming itself. It is, therefore, obviously but a short and a natural step from his teaching to that of St. Lambert, that man is “une masse organisée et sensible qui reçoit l’esprit de tout qui l’environne, et de ses besoins,” and to the unadorned materialism of Cabanis who defines thought to be a secretion of the brain. Thus mind disappears in matter, and the doctrine refuted by the lips of the dying Socrates, that the soul is the result of the corporeal organization, reappears as the last word of the Lockian ideology. Such is, in fact, and as matter of history, the issue of the great sensualistic negation of the eighteenth century, and we can trace accurately its course in the manifold forms which it assumed from its first formulation to its final resolution. Thus we have the cynical Deism of Voltaire, the coarse Pantheism of Diderot, the sentimental Protestantism of Rousseau, the swinish Naturalism of Holbach, the full-fed Atheism of Helvetius, and many other developments which “prudens prætereo.” But in all worketh one and the selfsame spirit: all are the offspring of a way of thinking about the supernatural originally derived from Locke, either directly or through the school of English Deists which he unwittingly founded. The *philosophes* are all of one family and bear an unmistakable family likeness.

The greatest names of the *philosophe* sect are confessedly those of Voltaire and Rousseau. The thought of the eighteenth century, in the form in which it most potently affected the world, is summed up in these two men. Let us consider them a little. Let us see what their message to the human race was: what were the causes why it had such free course and was glorified, and what its practical fruits. And first, as to Voltaire, supreme literary excellence must, I suppose, on all hands be conceded to him. He knew exactly what he meant; he knew the words which could most perspicuously convey his meaning, and he knew, by the happy

instinct of genius, the most effective way in which to dispose and order them. There is no French like his in its incisive clearness, its perfect polish, its exhilarating grace. Casting about for similitudes, one might compare it to a bright flashing Damascus blade in the hands of a consummate master of fence: it is as hard, as bright, as a diamond of the purest ray: it is like "the foaming grape of Eastern France" with delicate bubbles dancing airily in the glass and subtle fumes ascending to the brain and stealing away the judgment. But if we go on from his style to his thought, we discover that that one secret of his power is the simplicity of his doctrine. It may be said of him, as he said of his master Locke, "he has no great possessions," "but his substance," such as it is, "is well assured." His lucidity is, in great measure, due to his tenuity. He is not hampered by that sentiment of the infinite which is at the root of religion, heroism, and, in the high sense of the word, poetry. He has one and only one test of truth. Can the thing of which there is question be seen, tasted, handled? "Sworn foe to mystery," he holds the supernatural as mere priestcraft, and looks upon the supersensual as an idle tale. Hence Christianity, as being the great system of spiritualism, and as being ostensibly in possession of the world's intellect, is the object pursued by him with unremitting enmity throughout his long life. It is the Infâme which he attacks with every weapon available to him "from the pamphlet to the folio, from the epigram to the sophism." But of all his arms the favourite and the most deadly was ridicule. I do not know who has more fairly estimated his work than Mr. Carlyle in the following passage:—

With Voltaire . . . by nature or by practice, mockery has grown to be the irresistible basis of his disposition; so that for him, in all matters, the first question is, not what is true, but what is false; not what is to be loved and held fast, and earnestly laid to heart, but what is to be contemned, and derided, and sportfully cast out of doors. Here, truly, he earns abundant triumph as an image-breaker, but pockets little real wealth. Vanity with its adjuncts, as we have said, finds rich solacement; but for aught better, there is not much. Reverence, the highest feeling that man's nature is capable of, the crown of his whole moral manhood, and precious, like fine gold, were it in the rudest forms, he seems not to understand, or have heard of even by credible tradition. The glory of knowing and believing is all but a stranger to him; only with that of questioning and qualifying is he familiar. Accordingly, he sees but a little way into Nature; the Mighty All, in its beauty, and infinite mysterious grandeur, humbling the small *me* into nothingness, has never even for moments been revealed to him; only this or that other atom of it, and the differences and discrepancies of these two had he looked into and noted down. His theory

of the world, his picture of man and man's life is little; for a poet and philosopher even pitiful. Examine it in its highest developments, you find it an altogether vulgar picture; simply a reflex, with more or fewer mirrors, of self and the poor interests of self. The 'Divine Idea, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance,' was never more invisible to any man. He reads history, not with the eye of a devout seer, or even of a critic; but through a pair of mere anti-catholic spectacles. It is not a mighty drama, enacted on the theatre of infinitude with suns for lamps, and eternity as a background; whose author is God, and whose purport and thousand-fold moral leads us up to the 'dark with excess of light' of the throne of God; but a poor wearisome debating-club dispute, spun through ten centuries, between the Encyclopédie and the Sorbonne. Wisdom or folly, nobleness or baseness, are merely superstitious or unbelieving; God's universe is a larger patrimony of St. Peter, from which it were well and pleasant to hunt out the Pope.*

In Voltaire we have the logical development, with supreme skill, of the idea which is of the essence of Protestantism. Mr. John Morley has observed, and justly, that through him, "the free and protesting genius of the Reformation," "late and changed, but directly of descent," "made its decisive entry into France."† His negations go further than those of the sixteenth century, further than those of Locke; but they are identically the same in principle.‡ He appeals to the private judgment, to common sense as the supreme arbiter, and holds the individual intellect bound to dismiss contemptuously all that it cannot master. He will not hear of any logic of the affections: of those reasons of the heart which the reason knows not,§ he is ever the bitter mocker. Again, reason, whose chief office the wisdom of the ancient world held to be the subduing of the passions, he regards merely as a weapon wherewith to combat superstitions. And by superstitions he

* "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. ii. p. 15.

† Morley's "Voltaire," p. 66.

‡ This has been admirably pointed out by Comte, in the fifth volume of his "Cours de Philosophie Positive," "C'est ce," he writes, "que la raison publique a depuis longtemps essentiellement reconnu, d'une manière implicite mais irrécusable, en consacrant, d'un aveu unanime, la dénomination très expressive de protestantisme, qui, bien que restreinte ordinairement au premier état d'une telle doctrine, ne convient pas moins, au fond, à l'ensemble total de la philosophie révolutionnaire. En effet, cette philosophie, depuis le simple luthéranisme primitif, jusqu'au déisme du siècle dernier, et sans même excepter ce qu'on nomme l'athéisme systématique, qui en constitue la plus extrême phase, n'a jamais pu être historiquement qu'une protestation croissante et de plus en plus méthodique contre les bases intellectuelles de l'ancien ordre social, ultérieurement étendue, par une suite nécessaire de sa nature absolue, à toute véritable organisation quelconque."—p. 540.

§ "Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas."—Pascal.

means not only all religious beliefs, hopes, emotions, but all thoughts which transcend the seen and actual, all that concerns itself with the spiritual side of man's nature. He holds metaphysics in hardly less contempt than theology :

Ces beaux-esprits dont le savant caprice,
D'un monde imaginaire a bâti l'édifice,*

are the objects of his unceasing and indiscriminating attacks. In some instances he quite fails to comprehend even the alphabets of their systems. Within certain limits his vision was superlatively clear, but those limits were narrow, and his favourite device is to mask his intellectual shortsightedness by an assumption of contempt for what is unknown to him. He understood in perfection the art of exhibiting the things which he did not understand as unworthy of being understood. Take the verses in which he accumulates his flouts and gibes upon Spinoza :—

Alors un petit juif, au long nez, au teint blême,
Pauvre mais satisfait, pensif et retiré,
Esprit subtil et creux, moins lu que célébré,
Caché sous le manteau de Descartes son maître,
Marchant à pas comptés s'approcha du Grand Être,
Pardonnez-moi, dit-il, en lui parlant tout bas,
Mais je pense, entre nous, que vous n'existez pas. †

What can be wittier than the picture here drawn of this great genius and his philosophy? What more ignorant? Whatever judgment we may form of Spinoza, certainly nothing can be more erroneous than the view which represents as an atheist "this God-intoxicated man," as Novalis calls him, "the writer who, more than any one else, resembles the unknown author of the *Imitation*," as Cousin judges. The truth is that Spinoza lived in heights far above, out of Voltaire's sight, who could only conclude that "he did not recognize any God, and only made use of the word in order not to frighten people." It is an eminently characteristic conclusion, and is, in itself, a revelation of the mind which arrived at it. Not less valuable from this point of view are Voltaire's notes on Pascal. Maine de Biran justly observes that they might have been expressly written to expose the littleness, the wretchedness, the puerility of the writer's

* "Les Systèmes," *Œuvres*, t. xii. p. 204. This short poem seems to me to be an epitome of Voltaire's mind. A most instructive parallel might be drawn between this embodiment of persiflage and the terrible verses on the Last Judgment, belonging to the same age, into which a far profounder genius seems to have emptied all the *sœva indignatio* of his lacerated heart.

† "Les Systèmes," *ubi supra*.

system, and bring into strong relief the elevation and greatness of a philosophy opposed to that of sensation.* And he elsewhere remarks :—

Voulez-vous trouver un exemple frappant du contraste qui'l y a entre le caractère grave, sérieux et méditatif qui appartient au beau siècle de la philosophie en France, et le ton léger, frivole, cavalier, qui caractérise le siècle de l'irréflexion? Lisez l'article 6 des Pensées de Pascal § 5 et la note de Voltaire, qui ne conçoit pas ce qui est la pensée, et comme elle constitue toute la dignité humaine cela est curieux et instructif pour l'histoire de la philosophie.†

It is most curious and instructive, for it is a fair specimen of a thinker, whose influence over the European mind no man has ever equalled.

Next to Voltaire, Rousseau undoubtedly fills the chief place among the *philosophes*. In mental constitution, in personal character, in tastes, temper, method, and style, as in the accidents of life, the two men were very far apart. But they have this in common, that they both represent the same idea. I spoke of Rousseau's system just now as "sentimental Protestantism," and I used the expression advisedly. It is his hereditary Genevan Calvinism, with its dogmatic element eliminated, and nothing but the emotion left. It is a religion, not of persons and things, but of phrases and feelings. We have in it the realization of that "undogmatic Christianity" the praises of which are in the mouths of so many eminent men of the present day. If, let me say, Dean Stanley and Professor Jowett should attempt to embody their theological "views" in any symbolic document (I trust I may be allowed to put the purely imaginary case without offence to those popular and prudent divines), I venture to assert that the result at which they would arrive would not differ materially from "The Savoyard Vicar's Profession of Faith." The substance of Rousseau's teaching, as of Voltaire's, is the assertion of those usurpations of the reason which he calls its rights. They are at one upon the cardinal point of Renaissance philosophy, the self-sufficiency of man in the order of thought and the order of action. This is the great principle which underlies all Rousseau's speculations. Hence, no less

* Maine de Biran, "Sa Vie et ses Pensées," p. 162.

† Ibid. p. 194. L'homme n'est qu'un roseau le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parcequ'il sait qu'il meurt, et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien (Pascal).—En quoi quelques idées reçues dans un cerveau sont-elles préférables à l'univers matériel? (Voltaire.)

than Voltaire, he is the foe of Christian doctrines and mysteries, the uncompromising enemy of the cult, the ministers, the institutions of the Catholic Church. The very able writer to whom the world is indebted for the most recent biography of him claims, indeed, for his scepticism a great superiority over that of Voltaire's, as being a far more powerful solvent of dogma. "The latter," says Mr. Morley, "only revolted and irritated all serious temperaments, to whom religion is a matter of honest concern; while the former appealed to his doubts, and the more intelligent and sincere their belief happened to be, the more surely would Rousseau's gravely urged objections dissolve the hard particles of dogmatic belief." His objections, Mr. Morley is pleased to add, "were on a moral level with the best side of the religion he assumed; those of Voltaire were only on a level with its lowest side."* Comparisons of this kind are of frequent occurrence with Mr. Morley, and induce a doubt whether his conceptions of Christianity are not chiefly derived at second-hand through its assailants, who have found in him so thorough-going an apologist. Still, the passage which I have just quoted no doubt contains a truth. Voltaire's biting sarcasm appealed chiefly to the more superficial, unreflecting, and corrupt, in an age of which superficiality, irreflexion, and corruption were the chief notes. Rousseau's sentimentalism at least "did not revolt the moral sense; it did not afflict the firmness of intelligence, nor did it silence the diviner melodies of the soul."† In the melancholy philosopher of Geneva we have the "sober brow" spoken of by the poet, which no "damned error" ever lacks, ready

to bless it and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament.

The reactionary guise which his teaching wore only served to render it more effectively iconoclastic. His writings, their essentially naturalistic character veiled by a turbid and inconsequent spiritualism, appeared when the time of Voltaire's greatest activity was over; and "souls weary of the fierce mockeries, that had so long been flying like fiery shafts against the far Jehovah of the Hebrews, and the silent Christ of the later doctors and dignitaries, and weary too of the orthodox demonstrations that did not demonstrate, and leaden refutations that did not refute, may well have turned"‡ longingly to this new Gospel. Alas! it was a Gospel of the kind of which the Apostle speaks—*aliud Evangelium quod non est aliud*; no Revelation from on high, but the fantasy of a diseased heart

* Morley's "Rousseau," p. 409. † Ibid. p. 404. ‡ Ibid. p. 403.

and a troubled conscience, a creation as hollow and unsubstantial as that which the Goddess of Dulness devised when

Empty words she gave and sounding strain,
But senseless, lifeless ! idol void and vain !

No doubt there was an element of intense reality about Rousseau's writings which principally contributed to their vast influence. But that element, if we narrowly examine it, is egotism of a quite portentous kind. No man probably was ever "sick of self-love" to the same degree. Whether we consider his political or religious speculations, the central figure is everywhere Jean Jacques Rousseau. But even in this he is but "falsely true." It is not the real Jean Jacques whom we see as he existed in this world, "a moral dwarf mounted on stilts,"* his enthusiasm of humanity largely tempered by vanity, irritability, selfishness, mendacity, pruriency, cowardice, and ignorance, but a quite transcendental Jean Jacques, highly exemplary† and altogether philanthropic,

lecturing all mankind
On the soft passion and the taste refined,

pointing afflicted humanity forward to a visionary new heaven and new earth, wherein dwell a shadowy Être Suprême and the Contrat Social, or backwards to an equally visionary "state of nature." I shall have again to touch upon Rousseau's attempts at construction. At present I would merely point out that, wholly illusory as they were, they did much to accelerate the downfall of the old order. In his zeal to clear the ground for his projected Temple of Humanity and to possess himself of such fragments of the existing religious and social structure as he judged might with advantage be built therein, he was no less destructive than Voltaire, whose "rage to overthrow without rebuilding" was the constant theme of his complaints. It may be truly said of him :—

Nothing is more imperfect than his way of thought. It is empty, superficial, mocking, dissolvent, good to destroy and nothing more. There is neither depth in it, nor height, nor unity, nor future ; nothing capable of serving as a foundation or as a bond.‡

It was not of Rousseau, but of Voltaire, that Rivarol spoke these words, but they are as applicable to the one as to the

* "Un nain moral sur des échasses." It was Madame de Epinay's judgment of him.

† See the curious passage at the beginning of the *Confessions*, where he challenges all the human race to produce any one who can truly say, "je fus meilleur que cet homme-là."

‡ Œuvres de Rivarol, p. 238.

other. More, they are truly descriptive of the whole sect of the *philosophes*. Negation is the substance of their teaching; it is nothing but a negation of the past, present, and future of the human race.

Such was the sceptical philosophy which possessed itself of the intellect of France and diffused itself from Paris through the whole of Europe. The *philosophes* anticipated, after their manner, the victories of the future Revolutionary hosts, and in truth the triumphs of the Encyclopædists, are by far the more wonderful than those of Napoleon. It is one of the most striking phenomena in history that a doctrine so flimsy, logic so shallow, conceptions so mean, should have been everywhere received as though they were self-evident and irrefragable truth. The "esprit infini" of Voltaire, the literary excellences long below his, it is true, but yet very considerable, of Rousseau, Diderot, Helvetius, Grimm, are quite insufficient to account for the success of the *philosophes*. It is only when we consider the moral and religious state of France when their sect arose that we find, I do not say a complete revelation of the causes which enabled it to effect so great an intellectual and spiritual revolution, but if not a complete revelation, at all events clear and decisive indications of them.

It is beyond question that the decay so conspicuously exhibited in the public order of France during the last quarter of a century of Louis XIV.'s reign, extended to every department of life. The decadence socially and religiously was just as great as it was politically, and may in large measure be attributed to the same cause. The supreme arrogance of the Cæsarism which sought to merge all individuality, all power, in its own greatness, exercised a fatal influence alike upon the domestic virtues, and the religious institutions of the country. It is not easy to overrate the corrupting effect produced upon the nation at large by the brilliant Court which ministered at Versailles to the pride of the monarch. The representatives of the great families of France were withdrawn from the duties, which are best fitted to form a manly character, to the enervating and debasing career of courtier life. It was a life led under the control of an etiquette as oppressive as military discipline, but void of all that gives to military discipline its value, and compensates for the surrender of individuality and personal freedom. Nor was the mischief confined to those who were most directly and immediately affected, for the influence and example of the Court were of potent operation throughout the country. It may be truly said,

hac fonte derivata clades
In patriam populumque fluxit.

That *relâchement des mœurs* which is so signal a characteristic of the eighteenth century may be traced directly to this source. And behind the veil of decent hypocrisy which hangs over the last years of Louis XIV. only too abundant evidence may be found how far the relaxation had proceeded before that monarch passed away.

The Cæsarism of Louis XIV. was even of more disastrous operation in the religious sphere. Whether we consider it as manifested in his treatment of Protestantism, of Jansenism, or the Holy See, it was fraught with the direst evils. The effect of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the dragonnades—not to speak of their baneful influence upon the position of Catholics in this and other countries—was to galvanize for a brief time into new life the older forms of Protestantism, and to send the clergy of France to confront the age of Voltaire and Rousseau, defiled by the stains of blood and the taint of the charnel house. Jansenism again was persecuted with a severity which was no less unwise. The more profound our conviction of the mischief inherent in a system which was in fact but disguised fatalism, the more lamentable will appear the policy which made martyrs of those who had fallen into that unlovely heresy, and which attracted towards it the sympathies of the enemies of Absolutism. The truth is that here, as in his monstrous cruelties towards the Protestants, Louis XIV. was in the main animated by his overmastering egotism. It was “the king’s religion” which it was attempted to dragoon into his Huguenot subjects, and his chief objection to the Jansenites was grounded upon the supposed republican tendency of their doctrine: “*le vrai Janséniste,*” it was said, “*ne relève que de Dieu.*” So too in his contests with the Holy See, the ambition of the French Monarch was to arrogate to himself a supremacy not very unlike that which Henry VIII. attained in this country. Not only was the king’s religion to be accepted by all men, but all men’s religion was to be the king’s. Louis XIV.’s ecclesiastical policy was all of a piece, and his severities against the Jansenist and Protestant dissidents were closely connected with the Gallican revolt against the Supreme Pastor. They were, in fact, the bribe offered to the clergy to betray to the civil power the Vicar of Christ. And the bribe was accepted. The Four Articles were the price of blood. The effect of an alliance with Absolutism, effected upon such conditions, was fatal to the position of the spirituality in France. From the baptism of Clovis until the seventeenth century was far advanced, the French Church had been the most popular of the institutions of the country, and she had merited her popularity. For she had been the pioneer of progress, the nurse of nationality, the champion

of conscience, the fosterer of freedom, and the protector of the poor. "Whole in herself a common good," her loyalty to the Holy See had been the condition and the bulwark of her independence. With her loyalty to Rome that independence vanished, and with it her popular power vanished too. A century passed away before the ecclesiastical order reaped in the civil constitution of the clergy the full harvest which they had sown in their acceptance of the Four Articles: before they themselves experienced the application of the law which they had rashly sanctioned against themselves* in their exultation at the confiscation of the Protestant Consistories. Their history during the whole of that interval is a history of ever-increasing decadence. Even before the death of Louis XIV. that decadence had gone very far; the moral and intellectual guidance of the country had slipped from their grasp, and religion shared in the contempt which had fallen upon its ministers. S. Simon tells us in his *Memoirs* that when the Duke of Orleans was setting out for Spain to join the Duke of Berwick the King asked him whom he proposed to take with him. Among others the Duke named M. de Fonterpuis. "What, my nephew!" exclaimed the King, much moved; "the son of that mad woman who was for ever running after M. Arnauld! a Jansenist!" "Nay, sire," replied the duke, "he does not believe in God at all." "Is it possible?" the King said. "Do you really tell me that? Well, if that is the case there is no great harm. Take him by all means." On en a ri fort à la cour et à la ville, adds S. Simon. It has been truly observed that in those laughs of the court and the town we have the whole spirit of the eighteenth century in germ.

The death of Louis XIV. was the signal for the open manifestation of this spirit to the world. It is not necessary to dwell upon the gross profligacy and cynical impiety which have made the period of the Regency proverbial for license and blasphemy. We read in the introduction to *Madame du*

* *Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam.*

† La différence, à l'égard de la pratique de la religion, durant le règne de Louis XIV. et celui de son successeur, quoique frappante, n'a pas été peut-être assez sentie. Pendant le premier, il ne meurt, ni personnage important, ni homme célèbre quelconque, qu'on ne cite la manière plus ou moins édifiante dont il a fini. La réconciliation d'un mourant avec l'Eglise, et son repentir, semblent consoler ses amis de sa perte. La Fontaine déclare, en présence de plusieurs membres de l'Académie française qui, à sa prière, s'étaient rendus chez lui, son extrême repentir du scandale qu'il avait donné par ses contes; et après sa mort, on le trouva revêtu d'un cilice qu'il portait depuis longtemps. Racine, dans ses dernières années, ne paraît occupé que de pratiques religieuses et d'exercices de piété; il renonçait la veille des grandes fêtes, à toute occupation,

Hausset's Memoirs how in ten years a change of two centuries seemed to have come over France: how a torrent of ridicule was poured upon devotion and the devout: how the most scandalous occurrences excited no surprise. It was then that the sect of which Voltaire may be reckoned the chief arose to provide a philosophy congruous to the spirit of the age; and in the doctrine of Locke he found a suitable foundation for it. Man in his deepest degradation is ever willing to justify himself; to fit to his practice a theory of life. To the French society of the epoch, a method which dealt with man as a wholly sensual being, putting aside the God it had ceased to honour, the supernatural voice of conscience to which it had grown deaf, the moral law to which even the tribute of hypocrisy was no longer paid, was supremely grateful. It is a true saying—whoever said it—that “*les Passions sont athées* :” they darken the spiritual intuitions and religious instincts of man's nature. Voltaire, with his experimental psychology, taught men to laugh at those instincts and intuitions, and it was in that guise of persiflage that the philosophy of sensation came to France: its political tendencies did not appear until much later. It is quite clear that Voltaire was no revolutionist, in the sense of deliberately wishing and intending to bring about the overthrow of the public order as it existed. Although “*gaudens popularibus auris*,” there was nothing of the demagogue about him. He did not write for lacqueys or the mob, as he contemptuously announced, and there are few more curious instances of the irony of events than his quasi-canonicalization by the *profanum vulgus* whom he ever hated and kept at a distance. “*Voltaireism*,” remarks Mr. Morley, “was primarily and directly altogether an intellectual movement, for this reason, that it was primarily and directly a reaction against the subordination of the intellectual to the moral side of man.”* It is as true as it is tersely put. And it was precisely because the new philosophy presented itself in such an aspect, making the

à toute affaire. On voit encore, dans les lettres que j'ai citées, comme dans d'autres, combien les prédicateurs étaient suivis et les livres de dévotion recherchés. Sous la régence, le ridicule fut versé à pleines mains sur les dévots et la dévotion; et il semblait, dix ans après la mort de Louis XIV., qu'il y eût deux siècles entre son règne et celui de Louis XV., du moins quant à la religion.

Les lettres de Mademoiselle Ayssé, réimprimées en 1805, contiennent des anecdotes assez curieuses, et donnent une juste idée des mœurs pendant la régence. Elles étaient devenues tellement désordonnées, que les événements les plus scandaleux semblaient ne pas étonner les contemporains. Mémoires de Madame du Hausset. Int. p. 9. The writer goes on to give some curious specimens of these “événements scandaleux.”

* Morley's “*Voltaire*,” p. 25.

individual reason, which, in practice, is apt to mean the individual appetite, the sole rule of life, that it won so ready a reception among men weary of "creeds that refuse and restrain."

The spirit of the age, then, whose "dull sound of subterranean impiety," long before it mixed itself with life, had fallen upon the keenly attuned ears of Bossuet, and filled the prescient genius of Pascal with those vague alarms which betray themselves in the febrile uneasiness of his writings, received from Voltaire its formulation and logical embodiment. In his hand it became a tremendous weapon which there was nothing left in France to resist. There arose none like unto Bossuet and Pascal among their discredited and degenerate successors. The clergy who were confronted with the new philosophy were as men sleeping upon the walls of the spiritual city of which they were the watchmen, unconscious of the hosts gathered together for its overthrow: and if they dimly awake from time to time to an apprehension of peril, they display an utter inability to discern the course of the century and the signs of the times. Their only resource is in the secular power. In reversal of the Apostolic word, it may be said that the weapons of their warfare are not spiritual but carnal, and impotent to the pulling down of strongholds. There was hardly one of their general assemblies during the reigns of Louis XV. and Louis XVI. in which demands for fresh severities against dissidents were not addressed by them to the king; demands mingled with servile adulation of the monarch, and constant iteration of the Gallican doctrine of his absolute and immediate divine right. At the same time their tone towards the Supreme Pastor is in the highest degree arrogant and disloyal, while their practical disregard of him is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that the great liturgical revolution of 1738 was effected without one word of reference to Rome. Meanwhile fresh fetters are heaped upon them by the civil power. As though the interdiction of their assemblies without the royal license, the prohibition of correspondence between Bishops and the Apostolic See, the multiplication of *appels comme d'abus*, the requirement of the registration of Bulls by the Council of State, the control of Episcopal Mandements, were not sufficient infringements of the liberties of the Church, the constant endeavour of the Parliaments throughout the century is to reduce the spirituality to entire submission and the lowest depth of humiliation. It is not necessary for me to follow the deadly conflicts between the great judicial corporations and the clergy, which are so marked a feature of the reign of Louis XV., and the true bearing of which upon the public order appears to have been discerned by that monarch,

through the "solid darkness" which encompassed his soul.* I am here merely concerned to point out how the pretensions of the Parliaments to regulate the administration of the Sacraments under pain of the galleys, to suppress or burn Papal and Episcopal documents treating of purely doctrinal matters, to revise the list of General Councils, and to sit in judgment upon canonized saints,† afforded infinite matter for the sneers of the *philosophes*, and vastly added to the ever-increasing discredit of religion. One great cause of that discredit lay in the hierarchy itself. The abbeys and bishoprics of the Church were filled chiefly with courtiers, often of scandalous lives, who had succeeded in winning the good graces of a minister or a mistress, and who were usually as eager to shirk the duties as to obtain the temporalities of their preferments. The parochial clergy shared in the prevailing degeneracy. They were for the most part, it is true, of blameless conduct, but they were seldom men of solid learning, or active zeal, or a spirit ecclesiastical. As to the religious orders, there is an immense amount of evidence which establishes only too clearly the deplorable relaxation of their discipline,‡ the Trappists, Cistercians, and Jesuits being, indeed, bright exceptions. Such were the accredited defenders of the faith in the eighteenth century; and, in truth, they were only a little less infected than their opponents by the new philosophy. They had drunk deeply into that dry, analytical,

* Mme. du Hausset in her Memoirs relates the following scene:—"Un jour, le *maître* (Louis XV.) entra tout échauffé. Je me retirai, mais j'écoutai de mon poste.—Qu'avez-vous ? lui dit *Madame* (Mme. de Pompadour).—Ces grandes robes et le clergé, répondit-il, sont toujours aux couteaux tirés ; ils me désolent par leurs querelles ; mais je déteste bien plus les grandes robes. Mon clergé, au fond, m'est attaché et fidèle ; les autres voudraient me mettre en tutelle.—La fermeté, lui dit *Madame*, peut seule les réduire.—Robert de Saint-Vincent est un boute-feu que je voudrais pouvoir exiler, mais ce sera un train terrible. D'un autre côté, l'archevêque est une tête de fer qui cherche querelle.—M. de Gontaut entra. . . . Le roi se promenait agité ; puis tout d'un coup il dit :—Le régent a eu bien tort de leur rendre le droit de faire des remontrances ; ils finiront par perdre l'Etat.—Ah ! Sire, dit M. de Gontaut, il est bien fort pour que de petits robins puissent l'ébranler.—Vous ne savez ce qu'ils font et ce qu'ils pensent, reprit le roi : c'est une assemblée de républicains. En voilà au reste assez ; les choses comme elles sont dureront autant que moi . . ." p. 94.

† The Parliament of Paris excluded from the list of General Councils those of Florence and the Lateran, and struck out from the Calendar the Feast of S. Vincent de Paul.

‡ Things went on growing steadily worse, up to the outbreak of the French Revolution. As an example of what they had come to, thirteen years before that event, I may mention a petition addressed to the king in 1765 by twenty-eight monks of S. Germain des Près, praying to be released from the obligation of saying the night office, of abstaining from flesh, and of wearing their habit.

sensualistic spirit of the age which they were called upon to resist. Not only in France, but throughout Europe, the super-sensual character of Christianity seems to have been forgotten by its teachers: its mysteries are spoken of, if at all, apologetically and with bated breath: its dogmas are veiled: its essential mission as a manifestation of the supernatural ignored: materialism has invaded the very citadel of the most spiritual of religions. Theology loses itself in evidences which, it may be safely affirmed, never carried conviction to any human soul. We look in vain for any large philosophic conception of the Catholic faith, for any apprehension of the irrefragable foundation which, as Pascal had shown, it possesses in our spiritual intuitions and in the accordance of Revelation with the wants of human nature; nay, even for any appreciation of it as the great historical fact of the modern world. These things are no more to be found in the defenders of Christianity than in its adversaries. It is curious and significant how the favourite ground chosen by Voltaire is tacitly accepted by his opponents. Half his attacks are directed against a doctrine of the inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, which is, indeed, essential to the old "orthodox" Protestantism, but which has no sanction from the Catholic Church—nay, more, which is in truth quite out of harmony with her system. The upholders of Christianity, however, Catholic and Protestant alike, with scarcely an exception, take their stand upon the letter of those venerable documents of the faith, and, it must be owned, are in most cases ignominiously discomfited. The *philosophes* succeeded through the moral, intellectual, and spiritual weakness of their adversaries far more than through their own strength. In truth, the position of the clergy throughout the century is rather that of a victim than that of a combatant; and Voltaire turned in contempt from them to the giant* (as he termed him) of an elder generation, in whom at all events he recognized a worthier adversary. M. Sainte-Beuve has observed†, and I believe correctly, that among the French clergy not one was found to answer the attack upon the "Pensées." Comment would only dull the significance of such a fact.

* Voltaire writes to Formont in 1734:—"Il y a longtemps que j'ai envie de combattre ce géant." M. Sainte-Beuve observes: "Voltaire comprit que Pascal était le grand rival qui gênait la philosophie, et il l'attaqua de front. Pourquoi alla-t-il s'attaquer à Pascal plutôt qu'à Bossuet ou à tout autre? Voilà, selon moi, l'honneur singulier de Pascal et la preuve qu'il est au cœur du Christianisme même."

† "Port Royal," t. iii. p. 322. M. Sainte-Beuve says that the only champion who entered the lists with Voltaire in defence of the author of the "Pensées" was one Boullier, a Protestant, whose work I have not seen. Sainte-Beuve credits it with vigour and gravity.

Thus much in elucidation of the easy victory achieved by the Renaissance philosophical idea, in its ultimate development, over the intellect of France. Let us consider a little its practical fruits. The inquiry is not of merely bygone interest. History ought to be what the trite old saying affirms it is, philosophy teaching by example. And here we have, in fact, the materials for the answer to the question proposed of late by a brilliant writer and widely discussed, in every variety of key, in the organs of public opinion:—Eliminate the Christian religion from a society which has been penetrated by it and is life worth living? It is worthy of note that the *philosophe* doctrine is in all essentials at one with the Positivism of the present day. That we do not know, and that no one knows, whether there is an invisible world or not; that it is mere waste of time to think about it; that all religions and all metaphysics are chimerical and vain; that the only possible science is that of the physical world, its facts and its laws; such are the main positions of what is called “modern thought.”* And such were the doctrines dominant in France a hundred years ago, not only in the upper classes of society among whom they were at first diffused, but throughout the intelligence of the country. What, as a matter of fact, was the practical outcome of these doctrines?

I suppose we may take it, as Mr. Carlyle says, that “a man’s religion is the chief fact about him: a man’s or a nation of men’s. . . . The thing a man does practically believe . . . concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty and destinies there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest. That is his religion, and it may be his mere scepticism and no religion: the manner in which he feels himself to be related to the unseen world or no world.”† Now looking at the France of a hundred years ago, when *philosophism* had had its perfect work, we find the teaching of Rousseau on this matter predominant. The destroyer Voltaire had done his part. Rousseau was to create—to make all things new. The task before him was to preserve religion as a sentiment, while rejecting the supernatural facts and the authoritative dogmas of revelation. And he set himself to this task with indubitable earnestness. He was well aware of the existence of that in man which was hidden from the eyes of most of the

* Such is M. Littré’s account of the Positive philosophy:—“La philosophie positive est l’ensemble du savoir humain, disposé suivant un certain ordre. . . . Mais comment définirons-nous le savoir humain? Nous le définirons l’étude des forces qui appartient à la matière et des conditions ou lois qui régissent ces forces.” “Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive,” p. 42.

† “Lectures on Heroes,” Lec. i.

philosophes. The religious aspirations and affections which they derided as mere illusions and fables were for him an integral part of our nature, the necessary foundation of all morality, the only stable basis of the public order.* Nay, sometimes he quite outstrips the bounds of the experimental philosophy in his inconsequent ardour, and insists upon the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and a future life, as "incontestable verities and sacred dogmas." And in a remarkable passage of the "*Emile*," inveighing against the scepticism which he describes truly enough as a hundred times more affirmative and dogmatic than the teaching which proceeded from its adversaries, he denounces those who, under the lofty pretext of enlightenment, take from the wretched the last consolation of their misery, from the powerful and rich the only curb of their passions: who tear out from men's hearts the remorse of crime, the hope of virtue, and yet vaunt themselves the benefactors of the human race.† Never had Deism such a prophet; and men tried hard to believe him, but they could not. Faith is, after all, an intellectual act, and the intellect could not lay hold of his fugitive dreams. Mr. Morley justly remarks that—

His teaching was cold and inanimate, in its essence a doctrine of self-complacent individualism, from which society has little to hope, and with which there is little chance of the bulk of society ever sympathizing. The common people (he further observes, with a touch of contempt very characteristic of his school of thought) are wont to crave a revelation, or else they find Atheism a rather better synthesis than any other. They either cling to the miraculously transmitted message with its hopes of recompense, and its daily communication of the Divine Voice in Prayer and Sacrament, or else they make a world which moves through space as a black monstrous ship with no steersman.‡

* In his *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les Spectacles*, he writes:—"Je n'entends pas qu'on puisse être vertueux sans Religion; j'eus longtemps cette opinion trompeuse, dont je suis bien désabusé." And in the "*Contrat Social*" (l. iv. c. viii.): "Jamais État ne fut fondé, que la Religion ne lui servit de base." It would be easy to multiply passages to the same effect, or indeed to a quite opposite effect.

† "*Emile*," tom. iii.

‡ Morley's "*Voltaire*," p. 200. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of here quoting the following passage from this admirable writer:—"In truth, one can scarcely call [Deism] a creed. It is mainly a name for a particular mood of fine spiritual exaltation: the expression of a state of indefinite aspiration and supreme feeling for lofty things. Are you going to convert the new barbarians of our western world with this fair word of emptiness? will you sweeten the lives of suffering men, and take its heaviness from that droning piteous chronicle of wrong and cruelty and despair, which everlastingly saddens the compassionating ear like moaning of a midnight sea; will you animate the stout of heart with new fire, and the firm of hand with fresh joy of battle, by the thought of a being without intelligible attributes, a mere abstract creation of meta-

As a matter of fact we have the practical outcome of Rousseau's Deism, a very few years later, in the Fête of the Être Supreme with his disciple Robespierre, as ministering High Priest, and in the worship of the Goddess of Reason symbolized, apt emblem ! by a naked prostitute. It was the only serious attempt at construction in the religious domain made by the *philosophes*. Construction, indeed, is no part of the work of what Mr. Mill calls "the analytical philosophy of the human mind." It is a profoundly true observation of Maine de Biran :—

Le sentiment de l'infini est identique au sentiment religieux ou il en est la base. . . . Dans un siècle ou l'on raisonne de tout, ou l'on demande que tout soit démontré, il ne peut y avoir de religion ni aucune institution proprement dite; l'analyse fait évaporer le sentiment. Si elle veut remonter jusqu' à la source ou il se rattache et en mettre la base à nu, elle ne trouvera rien, elle niera la réalité de cette base, sans s'apercevoir qu'elle n'est pas de son ressort.*

The philosophical idea of the Renaissance was tried by "Time the old Judge" with inexorable justice, however slow the process, and reduced to its true resolution. And as the last century draws to its close in France we have its ultimate issue in a de-Christianized nation, making the experiment whether life is worth living upon the basis of Atheism.

If religion be the first fact about a people, the position of woman is the second. And in the modern world the position of woman has been determined by religion, and made an integral part of it. The family, as it still exists in Europe, is the creation of the Church. Marriage, monogamous, indissoluble, sacramental, is the basis upon which she has reared the social order. And the great guardian of marriage, as she conceives of it, is that virtue of purity to which she attaches so transcendent an importance—a virtue the very idea of which may be said to have well-nigh vanished from the ancient world when the religion of Jesus Christ appeared, and which, I suppose, I may take as universally admitted to be quite a unique feature of the Catholic faith. So the *philosophes* viewed it. Chastity they judged to be a mere monkish superstition, altogether incompat-

physic, whose mercy is not as our mercy, nor his justice as our justice, nor his fatherhood as the fatherhood of men? It was not by a cold, a cheerless, a radically depraving conception such as this, that the Church became the refuge of humanity in the dark times of old, but by the representation to men sitting in bondage and confusion, of godlike natures moving among them under figure of the most eternally touching of human relations; a tender mother ever interceding for them, and an elder brother laying down his life that their burdens might be loosened."

* "Vie et Pensées," p. 191.

ible with the fair ideal of human life proposed to the world in the "Pucelle," and their constant endeavour was to pour contempt upon it and to root it out from society. Let me again quote Mr. Morley, who in a curious passage puts this point with a certain amount of candour:—

The peculiarity of the licence of France in the middle of the eighteenth century is, that it was looked upon with complacency by the great intellectual leaders of opinion. It took its place in the progressive formula. What austerity was to other forward movements, licence was to this. It is not difficult to perceive how so extraordinary a circumstance came to pass. Chastity was the supreme virtue in the eyes of the Church, the mystic key to Christian holiness. Continence was one of the most sacred of the pretensions by which the organized preachers of superstition claimed the reverence of men and women. It was identified, therefore, in a particular manner with that Infamous, against which the main assault of the time was directed. So men contended, more or less expressly, first, that continence was no commanding chief among virtues; then that it was a very superficial and easily practised virtue; finally, that it was no virtue at all, but if sometimes a convenience, generally an impediment to free human happiness.*

Such, according to their latest apologist, was the formal teaching of the *philosophes* as to the relations between the sexes. Nor is there any room for doubt as to what came of it. There is an overwhelming mass of evidence regarding the ever-increasing degradation of woman as the "analytical philosophy of the human mind" pursued its victorious course. For my present purpose it will be sufficient to refer to the MM. de Goncourt's work "*La Femme au XVIII. siècle*," a book which, so far as my own researches enable me to judge, amply merits the praise bestowed upon it by M. Scherer as† a revelation of the century with which it deals, initiating us into its inner life and moral character. The burden of their volume is the

* Morley's "*Voltaire*," p. 108.

† Le volume de MM. de Goncourt est un des ouvrages qui nous font le mieux connaître le siècle auquel ils se rapportent, qui du moins nous font le mieux entrer dans sa vie intime, dans son caractère moral. On ne sait pas tout d'une époque lorsqu'on en connaît la littérature; il ne suffit pas même de lire les Mémoires des personnes qui y ont vécu; il y a en outre une foule de détails d'usage, de ton, de costume, mille renseignements sur les diverses classes de la société et leur condition, mille riens, inaperçus comme l'air même que l'on respire, mais qui ont leur valeur et qui contribuent à l'effet total. Or, voilà ce que MM. de Goncourt ont recueilli avec un zèle et un *soin* dignes d'éloge. Ils ont fait pour le dix-huitième siècle ce que des savants en us font avec moins de ressources, mais non pas avec plus de sagacité, pour des civilisations disparues: ils l'ont reconstruit par les monuments. Scherer's "*Nouvelles Études sur la Littérature Contemporaine*," p. 96.

complete revolution which was effected in woman by the new doctrine.

À se voir (they tell us) à ses leçons, la femme réforme son cœur et renouvelle son esprit. Ses sentiments natifs, son besoin de foi, d'appui, de plénitude, par une croyance, un dévouement, la règle dont l'éducation du couvent lui avait donné l'habitude, elle dépouille toutes ces faiblesses de son passé, comme elle dépouillerait l'enfance de son âme. Elle s'allege de tout idée sérieuse, pour s'élever à ce nouveau point de vue d'où le monde considère la vie de si haut, en ne mesurant ce qu'elle renferme qu'à ces deux mesures : l'ennui ou l'agrément. Repoussant ce qu'on appelle "des fantômes de modestie et de bienséance" renonçant à toutes les religions, à toutes les préoccupations dont son sexe avait eu en d'autres siècles les charges, les pratiques, les tristesses assombrissantes, la femme se met au niveau et au ton des nouvelles doctrines ; et elle arrive à afficher la facilité de cette sagesse mondaine qui ne voit dans l'existence humaine, débarrassée de toute obligation sévère qu'un grand droit, qu'un seul but providentiel : l'amusement ; qui ne voit dans la femme, délivrée de la servitude du mariage, des habitudes du ménage, qu'un être dont le seul devoir est de mettre dans la société l'image du plaisir, de l'offrir et de la donner à tous.*

Let us turn from this general view to the chapter entitled L'Amour. Up to the death of Louis XIV., we read, France seemed determined to etherealize love : to make of it a theoretic passion, a dogma surrounded with an adoring reverence which resembled a religious cultus, to veil its materiality by an immateriality of sentiment. Even in its perversion it strove to wear some appearance of virtue : to put on a semblance of greatness and generosity, of courage and delicacy. "Ses fautes, ses hontes mêmes, gardent une politesse et une excuse, presque une pudeur." Such was the ideal which, transmitted from the age of chivalry, still lingered in France until the eighteenth century.

Mais au dix-huitième siècle que devient cet idéal ? L'idéal de l'amour au temps de Louis XV. n'est plus rien que le désir, et l'amour est la volupté. Volupté ! c'est le mot du dix-huitième siècle ; c'est son secret, son charme, son âme. Il respire la volupté, il la dégage. La volupté est l'air dont il se nourrit et qui l'anime. Elle est son atmosphère et son souffle. Elle est son élément et son inspiration, sa vie et son génie. . . . La femme alors n'est que volupté. . . . Le dix-huitième siècle, en disant : *Je vous aime*, ne veut point faire entendre autre chose que : *Je vous désire*. Avoir pour les hommes, enlever pour les femmes, c'est tout le jeu ce sont toutes les ambitions de ce nouvel amour. . . . Le siècle est arrivé "au vrai des choses," il a rendu "le mouvement aux sens." Il a supprimé, et s'en vante, les exagérations, les grimaces, et les affectations. . . . La morale du temps . . . encourage la femme à la franchise de la galanterie, à

* "Nouvelles Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine," p. 40.

l'audace de l'inconduite, par des principes commodes et appropriés à ses instincts. Des pensées qui circulent, de la philosophie régnante, des habitudes et des doctrines conjurées contre les préjugés de toute sorte et de tout ordre, de ce grand changement dans les esprits qui ébranle ou renouvelle, dans la société, toutes les vérités morales, il s'élève une théorie qui cherche à élargir la conscience de la femme, en la sortant des petitesse de son sexe. C'est toute une autre règle de son honnêteté, et comme un déplacement de son honneur, qu'on fait indépendant de sa pudeur, de ses mérites, de ses devoirs. Modestie, bienséance, le dix-huitième siècle travaille à dispenser la femme de ces misères. Et pour remplacer toutes les vertus imposées jusqu'à son caractère, demandées à sa nature, il n'exige, plus d'elle que les vertus d'un honnête homme. . . . Les sophismes commodes, les apologies de la honte, les leçons d'impudeur flottent dans le temps, descendent des intelligences dans les cœurs, enlèvent peu à peu le remords à la femme éclairée, enhardie, étourdie, conviée aux facilités par les systèmes, les idées qui tombent du plus haut de ce monde, qui s'échappent des bouches les plus célèbres, des âmes les plus grandes, des génies les plus honnêtes. Et l'amour proclamé par le naturalisme et le matérialisme, pratiqué par Helvétius avant son mariage avec Mlle. de Ligneville, glorifié par Buffon dans sa phrase fameuse : "Il n'y a de bon dans l'amour que le physique,"—l'amour physique finit par apparaître, chez la femme même, dans sa brutalité.*

This was the woman of the eighteenth century as she existed in French society under *philosophie* teaching. Those who care to consult the M.M. de Goncourt's pages will find there a full account of what marriage and maternity became in her hands. I turn from these writers to their accomplished critic, M. Scherer, and shall borrow his words to trace the effect upon French society of this transformation. He has been speaking of the *salon* of the age, and of all those graces of conversation, those refinements of wit and manners, that perfect elegance and *bon ton* which gave to it its inimitable character :

La vie se passe difficilement d'un but sérieux ; elle offre cette contradiction éternelle que, tendant au bonheur, elle ne peut s'y attacher comme à son objet propre, sans, par cela même, en détruire les conditions. Ces hommes, ces femmes, qui semblaient n'exister que pour les choses qui paraissent le plus dignes d'envie, la grâce et l'honneur, l'amour et l'intelligence, ces gens avaient tari en eux les sources de l'intelligence et de l'amour. Cet épicurisme consommé allait à contre-fin. Ces vertus, bornées aux vertus de sociabilité, se montraient insuffisantes à supporter la société. Cette activité, dans laquelle le devoir, l'effort, le sacrifice n'avaient point de place, se dévorait elle-même. On a éteint l'âme, la conscience, comme des lumières inutiles, et voici, il se trouve que tout est obscur. L'esprit devait tenir lieu

* "Études sur la Littérature Contemporaine," pp. 151-174.

de tout, et l'esprit n'a servi qu'à tout flétrir et à se flétrir tout le premier. On n'a demandé qu'une chose à la destinée humaine, le plaisir, et c'est l'ennui qui à répondu.

Ce mal incurable de l'ennui, le dix-huitième siècle le porte partout. C'est là son fond, j'allais dire son principe. C'est par là que s'expliquent ses agitations, ses dégoûts, ses tristesses cachées, l'audace de ces vices. Il flotte sans trouver à quoi s'attacher. Il se prend à tout pour retomber toujours dans un désenchantement plus profond. Chacun des fruits auxquels il mord lui laisse un goût de cendres plus amer. Il se donne des secousses, et il ne parvient pas à se sentir vivre. Il est triste, triste comme la morte, et il n'a pas même la grandeur de la mélancolie. Tout ne lui est plus qu'un spectacle, lui-même il se regarde vivre, et ce spectacle a cessé de l'intéresser. Lassitude, aridité intérieure, prostration de toutes les forces de la vie, voilà à quoi il en est venu. C'est alors qu'on voit un phénomène bien connu se produire. L'homme ne s'arrête jamais, il creuse toujours, il creuse le vide même : ne croyant plus à rien, il cherche encore un je ne sais quoi qui lui échappe. La débauche, elle aussi, poursuit son rêve insaisissable. Elle demande aux sens ce qu'ils ne peuvent lui donner. Irritée de ses mécomptes, elle invente des raffinements. Elle assaisonne le libertinage de toutes sortes d'infamies. Elle devient féroce. Elle se plaît à faire souffrir les êtres qu'elle perd. Elle jouit des remords, de la honte de ses victimes. Elle met sa vanité à compromettre les femmes, à leur briser le cœur, à les dépraver s'il se peut. La galanterie se change ainsi en cynisme de méchanceté. On se pique de cruauté et de calcul dans la cruauté. Le bon ton affiche la noirceur. Mais cela même n'est pas encore assez. Les insatiables appétits demanderont au crime la saveur que le vice a perdue pour eux. "Il est, disent fort bien MM. de Goncourt, il est une logique inexorable qui commande aux mauvaises passions de l'humanité d'aller au bout d'elles-mêmes, et d'éclater dans une horreur finale et absolue. Cette logique avait assigné à la méchanceté voluptueuse du dix-huitième siècle son couronnement monstrueux. Il y avait eu dans les esprits une trop grande habitude de la cruauté morale pour que cette cruauté demeurât dans la tête et ne descendît pas jusqu'aux sens. On avait trop joué avec la souffrance du cœur de la femme, pour n'être pas tenté de la faire souffrir plus sûrement et plus visiblement. Pourquoi, après avoir épuisé les tortures sur son âme, ne pas les essayer sur son corps ? Pourquoi ne pas chercher tout crûment dans son sang les jouissances que donnaient ses larmes ? C'est une doctrine qui naît, qui se formule ; doctrine vers laquelle tout le siècle est allé sans le savoir, et qui n'est, au fond, que la matérialisation de ses appétits ; et n'était-il pas fatal que ce dernier mot fût dit, que l'éréthisme de la férocité s'affirmât comme un principe, comme une révélation, et qu'au bout de cette décadence raffinée et galante, après tout ces acheminements au supplice de la femme, M. de Sade vînt pour mettre, avec le sang des guillotines, la Terreur dans l'Amour."*

* "Études sur la Littérature Contemporaine," p. 101.

Such was the effect of the philosophy of sensation upon woman. All that distinguished her position in the modern world from that which she held in Pagan antiquity had come to her from Christianity. And with Christianity it vanished, leaving her poor indeed—stripped of the robe of grace and glory wherewith the Catholic religion had decked her—naked, and not ashamed. Thus, while the monarchs of the age were triumphing over the last remains of mediæval liberty, and carrying to its complete development the Cæsarism, which is the political idea of the Renaissance, its intellectual idea, embodied in the doctrines of the *philosophes*, had issued in ferocious animalism. The social edifice was at the same time overweighted with Absolutism, and shorn of the two main foundations, God and the Family, upon which the Church had reared it. Liberty and Freewill, those two great lights, ruling, the one in the political order and the other in the moral, die before the “uncreating word” of Materialism; for matter knows no laws but the physical and mathematical. And then is realized the picture traced by the deepest thinker England ever produced:—

Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And, last, eat up himself.

All systems of philosophy may be reduced to two great classes. Everything depends upon the point of departure. The recognition of the consciousness of the Ego by itself, or the non-recognition—such is the radical difference. There lies a whole universe between the philosophy which starts from the soul as the true Ego,* the form of the body, and the philosophy which starts from the physical organism. “Ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos” applies as truly to the thoughts of men’s hearts as to their external actions. Philosophy is in a very real sense the guide of life; and the unique value of the history of the eighteenth century is that it shows by a pregnant example whither the philosophy of sensation leads mankind.

W. S. LILLY.

* “Ego, ego animus. S. Augustini Confes.” L. x. c. 9.

ART. IV.—ETHICS IN ITS BEARING ON THEISM.

VERY little will be found in the ensuing article, which has not been said under one shape or other in the earlier portion of our series. In order, however, that we may exhibit in its due force that very important part of our reasoning which is connected with ethical doctrine, it is requisite that we disentangle this part from the many incidental controversies with which it has inevitably become intermixed. It is requisite that we place before our readers in due arrangement what may be called our trunk-line of argument, concerning the relation of Ethics to Theism ; and (as part of the same task) that we trace back that argument to its first premisses. This is what we propose on the present occasion.

The purpose of our series as a whole (we need hardly repeat) is the argumentative establishment of Theism against contemporary infidels. The true doctrine on Ethics ranks (in our humble judgment) among the most important premisses of Theistic doctrine ; and it is essential therefore that we duly treat it. At the same time we are not otherwise of course directly concerned with Ethics, than in its bearing on Theism ; nor shall we attempt, except in a very few incidental remarks, to cover wider ground. But even when our scope is thus confined, the proof of true ethical doctrine pre-supposes two logically prior principles. These principles concern (1) the authority of intuitions, and (2) the existence and character of necessary truths. We will consider then successively these two principles, and recapitulate part of what we have said concerning them on earlier occasions.

THE AUTHORITY OF INTUITIONS.

The indictment ordinarily brought by the Phenomenist against Intuitionists is, that throughout their philosophy their one procedure is the erecting gratuitously, into the rank of objective truths, the mere subjective impressions of their own mind. Accordingly, a contrast is energetically insisted on between the arbitrariness, vagueness, capriciousness of Intuitionism, and the firmness, solidity, security of Phenomenistic philosophy. The latter, it is maintained, rests on that impregnable ground, the study of phenomena, pursued systematically by a mutually consulting body of trained observers ; whereas the former—so the Phenomenist continues—has no firmer basis to support it, than those idiosyncracies of the individual philosopher, which he chooses to dignify by the name of intuitions. Nor in any other instance

is this objection so urgently and vehemently pressed, as when an *ethical* theory is founded on the alleged dictates of a moral faculty. To this large indictment we have always replied, that nothing, indeed, can be more reasonable, than to examine with keenest jealousy the question, whether this or that alleged intuition be really such; but that to repudiate *in toto* the authority of intuitions—to affirm that none are cognizable as genuine and reliable—is a course simply suicidal. Phenomenists and Intuitionists alike—we maintain—always do and always must base their arguments on an intuitional foundation. The only difference between the two is, that the latter herein do but act in accordance with their avowed principles, while the former tread theirs, we must say, unblushingly under foot.

As one illustration of what we intend by this statement, let us ask the two following questions:—(1) What philosophical result can reasonably ensue from that study of phenomena which is our opponents' boast, unless they assume as their constant premiss *the uniformity of nature*? And (2) How can the uniformity of nature be reasonably maintained, except by calling in the ministrative aid of this or that intuition? We will insist briefly on these two successive questions; and we will choose for our illustration, at random, one of the ten thousand physical truths which modern research has brought to light—viz., the combustibleness of diamonds. We would thus, then, address our Phenomenistic opponent:—

You lay down as a truth of science, that all diamonds are combustible; or, in other words, that all objects, possessing those attributes which are connoted by the name "diamond," possess that further attribute of being combustible. Now, taking the whole body of scientists together, we should like to know on how many individual diamonds the experiment has been tried. To put the matter greatly within bounds, it has been tried on a number of diamonds, indefinitely less than a thousandth part of those which exist in the world. On what ground, then, do you affirm this proposition as true in regard to that vast majority of diamonds— $\frac{999}{1000}$ + ever so many more—on which the experiment has *not* been tried? Of course in virtue of a certain general principle, called "the uniformity of nature," or "the law of causation;"* the principle, that similar phenomenal antecedents are universally followed by

* We explained in April (p. 307) that the word "causation" is used by Phenomenists, in a sense fundamentally different from that given to it by Intuitionists.

similar phenomenal consequents.* In a former article of our series, we challenged Mr. Mill to prove this principle if he could, without the help of some intuitional assumption; and at a later period we replied to his reply. See October, 1871, pp. 311-317; and January, 1874, pp. 32-38. The controversy was prematurely closed by Mr. Mill's death, and we cannot, therefore, guess what rejoinder he would have made on our reasoning. But as the matter stands, we must say we should be a good deal surprised, if any Phenomenist of ordinary candour were to profess himself satisfied with Mr. Mill's argumentative position on the subject.

Let us even suppose, however, that Mr. Mill had so far proved his point: a greater—nay, an incomparably greater—difficulty still oppresses the Phenomenist. "At last," as Dr. Bain observes, "all our interest in physical science is concentrated on *what has yet to be*: its present and its past are of value, only as a clue to the events that are to come; and experimental investigation is worthless, except so far as it unveils the secret of the future no less than of the present." On what possible ground—if intuitional premisses be excluded—have philosophers a right to lay down as even faintly probable, that the future will resemble the past and present? Dr. Bain for one—and he no subordinate or obscure member of the Phenomenistic school—sees no such ground as possible. He speaks of the "assumption" that "what has uniformly been in the past will be in the future." "Without this assumption," he adds, "we can do nothing; with it we can do anything. Our only error is in proposing to *give any reason or justification of it*; to treat it otherwise than as *begged at the very outset*." ("Deductive Logic," pp. 273, 4). It is Dr. Bain's judgment then, and not ours only, that if physical science is to have any practical value whatever, it must rest on an intuitional basis.† And if corroboration of his view be needed, it will most certainly be found in the complete breakdown of such attempts as have been made by two Phenomenistic writers to overthrow his position. See "Mind" for April and October, 1876. If any Intuitionist had been weak enough, in an inconsiderate moment, to perpetrate the incredibly shallow fallacy contained in the two papers to which we refer, he would

* "The one ultimate premiss of all induction," says Dr. Bain, "is nature's uniformity."

† In October, 1878 (p. 395), we said that this doctrine of nature's uniformity "may be called the opprobrium of modern Phenomenistic philosophy: so confidently is it assumed, and so inadequately established." In April last (p. 310, note,) we expressed our own humble opinion, as the way of satisfactorily proving the doctrine.

not speedily have heard the last of it from his contemptuous opponents.*

But we have been in the habit of pressing our point still more closely home. It is not merely that *experimental* science (in order to be reasonable) must rest on an intuitional foundation : all science, all argument of every kind, nay all thought (in order to be reasonable) must rest on such a foundation. For consider the position of Phenomenistic thinkers. In constructing their philosophy they make vigorous use—no men more so—of their intellectual faculties. But on what reasonable ground (if, as their principle requires, they reject indiscriminately the authority of intuitions) can they allege that the trustworthiness of those faculties is—we will not say say certain—but ever so faintly probable? Professor Huxley has suggested as an easily supposable hypothesis, that some powerful and malicious being may have power over me, and find pleasure in making a fool of me ; and that he may often enjoy this amusement—as in other ways—so also by means of compelling my faculties to

* Any one who observes either the language or the general tone of Phenomenistic philosophers, will see clearly (we think) that they do not *in fact* rest their belief in the uniformity of nature on any argumentative basis whatever, which they can distinctly contemplate and defend. The truth of the doctrine is made clear to them by reasons, which they do not attempt to analyze, and which they could not analyze if they did attempt to do so. The uniformity of nature is borne in upon them (if we may so express ourselves) by the every-day experience of their active life. Every day they receive fresh proofs of it, and live (as we may say) in contact with it. Accordingly, if ever they give their mind to an inquiry as to what those arguments are on which the doctrine can reasonably be based—any one may see that they pursue the examination in a spirit of languid indifference. They are already profoundly convinced of the doctrine, before they have even asked themselves any question as to its reasonable basis.

Now on this we have three remarks to make. (1) We think that their procedure so far is entirely reasonable. We are confident there are several truths of vital importance to mankind, which are reasonably accepted as certain on *implicit* grounds of assurance. They are reasonably accepted, we say, as certain, on grounds of assurance, which have not as yet been scientifically analyzed ; nay, of which, perhaps, scientific analysis transcends the power of the human mind. See what Catholic philosophers say on the "*sensus communis naturæ*."

But then (2) these philosophers are not less than wildly unreasonable, when (as they are so fond of doing) they contrast their own speculative method with others, as being characteristically precise, logical, scientific. On the contrary, it is in these very qualities that their speculation is as yet so conspicuously wanting. Here is a doctrine of their philosophy so fundamental—so simply at the root of their whole investigations—that unless it be known as certainly true, their whole system is one organised sham and pretence. Yet it is this very doctrine, for which they are unable to produce any precise, logical, scientific basis whatever.

testify what is false. What imaginable disproof can Mr. Huxley suggest of this supposition? But apart from it altogether, there are ten thousand physical agencies (for aught we know) which may possibly land my faculties in this or that entirely false avouchment. Professor Huxley makes vigorous and unintermittent use of his *reasoning* faculty. But if he repudiate the authority of intuitions as such—how can he reasonably even guess, that this faculty is not a mere instrument of delusion? The illustration, to which we have ourselves more commonly had recourse in this connection, has been the faculty, not of reasoning, but of *remembering*. The physical scientist tells us that he has just been witnessing a very important experiment. How do you know, we ask him, how can you even guess, that you have witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply, that you have the keenest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not doubt at all that you have that present *impression*, which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that your present impression corre-

And (3) they show themselves still more narrow, prejudiced, and bigoted, when they assume (which they often do) as a kind of first principle, that this method of implicit reasoning, which is so indispensably necessary for themselves, is in its nature insufficient for the certain establishment of conclusions. As one out of a thousand instances, consider what are sometimes called the "internal evidences" of religion. Even Protestants may in their measure (we are confident) reasonably appeal to these; but we will ourselves, of course, exhibit what we mean, as exemplified by a Catholic. Take then the case of a Catholic, who habitually frequents the Sacraments, who practises regular self-examination and moral discipline, who makes it one chief work of his life to discover and correct his faults, who constantly remembers God's Presence, and trusts to His strength in his own efforts to acquire virtue. We say with complete confidence, that such a person possesses a quasi-experimental acquaintance with the Existence, Power, and Holiness of some Great Supernatural Being; an acquaintance entirely analogous to that knowledge, which scientists possess of their fundamental principle, the uniformity of nature. Of course these philosophers are at full liberty to deny our allegation, and refute it if they can. But what we are here denouncing as so intolerably prejudiced and illogical is, that they will *not* take the trouble to examine and (if they can) refute it; that they stigmatise it as being self-evidently irrational and fanatical. The unreason and fanaticism are really on *their* side.

In one particular, the argumentative grounds which exist for Theism possess a marked superiority over those which (as yet at least) exist for the uniformity of nature. For the former—apart altogether from implicit reasoning—there exists (we maintain) a substantial, cogent, conclusive chain of explicit argument. No such chain of argument has hitherto been set forth by any Phenomenist, for the establishment of his one fundamental scientific premiss.

We wish we had space to exhibit the considerations on which we have here touched, in the fullness and detail which their importance, we think, deserves.

sponds with a past fact? See what a tremendous proposition this is which you, who call yourself a cautious man of science, coolly and unscrupulously take for granted. You have been so wonderfully endowed—such is your bold assumption—that, in every successive case, your clear and articulate present *impression* and *belief* of something as past corresponds with a *past fact*. That this should happen even once is surely (on your principles) a very remarkable coincidence: but you assume it as happening some thousand times in every hour of your waking life.

In truth the distinction is fundamental, between my knowledge of my *present* and my *past* experience. "I am conscious of a most clear and articulate *impression*, that a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is one judgment: "a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is another judgment fundamentally distinct from the former. That I know my present *impression*, by no manner of means implies that I know my past feeling. Here for instance, are two judgments: (1) "It is wrong to eat beef": (2) "*the Hindoo thinks* that it is wrong to eat beef." These two judgments, it will be admitted, fundamentally and clamorously differ from each other. Yet they do not differ from each other *more* fundamentally and clamorously, than the judgment,—“I have a present *impression* of having been cold,”—differs from the judgment,—“I *was* cold.” The former of these two judgments—we entirely admit—is honestly borne out by experience. But on what ground can the *latter* judgment be reasonably formed, by one who repudiates intuitions? Let men once deny the authority of intuitions—such is our argument—and it follows that they have no means of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, anything of any kind whatever, except the facts of their immediately present consciousness. Their knowledge is less than that possessed by the brutes.*

We have had no hesitation in using the words "intuition," "intuitional," because all our readers will have understood, with sufficient clearness for our purpose, what we intend to express by those terms. Here, however, we may as well set

* We have before now made an explanation, which it will be better here to repeat. Those avouchments of memory, on which we dwell for the purpose of illustrating our principle, are those only which concern my *quite recent* experience. Thus we have spoken of "the keen certitude with which I know that I experienced those sensations of a few minutes back, which my memory vividly testifies." We do not of course deny, that men's memory of what took place a long time ago is often far from infallible. Nor have we failed to explain in former articles, how easily reconcilable is this fact with (what we have called) the principle of intrinsic certitude.

forth their meaning precisely. On a former occasion we defined an intuition to be, "an intellectual avouchment, reliably declaring as immediately evident some truth, other than the mere existence and characteristics of such avouchment." There cannot be a better illustration of this, than the very instance of *memory* on which we have been insisting. Here is an act of memory:—"A very short time ago I felt cold." In this one act, (1) I experience a consciousness, and (2) I elicit an intuition. The consciousness which I experience, is simply the present impression, of which I am conscious, that a very short time ago I felt cold. Now if this were the whole value of the mental phenomenon, I should have no means of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, that I *did* feel cold at the moment to which my memory refers. It is precisely because every act of memory contains an *intuition*, as well as a consciousness, that knowledge (properly so-called) of any kind is possible. It is precisely because my act of memory contains an intuition, that I know with certainty—not merely my present *impression* of having been cold—but the past *fact* of my *having* been cold. If Professor Huxley, or any one else, affirms the broad general thesis that there are no genuine intuitions at all—that men cannot reasonably trust any intellectual avouchment except that of consciousness—he simply excludes himself from the possibility of reasonable and consistent thought on any theme whatever. If, on the contrary, he merely says that there *are* such mental phenomena, no doubt, as genuine intuitions; but that in each given case great jealousy should be exercised, lest we unwarily admit as genuine intuitions what are not really such,—then (with due explanations) he and we are so far in entire concordance.

The more such considerations as these are pondered by any competent thinker, the more inevitable, we are confident, he will find it to fall back on that principle of certitude, which we for ourselves have consistently maintained. This principle was held in one shape or other, we believe, by the whole body of Catholic philosophers, down to the time of that arch-revolutionist, Descartes. And it has quite recently been set forth with especial clearness by F. Kleutgen: see our article on "The Rule and Motive of Certitude," in July, 1871. We have called it the principle of "intrinsic" certitude, in order to distinguish it from two suicidal theories, which in more recent times have attempted to usurp its place. One of these would base my trust in my faculties on my knowledge of God's Veracity; the other would base that trust on the authority of my fellow-men. But both these theories, as we have said, are suicidal. They are suicidal, because it is obviously impossible for me reasonably even

to guess either that God or my fellow-men exist, unless I begin by trusting my faculties, and continue to do so during my whole investigation. The true theory then, we say, is the theory of intrinsic certitude; the theory, that my faculties authenticate *their own* veracity, in virtue of that intrinsic mental endowment, which Catholic philosophers have called "the light of reason." The particular shape in which we exhibited this theory (July, 1871) was moulded on F. Kleutgen's statements, which we largely cited; and we may thus express our thesis, with sufficient completeness for our present purpose. "Whatever my existent faculties (if rightly interrogated and interpreted) declare to be self-evident, is thereby instinctively known to me as self-evident.*

Now, this principle once heartily accepted, we proceed very readily to the conclusions which we desire, concerning (1) necessary truths, and (2) the reasonable basis of Ethics. Indeed Phenomenists are perhaps more or less clearly aware, how ruinous to them is the true principle of certitude: and they labour accordingly to throw obstacles in the way of its explicit reception. Mr. Stuart Mill for one—if we were to take his statements in their one obvious sense†—would stand sponsor for a singular theory. For his words seem to mean, that no declaration of a man's cognitive faculties is trustworthy, unless it be one which those faculties would have elicited, when he was "an infant;" when he "first opened his eyes to the light." In other words he affirms, that no argument is valid, unless it would have been recognized as valid by a new-born infant; and that no avouchment of memory is trust-

* As to this word "instinctively," we explained it on one occasion "as expressing the irresistible and (as it were) piercing character of the conviction to which we refer." "Let any one consider," we added, "the keen certitude with which he knows that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory vividly testifies."

We will also add another explanation, which we made in July, 1876. The principle of intrinsic certitude is not a "logical," but what may be called an "implicit and concomitant" first principle. No syllogism, *e.g.*, of the following kind passes through my mind: "Whatever my faculties declare as self-evident is really self-evident: but they declare such and such things as self-evident: ergo, &c." On the contrary—taking the case of memory as an instance—I am far more immediately certain of the proposition, that I was cold a short time ago,—than I am of the general proposition, that whatever my cognitive faculties avouch as self-evident is really so. The present act of memory is immediately known by me, with keenest certitude, to correspond with a fact truly past: and I *infer* the general principle of intrinsic certitude, by means of reflecting on this and a thousand similar data. This remark tends to mutually harmonise certain dicta of different Catholic philosophers, which on the surface present an appearance of discrepancy.

† See the passages we cited from him in July, 1873, pp. 22, 23.

worthy, unless the memory of a new-born infant would have securely carried that infant so far back. But we will do Mr. Mill more justice than he has done himself, and state his contention in a form less revolting to common sense. We will understand him to mean then, that it is not what my faculties *now* testify as self-evident which I can with reason so regard; but rather, what they *would* have testified as self-evident, had they grown to maturity under their own intrinsic laws of development, without being denaturalized and artificialized by that great body of experience, which has accrued to them since their infancy. It is of fundamental importance in the interests of philosophy, that the extravagance of this theory be duly appreciated; and we argued against it therefore, in July, 1873, pp. 23-26; in January, 1874, pp. 24-27. Here we will but briefly suggest the considerations, which we there more fully developed. We will use the phrase "primordial faculties," to express the human faculties as they would have existed in that imaginary state which Mr. Mill has hypothesized. And this being understood, the question at issue is as follows. We contend, that the rule of certitude is the *actual* avouchment of men's *existent* faculties; whereas Mr. Mill contends, that the rule of certitude is the *hypothetical* avouchment of men's *primordial* faculties. Let us now briefly exhibit the wildness of this latter theory.

We will once more recur to our old illustration, derived from *memory*. As we have so often shown—unless Mr. Mill had been able reasonably to trust the fresh avouchments of his memory, his knowledge would have been much less than that of the brutes. Yet, on his principles, how can a disciple of Mr. Mill's reasonably trust his memory? How can he know—how can he reasonably even guess—that his memory is not one of those faculties, which have been denaturalized and artificialized by the past facts of his life? He experiences, *e.g.*, a thought, which he takes to be a clear and keen remembrance of the fact, that a very short time ago he was feeling cold. If, under these circumstances, he is not certain that a very short time ago he *was* feeling cold—he can be certain of nothing whatever in the whole world, outside his consciousness of the present moment. Yet what is more abundantly possible (on his principles) than the supposition that his memory is delusive? He may well, *e.g.*, have suffered so frequently and intensely from cold when he was young, that his existent memory has become denaturalized and artificialized on the subject; that his existent memory often points to coldness as having been experienced at some recent period, when no such coldness was experienced at all. Until he has assured himself

that his faculty of memory has not been impaired, he cannot reasonably (on his principles) even so much as guess that its avouchments are true. Yet how can he so much as begin setting about to prove the trustworthiness of his existent memory, unless he has first *made up his mind to trust it* throughout the whole course of his investigations. The whole procedure implies from first to last, not some grave philosophical theory, but rather what Englishmen unkindly denominate an Irish bull.

Then here is another point. Mr. Mill throughout regards it as a more simple and obvious hypothesis that my *primordial* faculties would have been trustworthy, than that my *existent* faculties possess that attribute. But what even colourable ground is there for such a thesis? By denying indeed the trustworthiness of his *existent* faculties, he has cut away from himself all power of reasonably holding that men's *primordial* faculties would have been trustworthy at all. See our remarks in July, 1873, p. 25. Only by taking for granted that my *existent* faculties are veracious, can I arrive at any conclusion whatever, concerning the hypothetical trustworthiness of my *primordial* faculties.

We will call Mr. Mill's theory "the theory of primordial certitude." And it might not unnaturally have been thought that no other theory on the subject could possibly be so wild, had not one still wilder been invented by Mr. Herbert Spencer. This we will call "the theory of ancestral certitude." As regards, *e.g.*, the matter of *Ethics* on which we are presently to speak,—Mr. Spencer admits most frankly, that there exist in the human mind "certain fundamental moral intuitions," "quite independent of conscious experience" ("The Data of Ethics," p. 123.) He considers that certain "nervous modifications" of the past have now become in man "faculties of moral intuition, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility." On what possible ground, then, does Mr. Spencer refuse to accept those objective truths, which such intuitions declare? Because in his view no authority is due to any mental declarations, however unmistakeable and emphatic, which can be traced back to hereditary causes. No existent intuitions (we repeat) are, on Mr. Spencer's theory, to be accounted authentic, unless the philosopher can show that they are not derived from the mental phenomena of former generations by a process of psychical or cerebral law and development. Let me exemplify this by our old instance. Mr. Spencer cannot in consistency know or even conjecture that he was cold a few minutes ago—however clamorously his memory may avouch the fact—until he can first prove a certain necessary premiss. He cannot know that

he was cold a few minutes ago, until he can prove that his ancestors did not experience frequent and intense sensations of cold, which may have affected the faculty of memory as possessed by their descendants, and imbued that faculty with a morbid tendency to be for ever falsely avouching the past existence of cold. Exactly the same thing may be said—not only concerning the past experience of cold—but concerning every past event which memory testifies. And exactly the same thing may also be said—not concerning memory alone—but concerning every intellectual faculty whatever, which Mr. Spencer is in the habit of trusting. Everything which Mr. Spencer considers himself to know, which extends one step beyond what his dog knows, he is bound in reason to regard as a mere dream and delusion,—as the baseless fabric of a vision,—unless he is prepared to renounce and trample on his fundamental principle.*

Both Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer are in many respects writers of great power and subtlety, and they have thrown much light on various branches of psychology. It is the more remarkable, therefore, that they have been betrayed into these almost incredible aberrations, without any suspicion of their real character. And our sense will be intensified of the great gratitude due to the mediæval writers, if we consider the historical origin of these aberrations. For it is a plain matter of fact, that aberrations of this kind date from Descartes's repudiation of that theory concerning certitude, which (under one shape or

* Mr. Spencer's doctrine on the foundation of certitude is this: Those propositions, and those only, may be accepted as immediately known to me, which are such, that on the one hand they are undecomposable, while on the other hand their negation is inconceivable. For our own part, we entirely deny that all such propositions are *true*. See July, 1871, pp. 57—60. But we here wish to insist on the converse. We wish to point out how fatal a mistake it is to suppose, that no proposition can be immediately known to me, which does not possess these two attributes. Take, *e.g.*, the two following theses: "I was created by a mendacious being, who has endowed me with entirely delusive faculties:" "My memory often deceives me, in what it declares me to have experienced a minute ago." No one can possibly maintain that these theses are inconceivable, or even that there is the slightest difficulty in understanding what they mean: Consequently, according to Mr. Spencer, their contradictories are not immediately known to me. But Mr. Spencer would not himself allege that these contradictories are *inferentially* known to me; and he, therefore, cannot consistently maintain that they are known to me at all. He cannot consistently maintain that I have any knowledge of the fact, that my faculties are other than mere instruments of delusion; or of the fact, that my memory truly testifies my experience of two minutes ago. We need hardly point out that, if these truths were *not* known to me,—if it were not known to me that my faculties are trustworthy,—my possible knowledge would be inferior to that of the brutes.

another) had been the unanimous teaching of those philosophers who preceded him.

We have now, therefore, laid down a sufficient foundation for what is to follow. In subsequent portions of our article we are to establish, (1) that there exist certain self-evidently necessary verities, and (2) that there are certain self-evident *ethical* verities in the number. In order to show that these two theses are certain, it is requisite—but it is also sufficient—to show that my existent faculties, when rightly interrogated and interpreted, so declare. We have nothing whatever to do with the question, whether my existent judgment on either thesis may have originated in some antecedent phenomena, appertaining either to myself or to my ancestors. If I attached any, even the slightest, weight to any such consideration, I should be (so far) sanctioning a theory, which (whether in Mr. Mill's or Mr. Spencer's hands) issues in exquisite and unparalleled absurdity. The question before us (we say) is not at all how this or that avouchment of my existent faculties may have *originated*, but exclusively (as a matter of fact) what it *is*.*

NECESSARY TRUTHS.

In what we have to say on necessary truths, the first question we have to consider is, of course, what is *meant* by this term "necessary." We consider—as we have stated in former articles—that the idea "necessary" is a simple idea, not composed of any others; and on the other hand that it is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of anything experienced by the senses.† Now of course there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it composed of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting those simpler ideas. As it is, all we can do by the very nature of the case is so to express ourselves, that we may best enable our readers to recognize an idea, which (we are confident) is a very prominent part of their mental furniture. In order to do this, we will draw their attention to what we consider a co-extensive idea, of which we have made frequent use in preceding articles. A "necessary truth" then, we will say, is "a truth of which Omnipotence could not effect the reversal."‡

* Mr. Henry Sidgwick has introduced a very serviceable terminology. He distinguishes "psychological" from "psychogonical" inquiries.

† See on this head F. Kleutgen's first "Dissertation on the Scholastic Philosophy," p. 643 of the French translation; and our remarks in January, 1874, p. 32.

‡ In saying that these two ideas are "coextensive,"—we purposely avoid saying that they are precisely equivalent, as though the latter could be taken as a definition of the former. We mean (1) that all necessary

And if some readers should at first fail to recognise clearly and distinctly in their mind what it is which we here intend, we cannot doubt that they *will* recognize (if they possess ordinary education and intelligence) by following the course of our argument.

Next, what are those theses concerning necessary truths, which are required for our present purpose? There are two: one fundamentally important, the other less vital. We begin with the former.

Adopting Sir W. Hamilton's phraseology, we divide propositions into three classes. There are (1) "identical propositions" or "truisms;" in which the predicate expresses no more, than has been explicitly expressed by the subject: as "this apple is an apple." There are (2) "explicative propositions;" in which the predicate expresses no more, than has been implicitly expressed by the subject: as "this hard substance resists pressure," or "this square is not circular." And there are (3) "ampliative" propositions; in which the predicate expresses what has neither explicitly nor implicitly been expressed by the subject: as "diamonds are combustible;" or "the angle in a semicircle is a right angle." Now we do not concern ourselves with "identical" or "explicative" propositions. The thesis on which we lay stress is, that certain "ampliative" propositions are cognisable, as expressing self-evidently necessary truths.

We need hardly say, that this thesis is entirely denied by Phenomenists: and indeed its denial may almost be called their characteristic tenet. Moreover, it has commonly been thought by philosophers on either side, that (for more reasons than one) the field of *mathematical axioms* is the one, on which this vital conflict between Intuitionists and Phenomenists may be best fought out. Accordingly we confronted Mr. Mill on this field in October, 1871; July, 1873; January, 1874. Feeling (as we have ever done) and expressing great respect for many of Mr. Mill's characteristics—we nevertheless felt it our duty to state with unabashed emphasis, what we sincerely believed to be the issue of the fight. "We are deliberately of

truths are such, that Omnipotence could not effect their reversal; and (2) conversely, that all truths, of which Omnipotence could not effect the reversal, are necessary.

A Catholic critic, a few years ago, objected to the phrase we use concerning Omnipotence, as "most dangerous." We cited in reply (July, 1875, p. 61) Suarez's dictum, that what is intrinsically repugnant is "extra objectum Omnipotentiae." Take, therefore, any one of that inexhaustible mass, demonstrable mathematical verities. To effect the contradictory of that verity, would be accounted by Suarez as "outside the object of Omnipotence."

opinion," we said (July, 1873, p. 5)—"not that there is more to be said on our side than on Mr. Mill's—but that he is utterly and simply in the wrong; that not one of his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly one of them the slightest appearance of force." On a subsequent occasion—in the "Contemporary Review" for March, 1875—we repelled an assault directed against us on the same battle-ground by Mr. Fitzjames (now Mr. Justice) Stephen;* and we cannot honestly say that we consider ourselves to have been less successful against *him*, than against Mr. Mill. Here, therefore, we shall assume that we have conclusively proved the thesis, which so essentially distinguishes Intuitionists from Phenomenists. Nor need we trouble ourselves by recapitulating any part of our prolonged discussions; except that we will here draw attention to one particular premiss, on which throughout we laid emphatic stress.

That premiss is the following:—"If in any case I know, by merely pondering on my conception of some *ens*, that a certain attribute, not *included* in that conception, is truly predicable of that *ens*—then such predication expresses a self-evidently necessary ampliative truth." The certainty of this principle must be obvious to any one, who shall choose to consider it. Thus let it be assumed that, by pondering on my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity. Consider then any trilateral whatever, which can be formed by Omnipotence itself. I know infallibly that this trilateral is triangular. We repeat. Concerning any trilateral which can be formed by Omnipotence itself,—I know it to be literally inevitable, that such trilateral shall be triangular. Or (in other words) it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence, to make a trilateral which shall not be triangular. Consequently the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth.

We need hardly say indeed, that there are innumerable necessary ampliative truths, which are *not* known to me by merely pondering on my conception of their subject: as, *e.g.*, the whole mass of demonstrated geometrical theorems. Such truths as those just mentioned we have called "*self-evidently* necessary ampliative truths;" or again "axioms."[†]

We said just now, that there are two theses concerning

* This paper was appended to our number for April, 1875.

† We have more than once expressed our own humble judgment (see, *e.g.*, July, 1871, pp. 55—60) that certain Intuitionists have acted very unwisely, in alleging "inconceivableness" as a proof of "intrinsic impossibility." We venture to think that, by such language, they most gratuitously and unnecessarily expose their position to hostile onslaught.

On "Philosophical Axioms" see our number for July, 1869.

necessary truths, which we need for our present purpose : one fundamental, the other less vital. We have now sufficiently set forth that one which we account fundamental ; and also one particular premiss, on which we have laid stress as adducible in its defence. We now proceed to that other which we regard as less vital. We may add that this second thesis is by no means universally accepted by Intuitionists, though to us it seems both certainly true and of great philosophical importance. Dr. M'Cosh has (we think) done excellent service, by dwelling on it in detail. Here it is.

Those "axioms," or "self-evidently necessary ampliative truths," of which we just now spoke, are not ordinarily intued at first in an universal but in an individual shape. Let us take as our first illustration some arithmetical axiom. I hold seven pebbles in one hand and four in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to the smaller group. Or again—without actually doing this—I *imagine* myself to do it. I intue at once, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$; that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of these particular pebbles only, but of all pebbles ; and not of pebbles only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the still more general axiom $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$, where a , b , and m , may be any whole numbers whatever, so that m be not greater than b . Again, let us take a geometrical axiom. I place before my imagination some individual trilateral, and intue as a self-evidently necessary truth that it is triangular. On reflection, indeed, I observe that what is true of this trilateral is true of any other possible trilateral. Certainly ; but I recognized the necessity of the truth in one particular instance, before I recognized that necessity in the universal proposition. *Capability* of being universalized is of course a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths ; but we should be quite mistaken (we are confident) if we supposed, that they are intued *in the first instance* as universal. Indeed we incline to think that the immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting some axiom in its individual shape, will seldom be found to universalize it.

Before we conclude this brief section on necessary truths, a few words are desirable—in order to prevent the possibility of misconception—on the relation which exists between necessary truths and the One Necessary Being. We need hardly add, however, that this is an explanation addressed to Theists, and no part of our argument against Antitheists. We may exhibit our remarks, in the shape of answering an objection. How, it may

be asked, can He be called Omnipotent, who has no power of reversing whatever is included in this vast mass of necessary truths? On former occasions we have given two different answers to this question. Firstly then we say, that *He* is Omnipotent, Who can do whatever falls within the sphere of power. But the contradictory of a necessary truth is not an "ens possibile;" it involves a contradiction in terms. Now to create that which is intrinsically impossible—that which involves a contradiction in terms—does not of course fall within the sphere of power. But there is a second answer to the question we have raised, which of the two we rather prefer; because we think it exhibits more fully the whole doctrine on the matter. Necessary truths are founded on the Nature of God. They are what they are, because He is what He is. In a most true sense they depend on Him; though they depend on His Nature, and not on any exercise of his Power.*

SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL SCIENCE.

At last then we are in a position to approach more nearly the special and culminating theme of our present paper. We should be glad if our readers at this point would peruse our article on "The Foundation of Morality," which appeared in January, 1872. Even, however, supposing them to have done so, it will be important to exhibit once more those particular parts of it, on which our purpose requires us especially to insist. And we begin with drawing attention to those psychical phenomena, which stand at the foundation of our argument.

The human mind, as a matter of fact, forms a very large number of what we will call "moral judgments." "I am bound to do what I am paid for doing." "How conscientious a man is H!" "K behaved far better than L under those circumstances." "M is really an unmitigated scoundrel." "No praise can be too great for N's noble sacrifice." "O treats his children in a way which won't bear thinking of." "It was a matter of strict obligation on P to pay his debt at that particular time." "Of course if God gives a command, it is man's duty to obey," &c., &c., &c. All these moral judgments, which so constantly occur, are reducible directly or indirectly to one or other of three types. (1) "Act A is virtuous in this or that degree;" (2)

* This is the expressed doctrine both of Cardinal Franzelin and of F. Kleutgen. The Cardinal's words are these:—"Totus ordo metaphysicus constituitur legibus necessariis essentialium; que leges ideo sunt necessariae, quia Divina Essentia eas postulat. Unde ipsa Essentia Divina, non liberâ voluntate, sed ex necessariâ Suâ perfectione, est fons et mensura totius etiam veritatis ordinis metaphysici." "De Deo," p. 316.

"Act B is wrong in this or that degree;"* (3) "Act C is more virtuous than Act D."† There is hardly any other question (we think) in all philosophy so momentous, as that which concerns the true nature and the authoritativeness of such judgments. In order the better to fix our thoughts in its discussion, we will imagine (as we did in 1872) a concrete case. It is founded on, but much exaggerated beyond, Lord Macaulay's exposition of Lord Bacon's conduct.

A politician of high and unblemished character, with whose public principles I am heartily in accordance, has admitted me to his friendship, loaded me with benefits, and trusted me with his dearest secrets. I find, however, as time goes on, that my best chance of advancement lies in attaching myself to the opposite side. Filled with passionate desire for such advancement, I make political capital by disclosing my benefactor's confidences to the adverse party; and I embark heartily in a course of enterprise, which has for its end his ruin. As I am about to reap the worldly fruit of my labours, I am seized with a violent illness. The crisis of the illness having passed away, in the tedious hours of slow recovery "I enter into myself," as ascetical writers would say. I judge that my successive acts have been signally wrong and wicked. Now let us fix our attention on some one in particular of these judgments. For instance, let us take the following:—"That past act, in which I divulged my benefactor's secrets to the opposite party for the sake of my own advancement, was an intensely wrong act." Let us take this moral judgment as the specimen instance, whereby to test alternative ethical theories.

Firstly, we maintain that the idea "wrong"—or its correlative "virtuous"—is an entirely simple idea; entirely incapable of being analyzed into component parts. There are many Intuitionists, we are well aware, who differ from us on this head; but we are very confident, nevertheless, that our thesis is true. And as (in our humble opinion) the importance of this thesis, in the Theistic controversy, is unspeakably great, we must not fail—even at the risk of tedium—to place arguments before our readers which shall suffice to exhibit it conclusively. This we shall best do, by first passing under review some one antagonistic theory in particular. A certain number then of those Intuitionists who

* We use the word "wrong" as the best single word we can think of, to express the idea "anti-virtuous." But it is not quite a satisfactory word.

† When it is said in common parlance that this or that act is "of obligation," no more is meant (we think) than that to omit the act would be wrong. Whether in *scientific* language this is a proper use of the term "obligation," we need not here inquire. See January, 1872, p. 4.

deny that the idea "virtuous" is simple, analyze it thus: "A 'virtuous' act," they say, "means a 'free, act directed by me to my true ultimate end;' and a 'wrong' act means 'a free act oppositely directed.'" We need hardly explain how entirely we agree to the proposition, that "every free act directed by me to my true end is 'virtuous.'"* What we affirm, however, is, that the term "virtuous" does not *mean* "freely directed to my true end;" but, on the contrary, expresses an idea distinct from, and superadded to, that other idea. Let us turn then to our specimen instance, and see whether the proposed analysis will hold water.

Surely not. When, under my new impressions, I first reflect on the baseness of that particular act in my past history,—I clearly recognize that baseness, before I so much as begin to think of the end for which I was created. At one and the same moment, there starts up in my mind a keen emotion of bitter shame, and (in company with that emotion) the clearest and most pungent perception, how foully and atrociously I have acted. We repeat. I perceive *at once* with piercing clearness, that I have acted most wrongly, wickedly, basely. *Afterwards*, no doubt, I may begin to think about my ultimate end. I may reflect that I was created for something very different from this; and that my having so gravely thwarted my high vocation, has been a grievous calamity. But this is felt by me as a *new* reflection; a reflection entirely distinct from, though very directly founded on, my original reflection, that my conduct has been wrong, wicked, base.

In real truth, however, it is only necessary to exhibit in logical shape the tenet we are opposing, in order that every one may see its falsehood. According to this tenet, the term "a wrong act" means neither more nor less than "a free act put forth in opposition to my true ultimate end." Now consider the following proposition: "It is wrong for me to put forth freely an act, in opposition to my true ultimate end." According to the tenet which we are opposing, this proposition means neither more nor less than the following:—"to put forth a free act in opposition to my true ultimate end, is to put forth a free act in opposition to my true ultimate end." The proposition then—according to the tenet which we oppose—is as simple and bare a truism, as the proposition that "a chair is a chair," or "a triangle is a triangle," or "an apple is an apple." When the matter is put in this shape, surely no reader of ordinary intelligence can be taken in by so preposterous a notion. When I say "it is wrong in me to put forth a free act in

* We assume, of course, that there is no flaw in what Catholics call its "object" and "circumstances."

opposition to my true ultimate end"—every person of ordinary intelligence will understand me to mean something very different from a bald and naked truism. Every one will see that I am uttering an ampliative proposition, and one of considerable importance. In other words, every one will see that the idea "wrong" is not *identical* with the idea "freely put forth in opposition to my ultimate end," but entirely *distinct* from the latter. And this is the precise thesis which we wished to establish.

An argument in every respect similar may be most easily drawn out, against any *other* suggested analysis of the idea "virtuous." We consider ourselves then to have sufficiently established our first thesis; viz., that "virtuous" is a simple idea. Secondly, we would point out, that the reality which that idea represents is absolutely "metempirical."* In the course of our series we have already maintained this, concerning the two ideas "necessary" and "cause:" here we are to exhibit the same truth, as regards the idea "virtuous." Of course the idea itself, as existing in the mind, is a psychical phenomenon; but what we say is, that the *objective attribute*, which that idea represents, is entirely metempirical. Suppose I form the judgment, that such or such a course of conduct will probably preserve me in good health; or will conduce otherwise to my worldly advantage; or that it will obtain for me special help here and a special reward hereafter from some Invisible Being. In all such instances, the attribute which I predicate† is intelligible to me (so far as it is intelligible) by direct or indirect reference to phenomena of my experience. But when I form the judgment that such or such a course of conduct is "virtuous," and its contradictory "wrong,"—the attribute which I predicate cannot be even approximately represented in terms of phenomena at all. And yet—though such is undeniably the case—the meaning of this attribute "virtuous" is as clearly and readily intelligible to me, as is the most simple phenomenon in the whole world. For the truth of this last statement, we refer to the only possible standard of appeal—the testimony of each man's consciousness. In every moral judgment then, the subject is a certain phenomenal act, or certain phenomenal acts; and the judgment itself ascribes a certain metempirical *attribute* to that act or those acts. This is our second thesis on the present occasion.

* The word "metempirical" was invented by a Phenomenistic philosopher—the late Mr. G. H. Lewes—to express "external to the sphere of phenomena." We entirely agree with Mr. H. W. Lucas, that the word is a very useful addition to philosophical terminology.

† For convenience sake, we have always used the terms "subject," "predicate," concerning *judgments* no less than concerning *propositions*.

Our third thesis is, that certain moral truths are self-evidently necessary.* Let us here revert to our pattern specimen, "That past act of mine, wherein for my own selfish purposes I betrayed my benefactor's confidence, was a wrong act." Now in the preceding section of our article we mentioned one particular premiss, as having often been employed by us for the purpose of showing, that this or that truth is a necessary one. The premiss (it may be remembered) runs thus: If in any case, by merely pondering on my conception of some *ens*, I know that a certain attribute (not included in that conception) is truly predicable of that *ens*, then such predication expresses a self-evidently necessary ampliative truth. Moreover, when we cited this premiss, we trust we sufficiently showed how uncontested is its soundness. Now it can hardly be needful for us to say, how obviously applicable is this premiss to the case in hand. I ponder on this past phenomenal act of mine, as I remember myself to have perpetrated it. And, by the mere process of thus pondering, I come to know that the attribute "wrong,"—which is not included in my *conception* of the phenomenal act,—is nevertheless truly predicable thereof. Consequently, the proposition,—“that act was wrong,”—expresses a self-evidently necessary truth.

The Phenomenist, in replying to this argument, sometimes urges a consideration, which we are bound, no doubt, carefully to bear in mind. Inferences from experience, he urges, are often so obviously and spontaneously drawn, that they may most easily be mistaken for intuitions. We have always entirely admitted the force of this consideration, which indeed has a very important bearing on questions concerning the existent divergence of moral standards. We have always fully admitted, that we have no right to treat any given judgment as intuitive, until we have clearly shown that it is not inferential. But without at all denying that many moral judgments are inferential, it is evident on a moment's consideration, that (if our previous theses be admitted) *some* moral judgments are most certainly immediate. Take the case of some inferential moral judgment. Its predicate (as we have shown) is one or other exhibition of a certain simple and metempirical idea: "virtuous" or "wrong." Now such an idea cannot possibly be found in the conclusion of a syllogism, unless it be found in one of the premisses.†

* By "moral truths," we need hardly say, we mean "the objects of true moral judgments."

† If "virtuous" were a complex idea, it might imaginably be found in the conclusion of a syllogism, without appearing in the premisses except as regards its constituent elements. But here the idea *has* no constituent elements.

Some one of its premisses, therefore, is a moral judgment. If this premiss be itself a conclusion, we are only thrown back on some earlier premiss. In due course, therefore, we must by absolute necessity arrive at some moral judgment, which is immediate, not inferential. And there are no moral judgments which we *allege* to be intuitive, unless they belong to this class.

Our fourth thesis (in accordance with our view on axioms in general) is, that self-evidently necessary moral truths are first intueed in the individual case. When reflecting on my past life, I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that this particular past act of treachery to my benefactor was wrong, base, foul. No doubt I may carry my speculations further. I may come to intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that *any one else*, who under circumstances precisely similar should do precisely what I did, would also act wrongly, basely, foully. But we incline to think, that in a vast majority of cases the agent does not carry his speculations so far. Moral axioms, like other axioms, are *potentially* universal; but we much doubt whether ordinary men commonly intue them as such. This particular question, however, is one of no great practical importance that we can see.

But there is a view, not uncommonly taken by Intuitionists, which is of far greater practical moment; and from which we must dissent with some confidence. In considering that judgment of mine whereby I recognise the intense baseness of my past act, they would deny that this judgment is immediate and self-evident. They would regard it on the contrary as an *inference* from more vague and general judgments, which they do regard as self-evidently necessary. "Benefactors ought not to be harmed;" "secrets ought not to be disclosed;" "men ought not to pursue their own advancement at another man's expense;" &c., &c. On our side we need not here inquire, to what extent a list of general moral propositions can be drawn out, which shall be reasonably accepted as self-evidently necessary, and as admitting therefore of no exception.* But we submit with great confidence, that such an individual moral judgment,

* Mr. Sidgwick discusses this question with great care and signal ability, in his "Methods of Ethics," Book iii., chaps. 4—11. We think that his remarks deserve most serious attention from all ethical students. For ourselves, we will here only say that we are very clear indeed on one point. Mr. Sidgwick's arguments against Intuitionism, we are confident, would be quite immeasurably less plausible than they are, if he more distinctly confronted Intuitionism under the shape exhibited in our text. He recognises that phase of doctrine indeed, as one existing in many minds; but (for whatever reason) does not argumentatively confront it.

as we have taken for our pattern specimen, is in no way an inference from any general moral judgment. Of no syllogism can the conclusion be more keenly manifest to me, than are the premisses.* Yet it is with indefinitely more keenness manifest to me that my past act was base, than that those general propositions are true which we just now recited.

We have no space to pursue this particular question further; but we venture to think it of quite critical importance, in the controversy against Utilitarians and other Phenomenists. For our own immediate purpose, however, the matter is comparatively irrelevant. Whatever be held concerning our fourth thesis, the three earlier theses remain; and we have established, therefore, that there are certain self-evidently necessary moral axioms. Now on this fact ethical science is founded. These axioms, as is evident, may be made premisses in many a different chain of reasoning; and thus a large number of moral judgments will result by way of inference, in regard to which it is certain or probable (accordingly as the reasoning may have been more or less cogent) that they are necessarily true. Then, again, my "moral sense," in proportion as it is "properly cultivated" (to use F. O'Reilly's phrase), largely increases the number of moral judgments, which to me are self-evident as necessarily true. And it is by these various methods (as we look at the matter) that the great fabric of ethical science receives verification and enlargement.†

A Catholic moralist, as distinct at all events from a non-Christian, has to make a further point. The Church claims to teach infallibly concerning moral truth; nor indeed do we see how it can be denied by any believer in Scripture, that the Apostles claimed the same power. A Christian philosopher then has to show, as he very easily can, that this claim of infallible moral teaching involves no interference with the legitimate rights of reason. We merely mention this episodically, to shew that we have not forgotten it; but the matter has no bearing on our argument, and we have no space to enter on it. For the same reason,—want of space,—we will not here attempt a reply to two different objections urged against our thesis, which we have sufficiently met on earlier occasions. The first of these objections is directed "ad homines" against Christians, on the ground of God's apparent interferences, as recorded in Scripture, with those ethical verities which we maintain to be necessary and immutable. This objection we briefly answered, by help of Catholic theologians, in January,

* We are supposing of course, that the conclusion is no *otherwise* known to me, than as resulting from those premisses.

† See F. O'Reilly's statements in January, 1876, p. 95. See also our own remarks in January, 1872, pp. 66, 67.

1872, pp. 51-52; and Dr. Ward has treated the question in his "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 165-190. The second of the objections to which we refer, is the notable divergence of *moral standard*, which has existed in different times and countries. On this we must be content with referring our readers to our detailed reply in January, 1872, pp. 62-70.

THE BEARING OF ETHICAL SCIENCE ON THEISM.

We are now, in conclusion, to exhibit the bearing on Theism of those fundamental ethical verities, which we have laboured to establish. And we might commence this task by mentioning one ethical truth in particular, which all men will accept as self-evidently necessary, who believe that there *is* such a thing as necessary truth. If a Holy Creator exist, it is wrong, base, wicked, to refuse Him unreserved obedience, love,* &c., &c. Then we might further refer to the doctrine already mentioned, that all necessary truths, and moral truths therefore inclusively, are founded on the Nature of God; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. These are doubtless ethical truths closely bearing on Theism. Yet they are not exactly in the number of those which we are here considering. We are considering those ethical truths only, which tend to the *argumentative establishment* of Theism.

Now there is more than one class of ethical truths, which directly or indirectly tend to the establishment of Theism. It is only, however, the chief one of these, on which we are able to insist in our present article. What we would here then urge, is a consideration of all which is involved in that most unique and signally significant idea "virtuous," with its correlative "wrong." We ventured to say in January, 1872, p. 48,—and subsequent reflection has but confirmed us in our opinion,—that there is probably no other psychical fact whatever so pregnant with momentous consequences in the existing state of philosophy, as man's possession of this idea. In this statement however we include of course, not merely his *possession* of the idea, but his cognizance of its correspondence with an objective reality.

Before setting forth at greater length what we here mean, we must make an introductory remark on a doctrine which has occupied us in our two preceding philosophical papers; the doctrine of Free Will. Let us go back to our pattern instance of a moral judgment: the reflections of a repenting

* It is a very singular fact, that non-Catholic Theistic writers so often omit all reference to duties *towards God* in their ethical discussions. They speak of what are now called "egoism" and "altruism;" but apparently forget that there are other fundamental duties, besides those owing to myself and to my fellow-men.

politician on his bed of sickness. In recognizing the fact that this or that past act of treachery was on his part wrong and base, he intues (as we have been urging) that the baseness of this act is a self-evidently necessary truth. It is not *only*, however, this moral truth which he recognizes. At the same moment he recognizes another verity; the verity that those past acts were *free*. We urged this in April, 1874, p. 359. As to the *former* verity,—he intues it through that endowment of the human faculties, whereby they are enabled to recognize certain self-evidently necessary truths. As to the *latter* verity,—of that he is most intimately cognizant through his close and unintermittent familiarity with his own mental phenomena.

Whereas, then, self-intimacy acquaints me with the fact, that I am true master of my own actions—that the conduct of my life depends on my own free choice—my various moral judgments instruct me, with varying degrees of certainty, in the all-important lesson what that conduct ought to be. These judgments, taken individually, direct me in individual acts. But it is not our present purpose to dwell on them in this point of view.* What we here wish to urge, is concerned, not with individual moral judgments, but with my moral judgments, taken collectively. As time goes on then,—this, that, and the other act are successively known to me as not permissible—as wrong, base, wicked—whatever their attractiveness to my inclinations. Again, this act is known to me as more virtuous than that, whichever of the two—exercising my liberty—I may choose to perform. In proportion, therefore, as I give more attention to the ethical conduct of my life—in that proportion the number of such necessary moral truths brought within my cognizance increases unintermittently and inexhaustibly. I thus obtain an ever clearer perception of the fact, that I am in contact with a certain necessarily existing and pervasive Supreme Rule of life;† from which indeed, as regards its actual injunctions,‡ I cannot swerve, without wrong-doing and wickedness. No other motive of action has any claim on me at all so paramount, as the claim of this Rule. No other course of action is so reasonable, as that

* The question in itself is of course very momentous, how my various moral judgments may acquire increasing clearness and rectitude on matters of detail. On this see our article, January, 1872, pp. 66, 67; and for a fuller treatment, Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 119–161.

† We cannot of course refer to the Natural Law, without assuming the Existence of God.

‡ When we mention the "actual injunctions" of this Rule, we refer to those particular moral judgments which are of the type, "act B is wrong."

of conforming myself more and more with its counsels; nor can any other thing be so intensely unreasonable, as the doing that which it pronounces to be intrinsically evil.* We have already, therefore, arrived at a very remarkable and noteworthy conclusion. There is a certain purely invisible and metempirical standard, which claims to be the only true measure and arbiter of man's whole conduct in this visible scene. Man is proverbially monarch of the visible world; and it is precisely, man who is *de jure* subject to the authoritative judgments of an invisible tribunal.†

Here we take a further and most momentous step forward. This Supreme Rule is no mere catalogue of metempirical moral truths, but a *Law* imposed on me by *rightful personal authority*. Or, to express the same proposition in somewhat different terms,—what-

* One or two collateral points here emerge, on which we would refer for our view to Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction."

Thus (1) the case is imaginable, that, by doing what my moral judgment dictates, I shall impair my own permanent felicity. Dr. Ward submits (pp. 419-421) that such a case—though conceivable—is metaphysically impossible.

Then (2) some Intuitionists express themselves as though they held, that men cannot pursue virtuousness for its own sake, but merely as a *means* to beatitude or felicity. We do not think that this is in general intended by such writers, though they certainly express themselves obscurely. Dr. Ward at all events (pp. 409-417) exhibits strong theological authority in the opposite direction. He cites Scotus, Suarez, Vasquez, Viva, and other writers of name. See also pp. 404-409.

† Our argument will be interestingly illustrated, if we quote a few of Bishop Butler's expressions, concerning what he calls "the principle of reflection or conscience," and its due authority.

"The very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our whole conduct before this supreme faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority; and make it the business of our lives to conform ourselves to it."

"This is the most intimate of obligations; which a man cannot transgress without being self-condemned, and (unless he has corrupted his nature) without real self-dislike."

This superior principle "without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns the doer of certain actions; and if not forcibly stopped, naturally and as of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."

"Had it strength as it has right—had it power as it has manifest authority—it would absolutely govern the world."

There is one important difference between Bishop Butler's position and our own; viz., that he throughout assumes the Existence of God. But we think he lays very little stress on this in his argument.

Among the very many imperishable services which Cardinal Newman has rendered to the cause of Christianity and of Catholicity, none (to our mind) exceeds the example he has given, in always laying such prominent and emphatic stress on man's naturally implanted sense of right and wrong.

ever is known by my reason to be intrinsically and necessarily wrong, is also known by my reason to be necessarily forbidden by some Superior Being, who possesses over me rightful jurisdiction.

Before entering, however, on our grounds for this vitally important conclusion, it is of extreme moment, that we guard against a possible misconception of what is involved therein. We must on no account be misunderstood as alleging, that the idea "wrong," is *equivalent* to the idea "forbidden by some Superior Being," &c.; and (by parity) that the idea "virtuous" is equivalent to the idea "approved by some such Person." We have already argued, —conclusively, we trust,—that "virtuous" and "wrong," while mutually correlative, are at the same time absolutely simple ideas. Still there is one particular shape wherein a denial of this latter truth has been embodied, which to us seems so full of most serious evil consequences, that we cannot be contented without considering it expressly and at some little length.

It has been held then by some Intuitionists, that the idea "wrong" is equivalent to the idea "forbidden by my Creator:" and that the former idea, therefore, is complex; being correctly analyzed into the latter. To this allegation we have already given, we trust, one amply sufficient answer. Take this very fundamental and momentous proposition: "It is wrong to disobey my Creator." According to the allegation which we are opposing, this proposition would not be momentous at all: it would be a bald and naked truism, with no more significance than the proposition that an apple is an apple, and a chair a chair. For, according to the allegation which we are opposing, the proposition we have just mentioned would mean neither more nor less than this: "To disobey my Creator is to disobey my Creator." Such a supposition, we need not say, is among the absurdest which can be conceived. It is most plain then, that the term "wrong" introduces into the proposition some new idea, which is *not* identical with the idea of "disobeying my Creator."*

Here then is our first argument against the allegation, that

* An explanation should here be appended. Is it a self-evidently necessary and universal truth, that "it is wrong to disobey my Creator"? We submit that this is not the case, unless the attribute "Holy" be known as appertaining to the Creator. The supposition is conceivable—though of course intrinsically impossible—that some not perfectly virtuous being possesses creative power. Such a creator might impose some immoral command; and if so, assuredly could not be obeyed by me without my doing what is wrong. See our remarks in January, 1872, pp. 72, 73.

The proposition then, as amended, stands thus: "It is wrong to disobey my perfectly Holy Creator." We have already explained, that we account this a self-evidently necessary ampliative proposition.

the word "wrong" means "forbidden by my Creator;" or "forbidden by my Holy Creator." A second is urged by F. Liberatore with great force; though perhaps it is hardly more than the preceding argument displayed in a somewhat different shape. Theists themselves must admit—such is F. Liberatore's argument—that even after God has issued some command, the act commanded will still be destitute of obligation, unless an *antecedent* premiss be assumed: unless it be assumed, that "to disobey God is wrong, sinful, wicked." If you can say nothing more than that "to disobey God is to disobey God," you will have given morality no foundation whatever (*Ethica*, nn. 27, 29).*

There is a third argument, however, which has frequently been adduced for our conclusion, and on which for ourselves we would always lay greater stress than on either of the preceding. It is addressed of course to Theists, and we put it thus: Consider any one of God's Attributes; say His Omnipotence. This is an Attribute entirely analogous to the attribute "power," as possessed by a creature: entirely analogous, but existing in an infinite degree. In like manner consider God's attribute "Infinite Holiness." This is entirely analogous to the attribute "virtuous," as possessed by a reasonable creature: entirely analogous, but existing in an infinite degree. Now, if "virtuous" merely meant "conformable with my Creator's Will," then the Uncreated could have no Attribute of "Holiness" at all; and would lose (as one may say) the brightest jewel of His crown.

We must maintain it then as most certain, and even most evident, that that attribute, which is designated by the word "wrong," includes in its notion no reference whatever to God or to any Superior Being. Yet—as we just now alleged—there is another fact in the opposite direction, which is not less certain, and perhaps even hardly less evident. This is the fact to which we urgently solicit our readers' careful attention. We suppose throughout (it will be remembered) that the genuine avouchment of my faculties is entirely trustworthy and without appeal. Now it is surely an undeniable matter of fact, that when I contemplate a black catalogue of evil actions committed by me in time past, I contemplate them, not merely as intrinsically wrong and wicked, but as offences—as a rebellion—against some Superior Being, whose displeasure I have thereby incurred. Cardinal Newman expresses, with

* F. Liberatore's expressed thesis is merely, that morality does not depend on the *Free Will* of God. But those who read the sections to which we refer in our text, will see that he is also emphatically opposed to the doctrine that (as he expresses it in n. 27) "*God's Will*,"—not merely God's *Free Will*,—"is the first root and source of morality."

unsurpassable force and clearness, those experienced facts of human nature, which bear in this direction. We italicise a few words and clauses.

No *fear* is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not been *beautiful*, though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some advantage. But, if he has been betrayed into any kind of *immorality*, he has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society;—of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present service to him;—of compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable;—*of confusion of face, though it may have no witness*. These various perturbations of mind, which are characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable,—self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future,—and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like,—these emotions constitute a generic difference between conscience* and our other intellectual senses,—common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like

Conscience . . . always involves the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed. Inanimate things *cannot stir our affections*: these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, *this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible*, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight, which follows on our receiving praise from a father;—*we certainly have within us the image of some person*, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings within us are such as *require for their exciting cause an intelligent being*. We are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law; yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. “The wicked flees when no one pursueth:” then why does he flee? and whence his terror? *Who is it that he sees in solitude, in*

* We have avoided the word “conscience” in our whole discussion, for reasons which we gave in January, 1872, p. 46. From the best study we could give to Cardinal Newman’s writings, we had always understood him to mean by this word—as is so often meant by it—“man’s natural sense of right and wrong.” It was pointed out, however, in a letter sent to the “Tablet” with Cardinal Newman’s implied sanction, that we had importantly misapprehended his terminology. See our number for April, 1876, pp. 483—486.

darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, Holy, Just, Powerful, All-seeing, Retributive; and *is the creative principle of religion.**

Similarly F. Liberatore—whom we have seen so firmly opposing the notion that the word “wrong” means “prohibited by God”—nevertheless uses such language as this: “Natural reason itself,” he says, “in discerning actions as suitable or repugnant to human nature, places before us a *Divine prohibition or command*” (n. 79). “This dictate of [moral] reason is so perceived by man with a certain internal auscultation (*auditu quodam interno*), that he feels himself truly bound by a *certain command* To which *voice interiorly commanding* if any man refuse obedience, he is so pierced by the stings” of conscience “as to expect some penalty from some Supreme Authority” (p. 80). In moral judgments “there is always involved the obscure at least and indistinct perception of *some hidden power*, which objectively considered is no other than God” (n. 73). So again F. Kleutgen: “God makes Himself felt within us by His Moral Law, as an August Power to which we are subject.”

Here we must explain, as accurately as we can, the exact point on which we are at this moment insisting. We suppose ourselves of course preliminarily to have established our *earlier* doctrine—the doctrine, that there exists most indubitably a certain Supreme Rule of life, the precepts of which, so far as known to me, cannot be disobeyed without wrong-doing and wickedness. If any men then choose to live in moral callousness and obduracy, they act on one hand with monstrous wickedness, and on the other hand with extremest unreasonableness. Nor do we here maintain that such men as these have any means of arriving explicitly at the further cognition on which we wish to insist, unless they begin to amend their ways, and to act more in accordance with sound reason. But we make *this* allegation. If I be not altogether morally callous and obdurate—if I practise a certain sedulousness in avoiding whatever I know to be wrong—or even if I keep alive in my mind the express remembrance that wrong *is* wrong—then I come to cognize with ever increasing clearness the ampliative truth, that all acts of wickedness are acts of rebellion against some Superior Being. So universal, intrinsic, irresistible, is this conviction among all men who are not morally callous and obdurate, that (if man’s intellec-

* “Grammar of Assent,” Fourth Edition, pp. 108-110.

tual faculties are really trustworthy) the conviction *must* be well-founded. Either the judgment is intuitive, or it is an inference so universal and inevitable as to be tantamount in authority with an intuition. Those who believe in an intrinsic and necessarily existing distinction between right and wrong,—and who keep alive in their mind the remembrance of that belief,—are quite invariably found *also* to believe, that acts intrinsically wrong are forbidden by some Superior Being. We must not fail indeed to set forth what seems to us the true account of that psychical process, which issues in this universal dictate of reason. Still we entreat our readers to bear in mind, that the *existence* of this dictate is a fact indefinitely more undeniable, than is the correctness of any given theory which may be suggested; and it is on the universal existence of this dictate that we base our conclusion. Our own theory on its genesis would be the following.

Cognitions of every kind may be explicit or implicit. If they are explicit, I am explicitly conscious of them; if implicit, I am implicitly conscious (or, as it is now sometimes called, “sub-conscious”) of them. Suppose I am interrupted in my literary work by the roar of a neighbouring cannon: if I were asked whether I *heard* it, I should laugh at my interrogator’s joke. But if he asks me whether I have heard a certain low rumbling sound which has gone on near me for some time—my first impression perhaps will be that I have *not* heard it: yet, by carefully examining my recent consciousness, I may find that the sound did in fact reach me. My cognition of it then was real but implicit.

Now take the case of some moral judgment: “this my past act of treachery to my benefactor was wrong, wicked, base.” This judgment is most explicit, we need not say. But we submit that such a judgment is always in fact accompanied by another, though this other is *not* always explicit. We should thus express the second judgment: “That past act of treachery was an act of rebellion against some Superior Being, who possesses over me rightful jurisdiction.” This judgment, when I contemplate merely some one evil act, may possibly enough be altogether implicit: but when I contemplate a *series* of past evil acts, it assumes more and more an explicit shape. In defence of this conclusion, we argue as follows:

Let us first repeat what we have already said. By means of my various moral judgments, this, that, and the other act is successively cognized by me, as not permissible—as wrong, base, wicked—whatever may be its tendency to worldly advantage. In proportion as I give more attention to the ethical conduct of my life, in that proportion the number of moral truths brought

within my cognizance increases in a more rapid ratio. And I am thus brought into a constantly clearer perception of the truth, that I am in contact with a certain metempirical and pervasive Rule of Life, from which I cannot swerve without wrongness, wickedness, baseness; that the whole conduct of my life is *de jure* subject to the pronouncements of a certain invisible tribunal. Such was our earlier statement.* But as soon as I have arrived at the conviction expressed by that statement, a further step is strictly inevitable and irresistible. The notion of a Supreme Rule from which I cannot swerve without wickedness, passes inevitably and irresistibly into the *further* notion of a Law imposed on me by some Superior Being. The notion of an invisible tribunal, by which my actions are authoritatively praised or blamed, passes into the further notion of some Personal Judge sitting on that tribunal. To dwell on the earlier of the two convictions without passing into the later—to remain content with the notion of a Supreme Rule, without carrying it forward to the notion of a Natural Law—is as impossible psychically, as to pass my life standing on one leg is impossible physically. If ever there were a genuine intuition, it is that on which we are insisting. That Rule, to which profound, continuous, unreserved allegiance is due from free and reasonable beings, cannot be a mere *abstraction*; it must be the Law of some personal Superior possessing rightful authority.†

* We do not here refer to those other moral judgments included in the Supreme Rule, which are of the type "act A is virtuous," "act C is more virtuous than act D." We abstain from this, because our argument (though applicable to all these judgments) is exhibited with more irresistible clearness in the case of those particular judgments, which are of the type "act B is wrong."

† We submitted in January, 1872, that the view we have put forward is serviceable, on two doctrinal heads, in harmonizing Catholic writers with themselves, with each other, and with facts. Thus they hold on one hand that God (according to human modes of conception) cognizes any given act as intrinsically evil, antecedently to prohibiting it by the Natural Law; and yet they hold that in intuiting an act as morally evil, men spontaneously and inevitably cognize the fact of its being prohibited by some Supreme Legislator. Both these truths are provided for in what we have said.

Then for another matter of doctrine. The vast majority of theologians follow S. Thomas, in holding that God's Existence is not "*per se nota quoad nos*;" though they regard it as a truth very obviously and readily *deducible* from first principles. On the other hand, it is maintained by them all that a large number of moral axioms is self-evident; and they commonly add that some vague and obscure cognition of God is involved in the cognition of moral axioms. We harmonize these two doctrines by submitting that the Existence of a Supreme Legislator is an *inference*—though a very prompt and obvious one—from the self-evident truths of morality.

Of course our whole train of reasoning from first to last is entirely futile, unless inquirers admit what we have called "the principle of intrinsic certitude." But then, as we have so often argued, those who refuse to admit that principle, descend to the level of brutes—nay, to a level below that of brutes—as regards the knowledge which they can consistently claim to possess. Their knowledge (were it possible for them to carry out their principle faithfully) would be strictly limited to the passing consciousness of each individual moment. On the other hand, if persons admit the genuineness and trustworthiness of those particular intuitions which are called acts of memory,—they have no pretext for refusing to admit the genuineness and trustworthiness of those *other* intuitions, which are undeniably no *less* immediate declarations of the human mind than are acts of memory themselves. It is on such intuitions that we have constructed our argument. Those which we have alleged for our purpose, are divisible (our reader will remember) into two classes. The first class consists of those intuitions which declare, that certain moral judgments possess self-evidently necessary truth; while the second consists of those which declare, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that all wrong acts are prohibited by a certain Superior Being.

Now further. Since it is a necessary truth that all wrong acts are prohibited by a certain Superior Being,—and since it is very certain that wrong acts *are* committed,—it manifestly results, that the Existence itself of that Being is a necessary truth.

Moreover—as Viva argues—this Superior Being has on me such paramount claims, that though all other beings in the universe solicited me in the opposite direction, my indispensable duty would in no way be affected, of submitting myself unreservedly to His command. His will then is more peremptorily authoritative, than the united will of all existent or possible persons who are not He.

Once more. As F. Franzelin puts it, moral laws hold good for all persons existent or possible. All other persons, therefore, existent or possible, are no less unreservedly subject to the command of this Being than I am. Consequently he is Supreme Legislator over the universe of reasonable and free individuals.

We are thus landed in the conclusion, that there is a certain Necessary Being—faultlessly Holy—possessing authority rightful, absolutely supreme, exclusive, without appeal, over the whole existent or possible universe of rational and free individuals. We are well aware, of course, that objections more or less plausible may be raised against the reasoning which issues in this conclusion. But then we are also confident, that a review of these objections will only make the force of our arguments

more obviously certain and irresistible. Any such review, however, must be deferred to a future occasion.

Here then for the moment we terminate our discussion ; having arrived at the threshold, and indeed at some little distance beyond the threshold, of that disquisition, to which all our preceding articles have been introductory. The next stage in our argument will be to engage in direct conflict with Agnosticism as such ; to examine those arguments which have been adduced for the conclusion, that nothing of practical importance can be certainly known concerning the Great First Cause. On this head we shall take Mr. Herbert Spencer as representing the Agnostic party ; and they will certainly admit, that we could not choose a more powerful expositor of their doctrine. We expect, however, that our readers will be greatly amazed, when they see the extraordinary weakness and futility of the Agnostic position : a position, which not even Mr. Spencer's genius can invest with so much as superficial plausibility.

Before we begin this controversy, however, some supplementary remarks (as we mentioned last April) must be placed before our Catholic readers, on one important portion of the Free Will doctrine ; a portion which we were not able to discuss until we had gone over part of the ground covered by our present article.

After we had finished the preceding pages in their first draft, we read Mr. Balfour's volume on "Philosophical Doubt." This volume, in more than one particular, goes over the ground which we have trodden in this and preceding papers. And it is otherwise so remarkable, that we have written a notice of it, which appears in our present number.

W. G. WARD.

ART. V.—THE LAND QUESTION AND LAW REFORM.

1. *Free Trade in Land.* By JOSEPH KAY, Q.C. London : 1879.
2. *The Succession Laws of Christian Countries, with Special Reference to the Law of Primogeniture as it Exists in England.* By EYRE LLOYD, B.A. London : 1877.
3. *The Landed Interest and the Supply of Food.* By JAMES CAIRD. London : 1878.
4. *Report from the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 16th July, 1878.
5. *Report from the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 24th June, 1879.
6. *The Irish Land Question.* By STEPHEN M. LANIGAN, A.B., T.C.D. London and Dublin : 1879.

AGRICULTURE is the most important of our national industries ; it exceeds every other both in the number of persons to whom it furnishes employment, and in the amount of capital which it engages ; its welfare is so closely bound up with that of commerce, that depression in either is sure to be followed by a sympathetic movement in the other. Commerce finds a market for its manufactures in the rural population ; agriculture pours its riches into the crowded cities. Yet, in spite of this natural bond of union, there is a broad division of parties into commercial and agricultural, which corresponds very closely with that of Liberal and Conservative. Between these parties, between town and country, there exists political antagonism, and in this antagonism is to be found the secret of the land-question. The people of the town, or, as we shall call them, the Liberals, possessing no land themselves, feel dissatisfied with the way in which the actual owners hold and manage their properties, and would reform their customs whether they wish it or not. This is a most suggestive fact, that the principal demand for reform springs from without, and not from within, the landed interest. What the Liberals desire may be summed up in the title of the work which we have placed at the head of this article, “Free Trade in Land,” and

this may be explained in the words of a recognized leader of Liberal opinion :—

It means the abolition of the law of primogeniture, and the limitation of the system of entails and settlements, so that life interests may be for the most part got rid of, and a real ownership substituted for them. It means also that it shall be as easy to buy or sell land as to buy and sell a ship, or at least as easy as it is in Australia, and in many, or in all the States of the American Union.

From this it would appear that cheap transfer, and certain alterations in the law are the desiderata. But, surely, there must be some hidden motive, some expectation of great consequences to ensue from their introduction, to explain the passionate eagerness for these suggested reforms. Such a motive is not far to seek. The ownership of land is at present restricted to a limited class. The great estates of the aristocracy are odious in the eyes of a Manchester reformer, and he hopes, by the operation of "Free Trade in Land," to break down the "monopoly," to distribute the lands among a larger number, and to create, to some extent at least, a class of peasant proprietors. This motive underlies and explains the action of all such land-law reformers. That reform of some kind is desirable we do not deny, of its feasibility we have our doubts; but, while we cannot admit that reform in the direction indicated would produce the expected results, we must reprobate the spirit of animosity towards an existing class which furnishes the chief incentive to the ultra-radicals.

We propose in the following pages to examine the question of land transfer, and the proposed alterations in the general law, which taken together constitute the land question; and we shall then offer a few remarks on the merits of the system of small proprietors, which it is the professed object of reformers to introduce, at least partially, into this country. The laws of real property have been for the last half-century the subject of continuous amendment; many anomalies have been removed; some flagrant injustices have been remedied; the enjoyment of property has been made more secure, its recovery more simple, and its liabilities more definite. Great advances have also been made towards simplifying the forms of conveyance, but there is still room, in this particular, for considerable improvement. The transfer of land is, at the present day, admittedly in an unsatisfactory condition. Delay, expense and uncertainty are the subjects of complaint. These have no doubt been mitigated in recent times by the general improvement in the law; yet with reference to certain kinds of property the lesser evils have become more intolerable. Difficulties of transfer are a speculative grievance to the man who does

not contemplate a sale ; but urban and suburban land has become more and more an article of commerce, and has increased in relative importance with the extension of towns. The ownership of such land is in a state of perpetual flux, and it is here that the evils of the existing system press most heavily ; unfortunately, it is here too that the application of the remedy is most difficult. Liberals and Conservatives are alike constrained to admit the existence of a defect ; for a Land Transfer Act has been passed by each, and in each case it has proved almost wholly inoperative. It becomes, then, an interesting subject of inquiry, how far it is possible to amend, or reconstruct either of these Acts so as to give security of title and cheapness of transfer. This, it must be observed, is not the land question in any party sense ; both sides desire facility of transfer, both have introduced measures to effect it, both have lamentably failed ; but, while Lord Cairns deals with the subject as a purely legal problem, a great many Liberals have come to identify facility of transfer with re-distribution of land. In this we think they are wholly mistaken. The aggregation of land in the hands of a few is owing to the operation of social and economical causes quite independent of conveyancing cost. Even if the sale of a farm were as simple as that of a horse and its deed of transfer to fit on a visiting card, the contest between the large and the small capitalist would remain as unequal as before. The latter cannot afford the luxury of being a land-owner ; so long as land brings social position and political power the purchase-money will be increased to pay for these advantages ; and the man whose capital is small, and who would fain, first of all things, live, must not invest in such unremunerative shadows. We shall have an opportunity, however, of discussing the social bearings of the land question at a later stage, and now proceed to the consideration of Land transfer, and the several incidental reforms which have been suggested to render simple transfer a possibility.

Taking broad bands of history, the transfer of land has in this country been subject to strange vicissitudes. In the earliest feudal times the knight, whether he held his land in fee-simple, in tail, or for life, was not able to transfer his interest to a stranger. There were usually certain personal services to be rendered to the feudal superior, and he was not bound to accept those of a substitute. By slow degrees, however, the rigour of this restriction was worn down, until, in the beginning of the reign of Henry III., the right of what was called *sub-infeudation* was completely established. The Barons of Edward I., finding the privileges of their order compromised thereby, passed the celebrated Statute *de donis conditionalibus*, which

absolutely prohibited the alienation of estates tail. This amounted to tying up in perpetuity, as was then thought, a considerable part of the land of the kingdom. For two hundred years this Act of Parliament was permitted to work the evil which its authors intended; and it was not until the reign of Edward IV. that the trammels of landowners were cut asunder by a decision of the judges. In this instance the lawyers deserve the gratitude of their fellow-countrymen: by inventing "Recoveries" they restored to the market more than half the land in England; but the means by which this desirable end was achieved are shocking to common sense. A recovery was a mock action in which the plaintiff, or "demandant," *recovered* the land, and left the parties whose interests were barred to seek redress against the *common vouchee*, who was usually the crier of the court. The whole proceeding was a solemn farce, and the necessity of the case must have been grievous indeed, to compel justice to walk in such devious paths. For nearly two centuries after Taltarum's case (for Taltarum was the person who achieved immortality as the first "demandant") the land of England was less hampered by difficulties of transfer than it has ever been before or since. The modern system of settlement was then undiscovered, and each generation possessed complete dominion, although by a cumbrous procedure, over the fee-simple of the land. But with the gradual decay of the feudal system the conditions of property and the desires of individuals were completely changed. Men began to yearn for perpetuities. To found a family became an object of ambition to the *nouveaux riches*, and an excusable vanity made them desire to insure to their remotest issue the enjoyment of hereditary estates. Contingent remainders, at one time regarded as void, were welcomed by the subtle lawyers of the sixteenth century. Their validity was fully established in the time of Coke, and by their help a settlement was (after a fashion) capable of being made; but the unborn issue remained at the mercy of their parent, who, by a feoffment, was able to grant the settled estate to a purchaser freed from the claims of the remaindermen. These contingent remainders were of very perishable stuff, for they were liable to destruction in a variety of ways, which it is unnecessary to enumerate; but the net result was that the issue had but a poor hold on the property. This defect was remedied about the time of the Commonwealth. Sir Orlando Bridgman, afterwards Lord Keeper, who has been styled "the father of modern conveyancing," hit upon the contrivance of putting into the settlement trustees to preserve the contingent remainders; who, taking no beneficial interest themselves, yet by their living presence

protected the future interests of the children. The practice was eagerly followed, and the land of England was, once again, to a considerable extent withdrawn from the market. This time, however, the result was achieved, not against the will of the holders, as in the case of the statute *de donis*, but at their instigation. The landowner was so beset by posthumous ambition, that nothing short of an indefeasible entail streaming far away into the future was at all satisfactory to his aspirations. However, in the words of Coke:—

These perpetuities were born under some unfortunate constellation ; for they, in so great a number of suits concerning them in all the courts in Westminster, never had any judgment given for them, but many judgments given against them. 10 Rep. 320.

They have furnished to the lawyers a goodly harvest ; for it was not until the present century that, after a vast amount of litigation, the rule was finally established that the extreme limit of suspense is twenty-one years after existing lives. In the most common case of a marriage settlement, the vesting of the estate cannot be postponed beyond the majority of the children ; or, as it is usually expressed, beyond lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards.

The following account of the prevailing modern custom of settlement is extracted from Mr. Williams's standard work on the Law of Real Property :—

In the event of a marriage a life estate merely is given to the husband ; the wife has an allowance for pin-money during the marriage, and a rent charge or annuity by way of jointure for her life, in case she should survive her husband. Subject to the payment of this jointure, and such sums as may be agreed on for the portions of the daughters and younger sons of the marriage, the eldest son who may be born of the marriage is made by the settlement tenant in tail. In case of his decease without issue, it is provided that the second son, and then the third, should in like manner be tenant in tail ; and so on to the others, and in default of sons, the estate is usually given to the daughters. By this means the estate is tied up until some tenant in tail attains the age of twenty-one years ; when he is able, with the consent of his father, who is tenant for life, to bar the entail with all the remainders. Dominion is thus again acquired over the property, which dominion is usually exercised in a re-settlement on the next generation ; and thus the property is preserved in the family (p. 50).

Whether from the gradual accumulation of legal subtleties, or because of a change in the requirements of society, the state of real property law was about fifty years ago discovered to have become intolerable. Accordingly, commissioners were appointed to inquire and report. No men ever brought to their task more learning and diligence. They described the existing

law, pointed out its defects, and suggested remedies. Most of their suggestions have been since carried out by a slow process of piecemeal legislation; but in one important particular, namely, the registration of deeds, their reports have hitherto produced no result. On this subject they say:—

This has appeared to us to exceed in magnitude and importance all the other subjects within the scope of our commission; it has excited general interest; and we have found it to be so connected with almost every part of the law of real property, that the nature and details of any improvements to be proposed by us must greatly depend on the question, whether all deeds and instruments affecting the title to land shall be registered, or whether the security of title is still to rest on other expedients.*

This was, indeed, no novel suggestion; for the question of a general registry had engaged the attention of Parliament for several years during the Commonwealth, and had, at intervals, been discussed, and the measure all but passed on several subsequent occasions. Systems of registration have existed in Middlesex, Yorkshire, Scotland, and Ireland for more than one hundred and fifty years; and it seems strange that they have not been long since either extended to the whole of England, or abolished as useless in the localities where they prevail. What is good in Yorkshire ought to be equally good in Somerset or Devon; what has failed in Middlesex can scarcely be efficacious in Manchester. That a registry of deeds has not been established for the whole of England must be ascribed, not to any general dissent from the opinion of the Real Property Commissioners, but to the intrinsic difficulties of the problem. No branch of law reform has excited more attention; none has produced more instances of abortive legislation;† yet it is still regarded by many as a panacea for all the disorders of the existing system; and the committee, whose final report was presented to Parliament towards the close of last session, once more recommend its establishment, with a modification which has been many times considered, and as often condemned, namely the substitution of local registries for one central office. We shall presently offer some remarks upon this report, but before doing so it will be necessary to place clearly before our readers the objects of registration and the difficulties which oppose themselves to its successful operation.

* Second Report of Real Property Commissioners, p. 3.

† At the date of the Report of the Commissioners on the Registration of Title (1897), upwards of twenty bills had within as many years been brought into Parliament for the purpose of establishing a system of registration.

We must at the outset distinguish between two kinds of registration—the one of deeds, or more properly of assurances; the other of title. The former aims at establishing a complete record of every transaction affecting land, so as to give to an intending purchaser notice of any prior claim. The registration of title is a more ambitious scheme: carried out in its most perfect form, it would not only furnish a list of owners, but entry on the register would be equivalent to ownership; so that land would be transferred like ships, or stock, by the alteration of a name. Intermediate between these two systems is one which possesses some of the qualities of both. Its essential characteristic is that all deeds should not only be registered, but grouped; so that, on turning to a particular page, the searcher would find the legal history of the property. The objects of registration are, firstly, to make all dealings with land simpler, and consequently, cheaper; and secondly, to give to a purchaser or mortgagee greater security against latent defects than he now enjoys. That the present expenses of land transfer are high is undoubtedly true, that they would be diminished by a simple register of assurances is by no means self-evident. The opponents of such a system go farther, and say that it would only create additional cost. The examples of Middlesex, Yorkshire and Ireland support this contention; while in Scotland alone has registration been so manipulated as to prove a useful handmaiden to conveyancing. A perfect register of titles would fulfil to the utmost both the objects which we have mentioned; but we believe such a register could only be attained by a reform amounting to a revolution. Security of title is an element of wealth. A property with a slur on its pedigree is deteriorated in the market; but we may be called on to pay too high a price for absolute perfection; and we do not allude to the actual cost involved in establishing and maintaining such a gigantic system as would be necessary for the purpose, but to the violent alteration which it would necessitate, not only in our laws, but also in the habits and sentiments of society. A purchaser under the present *régime* is scarcely ever dispossessed of a property which he has bought; he is practically safe if he exercises moderate caution; but mortgages stand on a somewhat different footing, and the lender of money is more or less at the mercy of a fraudulent mortgagor. Instances occur from time to time of a trustee, or solicitor abusing his trust, and then there arises an unfortunate contest for priority between innocent victims. In a recent case an ingenious swindler, by forging duplicates of the conveyance to himself, succeeded in actually selling a property seven or eight times over to different persons. But considering the vast

number of transactions which take place, it must be admitted that the cases of hardship bear but a small proportion to the whole; and a serious question therefore arises, whether it is expedient to create an entirely new system in order to baffle the designs of a few unprincipled persons.

If all landowners were possessed of a clear fee-simple, if every field were surrounded by an immutable boundary, and if the dealings with land were not extremely numerous, registration of title would be the simplest thing imaginable. Nothing more would be necessary than to construct an official map on a scale sufficiently large to show the sub-divisions of property, and by a number or letter connect each enclosure on the map with a corresponding page of the ledger, where the ownership and its changes should be recorded. It would then be perfectly easy, and this is the desideratum in every purchase, to pass from the outward and visible estate to the abstract right of the vendor to dispose of it. The three suppositions which we have made as to the tenure of estates, the certainty of boundaries, and the number of transactions, inasmuch as they are in violent contradiction to the actual condition of things, indicate the three cardinal objections to the establishment in this country of any satisfactory system of registration of title.

We are, in the first place, confronted by the custom of settlement, which, if it does not affect the majority of titles, certainly extends to the larger part of the area of the country. All the "broad acres" are tied up as rigidly as the law will allow; and, in addition, are subject to jointures and portions, and perhaps mortgages and charges of various kinds as well; so that the ownership of any particular field may be divided between a number of persons—tenants for life and in tail, trustees, mortgagees and lessees, all of whom are required to make up the abstract idea of a complete owner. It is manifest that the interests of all these people must be registered, or protected in some way.

To avoid this complication of co-existent interests, it was proposed by the late Lord Westbury, when he first propounded the idea of registration of title, as opposed to registration of deeds, that only absolute owners, or trustees with a power of sale, should be recorded on the register; but he afterwards changed his opinion, for in explaining to the House of Lords the measure which became law in 1862, he spoke in disparaging terms of his former scheme:*

But that plan consisted merely of this—the putting of certain names upon the registry as if they were the absolute owners of the fee

* "Hansard's Debates," 3rd series, vol. clxv. p. 361.

simple of the estate, and letting all persons who had partial interests in the property depend for their security upon the system of *careats* and checks. A registry so constructed gives no proof whatever of any equitable interest, nor does it in the smallest degree facilitate the proof of title to any equitable estate.

The distinctive characteristic of Lord Westbury's Act then was the registration of equities, and to this attempted recognition of the complexity of actual fact may be attributed its almost total collapse. In fifteen years only 410 titles were registered; and it is matter of surprise to many competent authorities that the number was so large. A Royal Commission, appointed in 1868 to inquire into its working, unequivocally condemned it; and recommended (not however unanimously) a registration of absolute ownership. Lord Selborne, then Lord Chancellor, embodied this suggestion in a Bill, which re-appeared in several subsequent sessions, and after searching criticism and successive amendments for five years, it was ultimately passed by the present Lord Chancellor.

The principle of this Act is, as far as possible, to ignore the existence of troublesome complications, and to require that upon registration some person shall be named as absolute owner, the interests of all other persons being somewhat loosely guarded by *caveats* and inhibitions. But the failure of this measure has been even more marked than that of its predecessor. Its noble author, who was examined as a witness before the Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, fully admitted its want of success, and pointed out that his object was quite different from Lord Westbury's.

Lord Westbury's idea, he said, was that a conspectus of the state of the title, and of all the interests, would be an excellent thing to have upon the register. The object of the registration as I understand it is to make land transferable—the great object is to keep such interests off.* Between these extreme views of the end to be achieved by registration there seems to be no mean. We must either have the simplicity of bare ownership, or the tangled skein of equitable interests. Both Acts are unrepealed to the present day, but both are equally inoperative. Perhaps the most discouraging feature of the recent inquiry is, that no one had any fault to find with Lord Cairns' Act, or any amendment to suggest for the improvement of its general plan. Learned conveyancers and solicitors practically familiar with its details were unanimously of opinion that it was as perfect as the nature of the case would permit, and that the only change which could be made to further

* "Report of Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, 1879." *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 149.

its adoption would be the introduction of a compulsory clause. But if there were no other objections to such a course—and there are many—it would be a strange specimen of remedial legislation to compel all to accept what not one in 20,000 will voluntarily adopt.

The second difficulty in the way of a register of titles arises from the uncertainty of boundaries. There is not much use in conferring an indefeasible title unless you define the subject matter to which it extends. This is not in all cases easy. It involves, at least, local inquiries and a judicial process, and, eventually, the possibility of taking a slice of one man's land and giving it to another. Under Lord Westbury's Act the duty of this determination devolved upon the registrar, and this was one of its most glaring defects. Lord Cairns has in his measure avoided the difficulty by providing that entry on the register shall *not* be conclusive as to boundaries. This gets rid of troublesome notices to adjoining owners, which are always likely to awaken dormant claims, but leaves the registered owner in possession of only an indefeasible nucleus surrounded by a questionable fringe. The boundary is frequently of vital importance; and the expression is so elastic that it may mean much or little. Such questions are, of course, liable to arise under the ordinary system of conveyancing as well as under the registry; but any scheme which does not fix boundaries by some competent tribunal falls very far short of perfection. In Ireland the Landed Estates Court supplies adequate machinery for this purpose, and it has so far succeeded as to have attained a practical monopoly of the sales in that country. It is somewhat surprising that the example has not been hitherto followed in England. The advantages possessed by this system are that a property emerges from the Court with no shadow of suspicion lurking round it—bright and clean as a new coin from the mint; and that the dignity of a judicial investigation inspires the public with such confidence that they eagerly grasp at the opportunity of buying and selling under its auspices; while the dangers, as against adjoining owners, of conferring an indefeasible title are reduced to a minimum. The drawbacks are that the extra expense is considerable, which must eventually fall as a tax upon the landowner; that it is practically applicable only to the case of a sale; that after the title has been once cleared, the inevitable dealings with the land immediately begin to encrust its title with all its former obscurity, until after the lapse of a few years the whole proceeding has to be again undertaken; and lastly, that it is problematical how far such a system would adapt itself to sales of either very large or very small properties. The magnitude of the former might overstrain the

machinery of the Court, while the necessary expenses of the latter might swamp the owner.

A further difficulty is thrown in the way of a general registry—and this applies with equal force to a registry of assurances, as to a registry of title—by the enormous number of transactions which would require registration. It is estimated that about one thousand deeds relating to land are executed daily in England and Wales. Such a mass of matter would be more than any one office could record and classify. Any system that could be devised would be crushed by the dead weight of so great an accumulation, unless it had been introduced by degrees, and perfected by experience. The effectiveness of a register depends altogether on its index, and the difficulties of arrangement increase in an increasing ratio with the number of items to be arranged. Every traveller knows how hopelessly he is perplexed if he has to trace his intended journey through the labyrinth of “Bradshaw,” while the time-tables of the separate railway systems are easily comprehended.

Such are some of the difficulties which beset the problem of registration, and which the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer were forced to confront. Although the reference* to that Committee was sufficiently general to embrace the entire body of real property law, they excluded from their inquiry all subjects which might involve troubled questions of public policy. Some innovations in the general law they do, indeed, suggest; the value of which would depend in great measure on the stringency of the Act introducing them; for, having regard to the past, we cannot expect much from voluntary reforms.

The distinct issue between registration of deeds and registration of title was raised by the Reports prepared, respectively, by the Chairman, Mr. Osborne Morgan, and by Mr. Shaw Lefevre; and on a division the Committee declared in favour of the former, but only by a majority of two. As this Report may furnish the basis of future legislation, we shall endeavour to explain to our readers its recommendations and their probable results. It first devotes itself to an inquiry into the causes of previous failures, which it is, of course, most important to detect and avoid; and, as Lord Westbury’s measure had been already arraigned before a Royal Commission and condemned by it, the Committee deal almost exclusively with Lord Cairns’

* They were appointed “to inquire and report whether any and what steps ought to be taken to simplify the Title to Land, and to facilitate the transfer thereof, and to prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees of land.”

Act of 1875. Many explanations were given in the evidence, but the "Committee cannot suppose that they by any means account for the total collapse of the system inaugurated by the Act of 1875." Their own conclusion is—

That the Act has failed, because, rightly or wrongly, the public or their professional advisers have deliberately made up their minds that the advantages offered by the new system of registration are too speculative and remote to compensate for the immediate and certain outlay and trouble which are inseparable from it. To a certain extent, too, the result may be attributed partly to an almost superstitious reverence for title deeds which prevails in this country, and partly to the preference which Englishmen, as a rule, feel for managing their own affairs in their own way.

These reasons, it must be observed, apply as forcibly to any possible scheme for the Registration of Title, as to that which has been recently tried and practically rejected. It may indicate a short-sighted adherence on the part of landowners to familiar forms, but this has its foundation in the habits and modes of thought of the average Englishman. The reverence for title deeds has survived the satire of Hogarth, and is fully justified by the importance which the law attaches to their possession. "Put your deeds in a box, and sit on the box," was the advice given by Lord Eldon to a man who consulted him as to the defence of his title; and no doubt it is very difficult to eject a person who thus acts on the defensive. Still, if the owner wishes to sell or mortgage his estate, he must produce his muniments, and it is then extremely inconvenient to depend on things which have been described as "difficult to read, impossible to understand, and disgusting to touch."

The Committee, while admitting that registration of title is in the abstract to be preferred to registration of assurances, are compelled to come to the conclusion that, in the existing state of the law, the former is more or less unattainable. Simplicity of transfer presupposes simplicity of title, and to legislate for registration of titles without, as a preliminary step, simplifying the titles to be registered is to begin at the wrong end. They do not, however, propose the repeal of the two acts which at present languidly maintain an impracticable system. In this we think they are mistaken. It would be better at once to accept defeat, withdraw from the assault of an impregnable position, and begin a new campaign under more favourable circumstances. We also disapprove of the suggestion that a registry of assurances should be established. This plan has in recent years found little favour in comparison with registry of title. Whatever advantages it possessed were eclipsed by the attractive completeness of its rival. Two Royal Commissions

pronounced emphatically against it, and furnished reasons in support of their views which are not answered by the present Committee. It has been tried in Ireland, in Middlesex, in Yorkshire, and in Scotland; and in the last country alone has it met with any degree of success. In Ireland and Yorkshire the system appears to be endurable, although productive of additional expense; while in Middlesex matters have become so deplorably bad, that it is hopeless to search against a person with a common name or a large property. The Lord Chancellor expressed in his evidence before the Committee the following strong opinion on the subject:—

I have no doubt that registration of deeds would afford some protection at an enormous cost against fraud. This country will pay under a system of registration of deeds something like a million a year as an insurance against frauds, which, at the utmost, would never amount to one-hundredth part of that sum; but after all that is done, I think you will find in human affairs that a great deal will always be done upon the credit of individuals, and that where there is any person in whom people trust, he will be able to get great command of money by the faith people put in him, and if he proves untrustworthy, no system of registration will protect you.*

The Committee, however, believe that it "might be made perfectly self-supporting at a greatly reduced and very trifling cost to the public." Distribute this cost as you may, it must be ultimately borne by the land, which can ill afford any extra burthens. It is useless to assert that machinery can be provided for registering 300,000 deeds per annum at a "very trifling cost." Such a gigantic labour must involve a corresponding outlay, and the expense will be still further augmented by subdivision into districts.†

An argument from analogy is generally very misleading; for unless all the circumstances are identical, some essential element may be absent, and thereby destroy the correctness of the inference. It is particularly dangerous in passing from one country to another, for the habits of a people are an important ingredient in the success of a system. We suspect that the Committee have been influenced rather too much in favour of a registry of deeds by the seductive picture of Scottish conveyancing presented by Mr. Brodie, the keeper of the Register of Sasines in Edinburgh. They state in alluding to his evidence:

Not only is Scotland politically united to England, but the habits of society and conditions of life are very much the same in both countries, while the laws of real property, and the title to land is, or

* Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee in 1879, p. 151.

† "Second Report of Real Property Commissioners," p. 27.

until lately was, as complicated in the former as in the latter country. Yet it is stated by a very competent witness that in Scotland the cost of transferring land is comparatively small, while it is agreed on all hands that in that country land frauds, such as those which have recently started and alarmed English purchasers and mortgagees, are absolutely unknown.

Now, this result can obviously not be attributed to the mere registration of deeds, which Scotland has possessed for centuries; but must have proceeded from the improvements in their system of conveyancing which have been recently introduced. Unless, in England, we succeed in enforcing similar innovations, it will be vain to attempt registration; moreover, our real property law must be completely assimilated to that of Scotland, before we can be certain of the success of our new experiment. There is also this important fact disturbing the analogy between the two countries. In Scotland, there are only about 31,000 deeds to be registered in the course of a year, or about one-tenth of the number in England. But passing by the incompleteness of the analogy, let us see what changes have been introduced in Scotland, and whether similar reforms might not be made in English conveyancing. The first consisted in shortening deeds, which were formerly even longer than in England, to about one-tenth of their previous length. This was effected by furnishing statutory forms of conveyance which seem to have been readily adopted, for now an ordinary "disposition" fits on a sheet of paper. The second reform was the abolition of all local and peculiar tenures, and their conversion into the one common form of "feu-holding." The shortening of deeds, however, was far more important, and that it was possible must be ascribed to the practice which had sprung up of paying solicitors and conveyancers on an *ad valorem* scale. So long as men are paid by the length of their work, verbiage will, we fear, continue to be the rule, and not the exception. No amount of Parliamentary interference suffices to restrain conveyancers within a reasonable compass. Lord Brougham and Lord Cranworth vainly attempted to solve the problem by giving statutory forms which might or might not be made use of. They were naturally rejected as deficient in this or that respect, by the profession who would lose so many guineas by their adoption. As a preliminary step, therefore, to the establishment of registers the Committee recommend;—

I. The abolition of the present scale of conveyancing charges, and the substitution for it in all cases where it is possible of a graduated *ad valorem* scale of payment.

II. The compulsory use, as far as practicable, of short statutory forms, analogous to those used in Scotland.

We do not like these expressions, "where it is possible," and "as far as practicable," being convinced that any reform in conveyancing practice to be real must be compulsory. The owner is indifferent; he has become a fatalist as to costs; and the interests of two professions are distinctly opposed to his. We are told by Sir R. Torrens,* that the introduction of his system of registration into South Australia was ruinous to the entire body of solicitors, and that they had accordingly opposed it very vigorously. No such sweeping measure is contemplated, or possible in this country, and therefore the legal profession need not tremble for the total loss of their conveyancing charges; but these charges constitute at present a heavy land tax, which should be promptly abated by compulsory legislation, and we should take it as a healthy indication if the measure were "opposed very vigorously" by those whose interests it would affect. We do not believe in the efficacy of unobjectionable reforms. What is greeted with universal approbation is not likely to restrain a prevalent abuse. The existence of an evil implies that some class of the community is reaping an undue harvest, of which we seek to deprive it. If the reform, then, is worth anything, it will be bitterly opposed by the class whose interests appear to be compromised by it.

The Committee further recommend the substitution of a simple charge for the present form of mortgage; the appointment of a real representative who should have the same power over freeholds, as the executor now possesses over leaseholds; and, lastly, the repeal of the Statute of Uses.

These are the reforms which the Committee rely upon to simplify conveyancing to such an extent that registration shall become a benefit to the community, instead of an unattainable ideal as it has hitherto remained. We do not believe that, even if they were loyally accepted in practice, and not minimized by the ingenuity of conveyancers, they would produce so great a revolution as has been quietly effected in Scotland. Deeds and abstracts of title might, no doubt, be shortened by a change in the mode of remunerating solicitors, and by the *prohibition* of the present form of mortgage; and the appointment of a real representative would diminish the number of actions for the administration of estates; but there would still remain in the English Land Laws a unique complication, which greatly increases the difficulties of transfer and registration—we allude to the double title to land, or the doctrine of legal and equitable estates. This distinction had its origin in the diversity of our Courts of Law and Equity, was stereotyped by the Statute of

* "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee in 1878," p. 155.

Uses, and became so firmly rooted that it seems to have survived the fusion of the Courts. Mr. Williams, indeed, in the last edition of his valuable treatise on the Law of Real Property has changed "is" into "was" in the statement of the doctrine; but we fear that neither a judge, nor a prudent conveyancer could be found who would disregard this absurd distinction. We do not see why it should not be abolished. It exists in no other country in the world, and though its removal might involve some reconstruction of our land laws, that can scarcely be regarded as an objection in an age which yearns for codification. The existence of trusts is a necessity, but there is no connection between trusts and a legal estate: in fact, the notion of an "estate" in land different from the receipt of the rents, or the right of occupation or sale, is a metaphysical conception, part of an over-elaborated system transmitted to us by our ancestors as one of the many burthens of the land.

We will illustrate by an example the evil of which we speak.

If land is conveyed unto and *to the use* of A and his heirs upon trust for B and his heirs, A takes a legal estate in fee, B only an equitable. A having no express duties with reference to the estate, B can compel A to convey this legal estate to him. But suppose—and this is what usually occurs—that B neglects to do so; settles, mortgages and deals with the property for years as if he were the absolute owner. All goes smoothly until the day of reckoning arrives, a sale is made, and the keen eye of the purchaser's conveyancer sparkles with pleasure at "an outstanding legal estate." Can it be believed, this unreality, this phantom of a legal estate must be tracked through wills and heirships, until it is captured, possibly, in an infant descendant of the original A, when it must be made secure by a court of equity. This, it is evident, is no visionary evil. It entails considerable expense, delay, and complication; but, still worse, the actual rights of parties are made in some cases to depend upon the possession of this abstraction.

The doctrine of "tacking" finds favour with no one, yet it exists. It means shortly this—that where an estate is mortgaged above its value, and there is a conflict between the victims, he who succeeds in getting the "legal estate," or, as it is called by Lord Hale, "the creditors' *tabula in naufragio*," will be paid in full before the other mortgagees get anything. The admitted principle is—"Where equities are equal the law shall prevail;" yet, in spite of recent legislation turning all the Courts into Courts of Equity, this system of "tacking" is treated as still subsisting. This, we submit, should not be so; and we may

cite Lord Hardwicke's authority in confirmation of our opinion. He says on this subject: "It could not happen in any other country but this; because the jurisdiction of law and equity is administered here in different Courts, and creates different kinds of rights in estates." So that it would seem without a separate jurisdiction "tacking" could not happen. And again, he states it still more explicitly: "For if the law and equity are administered by the same jurisdiction, the rule, *qui prior est tempore potior est jure*, must hold."*

But whether the Courts might, after the passing of the Judicature Act, have held that the distinction between legal and equitable estates had been abrogated, does not now concern us. They have not done so; and the dualism of title has survived the amalgamation of the Courts. Very closely connected with this subject is the suggestion of the Committee that the Statute of Uses should be repealed. They stigmatize it as "a pitfall for the unwary," and as "a stronghold of conveyancing pedantry;" but, according to Mr. Williams, "All that was ultimately effected by the Statute of Uses was to import into the rules of law some of the then existing doctrines of the Courts of Equity, and, to add three words, *to the use*, to every conveyance."† The real evil which has been wrought by the Statute consists in the subtleties which have been founded upon it in connection with the doctrine of the legal estate. These would not now be affected by its repeal. And it must be remembered that it is essentially an enabling Statute. It confers power which does not exist at common law, and which would no longer exist if it were repealed—of giving an estate at a future time, or shifting it from one person to another upon the happening of any contingency. The meaning of the Committee probably is, that these results should be made to follow from any expression of intention, without the use of apt and technical language; but this would depend rather upon the abrogation of certain common law doctrines, than upon the repeal of the Statute of Uses; and could scarcely be effected with safety except by a reconstruction of the entire fabric. It is time, indeed, that an attempt at least should be made to codify our real property laws. An enormous benefit would result to the community from the abolition of what is called the "common law," and the substitution of a uniform system founded on the idea of "rights" instead of "estates." The criminal law has been reduced into a code, which only waits the necessary period of incubation to emerge as an Act of Parlia-

* *Wortley v. Birkhead*, 2 Ves. 571.

† Williams's "Law of Real Property," p. 159.

ment. This was not nearly so much required as a code of land laws, for the complication was less, and, also, men have generally a very good idea of what is a crime and what is not, since the boundary line runs roughly parallel to that between right and wrong. But the miserable landowner has no such guide, and he must submit to be piloted by men who can, practically, charge what they like for saving him from shoals and quicksands of their own creation. It is needless to observe that codification does not necessarily imply reform, although the occasion is eminently suitable for its introduction. Such a code as we have suggested might be so constructed as to leave the practical enjoyment of property precisely as it is, while it got rid of all the complexity engendered by an obsolete system.

We have hitherto treated land transfer from a purely legal point of view, and have come to the conclusion that, in the present state of the law, Registration of title is impracticable, while Registration of assurances would be worse than useless; that the recommendations of the Committee, although good in themselves, are of too trivial a character to effect the overthrow of the present conveyancing system; and that no greater boon could be conferred on the country than a really exhaustive code of real property law, in which no trace of feudalism should be discoverable. It is now time that we should glance at some of the social and political aspects of the land question, which are indirectly involved in cheap and easy transfer.

If we have advocated reforms it has been in the interest of those entitled to the first consideration—namely, the owners of property. Very different is the object of those who seek to stimulate their followers by the attractive, but delusive cry, "Free Trade in Land." With them, simplicity of transfer is joined with the abolition of settlements, and the repeal of the law of primogeniture, as the machinery for accomplishing a social revolution. They look upon these measures as forces to overthrow what is styled "a monopoly of the land" in the hands of the rich; and to establish through the length and breadth of the kingdom a system of peasant proprietorship. They stand in acknowledged hostility to the actual owners, and call upon them to answer for almost every defect in our complicated society. The land question is for such persons an agrarian war, in which they seek to dispossess the present holders, and to substitute for them a democracy of landowners on the model of certain Continental States. None, indeed, but the most enthusiastic or indiscreet openly avow that such is their object; but the changes are rung with monotonous persistency upon the evils of the "monopoly," and the advantages of small proprietors, till we feel convinced that "Free Trade in

Land " must mean the soil for the tiller. These remarks are especially applicable to the work before us by the late Mr. Kay, the title of which we have prefixed to this Article. As a careful lawyer he avoids straining or overstating his case, and accordingly we find no suggestions for the abolition of the aristocracy, or even of large estates, nothing in fact—to adopt Mr. Bright's expression—"to alarm intelligent owners of land." He only pleads for such changes in the law as he thinks will produce fewer large estates, and some peasant proprietors. But where are we to stop? Who shall say to this extent, and no farther, shall the subdivision of land extend? All foreign examples point to this conclusion, that the social forces tending to break up estates, once set in motion, are uncontrollable; and the process must go on till the extreme limit of subsistence is attained.

Mr. Kay did not live to complete his task, and it is now presented to the public under the auspices of Mr. Bright, who has written a preface expressing his approval of the views maintained:

The author (he says) is always just; he seeks to give that freedom to the soil which our laws have given to its produce, and which they give to personal property of every kind; he would leave to their free action the natural forces which tend to the accumulation of landed property on the one hand, as well as those which tend to its dispersion on the other; he would so change our laws as to give to every present generation an absolute control over the soil, free from the paralyzing influences which afflict it now from the ignorance, the folly, the obstinacy, or the pride of the generations which have passed away.

Mr. Kay first addresses himself to "the actual condition of things which the present land laws have produced." The accumulation of land in the hands of a few owners, which he regards as an unmitigated evil, is the only condition, however, that he cares to consider. By the help of the recently published "Doomsday Books" he arrives at some startling results as to the distribution of landed property in the three kingdoms. For example:—"Two-thirds of the whole of England and Wales are held by only 10,207 persons. Two-thirds of the whole of Scotland are held by only 330 persons. Two-thirds of the whole of Ireland are held by 1,912 persons." Now, these figures, and others which he quotes, represent, undoubtedly, the aggregation of great tracts of land in the hands of a few owners; but he does not propose a compulsory division, and admits that there are powerful motives urging landowners to increase their territories. It is part of his complaint against the existing system that small freeholds are every day being

“devoured” by the great owners, and that in the auction-room a man with a small capital has no chance in the struggle against the wealth of the local magnate, who will give much more than the agricultural value of a farm, in order to complete the symmetry of his estate, or add a few acres to his already extensive domains. Supposing for a moment that it is true that the number of small freeholders is continually diminishing, we may well ask how will the alteration of a law like primogeniture, which the landowner has it in his power to adopt or exclude, deprive land of its attractiveness so as to prevent the process of aggregation being carried on to its fullest extent? We look in vain for an answer, for this assuredly is not one,—

If the laws of primogeniture and settlements were altered, and if the dead man's arrangements were not allowed to bind the land long after his death, many of these estates would come into the market, and would in order to fetch the best prices, divide and sell in smaller plots just as they have done to some extent in Ireland, under the Encumbered Estates and Land Acts, spite of primogeniture and settlements.

This is prophecy, not argument ; and there is, in fact, no lack of land in the market. Every day large estates are advertized for sale in every part of the country, yet we do not see them broken up in small plots, for the simple reason that they sell better as a whole ; and so they would continue to do even if the alterations which are here proposed were effected. The fact of vast territories being owned by a few wealthy men cannot be explained as a consequence of law, but is a necessary result of our entire social system. Land possesses collateral advantages which make it worth more than if it were a mere article of commerce, and therefore the man who has to support life on its produce is out-bid for the proprietorship.

We do not, however, admit that the figures quoted above adequately represent the distribution of land in this country. Previously to the Parliamentary Returns recently published on the subject, the wildest statements were current as to the number of persons who monopolized the land of England. In the census of 1861, owing to errors of description and other causes, only 30,000 persons appeared as landowners, while in that of 1871 the number was still less ;* and it was frequently asserted that this figure represented the actual number of owners. In order to dissipate these erroneous views, a return was moved for by Lord Derby of the number of landowners in

* We may illustrate the incompleteness of any deduction from the statements in the census returns, by mentioning the fact that only 214 Members of Parliament, and 228 Peers are described as such in the census of 1871.

each of the three kingdoms, distinguishing those who held more than one acre from those who held less. The result was the Blue Books published in 1875 and 1876, which furnished a complete refutation of the theory of monopoly; for we find that in England there are 269,547 owners of more than one acre, and 703,289 owners of an acre and under, or an aggregate of nearly a million persons returned as landowners. Even if we exclude the whole class of owners holding less than an acre as not being properly agricultural, we are forced to the conclusion that if there is a considerable aggregation of land in the possession of the few, there is also a very considerable distribution of what is left among the many. But we lay no stress on figures: the "actual condition of things" cannot be made apparent in Blue Books, and we therefore turn from them with pleasure to the pages of Mr. Caird's interesting volume, to discover whether "the Landed Interest" is really to be regarded as a tyrannical oligarchy, a monopoly from which those possessing the justest claims are excluded. Mr. Kay's facts he would not deny: "The distribution of landed property in England, *so far as ownership is concerned*, is, by the growing wealth of the country, constantly tending to a reduction in the number of the small estates."* The words which we have *italicized* suggest an important omission in Mr. Kay's estimate of the "actual condition of things," namely—that "ownership" in our agricultural system does not exhaust the beneficial interest in the land, but may be reduced so as to be worth only an annual peppercorn, and a place in the "Doomsday Book."

But the tenant-farmers (Mr. Caird continues) are entitled also to be reckoned as part owners of agricultural property; for, in the crops and live and dead stock, they own equal to one-fifth of the whole capital value of the land.

As cultivators they employ and possess individually a larger capital than the peasant proprietors of other countries in their double capacity, as owners and cultivators. They are 1,160,000 in number.†

And he estimates the amount of this capital, which is quite distinct from that of the landowner, at the enormous figure of 400,000,000*l.* Such vast interests should not, we think, be ignored in reviewing the condition of the land as the result of its laws.

We now pass from the consideration of the "existing evils" to their causes and remedies. Mr. Kay believes that:

* "The Landed Interest," p. 41.

† Ibid. p. 44.

No matter how these great estates were originally formed, the main causes which at the present day keep them together, and prevent many of them coming into the market, are the laws which allow the owners to make deeds and wills which for many years, and often long after the owners' deaths, prevent the land from being sold, or the estate from being divided, no matter how expedient it may be that it should be sold, or no matter how foolish or extravagant the owner may be.*

The prime offender is thus the law of settlement, but primogeniture and even the power of granting long leases are indicted as accessories. The last can scarcely be regarded as a serious accusation, for the longer the lease the more it approaches to being the absolute transfer of the property, the purchase money being paid as an annuity, instead of as a lump sum. Primogeniture, too, may be acquitted after a very brief trial—that is to say, the law, not the custom of primogeniture; for the latter is rather a phase of English feeling, and an incident of settlements, than anything definite to be restrained by legislation. The law of primogeniture is part of the ancient and unwritten law of England, and it is by virtue of this law that the real property of an intestate owner descends to his eldest son, and not to all his children equally. This may be unjust, but it cannot be said to be injurious, for it rarely occurs. We have, unfortunately, no statistics on these subjects, but it is agreed on all hands that the amount of land descending to "heirs-at-law" is extremely small. Whether it is desirable to alter this law or not must depend on considerations other than the diffusion of property; and such a discussion, therefore, is somewhat beside our present purpose; but we may remark that the question has been exalted to a position very much beyond its intrinsic importance. If this law were repealed next Session of Parliament, and equal partibility substituted in its place, the interests of individuals would not be appreciably affected, for intestacy is, in this country, almost always an accident.

We must now briefly discuss the most difficult problem connected with land—entails and settlements. The custom is interwoven with every fibre of our social structure, and appears all but a necessity in the case of hereditary titles. But we do not desire to defend its universality on the ground of its benefit to any class, however exalted. We are not enamoured of the system; but, until the difficulties which we shall indicate are otherwise provided for, we must strenuously oppose any alteration of the law. It is in its agricultural

* "Free Trade in Land," p. 29.

aspect that the law of entail, as it is commonly called, is least defensible. We agree with much that may be urged as to the deplorable position of a tenant for life whose estate is so heavily burthened with charges, mortgages, and jointures that but little is left to him of his annual rents. His position is pitiable, but that of the land is worse, for there is no capital forthcoming to effect any necessary improvements; so that marshes remain unreclaimed, cottages are unbuilt, and the family mansion is perhaps fast falling into ruin. A timely sale of part of the property would probably have cleared the whole, and left the tenant for life the enjoyment of an unencumbered though diminished estate, to the improvement of which his means might have been adequate. A sale is, at all times, more advantageous to agriculture than a mortgage, for the latter diminishes the owner's available resources, while the former concentrates them upon a smaller area. Why, then, do we object to render land freely salcable at all times? Because it is not possible to have free land and limited interests; and without limited interests you cannot have marriage settlements. The whole question really hinges on the expediency of permitting land to be settled on marriage. If it is settled in any way so as to provide for the wife, and the issue of the marriage, it must be rendered inalienable until the eldest child at least shall have attained his majority; or else the virtual ownership of the property must be handed over to trustees. At one time, as we have already shown, there were no settlements of real estate, the holder for the time being usually retaining the absolute control; but at that time no dealing with the property could deprive the widow of her dower; and it is a pertinent fact that the claims of creditors upon the land of their deceased debtor were then very partially recognized.

The principal object of every marriage settlement is to secure the wife and her children against the improvidence of the husband. Its effect is to preserve the capital of the family for the next generation; and the absence of some such provision would throw the most serious difficulties in the way of marriage, and entail poverty and privation upon many innocent persons. We anticipate two objections to our argument: one, that if a woman entrusts herself to her husband, she may confide in his care for her material interests; the other, that we are by the settlement robbing the creditors that the widow and children may live in affluence. To the former it is enough to reply that for one man who is so dissolute or ill-conditioned as to render matrimony a grievous burthen to his consort, there are a thousand who are dangerously facile in their disposal of property. In a word, a man may be an excellent husband, and a

very bad manager. The second objection is still more easily disposed of, for settlements are so common that creditors must be assumed to contract with reference to a life interest; and if they suffer from the inflated credit of a man in possession of a large establishment, they are only reaping the fruits of their own folly. We believe that the exigencies of modern society require that land may be settled on the trusts of an ordinary marriage settlement: beyond that, we do not care to press our argument, for it really postpones the vesting of the property to the full time at present allowed by law. The fact that a very large proportion—most of those best informed on the subject, say nine-tenths—of the land of the country is under settlement, proves conclusively that any restraint upon such a course of dealing would run counter to the habits and feelings of the majority of landowners. After all, they are the persons most entitled to consideration in any discussion of the question; for though the country at large has an intimate concern in the welfare of agriculture, and successive life estates do not promote its prosperity, yet we must regard the problem as a mixed one, and inquire whether the evils complained of are not infinitesimal in comparison with those which might be introduced in their stead. The Author of "Free Trade in Land" attributes to the operation of these "land laws" the magnitude of estates, and the gradual absorption of small farms; and he anticipates from their repeal the most beneficial results in the sale of great properties, and their distribution among a class of small owners who would themselves cultivate the parcel of land which they might possess. In fact, he hopes that a gradual and partial establishment of peasant proprietorship would result as a consequence of free trade in land. Accordingly, a large part of his volume is occupied by encomiums upon that mode of cultivation, with illustrations of its beneficial effects in the various Continental countries where it prevails. This, indeed, is the motive by which all land-law reformers are actuated; and we shall therefore conclude this Paper by a brief examination of the relative merits of the two systems.

It may be premised that the question of large or small farming, although intimately connected, is not identical with that of peasant proprietorship; for there may be the utmost subdivision of land among mere tenants, although a system of peasant proprietors necessarily involves small farms. Agriculture on a very limited scale, or *la petite culture*, finds few advocates in modern times where the ownership is dissociated from the occupation of the soil; yet where the reverse is the case the position is upheld with all the ardour of enthusiasm. "A small proprietor," says Adam Smith, in a passage which has

been frequently quoted, "who knows every part of his little territory, who views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who, upon that account, takes pleasure not only in cultivating, but adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful."

Arthur Young, the celebrated agriculturist, was no friend to *la petite culture*, yet he never fails to pay the tribute of his admiration to the golden results of ownership. Writing towards the close of the last century he says:

Going out of Gange, I was surprised to find by far the greatest exertion in irrigation which I have yet seen in France; and then passed by some steep mountains, highly cultivated in terraces. Much watering at St. Lawrence. The scenery very interesting to a farmer. From Gange to the mountain of rough ground which I crossed, the ride has been the most interesting which I have taken in France; the efforts of industry the most vigorous; the animation the most lively. An activity has been here that has swept away all difficulties before it, and has clothed the very rocks with verdure. It would be a disgrace to common sense to ask the cause; the enjoyment of property must have done it. Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn it into a garden; give him a nine years' lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert.*

The same impartial observer ascribes to the "Magic of Property," the transformation of the blowing *dune* sand of Dunkirk into productive gardens; and the wonderful fertility of the country of Béarn. We cannot resist the temptation of extracting a few sentences from his account of the latter, for it presents perhaps the most perfect picture of peasant proprietorship at its best.

Take the road to Moneng, and come presently to a scene which was so new to me in France, that I could hardly believe my own eyes. A succession of many well-built, tight, and comfortable farming cottages built of stone and covered with tiles; each having its little garden, enclosed by clipped thorn hedges, with plenty of peach and other fruit-trees, some fine oaks scattered in the hedges, and young trees nursed up with so much care, that nothing but the fostering attention of the owner could effect anything like it. To every house belongs a farm, perfectly well enclosed, with grass borders mown and neatly kept around the corn fields, with gates to pass from one enclosure to another. . . . An air of neatness, warmth and comfort breathes over the whole. It is visible in their new-built houses and stables; in their little gardens; in their hedges; in the courts before the doors; even in the coops for their poultry, and the sties for their hogs.

* "Travels in France," vol. i. p. 51.

We readily concede that this is an attractive picture of rural life, and that a philanthropist might well be excused for desiring to establish such an Arcadia in his own country. But, is it possible? How much of the successful farming of the Béarnais is to be attributed to the fertility of the soil, the nature of its productions, and the perfection of its climate? Have not our "Yeomen" died out, because they could not contend with a system better suited to the peculiar conditions of agriculture in this country? Wordsworth* describes a community of small proprietors, the upper dalesmen of Westmoreland, as a republic of shepherds, producing sufficient corn and wool to feed and clothe them—no more; "existing in the midst of a powerful empire like an ideal society," in which "neither high-born nobleman, knight, nor esquire" was to be found; their chapel, "the only edifice that presided over these dwellings, the supreme head of this pure commonwealth." But the description leaves a painful impression of the absence of all the aims of life save living; and even the poet cannot infuse into it a single element of picturesqueness, so striking in the peasant life of Southern countries.

"It is especially Switzerland," writes Sismondi,† "which we should traverse and study in order to judge of the happiness of peasant proprietors;" and he then gives an eloquent description of their dwellings, agriculture, provisions, &c., and concludes that if wealth is a subject of pride to other nations, Switzerland may always boast of her peasants. Other writers‡ praise in extravagant terms the industry, frugality, and independence of this people, and the sedulous care which they devote to their farms. A vast mass of evidence is collected in the form of an appendix to Mr. Kay's book,§ all directed to the one end of glorifying the institution of peasant proprietorship. This appeared separately so long ago as 1850, in the first volume of "The Social Condition and Education of the People in England and Europe," and represents great diligence and still greater enthusiasm. A man who sets out with a theory is not likely to bring home truth; such a witness only sees the clean cottages and comfortable aspect of Saxony; while, on crossing the frontier into landlord-ridden Bohemia, his senses become keenly alive to dirt and discomfort. A series of Essays,|| published under

* "A Description of the Scenery of the Lakes in the North of England." Prose Works, vol. ii. pp. 263, 268.

† "Studies in Political Economy."

‡ See "Switzerland, the South of France, and the Pyrenees in 1830," by H. D. Inglis; and "A Plea for Peasant Proprietors," by W. T. Thornton, p. 91.

§ "Free Trade in Land," by Joseph Kay, Q.C.

|| "System of Land Tenure in Various Countries."

the sanction of The Cobden Club, appeared in 1870, the general drift of which may be described as an appeal for Free Trade in land, and a laboured argument in favour of peasant proprietors and *la petite culture*. This is especially remarkable in the Essay on "The Land System of Belgium and Holland," by M. de Laveleye, who seems to think no argument too transparently fallacious to bolster up the credit of his pet project.

We are fortunately not left on this important subject to the *ex parte* statements of skilful essayists, or the still more misleading effusions of mild enthusiasts. We possess in "The Reports from Her Majesty's Representatives respecting the Tenure of Land in the several Countries of Europe,"* a mine of authentic information about the land systems of the countries to which they relate. These Reports were prepared by men who had been long resident in the several countries, who were familiar with their institutions, and were free from the influence of local or national prejudice. They are written without bias, or colouring of any description, and in many cases are of singular ability. They were called forth by the Irish land legislation of 1870, and a certain uniformity of plan is secured by a Foreign Office circular of suggestive questions. To these pages, then, we turn with full confidence for an impartial estimate of peasant proprietorship, and we find that, the glamour of poetic description being removed, and its practical results only recorded, it cannot be regarded as a sovereign remedy for all the evils of agriculture. We have already given to the reader the most flattering picture of this system in the words of Arthur Young; we may now be permitted to present to his mind the darkest, the most deplorable example of European agriculture, which is still the companion of peasant proprietorship :—

Agriculture in Greece is carried on by peasant proprietors. Free trade in land may be said to exist in Greece. The truth is, small proprietors have little security to offer, and are consequently obliged to have recourse to money-lenders and usurers to whom they pay from 12 to 18 per cent. interest per annum, and sometimes, it is said, even more. About three-fourths of the landed property in Greece is mortgaged for its full saleable value. The mode of cultivation is primitive in the extreme. Oxen are generally used in tilling the land. The plough usually still employed is of the same simple construction as in the days of Hesiod, and is too light for any but the poorest soils (often not weighing more than the yoke), the ploughshare merely scratching the earth. Even threshing machines are unknown in Attica, and the

* Parliamentary Papers, 1870.

corn in the neighbourhood of Athens is still trodden out by horses as it was in the most primitive times.*

We do not charge peasant proprietorship with all the evils here disclosed, we merely desire to show that it is consistent with the maximum of misery, and cannot be relied on as a universal specific. But it is very apparent from these Reports that such a system brings one of two evils in its train, and often both; the peasant either subdivides or mortgages his land. In France *morcellement* has been carried to such an extent that there are more than 7,500,000 owners of land in that country, of whom about 5,000,000 hold on an average only six acres,† and some "parcels" are not more than a rood in extent. In Wurtemberg the subdivision of land has been carried to its greatest extreme, and public opinion ascribes to this, "its sad experience of recent years of scarcity;" and in many of the other States of Germany the evidence is of a similar character. In Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal the land is heavily mortgaged, and the worst aspect of these mortgages is that they are effected not to provide improvements; but, usually, either to purchase more land, or to avert ruinous subdivision on the death of an owner, by money payments to all the children save one. Thus primogeniture is practically re-established at the very bottom of the agricultural scale. In France the interest payable on mortgages is estimated at about ten per cent. of the annual value of the land; while in Germany the burthen is not less than one-half its total value. But we do not condemn the system so much for the results that inevitably flow from it, as on account of the higher good which it excludes. It limits us to small fields and to one social grade. It is a system which admits of no change. If the population increases the farms are divided or mortgaged, and comfort is replaced by squalid poverty; if, on the other hand, the population diminishes the farms aggregate into estates, and the peasant becomes an employer of labour. The family group is the unit of the system, but in a few years one family is replaced by several and they have no choice but exile, or division. Let us take the institution in its most flourishing condition, and postulate a happy and industrious population cultivating each man his own small farm. There is no rent to be paid, the produce of the soil suffices to feed and

* "Report by Consul Merlin respecting the Tenure of Land in Greece," p. 24.

† M. de Lavergne gives the following figures:—50,000 owners averaging 300 hectares, 500,000 averaging 30, and 5,000,000 with an average of only 3 hectares. A hectare is equivalent to about two acres and a half.—"Économie Rurale de la France," par L. G. Léonce de Lavergne.

clothe the family, and their time is fully occupied by their little property. This is, however, merely a dead level of material comfort. When the comparison is made with this country, so much to the advantage of the foreigner, it is apt to be forgotten that only the lowest class of our agricultural community is selected for the purpose. The peasant-owner is contrasted with the farm labourer, and the philanthropic reformer is jubilant at the chiaroscuro of his picture; but in order to judge fairly of the two systems, some weight must be attached to the existence of two other classes which are, in this country, engaged in agriculture, and which can, of course, find no place in a land of peasant proprietors—the owners of large estates and the farmers.

Our agricultural scheme has almost universally three terms, the owner, the farmer, and the labourer. The first supplies most of the capital, the second some capital, some skill, and some labour, and the last labour alone. We have thus a three-fold agricultural population; and we are entitled to reckon in our sum of benefits, the advantages accruing to the community from the existence of these three classes. The condition of the agricultural labourer, it must be admitted, was until recently a reproach to our civilization; but it has improved considerably in recent years, and as “compared with the labourer in towns his position is one of greater comfort.”* Although education, facilities for emigration, and a consequent rise in wages have done much, there remains a great deal still to be done, especially in the way of improved cottages, before even his material condition can be regarded as at all satisfactory. The distinguishing feature of our system consists in the existence of a class of tenant farmers, who occupy farms of various extent and work them by means of hired labour.† They have some peculiarities in the three divisions of the kingdom, which it is necessary to point out. In England the all but universal tenure is a tenancy from year to year, and the farmer is liable to be turned out on six months’ notice; whereas in Scotland nineteen years leases are the rule. In the former case the tenant enjoys (except in cases under the Agricultural Holdings Act) no security for any improvements which he may desire to make; while the drawback of the latter is that the tenant will probably rack the land towards the close of his term, and deliver up possession of a sadly deteriorated farm.

* “The Landed Interest,” p. 65.

† This class, according to Mr. Caird, numbers 1,160,000 farmers, 75 per cent. of whose farms are under 50 acres, 12 per cent. between 50 and 100 acres, and 18 per cent. more than 100 acres.—“The Landed Interest,” p. 63.

In Ireland the position of affairs is peculiar and anomalous. There, leases are the exception, but fixity of tenure the rule; rent is reserved, but frequently not paid; tenant-right often brings more than the value of the fee-simple, and the tenancy may be described as closely resembling inchoate copyhold.

In the thoughtful and temperate essay by Mr. Lanigan, which we have placed at the head of this article, the claims of the Irish tenant for still greater "fixity of tenure" than he at present possesses find an earnest advocate. Mr. Lanigan points out that the Land Act of 1870 recognized that, from an English point of view, the circumstances of the Irish tenant were "exceptional;" but that it failed to give a complete remedy, because it stopped short of absolute fixity of tenure. He examines the Report of the Select Committee appointed in 1878 to inquire into the working of the "Bright clauses" of the Act, which recommends, "a substantial increase in the number of small proprietors." With such a solution of the difficulty he is not satisfied, for it would be partial in its operation, and, if universal, would be disastrous. He appreciates too thoroughly the value of the example and prestige of a resident gentry, to wish for the annihilation of the landlord class; but he finds in the Report the expression of the great desideratum—increased security for the tenant. This he would effect, not by giving the tenant additional facilities for the purchase of the fee-simple, but by converting his precarious interest into a perpetual lease, the *fair* rent, and the amount to be paid to the landlord for the speculative increment of value, being determined by a permanent commission. Whether such a plan, founded on the *Beklem-regt* of Groningen, would work well in Ireland could only be determined by experiment: but any suggestion for the amelioration of the troubled relations between landlord and tenant in Ireland is, at the present moment, entitled to attentive consideration.

In a country occupied by peasant owners, the rudiments of learning are perhaps more diffused, but higher education is unknown; fewer suffer from actual want, but none is endowed with leisure to be great. Life is materialized into a perpetual conflict with nature, and its aims limited, after securing subsistence, to the paltry arena of village politics. If such a system had prevailed here, should we ever have heard of the Bakewell breed of sheep, or the restorative qualities of artificial manure? What peasant could afford to play the *role* of Mr. Lawes as an experimental farmer? Could the steam plough, and the countless other applications of machinery to the purposes of farming, ever have been produced under the *petite culture*? Not only could they have not been invented under that system, but they

cannot be used with advantage and economy upon small farms. It is a general complaint in the reports from foreign countries to which we have already referred, that machinery cannot be brought into use, where the land is subdivided among many owners; and this is itself sufficient to condemn the system, at least for countries whose chief productions are grass and corn; for the Lombard proverb—

Se l'aratro ha il vomero di ferro;
La vanga ha la punta d'oro.

(If the ploughshare is of iron made,
Still a point of gold has the peasant's spade.)

is only true where the soil is exceptionally productive, and the crops of such a nature as to require for each plant the personal attention of the owner. For most of our productions the soil is best prepared by machinery. One reaping machine can do the work of ten men, and the steam plough that of ten men and twenty horses; but so dependent is the latter upon the *grande culture*, that the ploughing of two fields of five acres costs once and a half as much as if the two fields formed but one enclosure, and, moreover, consumes twice the time.

We may, perhaps, be considered rash in selecting the present moment for the comparison of our agricultural system with the *petite culture*. Foreign competition and a series of bad harvests have diminished the price and the quantity of farm produce; the increase in local taxation and the rise in labourer's wages have narrowed the margin of profit; there are even instances in which the business of farming has been carried on at a positive loss, so that landlords find difficulty in procuring tenants, and farms are in danger of being left untilled. Discontent is felt with the game laws, and the laws of fixtures, and distress; and the farmer with just cause complains of the absence of security for improvements; while in the sister kingdom there is an additional complication in the unsatisfactory relations between landlord and tenant, and the political agitation which seeks to make capital out of the country's distress.

But we believe these to be transient and temporary evils; and we trust that, with the return of good harvests, and the revival of trade, we shall see the restoration of prosperity to every branch of the landed interest. However severe the depression, and whatever the trials still in store for both landlords and tenants, we deny that a system of peasant proprietors would obviate or mitigate them. We believe, indeed, that under such a system the crisis which we are passing through would have been an incalculable

disaster. What would have been the results of the Irish potato famine if its visitation had fallen upon a land of peasant owners? We ask the advocates of the system to endeavour to realize its dread consequences in such an event, and weigh them well against its fanciful benefits.

Men are masters of their own actions, not of the long results that flow from them. We cannot predict the momentous changes which an apparently trivial enactment may effect in a few generations. In the effort to control the future course of history we are dealing with unknown forces, and the alteration of the whole structure of society is necessarily a perilous experiment. What is suitable to the requirements of one country may be destruction to another, under altered circumstances of climate, character, and products. A fearful responsibility is therefore incurred by those who rashly advocate the overthrow of an existing system in order to substitute a Utopia.

AUBREY ST. JOHN CLERKE.

ART. VI.—LEGENDS OF THE SAXON SAINTS.

Legends of the Saxon Saints. By AUBREY DE VERE. London : C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1879.

IN two books of "Legends" the same poet has now recorded his impressions of the dawn of faith upon two nations. The "Legends of St. Patrick" formed a series of pictures of Ireland's evangelization—one man's apostolic labours among a "race high-dowered," to whom, as the poet well says, the Gospel was as something remembered, and God's kingdom as their native haunt. The "Legends of the Saxon Saints" describe the corresponding period for England, beginning with the coming of St. Augustine, passing through "the golden age of Anglo-Saxon sanctity," and ending with the last hour of its historian, the Venerable Bede. Both periods correspond in the one great event, but not in the manner of its accomplishment, nor in its character, nor in its results. The two peoples were both, indeed, predestined races, with a marvellous work to do in the world's history; both, even in their first fervour, were to begin the apostolate for others. But one was to be tried by centuries of suffering, the other by ages of material prosperity; and from the very outset one had the martyr spirit—swift to love much, enthusiastic, heroic in devotedness; while—if we may venture to make a parallel—the other showed

the spirit of the confessor—a willing spirit despite earthly weakness, patient, firm, slowly conquering self, struggling, losing and gaining silently, silently and deeply athirst for heaven. Even in the golden age of Saxon England the faith of the nation passed through many vicissitudes; while it flagged and failed in one kingdom, it was brightest in another, and with the people collectively as with individuals, the return to faith frequently outshone even the glory of first fervour; it was wont to be a return in accordance with the national character, justice-loving, solid, abiding, resolute in labour, frankly generous. The time may come when such partial and temporary lapses from the right will be found to have foreshadowed the later age of error; and the old ardour for the re-asserted truth may appear as an early type of the nation's return to a second fervour of justice sought* and duty done—a life-long expiation, fruitful in deeds not words, like the sorrow of a great soul. So it is that the coming of Christianity to the Sister Countries, though widely different in lasting results, is not to be hastily judged less glorious to one nation than to the other. For Ireland it was the majestic sunrise of a day that shines unchanged from the fifth century to the nineteenth, and onward unsetting through the ages.† For Saxon England conversion was a slowly-growing dawn, leading to alternate gloom and splendour. But it was a morning of promise too marvellous to be forgotten. Eight centuries later there came, not night, but eclipse. Now that the shadow is at last moving with all but imperceptible slowness from the land, we call to remembrance that morning of Saxon holiness; and unless new elements have altered the very basis of the nation's character, the early golden age may be taken to measure the possible glories of faith restored. Measuring by such a standard, we scarcely dare to picture what the second era of fervour might be, in the land that became Mary's dowry in Saxon times by its grandeur of earnestness and its wealth of sanctity.

As the Irish Celtic and English Saxon races differed in character, in destiny, and in the tale history was to tell of them, so did their annals of conversion differ widely, each nation reflecting its own mind in the telling of the story as much as in the story told. The tripartite life of St. Patrick and Venerable

* Even already in the England of these dark days, the liberty of the Church is more assured and the energy of her apostolate more unfettered than in any other country of the old Christendom.

† "May my Lord never permit me to lose His people, whom He has gained in the ends of the earth."—The prayer of St. Patrick in his famous "Confession"—a prayer which, so far, promises to be fulfilled in its widest significance.

Bede's records of the Saxon Church are the earliest histories of the faith in the two countries. The contrast between the books is like a revelation of the difference between the races. Both are true history, true copies of the life and events of a remote age ; but they differ in kind, as a painting differs from a photograph. The photograph may be more satisfactory to the student of facts ; but he who wants the impressions created by facts must rather study the painting ; it may be less accurate in details, but for all that it is more true, because it reveals more of the truth as a whole, and, passing it through a human medium, reveals it more intelligibly and more richly. The tripartite life of the Apostle of the Irish bears still the warmth of its first enthusiasm ; it seems to hurry in breathless exultation ; it is at times legendary and figurative ; it is sublime at one moment, in the next commonplace, but it always has the loud rough ring of an old triumphal poem. The signs of the supernatural startle us on every page. It seems an age and a land of miracles, where faith moves mountains. Human affections glow through the tissue of wonders, and homely ways and words mingle with the signs and marvels of a most familiar world unseen. The old Irish records, invaluable as they are to the student, can never be appreciated unless he who studies them is a Christian and a poet. But when we turn from the old Celtic remains, the work of many hands, to the work of the monk who wrote the one history of the early Saxon Church, and wrote it in her own immortal language, we perceive a contrast, which is all implied in the one word that its attractions are not for the poet but for the Christian student alone. It is a calm, circumstantial, unimpassioned history. Its value is inestimable, but its beauty scant ; if its beauty were greater its value would be less, and historians and controversialists could ill afford the exchange. There may be in its pages "better poetry than is to be found in the professed poetry of a materialistic age," but it is of the same nature as that which is contained in the simplest episode of Christian life ; it takes but little warmth from the emotions of the chronicler ; it has but little colour to guide the imagination. His records have, indeed, their own freshness and joyousness : how could it be otherwise when he wrote in an age of faith ? And thoughtful reading shows that "the chief human affections, things far deeper than the passions, are abundantly illustrated ;" yet so are they by the least poetic history that ever had to deal with individual lives. In a word, it is the book of a painstaking historian, whom an innate bias of poetry was not wont to carry out of his way either in the choice of subjects or of language.

When we contrast thus the old Celtic writings and the Latin history of the Saxon monk, we are contrasting the materials

which are the basis for all accounts of Ireland's and England's conversion. If the account were to be given in verse, there can scarcely be question where the poet's more congenial task would lie. In the case of the author of the "Legends" there may never have been an actual choice; and even if there was, other reasons may have determined it; and certainly there was, apart from all other motives, a fitness in telling first the story of Ireland's earlier conversion. But whatever ruled the preference, the easier task was done more than seven years ago in the admirable "Legends of St. Patrick;" and it is clear that a far more difficult work was undertaken in transforming into poetry "Legends of the Saxon Saints," based chiefly upon Bede. But the author who essayed it is well known to be a student as much as a poet; and instead of being content with giving versified sketches from St. Augustine's time to that of Venerable Bede, he conceived the wider design of picturing at the same time the England of the Saxon saints. The plan is fully explained in a few lines of the preface. The aim of the "Legends," it says, is—

To illustrate England, her different races and predominant characteristics, during the century of her conversion to Christianity, and in doing this to indicate what circumstances had proved favourable or unfavourable to the reception of the faith. It became desirable thus to revert to the early emigration of that "Barbaric" race of which the Anglo-Saxon was a scion, making the shadow of Odin pass in succession over the background of the several pictures presented, and to show how the religion which bore his name was fitted at once to predispose its nobler votaries to Christianity, and to infuriate against it those who but valued their faith for what it contained of degenerate. It seemed also expedient to select for treatment not only those records abounding in the picturesque and poetic, but likewise others useful as illustrating the chief representatives of a many-sided society; the Pagan king and the British warrior, the bard of Odin and the prophetess of Odin, the Gaelic missionary and the Roman missionary, the poet and the historian of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

The design is faithfully followed. There is a scholarly groundwork, and more historical narrative than description. Had the book proved merely attractive and not instructive it would have failed of its object, which was to give a general idea of the truth in its entirety, and not of its most beautiful isolated fragments. Frequently the author has sacrificed himself to his purpose. Though the basis of the Irish "Legends" was in itself far more poetical, the Saxon history has been more carefully reproduced. There are many imaginative incidents, but these, for the most part, occur where the details of the legend failed; they do not embellish its whole length, or enrich it beyond cautiously set limits. And if we leave the useful element

out of account, and judge the whole as a poetical creation, the imaginative passages stand out in bright relief. The spirit of the facts seems to be more inspiring than the facts themselves; and, at the risk of praising a poet to the dispraise of his subject, we must declare the freedom of his fancy to be the almost invariable measure of poetical value in the work. We say of poetical value, because there is another kind of worth to which the author gives equal place, if not precedence. He wished not merely to amuse an idle hour, but to impart a taste for the period of his study, and to teach what that period was. And if beauty is less evenly distributed than utility, it is by the author's own choice. He, avowedly, did not confine his selection of episodes to "the picturesque and poetic;" and one must not expect from the result a character which it was never meant to possess—the character of being in all parts poetical and picturesque. Thus, not only is the subject hitherto untrodden ground, but the plan of venturing upon it is in itself original.

There is a prevalent custom of reversing the order of things and reading the preface last. But in this case half the meaning of the after-text would be missed without the preface. Nor is it only a necessary key to the "Legends;" it is in itself an excellent essay on the Anglo-Saxon primitive religion, and the characteristics of their race, and of their conversion. The information is far more happily given in that form than in foot-notes; it was, perhaps, the only way in which it could be given at all, for without it there are certain legends, that for the general reader would have required a small dictionary of foot-notes; and how few there are who have enough patience and poetical perception to bear the constant interruption of verse, and to preserve even their inclination to appreciate it. The preface deals largely with the tradition which underlies the opening poem or prologue—"Odin the Man." Odin the god was only the deformed gigantic shadow of the man, his memory personified and exaggerated. The human Odin is exalted by a tradition scarcely to be surpassed for grandeur; and, if his religion had anything like the degree of primeval purity here ascribed to it, there is a halo of heroism about his name. In the far East, upon the plains of Scythia, there dwelt in the vague twilight of history a barbaric race, long invulnerable even to Rome. Conquered at last, instead of submitting to the world-wide yoke, Odin, their chief, led them by long transition northward to the uncoveted regions of pine-forest, and ice, and snow. There, simplicity strengthened them, endurance hardened them; and thence, after four centuries, the "Barbarians" of the North swept down upon Rome in their day of vengeance. From that same hardy stock, once led northward by Odin the man, and after-

wards fallen to the worship of Odin the god, was descended, amongst other Teutonic and Scandinavian tribes, the strong root of the English race, the Anglo-Saxons. Their Valhalla was peopled with the Scandinavian gods; warfare was a virtue, being necessary to immortal honour. A wild and dark mythology obscured all vestiges of the earlier belief. It had been far different in the old days; then a bright reflection of the truth was preserved among the Northern nations. As the most ancient lore of Iceland proves, there once had been a time when they looked up to one God, omnipotent, omniscient, all-just, who was to be worshipped only beneath the unbounded heaven, and imaged under no bodily form. Like other peoples of the ancient world, they had kept, even in their farthest wanderings, a remnant of the great birthright; so long as they preserved their portion, they had the pledge of a glorious restoration of all. To take a beautiful figure from the text:—

Each nation from Man's great stem
 Issuing, had with it borne one Word divine,
 Rapt from God's starry volume in the skies:
 Each word a separate Truth, that, angel-like,
 Before them winging, on their faces flung
 Splendour of destined morn.

It is before the mind of the race suffered degeneration, before the true was changed to false, that we are shown "Odin the Man." A heroic subject here inspires a poem entirely imaginative. Odin is represented of exalted character, having learned from Persia to worship one God upon the heights, and having either a tinge of prophecy in his wisdom, or else that iron strength of resolution which makes the will outspoken sound prophetic. Rome gives him four days to surrender. He answers, that he will take not four days but four centuries to bide his vengeance. But before he leads northward the storm-tossed race—"image of greatness that disdains to die"—he pours forth to them an impassioned address, not so much in lament as in menace against the Power that drives them to self-exile. There was for himself, he declares, a time when a shock of anguish set him free, and he awoke, a man.

My people too shall wake:

They shall have icy crags for myrtle banks,
 Sharp rocks for couches. Strength! I must have strength;
 Not splenetic sallies of a woman's courage,
 But hearts to which self-pity is unknown:
 Hard life to them must be as mighty wine
 Gladdening the strong: the death on battle fields
 Must seem the natural honest close of life;
 Their fear must be to die without a wound,

And miss Life's after-banquet. Wooden shield
Whole winter nights, shall lie their covering sole :
Thereon the boy shall stem the ocean wave :
Thereon the youth shall slide with speed of winds
Loud-laughing down the snowy mountain-slope :
To him the sire shall whisper as he bleeds,
"Remember the revenge! Thy son must prove
More strong, more hard than thou!"

"The revenge," planned by Odin with the determination of a seer who looks beyond the centuries, gives a new power to the chief figure of the tradition. He will not have for his people wealth, for it begets luxury; nor splendour of learning, wherein lurks heart-pollution; he will give them an inheritance of the cold North alone, where they may be strengthened by sufferings, hardened "from clay to stone, from stone to adamant." They are not to play at States, but to be a Race—the Race of Man. They are to build no stone-walled house, no cedar-roofed temple, gathering cities about gilded shrines. Their adoration is to be for none but God the Unknown, and like Persia in her day of strength they are to pray upon the mountain tops—"And see ye pray for vengeance!"

Four hundred years—
Ye shali find savage races in your path :
Be ye barbaric, ay, but savage not :
Hew down the baser lest they drag you down ;
Ye cannot raise them ; they fulfil their fates.

The earth is God's, not Man's : that Man from Him
Holds it whose valour earns it. Time shall come,
It may be, when the warfare shall be past,
The reign triumphant of the brave and just
In peace consolidated. Time may come
When that long winter of the Northern Land
Shall find its spring. Where spreads the black morass
Harvest all gold may glitter ; cities rise
Where roamed the elk ; and nations set their thrones ;
Nations not like those empires known till now,
But wise and pure. Let such their temples build
And worship Truth, if Truth should e'er to man
Show her full face.

There is no need to discuss whether the Odin of so sublime a mandate would not be something more than "the Man." It is a fine conception, justified sufficiently by the story of the migration and by extant records revealing vestiges of a pure religion in the North. And even though the prophetic character be unhistorical, and the whole Odin a poetic creation, it is the privilege of the poet to reproduce the spirit rather than the

letter of history. His "Man" is not meant for the man's self, but as the symbol of his influence.

One branch of the race thus set apart in rugged simplicity and hardihood is the Anglo-Saxon people of an after age. To them in the predestined time comes the golden era, which the poet's Odin predicted as a dim possibility. The full face of Truth is shown to them. Augustine comes with the Roman missionaries; others from Gaul and from Ireland follow in his steps. The race with its cities and its "harvests all gold" becomes a nation wise and pure, and builds its temples, and worships the Truth, but not as their barbaric forefathers dreamed of it. It is the shadow of the Crucified that stretches slowly across the land; they begin a new existence, worshipping Him who is the Truth and the Life. The children of Odin's warriors learn the lesson of sacrifice. The race bred in simple hardihood is ready for the highest, whitest summits of the Christian life. Conversion seems to be synonymous with holiness. Cloisters arise to shelter not their tens but their hundreds. Whole families become halo-crowned. Saints shine out not singly so often as in wandering lines and familiar groups, like the star-clusters of a wintry night; and as in a winter's night, too, there is a depth of darkness behind their splendour—it is the darkness of lingering and struggling Paganism, where the sons of Odin the man are still the worshippers of Odin the god.

The final victory of the Christian light over the darkness of Paganism had long been foretold in a dim and confused manner by the oldest of the traditions of the North. It forms the subject of the strangest and strongest of the "Legends,"—"King Sigebert of East Anglia, and Heida the Prophetess." King Sigebert, once exiled in France, where he had heard tidings of the faith, has been visited by St. Fursey, one of the Irish apostles who in those days shared largely, revived, or completed the work of the Roman and Saxon missionaries. Startled and disturbed by what he has heard, he recounts it all to Heida the Prophetess; and she recognizes the coming fulfilment of the earliest and most terrible prophecy of her race, the *Voluspà*, the prediction of the final battle of the gods against the greater Power that is to destroy them.

Upon her breast
Came down the fire divine. With lifted hands
She stood: she sang a death-song centuries old,
The dirge prophetic both of gods and men

What Heida sings is in substance and often in precise detail the dim foreshadowing of the end known to the Northern nations, the destruction of the world by fire, the new state of the race immortalized, the earth "holier and happier," and the heavenly

Asgard with its palace of gold. The interpretation of the prophecy dawns gradually upon Heida, and is only gradually accepted by the King, at first with defiance, then with resignation. The rendering of the battle description, closely parallel with the Icelandic record, is one of the most spirited passages. There is a majestic force and barbaric strength about it, well suited to the scenes described in the battle chaunt; there is just enough embellishment to suggest that the conflict is passing before her vision and too much to disguise in poetry the characteristic roughness and briefness of the *Voluspa* itself. The charge from Valhalla, judged from that point of view, is very felicitous:—

“The warder of the Gods
Soundeth the Gjallar trumpet, never heard
Before by gods or mortals : from their feast
The everlasting synod of the gods
Rush forth, gold armed. with chariot and with horse :
First rides the Father of the flock divine
Odin, our King, and, at his right hand, Thor,
Whose thunder-hammer splits the mountain crags
And level lays the summits of the world ;
Heimdall and Bragi, Uller, Njord, and Tyr,
Behind them throng ; with these the concourse huge
Of lesser gods, and heroes snatched from earth,
Since man's first battle, part to bear with gods
In this their greatest. From their halls of ice
To meet them stride the mighty Giant-Brood,
The moving mountains of old Jötunheim,
Strong with all strengths of Nature, flood or fire,—
Glacier, or stream volcanic from red hills
Cutting through grass-green billows ;—on they throng
Topping the clouds, and, leagues before them, flinging
Huge shade, like shade of mountains cast o'er wastes
When sets the sun.”

The position of the legend of Heida the Prophetess with regard to the rest reminds us of that of “St. Patrick and Oisín” among the legends of Ireland. Both rest on different bases; and one is in ballad metre, the other in the uniform blank verse of this volume. But they have the similarity, that they typify and describe in each case partly from the Pagan point of view the victory of the Cross over the vanishing myths.

To turn to the “Legends” of Saxon Christianity, we find the subjects selected are—The Coming of St. Augustine; the midnight Consecration of Westminster Abbey; the night-watch of St. Laurence, whom St. Peter warns in a vision not to abandon his See; the tales of Sigebert of Essex and Oswald of Northumbria, both taken in detail from Bede, and more

fruitful in history than in poetry; Ceadmon the Cowherd, the first English poet; King Oswy's crime in slaying Oswin, and the Wife's Victory over his impenitence: the opposition of the monks of a Mercian Abbey to admitting the relics of the saintly Oswald of Northumbria, a legend to be included among those most characteristic of the time, but not among the most poetical; St. Cuthbert's Pentecost at Carlisle—like the epilogue, to a great extent a picture of the Christian ministry among the simple ranks of the people; the flight of the Virgin Frideswida to Oxenford; the Banquet-hall of Wessex, chiefly an illustration of the turbulent animosity of the Pagans, and their anxiety to suppress by force the faith that supplants theirs by meekness; and lastly, a picture of the missionary labours and death of the great Historian of the Anglo-Saxon Church—a picture of Bede, the teacher of the people, the monk of Jarrow, amassing written treasure to the last; the old man surrounded by his sons of the cloister, and yielding up his soul amid their labours, prayers and tears. Of all these "Legends," "King Oswy of Northumbria, or the Wife's Victory," seems to be the one which has the largest scope to illustrate the period, and which at the same time is the best representative of the book. It deals largely in historical narrative, and takes care to do its teaching part by explaining all the facts and circumstances. Its imaginative passages are sometimes very beautiful: they suggest what the author has sacrificed, in denying himself elsewhere naturally attractive currents of thought, in order to follow hard paths and fulfil his strictly-defined plan. The legend opens with the question, "Who loved not Oswin?" and it is justified by the description of the King of Deira, "young, beauteous, brave," and so meek, that Aidan the Bishop predicts of him—hiding the sad prophecy under his native Western speech—"God will not leave such meekness long on earth!" The other portion of Northumbria, Bernicia, is ruled by Oswy, "a man of storms," fierce, half Pagan, though in youth baptized to Christ. He comes down upon the kingdom of Deira; and its meek king, seeing his people like a little flock among countless wolves, asks, Why should they perish for him? Let them disperse in peace: for their sake he will return to exile whence he came, "or gladder die." He rides to Gilling Tower, and thither Oswy, the Man of Storms, marches next day and slays him, unarmed. Twelve days after, Aidan the Bishop dies at Bamborough, beside a half-built church, and pillowing his head against a buttress. His grave is made at Lindisfarne, while Oswin's is in after days a place of pilgrimage and of sanctuary under the name of "Oswin's Peace." The murderer, King Oswy, has for his wife the kinswoman of the dead king.

We see her "kneeling on the rain-washed ground" near Gilling's Keep, weeping and praying, and with passionate tenderness and remorse kissing the earth over the new-made grave; and we hear in retrospect how it happened that the pagan-hearted king ever won and wedded so gentle a queen. Oswy now surprises her in her prayer—

"Up, wife of mine! If Oswin had not died
His gracious ways had filched from me my realm,
The base so loved his meekness!" Turning not,
She answered low: "He died an unarmed man."
And Oswy: "Fool that fought not when he might;
At least his slaughtered troop had decked his grave!"

He is still hard in the scorn and hatred that prompted the deed. The voice of the Church has denounced his crime; but he calls rebuke madness, and goes his way. The year runs on, and autumn gives place to winter. He knows the queen weeps in secret, but he never sees her tears. Near him her face is pale but bright, her service loving. She chides him neither by words, nor by looks, nor by silence. But taking all reproach into her heart—

Like some penitent she walked
That mourns her own great sin.

Oswy, we are told, though remorseless now, "had moods of passionate love." He is the great king, the ruthless slayer of his enemies, but he has before now held the dying head of a plague-stricken soldier, cheering the deserted man's last hour "with songs of Odin strangely blent with Christian hymns." The naming of such an incident is a touch of art, for it shows how the sequel is possible, and makes us ready to believe in the sudden change and softening of his strong passionate nature. Then comes an admirable picture, a marvellous story told in a few words. The telling has a characteristic briefness; it is a finished idyll of faith; while it may be that the vision we are given of Eanfleda is meant by its poetic smoothness and brightness to contrast with the narrative portions and the harsher war scenes, just as her secret sanctified grief contrasts with the rough war-ridden life of the king. Oswy, returning from a distant chase, is overtaken by the darkness, and he has to pass Oswin's grave.

The snow, new-fallen,
Whitened the precinct. In the blast she knelt,
While coldly glared the broad and bitter moon
Upon those flying flakes that on her hair
Settled, or on her thin, light raiment clung.
She heard him not draw nigh. She only beat
Her breast, and, praying, wept: "Our sin, our sin!"

There as the monarch stood, a change came o'er him :
 Old exiled days in Alba as a dream
 Redawned upon his spirit, and that look
 In Aidan's eyes, when, binding first that cross
 Long by his pupil craved around his neck,
 He whispered : " He who serveth Christ his Lord
 Must love his fellow-man." As when a stream,
 The ice dissolved, grows audible once more,
 So came to him those words. They dragged him down :
 He knelt beside his wife, and beat his breast,
 And said, " My sin, my sin !"

. . . . Aloud she cried :

" Our prayer is heard : our penitence finds grace :"
 Then added : " Let it deepen till we die !
 A monastery build we on this grave :
 So from this grave, while fleet the years, that prayer
 Shall rise both day and night, till Christ returns
 To judge the world—a prayer for him who died ;
 A prayer for one who sinned but sins no more."

The church is built, and " the one true greatness" more and more takes possession of Oswy's spirit. At the same time he advances in power. He is named Bretwalda, for until then the Seven Kingdoms have seen no king to be compared to Oswy the Christian. The envy of Penda is excited ; his rule in Mercia is the greatest standing barrier against Christianity, and he is ready to give credence to the rumour that the power of the Christian king is the result of Christian sorcery. He sends his son Peada to Northumbria, to learn if it be true ; but, as if there were, indeed, some witchery in the new religion, the mission has an ending strange beyond his dreams. Peada becomes a Christian, and takes in marriage the daughter of Oswy. He embraces the truth only after long inquiry and meditation ; and an image from nature aptly describes the changes which day and darkness bring to his fluctuating belief ; the later the hour the more is the mind willing to be influenced from without, and to recognize, within, its own depths of feeling ; so Peada says of the great truths he contemplates, that each evening—

Distinct they shine like yonder mountain range ;
 Each morning mists conceal them.

When the news of his conversion spreads into Mercia, the subjects of Penda dread his rage against Peada. " Will he slay his son ?" is the question asked on all sides with white lips. But Penda declares the man he scorns is he that vows himself to serve some god, yet breaks his law and " walks, a lie." Let Peada

serve his Christ; but it is the kingdom of Northumbria that shall die.

“Man nor child,”

He sware, “henceforth shall tread Northumbrian soil,
Nor hart nor hind; I spare the creeping worm:
My scavenger is he.”

He musters his innumerable mass of warriors; chiefs of many a princedom and province join him.

Mightier far than these
Old Cambria, *brooding o'er the ancestral wrong*
The Saxon's sin original, met his call,
And vowed her to the vengeance.

Hearing of the advance, Oswy first strives to make peace; and then, in prayer for victory, vows to God the virginity of his child, and lays before the altar twelve caskets “heaped with gems and gold”—the peace offerings rejected by Penda, and now the price of twelve future monasteries. The Northumbrians march under white standards of “the Mother-Maid and Babe Divine.” The Mercians and their allies are completely routed, turning their arms upon each other in confusion, and swept away in their headlong retreat by the sudden overflow of the swollen river—

Penda scorned to fly:

Thrice with extended arms he met and cursed
The fugitives on rushing. As they passed
He flung his crownèd helm into the wave,
And bit his brazen shield, above its rim,
Levelling a look that smote with chill-like death
Their hearts that saw it. Yet one moment more
He sat, like statue on some sculptured horse,
With upraised hand, close-clenched, denouncing Heaven:
Then burst his mighty heart. As stone he fell
Dead on the plain. Not less in after years
Mercian to Mercian said, “Without a wound
King Penda died, although on battle-field;
Therefore with Odin Penda shares not feast.”

Yet we are told—and it is a striking illustration of that age of sudden-springing generous faith when the good mingled closely with the evil—Penda, the strength of the heathen power, left Christian sons, and daughters who took the veil. To follow the poem—Oswy, in fulfilment of the vow, sends his child to the Abbess Hilda, “who made her Bride of Christ;” and the monasteries he raises become twelve centres of productive labour on the soil and of charity to the poor. Years pass; he is at length “an old king glory-crowned.” He desires to go forth from his

kingdom as a pilgrim, and to end his days in Rome. But Heaven wills otherwise, and he is stayed by the hand of death.

Long sleepless t'ward the close
Amid his wanderings smiling, from the couch
He stretched a shrivelled hand, and pointing said,
"Who was it fabled she had died in age?
In all her youthful beauty, holy and pure,
Lo where she kneels upon the wintry ground,
The snow-flakes circling round her, yet with face
Bright as a star!" so spake the king; and taking
Into his heart that vision, slept in peace.

This seems to be the fitting end for the legend; but the pleasure of resting finally upon a beautiful fancy is sacrificed for the usefulness of finishing the narrative, and one or two historical facts carry us a few lines farther down the page, and a long way off from our small share in the old king's delusion. It is to be remarked that in the versified legend the most felicitous parts are of the poet's creation. The manner of Oswy's conversion is entirely imaginary. Bede tells us that at his order, not by his own hand, Oswin was slain; that afterwards a monastery was built on the spot, and prayer was daily offered for the soul of the murdered king and for the living king who had caused his death; that Utta, the priest, was despatched to Kent to bring Edwin's daughter, Eanfleda, to be Oswy's bride; and subsequently we find Oswy not only a Christian in life, but persuading others to follow his example—"about this time, through the influence of king Oswy, the East Saxons again embraced the Christian religion." Somehow, it is clear a great change has come to Oswy; Bede does not tell how; but the poet brings Eanfleda to solve the difficulty, and his creation becomes the key-stone of his legend, while the incident of the dying warrior is skilfully invented to help out the explanation. As for the scene in which the historian gives most detail—the banquet scene where Oswin proves his meekness—the legend in verse falls short even of Bede's account.

The more we seek to determine the source of our pleasure in certain parts of this poem, the more we are inclined to believe that the best of the legends, and the best passages of all the "Legends," are those where, as the preface says, the original record being brief, "all except the fundamental facts had to be supplied." In every story, from that of Augustine to that of Bede, the "fundamental facts" are not worked in to form the brightest portions; the most brilliant points are of pure imagination, supported only by a knowledge of the people and the period. In the "Consecration of Westminster Abbey," the fisherman's vision of the pile with its "kindling windows," and

all his impression of the glory of the heavenly rite within, does not equal in poetic felicity the description of the procession on the river next day. The latter event would seem to be far less promising; but an abundance of airy detail is supplied. The fancy is given free play, and with admirable results. Old Thames becomes the scene of a pageant that can scarcely be reconciled with the identity of the many-bridged flood. The wharves, the crowd of craft, the smoke-clouded city, all disappear—or almost disappear, for there are still, even in the early days, the small beginnings of these things. We see, instead, a river “brightened with banners of a thousand boats,” and gladdened with the anthems of the consecration rite, and with the glitter of “the cross in silver blazoned or in gold.” It is a river banked by grassy slopes and orchards near the old church of St. Paul, and with reedy shallows farther up, and waves strewn with chaplets and green branches. The London of the first Christian age rises dimly to the mind with a distant echo of its festive happiness; and last of all comes a realistic touch, reproducing in its aspect of that day the one work of man’s hands that has kept its place in the scene, and that is familiar to us still.

Alone the Julian Tower

Far down the eastern stream, though tap’stries waved
From every window, every roof o’er-swarmed
With anthem-echoing throngs, maintained, unmoved,
Roman and Stoic, her Cæsarean pride;
On Saxon feasts she fixed a cold, grey gaze;
’Mid Christian hymns heard but the old acclaim—
“Consul Romanus.”

Again, in “The Penance of St. Laurence,” the vision of St. Peter described by Bede does not suggest the most poetic passage. The author has discovered elsewhere in the chronicle that King Ethelbert, Queen Bertha, and the great St. Augustine himself are buried in the church where St. Laurence keeps his night watch; and of all who read the legend there will be few to deny that its beauty lies in the old man’s tearful and self-reproachful prayer at each of these tombs. The accessories of the scene are made to do their part—the ice-cold moon ascending “from the *dark fringe* of a rainy cloud,” and creating alternate gleam and gloom; “the vast, void nave” itself; the mat, and deer skin, and stone pillow, the old man’s couch; the one glittering lamp; the tomb where King Ethelbert sleeps marble-shrined, and, far away beyond a space of dark shadow, the grave whereon lies “the Patriarch’s statued semblance as in sleep.” The aged monk, creeping from stone to stone, is the one figure that moves through the deserted church; and the whole scene

is admirable, for one has a remembrance of the lay brother "with lamp in hand" gone now with the rest, and a consciousness of the monastery outside, where the bitter blast blows through "windy corridors and courts stone-paved." There is a whole imaginative structure built here upon very little; but as the description is given, not together in the poem, but in scattered detail, our preference lies still with the prayers of the exiled bishop, and these are purely the poet's creations; for though St. Laurence watched and prayed, we are not told that he prayed to the dead King and Queen of Kent, and to his sainted predecessor in the See of Canterbury. In the versified legend, he recalls to King Ethelbert the happy bygone time when "the Bride of God" set her pure foot on English shores, and he, the king, welcomed her, and gave her his palace, and built that abbey:—the days when he saw "his realm made one with Christ's," his race, "like angels ranging courts of heaven." Then at Bertha's tomb he makes his farewell prayer—the briefest of the three, yet perhaps the most inspired; for the Christian queen, that welcomed Augustine, seems long ago to have become a chosen heroine with the poet who places her praise so touchingly upon the lips of St. Laurence, the departing exile.

Thou tenderest Queen and sweetest,
Whom no man ever gazed on save with joy,
Or spake of, dead, save weeping! Well I know
That on thee in thy cradle Mary flung
A lily, whiter from her hand, a rose
Warm from her breath and breast, for all thy life
Was made of Chastities and Charities—
This hour thine eyes are on the Vision bent
Whereof the radiance, ere by thee beheld,
Gave thee thine earthly brightness. Mirrored there,
Seest thou, like mote in sunbeam well nigh-lost,
Our world of temporal anguish? See it not!
For He alone, the essential Peace Eterne,
Could see it unperturbed. In Him rejoice!
Yet, 'mid thy heavenly triumph, plead, O plead
For hearts that break below!

At St. Augustine's grave he weeps—

Ah me! ah me!

There was a Laurence once on Afric's shore:
He with his Cyprian died.

Then follows his deep sleep, and his half waking ere the dawn, when "a Venerable Shape, compact of light," approaches his couch, and from the Prince of the Apostles he receives the assurance that, at all risks, he must still hold his See and

remain on English ground. The mild and compassionate reproach is a beautiful and poetical, if {unwarranted, rendering of the version of the story given by Bede; but the return of the bishop to face death before the king, and the subsequent change of King Eadwald's purpose, transfer us to less poetical situations.

In like manner, profuse and imaginative detail, or even imaginative scenes, throw the strictly historical element into the shade elsewhere. For instance, St. Frideswida, in the forest, makes a sort of pre-Raphaelite picture in words—something very fair and bright to look upon, and clear and graceful of line; but though we naturally expect more of St. Frideswida at Oxford, the Oxford pictures are far less impressive, because less distinct—with the exception, perhaps, of the incident of her touching charity to the leper. Even the last legend of all, the death of the Venerable Bede (which certainly is a subject for poetical treatment), does not quite come up to our expectations. But some of Bede's preaching, founded on his own writings, goes as far beyond anticipation, and so do many portions of the discourses of St. Cuthbert. There are, in fact, many beauties in the legend last referred to; but they are so far apart from the narrative, that most of them might be taken as excerpts, and, with a touch at the beginning, made complete by themselves. For instance, the Three Lives of Womanhood could be transformed into a separate poem, and the conception would carry all its excellence with it. The same is true of the tale of the monk, who wrote against heresies a book "like tempest winged from God," but whose right hand alone fell to dust in the grave; it is also true of the very different story of the keen-witted thane, who, being enjoined a penance of a hundred days' fast, cancelled the debt "a hundred days in one," by imprisoning ninety-nine of his friends and lieges to share with him an unwilling fast of twenty-four hours.

Altogether, the work leaves the impression that if the fancy had been given more freedom, if the scope of the legends had been somewhat narrowed, and if they had contained a little more description and a little less narrative, we should have had a greater abundance of poetry, and, perhaps, a nearer view of the Saxon saints. But then we should have had less history, and a less instructive illustration of the period; and both these things made part of the original plan. It was a design most difficult of execution, and, where there is a difference between the merits of the first and second book of "*Legends*," we have no hesitation in ascribing it to the peculiarly historical character of the subject of the second, and the breadth given, with commendable purpose, to the plan. It was natural to expect some

such difference between the two accounts of the planting and spreading of Christianity. As we suggested at the outset, the difference between the two races, the predominance of the supernatural and miraculous in one account of conversion, the emotional and traditionary character of its records, and the calmly historical character of those of the other, all point to a vast difference in the facility of the task of telling for the two countries the tale of the first age of faith. And yet with a scrupulous care for the historical side of the work, the second set of "Legends" are, on the whole, far less imaginative, and drawn more accurately from their source than were the first; and fitness for poetic treatment is no longer the guide to the selection of subjects, for some are chosen for other stated reasons, and some beautiful episodes from Bede, and many legends of the Saxon saints not recorded by him, have been judged outside of the author's plan.

There is another difference to be noted between the "Legends of St. Patrick," and those of the "Saxon Saints." The present volume is entirely of blank verse; an agreeable interruption to the uniformity of the other was made by several legends being in rhyming verse, the parts of the Ossianic legends being given at intervals in ballad-metre, and the verse being broken by many changes, with very pleasing effect. Might not the effect produced in such legends as the "Monks of Bardeney" have been enhanced by using a similar medium of dialogue, even at the cost of lowering a stately poem to the level of a forcible ballad? And do not many of the incidents in the other legends suggest that, isolated, they might have been wrought into admirable short poems, flowing in any one of the stanzas in which their writer has proved himself of old to have no ordinary skill? It is true that large narrative portions would have been lost; but we remember some fragments of haunting melody from the same source as these weighty poems, and the remembrance makes us for once not sure that utility is the supreme good, or, at least, that it is not dearly bought at the cost of beauty, which, in such hands, could not fail to be utility also, since it would be like the persuasive beauty of holiness. But we do not forget that blank verse is facile and easily adapted to the different parts of a wide subject, and especially of a historical subject. We do not forget either that our English tongue, abundantly, well nigh supremely, rich in all else, is sadly poor in rhymes. Five centuries of verse writing have not rendered null Geoffrey Chaucer's lament that "rime in English hath soch scarcite;" and most bards since his time have felt it, as he did, "a great pennaunce" to know with what ease foreign brethren of the craft can fling off their verses. But there is

good in the seeming disadvantage. Necessity is the mother of invention: energy springs from difficulty. The "flour of hem that make in Fraunce" had in Chaucer's time outdone us; but native energy has been at work, in this, as in all else, nerved to greater effort by the difficulty itself; and long ago we have left French verse far in the background, while our literature of rhymed poetry stands on a level—for quality, though, we are thankful to say, not for quantity—even with the melodious Italian and the assonant Spanish. Nor is this the only good of "soch scarcite." Our literature has been wholesomely restrained in quantity by the fetters of rhyme; and so are the efforts of the individual. They are ruled, and their outcome is not only marked with the energy of a difficult art, but it is more compressed. Now, when there is a natural current of poetry in the mind, and when blank verse is the chosen metre, there is always a tendency to diffuseness. The result is likely to be—as in the case even of some poems of renown—a number of scattered gems with a large and unsatisfactory setting, of but little value in itself. Perhaps there is at the present day only one poet who is a perfect master of this tempting and perilous measure—one only who so balances every thought, and so times and varies the cadence, and polishes every phrase, and adjusts every word, that tedium is banished, and the most prose-like metre of the language becomes the most melodious. On the other hand, when blank verse is avoided and a rhyming measure chosen, there is the opposite danger—that of producing rhyme and nothing but rhyme, melody and nothing else. And this is a far more common kind of failure in our days. If Sir Philip Sidney said in his time that most English verse was "a confused masse of words with a tinkling sound of ryme barely accompanied with reason," what would he say of much of the later nineteenth-century verse? Are there not one or two poets whom it is the fashion to praise (as well as a whole school of second-rate rhymers), whose work might be entitled, not, alas! songs without words, but songs without sense? Tricks of endless alliteration and *tours de force* in rhyme supply their melody; their profundity is nothing more than the shallows unwholesomely perturbed; their genius is not of the clouds, but of the fogs, wherein it appears somewhat large and mysterious; a voluptuous turn of fancy helps to counterfeit poetic fire; and all the while clever management of rhyme and rythm is the one thing that covers their multitude of defects. If on one side, then, there is in blank verse the chance of falling into diffuseness and prose, on the other there is, in a rhyming metre, the danger of pleasing the ear with sound without satisfying the mind with thought. Of course there are a great many grada-

tions before these extremes of error are reached on either side, and we should look vainly for a poet who has not erred in one direction or the other, just as we should for any human work continuously and altogether perfect. There is no golden key to security here, any more than there is to genius or to excellence in art. But, granting inspiration to begin with, we do not think there is a safer guide than the habit of compression. There seems, therefore, to be more hope of excellence in rhymed than in unrhymed metre. The sonnet, with its many rhymes and its condensation of thought, is for these reasons not only the briefest and most harmonious, but, as many will say, the most beautiful form of poetry. The Poet of the Lakes loved to bound his inspirations by its narrow limits, though he had travelled more miles of blank verse than most men, often on the heavenward heights and often on low and rugged ground; and perhaps his most uniform excellence lies in his sonnets. Nor need we go so far for an example. There are pages of our own poet's Saxon and Celtic "Legends" that please for the moment well, but pass, with their histories, their pictures, their voices, utterly away from the mind; but there are two sonnets on "The Miserere in the Sistine Chapel," that live in the memory like its prolonged echo, and that make up in twenty-eight lines an unmistakable success not easily forgotten.

But from the versification of the Saxon legends we have been carried away to the polished verse of the best writer of unrhymed measure, and to the most unpoetic writers of rhymed measure—those who with some amount of fashion on their side give us less poetry than music of words. Far be it from us to contrast the present volume with either; there could not be a more ill-assorted comparison. For we do not place even the desirable degree of word-melody anywhere on the same level to which poetry inspired by faith ascends alone; nor would exquisite finish, carried to the utmost, weigh with us in comparison with that treasure of truth which removes our own poetry of religion to a totally different region from all other efforts of verse. But without comparison or contrast, it is quite legitimate to trace in the successes or failures of non-Catholic poetry, the possible successes or failures of our own. If blank verse has been a treacherously easy medium for many, so may it be for others. On the other hand, if there is a peril in rhyme it is well to see whence the delusion may spring. And finally, if, as we have suggested the best safeguard is condensation and compression, we have reason to lean towards rhymed verse, as giving most hope of care and brevity; and as an additional assurance that we are looking in the right direction, we have noted the frequent excellence of the sonnet,

where a great soul of thought has to be held in the small frame of fourteen lines.

There is, however, another element in poetry besides metre which it will be interesting to advert to; that is, the choice of words. In this choice lies a great deal of the poet's art. There is more in the mechanism of verse than the ordinary reader of poetry dreams of. The words that please the ear and haunt the memory owe a large part of their power to the succession of sound, which, itself passes unnoticed or seems accidental. It may appear to be no more than the result of chance, but it is a chance directed unconsciously by an inspired taste, or by a perception too quick to be marked even by its possessor. In other cases, and perhaps in nearly all, the happy combinations are distinctly purposed, though, again, it may be unconsciously, for practice in any art turns excellence to a habit. Probably there is seldom a case where the author himself fully analyzes at the time the power of what he is creating, and yet creates it well. The best art in the melody of words is the art that has become a second nature; the inspiration grows cold while it is calculating how to find expression. For instance, we may be sure that in one of the finest stanzas of the "May Carols" the words were chosen instinctively, not deliberately; indeed, one has to examine very closely to find whence their melody comes—

O Earth, some orb of singing souls
Brings down to thee *thy* Pentecost.

The alliteration of "singing souls" strikes us at first. But there is something of the kind, too, in "earth" and "orb." And then the secret dawns upon us; the music of the line lies in its perfect cadence, the sound growing full and forcible from "earth" to "*orb*" and from "singing" to "*souls*." The seeming and the perfect alliteration, and the swell of the vowel-sound at the close of the second foot and of the fourth, give to "O Earth, some orb of singing souls," a melody that could not be accounted for by the similarity of the two last words alone. This feat of unconscious art reminds us of a line from Spenser which has in a still greater degree a beauty at first mysterious—"Such as a lamp whose life doth fade away." Here one is apt to ascribe success to Spenser's well-known alliterative taste. But then comes the question, why would not "lamp" and "light" have done as well; and though there is an advantage in the pathetic allusion to the flame dying, one discovers that there is something gained, too, in having no hard dental consonant to break the flow of the sounds, but letting the "f" of "life" form an alliteration with "fade," where an assonance ends the line in character with its spirit of soft-

ness. All these nice distinctions of wording are by no means to be despised, though they can make only one of the lesser merits of verse. They are not forgotten by the author of the "Legends;" he uses—and has never, like so many others, abused—the art of words; still in this case more attention to it would have improved the verses. But in the choice of words the sound and smoothness are, after all, a minor consideration compared to the sense they express; and there are many passages where they are so selected as to give admirable touches of description, or to imply rather than express an imagery underlying the real meaning and not interfering with its clearness. Such occurs in the description of the swollen river on a stormy night, when—

through the clouds
A panic-stricken moon stumbled and fled,
And wildly on the waters blast on blast
Ridged their dark floor.

Or, again, to take words that are figures, and yet themselves occur in a figure of speech—

like that last beam
Which, when the sunset woods no longer burn,
Maintains high place on Alpine throne remote,
Or utmost peak of promontoried cloud.

The "Alpine throne" somewhat interferes with the beauty of the rest, but in the last verse there is a fine example of the force of one descriptive word. Falls and breaks in the style, are, indeed, somewhat frequent. There is a tendency not only to mar the smoothness of a passage by an unpolished phrase or thought; but also to prolong a felicitous idea beyond its natural climax and make a sudden downfall at the end. For instance, the last line seems superfluous in the story of the monk whose right hand alone decayed in the grave, and who coming in vision tells the reason:

Inferior tasks
I wrought for God alone. Building that book
Too oft I mused, "Far years will give me praise."
I expiate that offence.

The same may be said of one of the best passages in Bede's discourse to the people; the last line carried us beyond the point where a pause would have given rest upon its loftiest thought:—

Put on Christ's garments. Fools shall call them rags—
Heed not their scoff! A prince's child is man,
Born in the purple; but his royal robes
None other are than those the Saviour dyed,
Treading His Passion's wine-press all alone:
Of such alone be proud.

And, to finish the ungrateful task of finding flaws where so much is to be commended, we may note that there is sometimes a poetical thought which has escaped in prose-like words : as where, on the same page with a fine parallel between Creation and the coming of Faith, we discover such verse as :—

The heroic heart
Beats to the spiritual cognate, paltering not
Fraudulent with truth once known.

In the poetry of the “Legends” we do not miss what is elsewhere a beautiful characteristic of their author’s work. We have left it to be dwelt upon last, because it is a peculiar merit that shows his poetry in the light under which we like best to remember it. He is a lover of nature, a sympathetic observer, and at times an apt describer. But all this others are, and to an incomparably greater degree. There are others more inspired, more eloquent, and more skilled in reproducing for our mind the aspect the world wears in their sight. But the Catholic poet, excelled in all else, claims a higher place than the rest because of one grand privilege. His distinction is, that, in gazing upon the material world, his tendency is always to mingle its beauties with a light from the spiritual world. Nature is for him to be interpreted by Religion, and Religion to be illustrated by Nature. Now the world is seen by him soul-stirred in worship; now thronged with visible types of spiritual truths; now clothed with a new radiance, and seen by spiritual sight to be one vast symbol of the ritual of the Church. Seek where we will, there is no other merit in his work to be even compared with this characteristic of his inspiration. It was beautiful and most prominent in the “May Carols,” but it had shown itself before they were written, and lives on through everything else, making good his claim to the title of a Christian poet. For him Nature has “sanctuaries and shrines;” and so fair does the world become that he need not stretch imagination far to see its possible resurrection—“O Earth, thou shalt not wholly die!”—or when the May-time has filled its very fields and hedgerows with spirit-light, there breaks forth a yearning question :—

Ah, tell me! in the heavenlier sphere
Must all of earth have passed away?

For him, the winds sing their anthems; the forest trees make the aisles of a sanctuary; the sparkles of sunlight upon water are like souls springing from-out eternity. When the last trees relent to the embrace of May they are heart-touched at last, like sin-hardened men subdued to the welcome of grace. When the sea murmurs its “sob suppressed” along the shore-line, it is like the audible thrill of adoration when the Host is raised in

"some chapel on the Irish hills." In the early year the world's Pentecost comes with the rolling music of winds above the woods, and with the leaves fired beneath by "the golden-tongued and myriad light;" and when the year draws to a close the autumn colours are glorified as "hues pontific." It is a noble thought thus to show the world most beautiful in perfect unison with our faith and with our worship. If we seek for the same spirit in the "*Legends of the Saxon Saints*," we shall find it still abiding. In the description of St. Cuthbert's life on the "little rocky islet" of Farne, an image is taken from nature, to tell how earthly thoughts and memories crossed, without disturbing, his contemplation; for he had not separated himself from the world beyond; his brethren were still in his heart, and his hermitage was accessible not only to them but to the sinful and sorrowful. Yet his prayer went on, and his soul was firm in peace; the things of the external world tell us how, and show what symbols they may become for one to whom they are interpreters of truths unseen. We are told:—

He saw by day
The clouds on-sailing, and by night the stars;
And heard the eternal waters. Thus recluse
The man lived on in vision still of God
Through contemplation known; and as the shades
Each other chase all day o'er stedfast hills,
Even so, athwart that Vision unremoved,
For ever rushed the tumults of this world,
Man's fleeting life, the rise and fall of States,
While changeless measured change.

And when he returns to his hermitage in his last days the image is reversed, and he is said to have seen—

Once more, like lights that sweep the unmoving hills,
God's providences girdling all the world
With glory following glory.

The reflection of Religion from Nature is given with perfect ease in the parables of Cuthbert the Bishop to his peasant flock; but we find it reappearing abundantly, if less avowedly, elsewhere; and it comes with good effect when the death of Ceadmon is approaching, and the monks hear the great deep roaring in the distance and sobbing round "Whitby's winding coast":—

They heard, and mused upon eternity,
That circles human life.

There are, no doubt, in other poets countless examples of sacred types drawn from Nature, and of glimpses of its worship of the Creator; but we know of none who so often betrays, as

a constant habit of mind, the tracing of heavenly truth through earthly beauty. The loving loyalty to the Church, which distinguishes all his work, has in this manner its outcome in many of the smallest details. His poetry and his Catholicism are inseparable.

We have long ago expressed our opinion that there is yet no *great* poet among our Catholic writers. We are sure they one and all agree with us; and there is amongst us no writer of verse in whom the knowledge of truth and the appreciation of its beauty has not called forth a yearning for one far more gifted than himself to be sent to do the grand work possible for a great Catholic poet. Such there may be in the times to come—a man of faith, with a “heart of hearts” and with the might of eloquence, turning to its highest use the most sublime and the most powerful art known to man. What are the other arts beside it but faint, and limited, and transitory? It can speak to the whole world, and to all time, and it alone can give anything like full interpretation of one human soul to all the rest. It is unlike every other art in its power over men. Have not nations marched to war with pulses quickened by a few words, sung first at the home-hearth and last by the watch-fire? Has not the rage of a city in tumult been increased by rhymes at the barricades? How many are there for whom the spell of a few verses was the beginning of darkness and error! The atheism of our days, the doubt that robs nations of their inherited faith, the love of luxury that saps their strength, all these are spread by an army of poets and poetasters, whose share is large and continuous in the unholy work. May we not, then, by its force for evil calculate what might be the force for good of this marvellous, much-abused gift? It is no unfruitful boon that we desire, no airy possibility of blessing, but a very tangible good, when we long to have our times and our country feel the influence of a great Catholic poet. While yet it is not granted to us, all praise to those who give their energy, heart-whole so far as it goes, to the praise of Christian truth and the glory of the Church. And of this much at least we can be sure, that the Heaven-sent poet of the future, if ever he come, will have his course foreshadowed by two characteristics of a writer of to-day. He will see creation in light reflected from the knowledge and worship of its Creator; and he will find the key to Nature’s “sanctuaries and shrines” in the veneration of her who was praised in the “May Carols.” He will be in supreme excellence for after days what in a lesser degree the author of the “*Legends of the Saxon Saints*” is for ours—the lover of Nature illumined by Faith, and one of Our Lady’s laureates.

ART. VII.—POPE LEO XIII. AND MODERN STUDIES.

1. *Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII. on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy.* Translated by F. RAWES, D.D., with a Preface by his Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. London: Burns and Oates. 1879.
2. *Der Heilige Thomas von Aquino.* Von Dr. KARL WERNER. Drei Bänder. Regensburg: G. J. Manz. 1859.
3. *Elementa Philosophiæ Christianæ.* Auctore P. F. ALBERTO LEPIDI, O.P. 2 vols. Parisiis: Lethielleux. 1875.
4. *Institutiones Philosophiæ Speculativæ ad mentem Sti. Thomæ Aquinatis.* Auctore, J. M. CORNOLDI, S.J., in Latinum versæ a Dominico Agostini, Venetiarum Patriarchâ. Bononiæ. 1878.

THE important Encyclical of the Holy Father, *Æterni Patris*, has now been before the world for five months, and theologians, scholars, and devout Catholics generally have had time to analyze it and to understand its drift and its recommendations. It has become quite clear that it is intended to effect a very great work; to bring about unity in Catholic philosophy, and this by the universal adoption of the philosophic teaching of St. Thomas of Aquin. We say *philosophic* teaching, rather than *theological*; because theology, as a science, depends upon philosophy. In theology, even taking that word in a sense much wider than the science of "Catholic" truth, Catholic divines may be said to be agreed. There are numerous controversies, no doubt, in the treatises on God and on the Incarnation, on Grace and on the Sacraments; but they are not controversies which affect ultimate conclusions; and they will always, or nearly always, be found to rest on differences in philosophy.

It cannot be that Pope Leo XIII. intends to extinguish for ever all disputes in the Schools of the Catholic Church. That would be neither practicable nor, it may be said, desirable. But the field of human speculation, growing wider, as it does, with every generation of thinkers, is so vast that the unassisted lights of the average Catholic flock are insufficient to distinguish the good from the bad, the valuable from the dross, the poisonous from the pure; and, therefore, the Popes have been accustomed, from epoch to epoch, to interfere and to narrow the limits of legitimate discussion. Sometimes it has been that Catholic thinkers have broached dangerous doctrines, or put forth pernicious novelties; sometimes it has been that the brilliant

but unsound speculations of non-Catholics have seemed to be making too great an impression on Catholic teaching; and again at other times it has been that occasion has been taken to praise particular doctors or to commend particular books. It is the office of the Holy See to defend and protect Catholic truth. In the execution of this office it is infallible beyond the limits of strictly theological matter; and even where its infallibility technically ceases, its voice must command the assent and adhesion of those who belong to the fold of Christ's Church.

In a very true sense the Church has been long committed to the Scholastic Philosophy. The terminology of the Church's detailed doctrine is entirely Scholastic and Aristotelian. In the Holy Scriptures terms are used loosely, and there is no trace of "science," except in some of the writings of St. John. Even the "science" of the fourth Gospel, however, falls in marvellously with the Aristotelian terminology. In the centuries before St. John of Damascus there was immense speculation and interminable discussion. That discussion cannot certainly be said to have been altogether about words and terms; the development of the Creed remains to attest the contrary; but it may safely be said that if there had been a recognized meaning for a certain half dozen terms there would have been much less discussion and much less deceiving of the unwary. Yet no one can have even an elementary knowledge of how St. Thomas of Aquin uses the early Fathers without being aware that all their commendable terminology is easily reducible to the terms of Aristotle's philosophy. When St. John of Damascus gave the Church in the eighth century the first scientific body of theology, he proceeded avowedly on the lines of the same philosophy. Before St. Thomas or even St. Anselm had put pen to paper, the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist, the Sacraments, and Grace was developed into an orderly "science" by means of Aristotelian teaching on "Person," "Generation," "Substance," "Matter and Form," and "Habit." What was effected by Peter Lombard, and, in an infinitely more finished measure, by St. Thomas himself in the "Summa," was to extend, complete, and correct the exposition of doctrine in the terms of Aristotle. He dispersed the mist by procuring and using the best copies of the master; he showed in greater detail the connection of present with past; his width of view unexpectedly removed a host of difficulties, and his acute analysis discovered a thousand new points of agreement. The Church has, therefore, been committed in a very important sense, to the Aristotelian philosophy for many centuries before Pope Leo XIII. spoke in commendation of St. Thomas. But it never was true, and it is not true now, that the Church has committed herself to any point, proposition, or

doctrine of that philosophy, except in as far as she has adopted it in detail. Aristotle is not, and never was, the Church's teacher. She found his terms, the very best scientific terminology that human thought had conceived and wrought out, ready to the hand; and since it was absolutely essential that she should use some set of terms, she chose Aristotle's.

The term "Scholastic" philosophy differs from the term "Aristotelian" philosophy. But they only differ as a tree from its trunk. The Scholastic philosophy is that wide scientific application of Aristotelian terminology to the development of theological teaching—including the purely philosophical matters preparatory to it—which has been going on from the days of John of Damascus to those of Franzelin and Zigliara. And therefore it is no reversal of Catholic tradition, but the opposite, when the Pontiff offers us for our use the works of St. Thomas. And we admit, as has already been stated about Aristotle, that what the Pope commits us to is not "St. Thomas," but the "truth" and the "wisdom" of St. Thomas. But the solemn act recently performed would undoubtedly have very little meaning if it did not mean that the Pope holds and asserts that St. Thomas, throughout his works, except in unimportant details, simply teaches what is wise and true.

The questions which, more than any others, are occupying the minds of theologians and of Catholics generally at this moment are principally two: viz., first, Why has the Holy See spoken so strongly at this particular time, in commendation of the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin? and secondly, What, in brief, is the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin? It will be well to attempt an answer to each of these inquiries.

It would be to misconceive the spirit and scope of the Encyclical to think that it was intended to bring about some violent change or to sound the warning signal of a revolution. There is no special crisis in philosophical matters at the present moment. The sickness of the age is one which is both chronic in its character and more fundamental than any question of the schools. When serious thinkers deny the possibility of knowing whether there is a God or not, of distinguishing matter from spirit and man from the universe, the precise refutation or the demonstration which is to convince them will hardly be found in any "Summa" of the Middle Ages. Yet the present moment has been chosen by Pope Leo to issue a strong exhortation to cling to the "philosophy" of St. Thomas of Aquin, and it is not difficult to understand that the moment has been chosen well. What Catholic thinkers want is, *Unity in truth*. Not unity only, nor mere essays and trials after truth; but a clear hold of

one true system. Catholic divines and cultured laics have to keep their own faith sound and healthy, therefore they must have a sound philosophy; they have to instruct and confirm the younger generation springing up around them, and therefore they must have something more than hypothesis and theory to stand upon and start from; and they have to confront the physicists and the agnostics, and therefore—since they cannot answer one tithe of their arguments and questions for sheer want of time—they must meet them with the only influence which can dispense with detailed discussion, that is, the unveiled and unbroken Truth. The Encyclical is rather a domestic warning than a plan of campaign. It is an order to the household to attend to its own health rather than a call to go forth and fight. The Catholic flock has been wasting its time with second-rate teachers; it has been divided, outside the domain of Faith, into sets and parties; its best men have spent a lifetime in elaborating systems to which the last touch had scarcely been given when they were found to be worthy of condemnation. Life is too short to allow each generation and each eminent professor to think out an original scheme of things. And therefore the Pope steps in, as Popes have been in the habit of doing ever since St. Peter denounced the “proud words of emptiness” of certain teachers of his own day, and exhorts the flock over which he rules to cling fast to a teacher whom God had gifted above his fellows, whom time has tried, and whom the ages and the Church have stamped with their approval. Pope Leo says that, on the whole, the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin is truth; he wishes us, therefore, not to lose our labour in searching and asking, but to go to St. Thomas and master the “golden wisdom” we shall find in him.

What the exact effect of this exhortation will prove to be, we shall inquire later. Meanwhile, let it be observed that the words of Pope Leo are much more the confirmation and approval of a movement which has been long going on, than a new departure. The restoration of Thomist philosophy has been slowly proceeding for nearly half a century. In 1838 Victor Cousin could boast* that his Eclecticism was almost supreme in Europe wherever metaphysics were studied. Galluppi had introduced it into South Italy; Mancino had naturalized it in Sicily; Rosmini was criticizing it severely, but courteously, in North Italy; Schelling in Germany and Sir William Hamilton in England—the one “the greatest thinker,” the other “the greatest critic” of the age—were occupied with discussing it; whilst even in the United States Brown-

* In the Preface to the 3rd Edition of “*Fragments de Philosophie Contemporaine*.”

son had defended it in brilliant articles against the sectaries whom afterwards he was to attack much more seriously. Cousin may perhaps be cited as the supreme instance of what a Christian thinker can do who does not adopt St. Thomas. Profound, brilliant, and Christian, he nevertheless succeeded in founding absolutely nothing. The philosopher who would add to the world's ideas must begin where other men left off. No tree can grow in one generation; and the thinker who undertakes himself to plant the seed and exhibit the fruit of a philosophical system can no more do so than the Indian juggler can make a tree really grow before the eyes of his audience. Where the Thomistic philosophy had hidden its head in those days it is difficult to say. It seems certain, however, that in the schools of the religious orders the old philosophy was generally taught. We say generally, for the fact that at this very time, or a little earlier, Padre Ventura was occupying the first chair of the Dominican order and of the Christian world—the professorship of the Sapienza—shows clearly enough that the Thomism of many a famous school was not very strict. But a change was coming. In 1840 certain priests of Naples, the oldest and most able of whom was Cajetan Sanseverino, founded a religious scientific periodical called *La Scienza e Fede*, and shortly afterwards Sanseverino began the composition of that able and painstaking work, “*Philosophia Christiana cum Antiquâ et Novâ comparata*,” in which the Thomist philosophy, if not vindicated on every point, is systematically set forth and intelligently explained. His object was to “compare” the teachings of the Fathers and the Scholastics—especially of St. Augustine and St. Thomas—with the views of other philosophers, ancient and modern, and thus to show plainly and clearly that the “Christian” philosophy had solved every problem and fairly grappled with every difficulty which ancient or modern had proposed. For this purpose it was necessary, before everything else, to find out what the Christian philosophers had really said: to vindicate them from those ignorant and absurd charges which it was then the fashion to bring against them; to show up the Protestant and Rationalist historians who had written out their systems for many a generation, and had found in their pages every kind of error and impiety, superstition, materialism, false mysticism, and Pantheism itself. The work, which unhappily the lamented death of the author has left unfinished, is a mine of varied information and strong, sensible discussion. Its character as a pioneer enterprise and a polemic deprives it to some extent of that flow and serenity with which ideal philosophy ought to be treated. But it has done good work, and its fruit remains.

Meanwhile other champions were appearing in the field. The formidable array of the *Civiltà Cattolica* were bringing their erudi-

tion, their keen sense of faith, and their indefectible continuousness to the succour of Christ and philosophy. Two men especially have merited well of the cause. Father Matthew Liberatore continues to this day the work that he begun nigh forty years ago. He has argued and entreated, discussed and ridiculed, in favour of Christian philosophy: he has written courses, condensed them into compendiums, marched with slow but strong perseverance through the jungles and primeval forests of original speculation, and been always ready to encounter with mild rhetoric or formal syllogism, in serviceable Latin or flexible Italian, the orthodox and heterodox opponents who have risen in his path. With him was joined—too soon, alas! to be separated—Aloysius Taparelli, a man who might have done much had he been spared. His great Essay on Ethical Science may be too pedantically precise with a precision which becomes mathematics rather than morality; its writer may not have taken up with sufficient confidence the lines of the "*Secunda Secundæ*;" but he is deeply philosophic, he is deeply Christian, and he has committed himself to no brilliant error or new and original mistake.

In France, the increased attention which was then being turned to the Middle Ages in general, produced a considerable effect on the revival of the Scholastic Philosophy. Cousin himself edited and annotated a great many works and fragments of mediæval writers. The work of Haureau* is well-known. Such books as Remusat's "*Saint Anselme*," Tailliandière's "*Scotus Erigena*," Charma's "*Lanfranc*," Montel's "*Mémoire sur St. Thomas d'Aquin*," and Abbé Baujeat's "*Vincent de Beauvais*" both showed the direction the current was taking and helped to make it the stronger. It is true that, in those days, the scholastics were not sought for or valued on account of their scholasticism. The revival of interest in the great doctors and teachers of the Middle Ages was part of that romantic revival which began from Chateaubriand, and which has so strongly influenced the historical, poetical, and literary activity of France up to our own times. Still the various memoirs, studies, and biographies had their use. They were a first glance into an unknown region. Their authors, like many other discoverers, often came away with the wrong story, and made too much of the wrong things. But they showed the way, and others were not long in following to better purpose.

The great work of Father Joseph Kleutgen, "*Die Theologie der Vorzeit*," ("*The Theology of Past Times*,") appeared in 1853. It had one defect, and one great excellence. The defect was, that it was too much concerned with refuting such purely

* "*Histoire de la Philosophie Scholastique*."

German innovators as Günther and Hermes—men who were only plodding and obstinate pedants, and unworthy of elaborate refutation. It is quite true that it was necessary, at the moment, to attack their systems; but the space devoted to them is a drawback to Father Kleutgen's work. But this drawback was more than counter-balanced by one great merit; the author went straight to St. Thomas, and gave his readers a first-hand acquaintance with the incomparable wealth of the "Summa." This first work, which was soon translated into Italian and French, was followed a few years later by another, of far more importance in its effect on philosophic teaching. This was "Die Philosophie der Vorzeit." It is the only existing work, with the exception of that of Sanseverino, and of Dr. Karl Werner, which gives the Scholastic Philosophy at once from pure Thomistic sources, and in a literary and readable form, as distinct from the academical form of "courses" and "text-books." At the same time, it seems doubtful whether the influence of Father Kleutgen's book has been in direct proportion to its ability and thoroughness. In Catholic and domestic circles the impulse to return to St. Thomas would first be felt by priests, who were obliged to study some kind of philosophy as part of their course. Now the clerical schools, in Italy at least, and wherever Italian influence spread, were under the sway of Father Liberatore. It is from his larger work, and from his admirably condensed "Compendium," that thousands of the present generation of the clergy have imbibed their Scholastic Philosophy. The weakness of Father Liberatore is two-fold; he gives us too little of St. Thomas, and he is not successful in his treatment of distinguished thinkers whom he attacks. It would be ungrateful, and indeed extremely stupid, not to acknowledge his immense services in familiarizing a generation with the terminology of Catholic philosophy. Perhaps it was only by such work as his that the pure Thomism to which we are now exhorted, has become possible. Father Kleutgen's elaborate "Philosophy" takes us to St. Thomas. Perhaps even with him a hypercritical considerer would have a fault to find. To know St. Thomas well one must know St. Thomas first, and the sixteenth and seventeenth century Jesuits second. Those gigantic intellects—Suarez, Viva, Vasquez, and De Lugo—are not commentators on the master; they are nearer to being rivals. The true commentator is such a man as Cardinal Catejan, the Salamanticenses, Cardinal Gotti, or, in a lesser way, Billuart—thinkers who sit at the feet of the Angel of the Schools, who accept, as a first principle, that whatever he says is right, and strain and strive to reproduce, illustrate, and defend his every phrase. Their method may not be one which leads to new discoveries. Yet, with St. Thomas for master, it is

more probable than not, in a given case, that to penetrate his thought is to get at the truth, and to travel on his path is to make progress. At any rate, this is what the Pope is recommending. Father Kleutgen loses in force and concentration by his not having the true bigotry of a disciple. This, however, as we have said, is hardly necessary to draw attention to. He who reads Kleutgen will know St. Thomas fairly well.

It will hardly be disputed, perhaps, that the book which has done most to send the present generation to St. Thomas is the "*Philosophia Christiana*" of Sanseverino. This work, as we have already said, is by no means an exclusively Thomistic manual. It travels over a wide region, vindicates the early Fathers, quotes continually from St. Augustine, makes considerable use of most of the thirteenth century Scholastics, and speaks with great respect of Scotus. But its pages contain, on every point treated, numerous and apt citations from St. Thomas. It is concerned very frequently—too frequently, indeed—with the refutation of the heterodox. But there is a judicial fairness, a sticking to the point, and an easy calmness about the work which give one the idea, not of an advocate, but of a strong mind thoroughly convinced. Then the author's immense reading, and the numerous references to thinkers of every school, have enabled professors and students to carry on for themselves the researches begun in the book itself. The moment, therefore, that the Ontologistic school crumbled to pieces, the eyes of Catholic professors were turned to Sanseverino. We have only to regret that the work is so far incomplete, and that neither physics, anthropology, nor ontology has been treated by a writer who has done so much for the Aristotelian logic and for Christian psychology.

The great work of Werner, named at the head of this article, is primarily a biography of St. Thomas. But the whole of the third volume—that is, more than 800 large pages—is dedicated to a history of St. Thomas's philosophy. It traces the history of the part which has been played by that philosophy in the development of theology, and in the discussions and polemics of the schools of Divinity; it describes the systems, antagonistic to Aristotle and St. Thomas, which have been put forward from the time of Scotus to the present day; and it goes through the story of the fortunes of Thomism itself, and the various development which the followers of the Master in all ages have given to one side of it or to another.* It is a work which names and discusses, with complete learning, nearly every philosophic writer of

* Dr. Werner is largely quoted in Archbishop Vaughan's "*Life of St. Thomas of Aquin*;" but the citations are principally from the biography proper.

weight from the thirteenth century down to our own times.* If we do not mistake, it will begin to be in great request as soon as inquirers really begin to study St. Thomas for themselves. It will prove a very complete and serviceable guide-book.

We may fairly say that, for the last five-and-twenty years, a new text-book of Scholastic Philosophy has appeared every two or three years. We need merely mention, in addition to those already commemorated, such names as Roux Lavergne, Goudin (reprinted), Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Gonzalez, Cornoldi, and Agostini. All these writers are professed and enthusiastic Thomists; all are not equally steadfast in adhering to the principles of their Master. But, taken as a whole, the movement of the schools has, for a quarter of a century, been steadily towards Thomism. One after another, false and heterodox systems, one-sided, if orthodox systems, brilliant but exaggerated systems, have culminated, waned, and expired. One after another, innovators, rhetoricians, declaimers, discoverers, system-mongers, and would-be reformers, German, Italian, and French, have perished in the very noise of their own renown. Some of them have been struck by the anathema of the Church; others have come perilously near the fire, and have only escaped burning because they were above all things obedient Catholics; and others, again, having laboured long and truly for the kingdom of God, have had the good fortune to make the Christian world forget the enthusiastic speculations on which they had fondly built their hopes, not of fame, but of usefulness to the cause they loved. Each year the seminaries, schools, and professorships of Catholic theology and philosophy have given up some unsatisfactory "system" or "course," and looked out for a text-book which professed to keep closer to St. Thomas. Many of us have seen the process going on under our own eyes; how Reid was gradually dropped; how Whateley no longer satisfied the mind; how (though this would only hold of contemporaries of Plancus) Watt's *Logic* was put away among the old books; how the young professors who were bitten with Ontologism and carried away by Brownson, and were performers in the "*Commedia del Ente*," gradually calmed down and studied the "*intellectus agens*." The Catholic schools have been drawing together, and it is not a moment too soon. The enemy himself has, during the same time, marvellously simplified his attack. The war is no longer a war of outposts. The question is not whether Jesus Christ is God, but whether there is a God; not whether there is a life to come, but whether there is such a thing as reasoning man distinct from brute; not whether this or that is right, or

* There is, of course, no mention either of Father Kleutgen's books, or of the "*Philosophia Christiana*" of Sanseverino.

that other true, but whether right and wrong, and truth, and external things exist at all. And even though this Agnosticism, this Phenomenalism, this dumb and brute necessity, be only old shades under new names, yet because the world is now so much more close together, thinking men must take sides much more absolutely than they have ever done before, and the battle is practically universal. Minor issues are still fought out in by-ways and in corners; but the noise of the main engagement drowns all else. Therefore it was time for Catholics to have done with groping and feeling, with trying and tasting, and to rally round some one standard. Their holy faith does not depend upon philosophy. Yet, humanly speaking, so needful is philosophy to faith, that, even whilst the blood of the martyrs was freshly flowing—even while the echoes of apostolic voices could still be heard—the holy Fathers seized on Aristotle and on Plato, to press their true wisdom into the service of the Kingdom of God. True philosophy is universal truth; and faith cannot shine, or walk, or grow without the aid of natural truth. And, therefore, true philosophy is as necessary for the victory of revelation as the soil is for the plant. If a thinking people is converted without philosophy, that is, the use and display of true natural reason, it is a miracle; and miracles, though possible, are not to be counted upon. If the imposing array of hostile science is to be confronted with a science (of Revelation) as imposing as its own, it must be by the effort and the effect of human natural reason and truth—always, it need not be said, assisted and illuminated by Divine grace. God has given His holy Revelation: to prepare human minds to receive it, to form it into a body of science, and to strengthen and adorn it from year to year, from century to century—this He has left to the reason and the zeal of grace-aided man. But all must work, and no one must pull down. The great cathedral may take a thousand years to build; it is no matter, provided only that every age does its part, and no other building of the time rivals its pre-eminence. But if a century comes when the builders grow slack, when the scaffoldings are deserted, and the unwrought materials are left in rude heaps; when the skilful hands and heads are down in the streets planning chapels, and temples, and meeting-houses; then the great Church decays and wastes, and some rival interest, some new and white-fronted hall of trade, or law, or so-called science, seems to usurp the foremost place in the interest of men. All must work and none must waste. Therefore there must be one philosophy.

What that philosophy must be has now been proclaimed by a voice there can be no mistaking and no disobeying. Signs were not wanting that the warning was coming. Pius IX. often spoke on philosophic matters, and he always pointed to St. Thomas.

In the letter of 15 June, 1857, in which he condemned the errors of Günther, as well as in that to the Bishop of Breslau, of 30 April, 1860, in which he treated the teaching of Baltzer, he spoke (though without mentioning St. Thomas) of the Thomistic doctrine of the soul's being the only and the immediate "form" of the body, and of the unity of man, in terms which made it quite clear that he held that doctrine to be the truth. The well-known condemned Proposition of the Syllabus (extracted substantially from the Brief on the Munich meeting, *Tuas libenter*, Dec. 21, 1863), showed much more clearly and emphatically that the Holy See held the method and principles of the Scholastics to be perfectly suitable to the age in which we live. Another remarkable utterance of Pius IX., foreshadowing what was coming, occurs in the letter sent by him, 23 July, 1874, to Doctor Travaglini, founder of the periodical *La Scienza Italiana*, and co-founder with Father John Mary Cornoldi, S.J., of the Philosophico-Medical Society of St. Thomas of Aquin. "We observe with pleasure," he says, "that you . . . have resolved to admit into your Society none except those who hold and will maintain doctrines laid down by the Holy Councils and by this Holy See, and in particular *the principles of the Angelic Doctor concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body of man, and concerning substantial form and primary matter.*" This is a very strong recommendation, and it raised a considerable controversy;* but moderate and judicial minds, like Mgr. Czacki† and Mgr. Parocchi, the eminent Archbishop of Bologna,‡ considered that nothing further than a recommendation was intended, and that the opposite school were still free to teach their views. But at length, on August 4 of the present year, on the feast of St. Dominic himself, appeared the Encyclical, which seems to have given to the Church, finally and for ever, the Dominican or Thomist doctrine as the safe, true, and only philosophy. What the Holy Father really means, how his intentions are to be carried out, and what will be the practical effect on Catholic teaching we are now briefly to inquire.

1.—At the outset it must be clearly understood that the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* does not define any proposition as of

* One of the chief litigants in this controversy was Father Paul Bottalla, S.J., Professor in the Theological Faculty of the Catholic University of Poitiers, who in two *brochures*, "*La Composition des corps d'après les deux principaux systèmes qui divisent les écoles Catholiques*," and "*La lettre de Mgr. Czacki et le Thomisme*," strongly maintained anti-Thomistic views on the points in question, insisting that no restriction of freedom was intended by the Holy See in the words referred to.

† "Lettre à Mgr. Hautecœur, Recteur de l'Université Catholique de Lille."

‡ Letter to Father Cornoldi, of 4th August, 1877.

faith nor impose any duty of interior belief or acceptance of any dogmatic formulary. There is a strong recommendation in it, and, as we shall see, even a definite command; but no doctrinal definition. The reasons for this we need not enter into, but they will be clear at once to everyone who considers. It is true, however, that the Encyclical is *ex cathedrâ*, the word of Pope Leo XIII. as Head of the Church of Christ.

2.—The Encyclical has a definite purpose, and does a very definite thing. What it does is, in a word, just this: it expresses a wish, in terms as strong as it is possible for a wish to be expressed, that the Scholastic Philosophy, especially as taught by St. Thomas of Aquin, be taught in all Catholic schools. The strength of the Pope's wish—amounting, we may fairly say, to a command—comes out very remarkably on a cursory inspection of the Letter itself. Let us confine ourselves merely to the latter part, where the Pope comes to speak of St. Thomas. He calls him the prince and master of all the Scholastics, the pride and safety of the Catholic Church. He quotes several strong expressions of the Popes, his predecessors, among which may be cited the important words of Blessed Urban V. to the University of Toulouse: "We will, and by these presents we enjoin on you, that you follow the teaching of the Blessed Thomas as true and Catholic teaching, and promote it to the utmost of your power;" and those of Innocent VI. that "every one who differs from St. Thomas may be suspected to be wrong." These emphatic testimonies, spoken in ages differing from our own, are here reproduced by the present Pope as suitable to the latter half of this nineteenth century. Pope Leo adds, in summing up his whole pronouncement, that it is a proof of the truest wisdom on the part of those who recently have been striving to restore philosophy, to have made it their purpose to reinstate and to vindicate the teaching of St. Thomas. He says that many of the bishops are moving in the same direction: "I praise them," he says, "very much (*vehementer*) and I exhort them to go on in their design;" and he would have all the bishops to know that there is nothing he desires more ardently (*nihil nobis esse antiquius et optabilius*) than that they should give all their students the means of studying St. Thomas. Then he goes on to give the reasons for this "eager desire" (*quæ faciunt ut magno id studio velimus*). Passing over these for the present, we note further expressions, in the peroration of the Letter, of the same wish. "We exhort you all, Venerable Brothers, with the greatest earnestness (*quam enixe*) to reinstate and to propagate far and wide the golden wisdom of St. Thomas—unto the safety and glory of the Catholic faith, the advantage of society, and the progress of all the sciences." "Let your professors instil into the minds of their scholars the teaching of St.

Thomas, and let them make it quite clear that no other is so solid and so excellent. Let academies"—we should call them societies or institutes—"founded by you, or to be founded in the future, illustrate and defend it, and use it in the refutation of the errors of the times." "Take heed that the wisdom of Thomas be drawn from the fountain head. . . . and keep away the young from foreign and unwholesome admixture" with the purity of Thomistic teaching.

This much, therefore, seems incontestable, that the Pope wishes all the Bishops of the Catholic Church to teach in their seminaries and other high schools the philosophy of St. Thomas, and nothing which is at variance with it. But to make the matter yet more clear, let us cite two sentences from the Brief of October 15th last, addressed to Cardinal de Luca, Prefect of the Congregation of Studies.* The Pope thus describes the purpose of the recent Encyclical: "We earnestly exhorted the Bishops to join their efforts with ours to restore to the Catholic schools, and replace in the post of honour it formerly held, that ancient philosophy"—he has just called it the philosophy, by excellence, of St. Thomas—"which has been pushed out and almost abandoned." Then, after mentioning how pleasing it has been to him to receive the numerous protestations of obedience and adhesion which have reached him, he says: "Wherefore, Venerable Brother, we most earnestly desire (*illud nobis est magnopere in optatis*) that the doctrine of St. Thomas, which is pre-eminently conformed to the truths of faith, may be revived without delay in all Catholic schools (*in omnibus Catholicis Athenæis quamprimum reviviscat*), and especially in this city, the capital of the Catholic universe." He then mentions that he has taken measures to have taught, in the Roman Seminary, in the Gregorian College (the famous Roman college), in the Urban College, and other institutions, Philosophy purely according to the views and principles of St. Thomas (*secundam mentem et principia Doctoris Angelici*); he begs Cardinal de Luca to promote the formation of associations and academies for the same purpose; and he announces his intention of bringing out a complete, authentic, and magnificent edition of the Holy Doctor's works, with the best commentaries that exist. In all this he hopes for the unanimous support of the Episcopate. Henceforward, then, there can be no doubt that the Pope "wishes" all Catholic professors to teach, and all Catholic students of philosophy to learn, the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin.

3.—This being so, the question will at once be asked, as indeed it has been asked already, whether it follows that the Pope has ordered us to accept as true every proposition and dictum of

* The text of this Letter is printed in our present number.

St. Thomas. To this the reply is simple. He has not ordered us to "accept" anything whatever. He has directed the philosophy of St. Thomas to be "taught." If an objector insists that the Pope would never order us to learn a system which was not true, or which he did not himself think true, we may admit that this is so; but the admission requires some explanation. The Encyclical implies the truth of the Thomistic philosophy. But an "implied" pronouncement of the Holy See is no ground, as such, for any obligation on the conscience. We say, as such; that is, by virtue of its being a pronouncement. So far, then, the truth or falsehood of Thomism is unaffected by the present Encyclical. Thomism was, some of it already a part of Catholic faith, some of it next door to faith, much of it very intimately bound up with faith. The present Encyclical adds no new decision to what is already decided, and does not alter directly the status of any philosophic proposition. But it is quite true that the expression of the wish and order of the Holy Father has increased the extrinsic motives for accepting Thomism as a whole, and has also widened the margin whereon it would be rash for questioners to tread. To put it plainly and simply: the Pope has emphatically told us to teach and to learn Thomism; but that is part of the Pope's peculiar business; therefore I, as a Catholic, will be ready and willing to accept Thomism, in the absence in a given case of strong and overpowering motives to doubt it. At the same time, supposing such adequate motive to exist, there would be no new obligation to accept this or that particular Thomist view; though to *teach* in opposition to St. Thomas, at least in the case of official Episcopal teachers, is now against the "wishes" of the Holy See.

That the Holy Father really means "St. Thomas," and no one else, is evident, as we have seen, on the very face of his recent utterances. This Encyclical, it must be carefully noted, is not a mere vague and general exhortation to seek the truth, in philosophic matters. The Pope, it is true, will not reject what is rightly and wisely said, by whomsoever said.* But to use this as an argument that he recommends Catholic philosophy to take the lantern of the eclectic and wander about the earth in search of teachers, accepting a dole of truth from each, would be to stultify the Pope, and to make the Encyclical well nigh idle words. There may be an apple here and there on many a tree of the orchard, and even beyond its bounds, but the Sovereign Pontiff desires his children to shake one particular tree. Life is short, questions are many, unity is absolutely essential, a few minor

* *Edicimus libenti gratoque animo excipiendum esse quidquid sapienter dictum, quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum aut excogitatum.*

mistakes are no great matter. Therefore, we are to go to St. Thomas.

Moreover, it is vain to suppose that one can take St. Thomas and leave Aristotle. The mind of Aristotle, on every substantial and leading matter, it may safely be affirmed, of logic, of metaphysics, and of ethics, is simply the mind of St. Thomas. Doubtless, St. Thomas has corrected or rejected his master on very many points. But one brief reflection will show that they are, for all that, substantially identical. What is St. Thomas's teaching on syllogism, on the composition of material things, on the process of understanding, on good and evil? These are cardinal points in philosophic science, and no one doubts for a moment that, in treating them, the Greek sage and the Christian doctor are virtually one.

What then, after all, *is* this Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy, which is the subject of an encyclical which will certainly mark the commencement of an epoch in Catholic teaching? The question is a difficult one to answer had we a volume at our disposal. But it must be shortly attempted.

The Scholastic begins by accepting, without much inquiry, his own existence, the trustworthiness of his external senses, and the reality of external things.

Looking over the universe of things—himself, the visible world, and the Maker of both—he makes the generalization that it is divided into things which change, and the One who does not change. Investigating things that change, he swiftly perceives that change does not mean the substitution of one thing for another, as if bubbles burst and other bubbles came in their place, but that it implies, first, an element of sameness, permanent, but undetermined, and, secondly, a determination ready to succeed as soon as an existent determining element has passed away. This wide general view of things is called the principle of Power and Act. It penetrates the Scholastic philosophy as colour penetrates material masses; so that whether you look at the outside of things or the inside, whether you break mountains into lesser mountains, or separate the atoms of dust with a microscope, it is always present and always to be detected. The Scholastic, having thus widely surveyed whatever is, looks more nearly at the mutable universe. He sees three grand classes of being—the unintelligent world, intelligent man, and the world of man's mental creation. He finds that in corporeal substance there is, as everywhere, change, and therefore the indeterminate element and the determining. Living or not living, corporeal things change really into one another; and, as an old substance decays, a new substance, somehow the same yet somehow different, takes its place. This view he generalizes under the name of the principle

of Matter and Form ; in other words, that all corporeal substance is composite, and its composition consists of substantial act and substantial power, or, of substantial form and primary matter. Fixing his abstractive gaze, now, on one single substance, he is speedily aware that there are other diversities and other changes besides those which are substantial. Substances—and by substances the Scholastic means whatever has a separate existence—change not only into one another, but change in themselves whilst continuing to be the same substance. Thus he arrives at the generalization of Substance and Accident. These three wide categories, power and act, matter and form, substance and accident, are the keynotes of all the Scholastic philosophy. With their help, the Scholastic investigates the rules, the principles, the co-ordination and classification of everything that exists. He first finds them, it is true, in visible and sensible things ; or, rather, his intelligence, the participated similitude of the Infinite Intelligence, sheds on these things its own light and surrounds brute matter with luminous spheres, true to the outlines of matter, yet projected by itself. From the physical world he carries the deep-reaching analysis into the world of spirit, the world of ideas, and the world of logical form. He finds they hold good everywhere. Wherever they shine, chaos vanishes and order reigns, the thought mounts on high, and the horizons of the mind enlarge. With them he discusses the engrossing questions which brighten a life of metaphysical study ; the origin of ideas, the faculties and operations of the mind, and the moral nature of man. By their instrumentality he can classify and consider in orderly array the great doctrines of Revelation itself. The Catholic Church has accepted his generalizations and his terminology. The revelation of the Holy Trinity has become a “science” by means of the Scholastic philosophy ; the precious materials of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers on the incarnation of Jesus Christ have been moulded into a glorious group of heavenly symmetry by Aristotelian generalizations ; and the world of grace and of the sacraments—a world which Pagan thought never once anticipated—is mapped out into provinces and filled with human light and colour by the mechanism and alchemy of a man who wrought far back in times when no ray of Gospel light could pénétrate these shades of death wherein he laboured. And, lastly, by the help of these Scholastic institutions, the philosopher and the divine come nearer to knowing the Infinite Himself. It need not be said that their abstractions and their divisions must needs stop short on the outskirts of the impenetrable light of the Godhead. There is nothing of what is called “accident” in God, but all is His personal Self ; there is nothing material ; there is no power, or passivity, or indetermination,

but only pure, and complete, and perfect Act. Yet by these very negations God is known. By taking all the words of perfection, of goodness, and of beauty which man has coined for his use in regard to things around him, and by throwing down with an effort of the mind-directed fancy all limit, every barrier, every bound, he is able to make for himself a divine language, which his tongue may employ, stammering and as it may, to keep before his soul and heart some inadequate picture of Him whom none can comprehend but Himself.

If it be asked what useful purpose can these generalizations serve, and these abstractions, the answer must be that such things are "science," and the want of them the absence of science. Discovery and experiment are noble exercises of the powers of man; but they are not science. When all has been tried, and all discovered, there is only a heap, not a system. When discoverers begin to lay down principles and laws, there is the beginning of science, notwithstanding that such beginning is too often, in these days, only the simulacrum of science and not its reality. But it must be remembered that there is a possibility of seeing a whole science in a single individual thing. For the discovery of the comparatively narrow laws of special physics a thousand instances may or may not be required; for the formularization of the general laws of being a simple example may suffice. A single visible thing, like the straw or the stick in the brook, which the weaver, Frost, seizes on to rest his web, may set free the mental intuitions and give a shape to their embodiment. Such mental operations do not give the world bread, or fuel, or medicine. But they give cultured minds, intellectual systems, and a universe of spiritual experience. They are for the few; but they tell in the long run on all the masses of men. Art, physical science, mechanical discovery, enlightened patriotism, military prowess, and social refinement, have always in every age depended largely on mental philosophy.

As for physical science, as properly understood, it cannot be too emphatically stated that it is not touched by the present Encyclical, or by the Scholastic philosophy. Physical science means the discovery of physical facts, and the deduction from facts of special laws. The universal laws of physics, as laid down by Aristotle and St. Thomas, have nothing to say, either for or against, to such investigations and generalizations. As long as any law is only generalized fact, or experience stated as a principle, that law comes under special physics, not general philosophy. The laws of philosophy do not depend on experiment at all. They are intuitions from a single instance; therefore no amount of experiment can affect them, and they cannot affect experiment. The principle that all material things are composed

of primary matter and a form has nothing whatever to do with any purely physical, atomic, molecular, or dynamical theory of matter. We say, purely physical—that is to say, confined to bodies or parts of bodies which the sense or the microscope can take note of. If a theory, atomic or otherwise, should lay down principles as to the constitution, not of a material substance, but of material substance *as such*, or as to the *origin* of matter, or as to the difference or identity between matter and spirit, then that theory is no longer physical or experimental; it is metaphysical, and must be dealt with by philosophy. We cannot at this moment say more as to the relations between the Scholastic Philosophy and modern science; but we hope to return to the subject. Meanwhile, in order to reassure any anxious Catholic physicist, let us quote, not the words of the Encyclical, though they are clear and emphatic enough, but those of a commentator on the Encyclical, who well deserves to be heard. Père Carbonelle, S.J., started, about three years ago, the *Société Scientifique de Bruxelles*, and at the same time a quarterly journal called the *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*. He was honoured by a letter from Leo XIII., dated 15th January, 1879, in which the Pontiff declared that the idea of promoting physical science in union with Catholic principles was “opportune,” and exhorted the Society by all means to persevere. Père Carbonelle, in the recent (October) number of the *Revue*, speaks as follows. It is to be observed that he has just been mentioning, in indignant terms, certain ultra-Scholastic Catholics, one of whom had said that Father Secchi was no better than Moleschott and Buchner, whilst another had rejected the infinitesimal calculus because it “reposed on an error contrary to revelation”—

It is evident that the Pope attaches great importance to the development of scientific theories, and the Encyclical itself contains proofs of this, though its immediate object was philosophy. Should we correspond with these wishes of the Pope by abandoning to irreligious scientists a portion of the ground covered by science, and by thus seeming to justify, by misplaced timidity, the very accusation of tyranny which we denounce? . . . Do you believe that the Pope accepts as auxiliaries those who contradict him, and make out that there is real opposition between the principles of the Scholastic philosophy and most of the great theories of modern physics? . . . Instead of narrowing our limits of action, the Encyclical has really widened them. Without changing our programme—without adding philosophy to these subjects which we profess to treat—we learn from it how “Scholastic philosophy, wisely set forth, would give strength, luminousness and additional resources” for the development of theories of science. This pronouncement will certainly be loudly re-echoed among our own ranks, as it will be all the world through. It will not be barren. . . . Let us thank the initiator of this great movement;

let us follow in the direction he has pointed out, and prove to him, by redoubled activity, that we understand his idea, and cordially enter into his designs" (p. 410).

So much, for the moment, on the effect which the Encyclical may have on the study of physics. But what we are now directly concerned with is the effect it will have in the schools of philosophy and theology. The Pope, in this most grave Letter, does not speak directly of theology. That unity in scientific principle and method which, as we have said, it is the object of the letter to bring about, already exists, at least to a considerable extent, in the schools of theology. Nevertheless, the Pope most certainly has in his view the teaching of theology. This is evident, because in the first place he quotes a long passage of Pope Sixtus V. in praise of Scholastic *theology*, for the purpose of saying, as he does in his own words, that Scholastic theology derives all its excellence "only from the right use of that *philosophy* which the masters of the schools have wisely and generally agreed to adopt even in their theological lectures." It is clear, moreover, that there can be no such theory as a science of theology without philosophy; and if a philosophy must be chosen, no doubt now remains as to what philosophy the Pope recommends. The consequence of the Encyclical will be, then, the general adoption of Thomistic theology. Now it need not be said that in theology, as commonly taught, there are two distinct elements, viz., the conclusions, and the working out of the conclusions. A theology which contents itself with conclusions is only a magnified form of elementary catechism. But even as regards conclusions, it will, no doubt, happen that St. Thomas's opinions will now prevail. Considering, however, that the greater number of theological controversies turn precisely on the question of what St. Thomas's opinion really is, there will still be left ample room for discussion. And then, it must be remembered, unity means progress, not stagnation. If all are agreed, no time will be lost in discussing the present situation or disputing as to the ground which is actually occupied; but all can look forward and bend their whole energy to fresh developments and further discoveries in the realms of truth.

But we cannot help anticipating that a great change will presently come about in the "method" of theological teaching. Want of time and the requirements of the Apostolic mission on the one hand, and modern controversy and literature on the other, have combined to abridge and attenuate, in many of our schools, at home and on the Continent, the course of theology proper. The Encyclical *Æterni Patris* is a distinct indication that the Holy Father wants this subject to be reconsidered. Scholastic philosophy is no light matter to learn, and, when

learnt, it is meant to be used. We, therefore, look forward to a movement in a threefold direction. First, Theology will be treated with more development, after the manner of the Scholastics. The great subjects of Catholic teaching which make up revelation, as distinguished from the *preambula Fidei*—God, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist, and Divine Grace—will receive a fuller and more extended consideration, by means of the terms, views, and methods of the great Scholastic doctors. To carry this out with even fair completeness will take time; and therefore it may be prophesied that the course of theology will now be longer than it has been. Secondly, the text of St. Thomas himself will receive greater attention than hitherto. It is, to some extent, a prevailing opinion that the *Sums* of the Angelic Doctor are rather a repertory of conclusions than a developed course of theology. The truth is that St. Thomas himself, especially in the great *Sum*, has applied the terms and science of Aristotle to every department of Catholic truth, with a thoroughness of exposition which students can only realize by reading the original. It is true the “*Summa*” is an abridgment; no one who goes through, for instance, the commentaries on the “*De Anima*,” but must marvel at the way in which the great Doctor, in the later work, compresses whole columns of philosophic discussion into a pregnant sorites or a few brief enthymemes. But, for all that, the “*Summa*” is long enough to contribute the most admirable mental and theological training which can possibly be given to a student. What we look for is, that our seminaries will read the greater “*Summa*,” if not article by article, at least such a selection of articles as may fairly represent it. Thirdly, It would take not one but several papers to show how the Encyclical will affect the study of the Scripture and of the holy Fathers. Such courses as that of Cardinal Franzelin we hold to be among the truest developments of Scholastic Theology. It would also take us long to discuss its bearings on moral theology, on modern religious controversy, and on the war with Agnosticism, Sensualism, and other Rationalism. But this may be said, that its effects will be to make priests and cultured laymen study the enemy less and trust to their own arms more. In a very true sense, it is a disadvantage and a drawback to have read heterodox literature; it troubles the mind, taints the imagination, disturbs the serenity of the orb of truth, and, to say the least, takes up time and room. On the other hand, if Catholicism and St. Thomas’s exposition of it are true, nothing can be more powerful, both as a means of mental culture and as a resource for the persuasion of others. But the power of Catholic truth, in this sense, depends upon its being in the mind as a broad kingdom, extended, developed,

defined, and perfect in every part. The Scholastic exposition is exactly adapted to bring about this happy effect; and, therefore, the more one studies St. Thomas the less one need know, by actual experience or first-hand acquaintance, of those numberless modern books whose very multitude sometimes tempts the Catholic apologist to despair.

We have dwelt on Scholastic Theology, because Scholastic Theology means Scholastic Philosophy. And here for the present we leave the subject. How Thomism is related to the origin of ideas, to physical science, to modern liberties and theories of government, what text-books are best, and what methods of teaching are most effective—these, with many other considerations and details, we look forward to being able to treat in future Articles.

ART. VIII. — THE ALLEGED GALLICANISM OF MAYNOOTH AND OF THE IRISH CLERGY.

THE Article on "Theology, Past and Present, at Maynooth," published in the October Number of the DUBLIN REVIEW,* plainly calls for a reply from the College, the traditions of whose theological school it represents in so unfavourable and, as I shall show, so misleading a light.

§ 1. *Introductory.*

In that Article Maynooth is charged with having "for nearly half a century" "carefully" cultivated and propagated through the lectures of her professors, and through her authorized text-books, in "dogmatic" and in "moral" theology, "the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne"—a theological system which, at least as regards its dogmatic tenets, no theologian can hesitate in stigmatizing in terms of as strong emphasis as those employed by the learned writer of the Article, as so essentially at variance with the fundamental principles of ecclesiastical subordination as established in the Church by her Divine Founder, that if Maynooth could in truth be charged with what is thus set down against her she should unquestionably plead guilty to that further count of this formidable indictment, in which it is so circumstantially alleged that, through her influence and action, "the Irish clergy" became imbued "*to the core*" with the principles

* "Theology, Past and Present, at Maynooth," by the Very Rev. Dr. Neville, Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1879, pp. 449, &c.

and tenets of this "alien theology," which thus "balefully affected the youth and manhood of the Irish Church, misdirecting their professional studies, and, *if not entirely estranging* their feelings of allegiance, *at least sensibly weakening them* towards the true object of Catholic loyalty"—the Holy See.*

Thus arraigned, Maynooth, of course, cannot allow judgment to go by default. She pleads not guilty. And she claims for her reply a fair hearing; not, indeed, from Irish readers—for in Ireland, judgment has long since been given in her favour—but from those in England, and in more distant lands, where her history, and the living evidences of the work of her earliest years, cannot be so familiar as they are at home.

For many reasons I am anxious that the duty of repelling those statements, which has thus been forced upon me, should be discharged in the most purely abstract and impersonal way. I should, indeed, be desirous, if it were possible, to avoid even the most distant reference to their author, or to his past or present official position in the educational hierarchy of the Irish Church. But, unfortunately, it is not possible for me, without some such reference, to state my main reason for writing at all in refutation of statements which I dare say many old and zealous friends of the College may be of opinion should rather be allowed to pass unnoticed, as so obviously at variance with known facts as to carry with them their own refutation. That course, indeed, I should perhaps have adopted if those statements had been put forward in the anonymous form favoured by other Reviews. But I find it impossible—and I am reminded on all sides that it is impossible—to allow them to pass unrefuted now, placed as they have been on permanent record, attested by the signature of a writer whose official positions, past and present, are such as could not fail, in the absence of a formal protest in the next number of the REVIEW, to lead the ecclesiastical historian of a future age to regard them as unquestionable.

But having thus disposed of all necessity to make further reference to the learned writer of the Article, I shall endeavour to deal with the statements it contains, altogether abstracting from their authorship, and viewing them solely as regards the so-called "facts" which they set forth. Of those statements, then, I shall select three, which seem to me to comprise the entire gist of the charge with which I have to deal. And lest, from the strangeness of some portions of this charge, I should

* The passages marked in this paragraph as extracts from the Article will be found in the October number of the REVIEW, on pages 455 and 461.

seem to do injustice to the distinguished author of the Article, I shall set them down in his own words—first, however, stating, as it surely is not out of place for me to do, that as regards the really objectionable portions of the statements, there is not in the Article, from first to last, any proof, or attempted proof, put forward in sustainment of them: they come before us resting solely on the unsupported authority of the writer, who, notwithstanding all the weight that would unquestionably be due to his opinion if there were any controversy on the merits of the theological questions involved, cannot surely object to our desiring something beyond mere statement, something in the shape of evidence, when the question raised is exclusively one of historical fact.

Although, however, the burthen of disproof does not lie upon me, I should not have thought of writing at all, if I were not in a position to undertake it and to place beyond question, as I hope to do before the close of this Paper, the utter impossibility of reconciling the statements of the Article with the ascertained facts of the case—facts, of which, fortunately for the theological reputation of the College, abundant and incontrovertible evidence is still extant and forthcoming.

§ 2. *The Three Counts of the Indictment.*—(1) “*The careful Cultivation in Maynooth, for nearly half a century, of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne;*” (2) “*The College Class-Books, its faithful expression;*” (3) “*The Irish Clergy thus Gallicanized to the core.*”

Let us, then, take the three statements in the words of the Article itself. The first is this:—

1. Gallicanism in dogmatic theology, Gallicanism in moral theology, *the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne, the Gallicanism of the Clerus Gallicanus of the last century*, was the teaching brought to Maynooth by the French refugee professors, and there *carefully cultivated for nearly half a century* (p. 455).

Furthermore, lest any misconception should exist as to the full meaning of the charges thus conveyed, it may be well to quote from the Article the circumstantial exposition of this “Gallicanism of the Sorbonne,” as set forth with characteristic precision of statement by the writer himself.

The dominating influence of the Sorbonne which unfortunately stands before us in history as the mouthpiece of the *Clerus Gallicanus* contributed, and largely, to make the whole Church of France appear to be responsible for Gallicanism.

The French theology of the *eighteenth century* exhibits two anomalous departures from the common teaching: first, *Gallicanism*; second, an exorbitantly severe system of Ethics. . . . The former *had for its end*

and object the upholding of the *Libertates Ecclesiæ Gallicanæ*, which it did *per fas et nefas*. . . . "The Declaration of the Gallican Clergy, 1682," is the authorized exponent of Gallicanism. . . . [Then follows a transcript, in full, of the famous Four Articles of the Declaration.]

The gist of those Four Articles . . . lies in three points—the depression of the Pope, the exaltation of the King, &c.

Article I. takes from the Pope all *temporal* power, direct or indirect. . . . [His *spiritual* power] is restricted in Article II., in which it is declared subject to the authority of a so-called "General" Council, in the event of a collision between the two. Article III. does not consider the Apostolic power sufficiently depressed by making it subject to a General Council; it finds it necessary "to moderate the use of that power," at least in France, by holding "the rules, customs, and institutions of the kingdom" exempt from its control. All these deductions being made, *very little* even of *spiritual authority* remains to Peter and his successors. . . . [Article IV.] Though he still is permitted to retain a leading part in matters of faith, even there, too, he is dependent; his judgments, "to be or not to be," hang on the word of the Church. [In other words, this Article denied that the Pope, even when teaching *ex cathedrâ*, is infallible.] (pp. 456-459).

Having before us this circumstantial account, given by the writer himself, of the body of theological tenets designated in his Article as "the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne and of the *Clerus Gallicanus* of the last century," the theological system which, as he alleges, was, "for nearly half a century," so "carefully" cultivated in Maynooth, we may now proceed to the second and third counts of the indictment. They are as follows:—

II. The treatises of Delahogue, *De Ecclesia*, &c., are its faithful expression. . . . Louis Ægidius Delahogue, Doctor of the Sacred Faculty of Paris, Fellow of the Sorbonne, and Professor *Emeritus* of Theology in the Sorbonne Schools, "*cælum non animum mutans*," was chosen Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the Seminary of Maynooth, and lectured, and composed treatises, for the successive generations of the students thereof. Those treatises they were *obliged to purchase*. They were their *class-books*. There was *no alternative* from the Sorbonne theology for them, except what lay silent in the tomes of the College library, sources of knowledge which, as we have already seen, they were not at all encouraged to approach (p. 461).

III. Hence, as an inevitable consequence, the Irish clergy became *Gallican to the core*. . . . An alien theology . . . thus balefully affected the youth and manhood of the Irish Church . . . if not entirely estranging their feelings of allegiance, at least sensibly weakening them, towards the true object of Catholic loyalty (p. 461).

§ 3. Reply to the Third Count.—The alleged Gallicanism of the Irish Clergy.

For reasons which will be obvious as we proceed, I think it

advisable to take up, in the first place, the *third* of the three statements I have set forth. With regard to it, I have elsewhere said that "I should feel I owed an apology to the venerated Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland if I were to assume that such a statement stood in need of any refutation or contradiction from me."* Of this remark, the learned author of the statement has said that he fails to find the point.† As the point, then, is of the most vital importance in the case, lying in fact at the root of the main issue involved, I must endeavour to explain it. But I should have thought—as, indeed, I know that very many who have read my statement are satisfied—that its meaning was sufficiently obvious to stand in need of no exposition from me.

Before proceeding, however, to explain it, I may say that I have seen with much satisfaction that in referring to my words, the learned writer of the Article has formally and unreservedly disclaimed any reference in his statement to "the *existing* Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland, in any sense." So far, no doubt, this is satisfactory. But inasmuch as at the same time, in the same letter—as, indeed, in the three letters that he has written on this subject in the leading Catholic newspapers of London and of Dublin—he has reiterated the statements of his Article, steadfastly persisting in characterizing them as "facts," it becomes necessary for me to clear away the misconception which appears, though, as it seems to me, most unaccountably, to have hitherto prevented him from at once apprehending the full force of the refutation of those statements, furnished by the very admission he has so explicitly made.

I have, indeed, no doubt that nothing could have been farther from his intention, when writing the Article that has given rise to all this unpleasantness, than to refer in any sense to the existing Episcopacy or Priesthood of Ireland. But, unfortunately, it is not his intentions, but his statements, that we have to regard with apprehension, as the possible materials of future ecclesiastical history. It is with his statements alone, then, that I have to deal. And I have little doubt that on reflection he will see that, understood in their plain, and indeed their only possible sense, they necessarily refer to not a few—and these not the least distinguished or least venerated members—of our existing Episcopacy and Priesthood.

Maynooth College was opened in 1795. Its first "half century" closed in 1845. But, not to strain points, let us go back even ten years, and take 1835 as the close of the period of

* See Letter in the *Tablet* of November 15th, 1879.

† Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

"*nearly** half a century," which the Article specifies as the period during which "Gallicanism" was "carefully cultivated" in the College, with the "*inevitable* consequence" of Gallicanizing "the Irish Clergy to the core."

Now, as I am armed with such a distinct disclaimer as to the existing members of the Irish Episcopacy and Priesthood, I am free to remind the learned writer of the Article that even within our College walls of Maynooth we can point to living evidences of the untenableness of the statements he has made. More than one respected member of our present College community completed his theological course in Maynooth within the period specified—one, indeed, so far back as the year 1827, and I am in a position to state on his authority that, even at that early date in our Collegiate history, so far from there having been any "cultivation of Gallicanism" in the teaching of the house, that theological system, so justly stigmatized in the Article, was on the contrary regarded, and of necessity regarded, by the authorities of the College in so unfavourable a light, that, if any Professor of Theology had so far forgotten his duty to the Holy See as to teach those doctrines,

* Not the least unsatisfactory incident of the unpleasant discussion raised by the publication of the Article has been that subsequently to its appearance in the REVIEW, its learned author, in various letters to the newspapers, while varying his phraseology so as to convey, to some extent, the impression that he had partially withdrawn from the position at first taken up, has nevertheless continued in express terms to maintain the accuracy of the statements originally published; they are statements of "facts," "facts" of which he is "well satisfied," "facts" which he will not abandon until they are "satisfactorily refuted."—(See his Letters in the *Tablet* of November 8th and 22nd, 1879.)

But, indeed, as I have just observed, the change of phraseology employed in those letters in the actual reproduction of the statements themselves, does not in reality imply anything inconsistent with what was stated in the Article: "*well into this century*," "*a good portion of this century*," and "*some forty or fifty years ago*" (the phrases employed in his last Letter in the *Tablet*, November 22nd), are expressions fully compatible with that originally employed in the Article, especially if this be understood in the restricted sense in which I have above interpreted it, so as to designate a period ending in 1835, now forty-four years ago.

I do not insist, then, on those passages in the Article that might justify me in bringing down the period of "*nearly half a century*" to a date subsequent to 1835. But it may be well to note that such passages do occur—as, for instance, the passage in which the incident regarding the Blessed Alphonsus is related (p. 455), to which I shall again have occasion to refer; and the passage where the "Gallican" period, and that later time, when "theology of a different stamp" was taught in the College, are so sharply contrasted, "the *fifth*, sixth, and seventh decades of this century" being set down as the designation of the period when the dogmatic teaching of the College was in a condition satisfactory to the learned writer (p. 462).

the inevitable result would have been his removal from the professorial office, within the very narrowest limits of time required for the observance of the forms prescribed in the College statutes. Then as to the Bishops of Ireland, without entering into details, it will suffice to say that not a few members of our existing Episcopacy were students of Maynooth within the period specified. And the same is necessarily true of every priest in Ireland who studied in Maynooth, and who completed his collegiate course not later than the year 1835.

I am quite sure that not one of those included in the various classes I have enumerated will for a moment hesitate to accept the assurance so unreservedly tendered, at least to this extent, that the learned writer of the Article did not *intend* in his statement to refer to them. And I am no less sure that I may take the liberty of adding for him, that it was equally remote from his intention to refer to any of their contemporaries, whether bishops or priests, so many of whom, after a life of splendid devotion to the work of their ministry, have already passed to their reward.

But, then, I am entitled to ask, to what generation of the Irish Clergy, educated in Maynooth, do these statements refer? How far back are we to go? Surely the writer of the Article, anxious as he may be to uphold the accuracy of what he has written, ought not to be unwilling to accompany me a few steps farther than he has yet advanced in his admissions, and to acknowledge that we should go far indeed into the recesses of Irish ecclesiastical history, and bring to light the records of some period that has hitherto eluded the researches of our most painstaking ecclesiastical antiquaries, before we could hope to find a generation of Irish bishops or priests, of whom it could be said that they would not have looked with horror on such a theological code as that "Gallicanism of the Sorbonne," so truthfully described as recognising "but little even of spiritual authority in the successors of St. Peter," and as "sensibly weakening," "if not entirely estranging," "the feelings of allegiance" of those by whom it was adopted "towards the true centre of Catholic loyalty"—the Holy See. Surely it would not be too much for me to regard it as undeniable that to find a generation of the Irish Clergy imbued to the core with tenets such as these, we should at all events go back to some period of our history so remote, that to account for the existence of a creed so abnormal in the Church of Ireland, it would be futile to refer to the theological influence of a College that was not in existence ninety years ago. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is bad logic: *non post hoc, ergo non propter hoc*, is unanswerable.

But this is not the point with which I am now immediately concerned. As I do not wish to argue from postulates that may be disputed, or to engage in a discussion that more properly belongs to the province of the ecclesiastical historian of the Irish Church in the early part of the present century, I must, I fear, proceed on the supposition that the learned writer of the Article has not withdrawn, but merely modified, his statement regarding the "Gallicanism" of the Irish clergy. Confining myself, then, to the fact, as to the *existing* Episcopacy and clergy, conceded by him in his last Letter to the *Tablet*, I must endeavour to point out the fallacy so obviously underlying his supposition that even this fact, so unreservedly acknowledged, can by any possibility be reconciled with his assumed "facts" regarding the "cultivation of Gallicanism" in the College for the period specified in the Article. The fallacy is this: It is assumed that when the College is charged with having "carefully cultivated, for nearly half a century, the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne," with the "inevitable" result of Gallicanizing "the Irish Clergy," the "clergy" thus referred to are persons no longer in existence. For, having taken a certain period in the past history of the College, he considers that, inasmuch as he spoke only of "the clergy of the *corresponding period*," his statement could not have referred to any of the clergy of the present day.

Now, I am almost ashamed to spend so many words in pointing out—what, indeed, but for so obvious a misconception of it, I should have regarded as self-evident—that when, as here, there is question of the influence exercised on the priesthood of a nation by the teaching of an ecclesiastical college during a given period, "the clergy of the *corresponding period*" are not those priests who were engaged in the labours of missionary life, throughout the country, at the period when the tenets in question were being cultivated within the class halls of the College, but they are the priests of after years who, *having been students* of the College *during the period specified*, have then in due course passed from its halls to their various spheres of priestly duty, and, after an interval of thirty, forty, fifty, or sixty years, are to be found, some in the professor's chair, some in the ministry of the parochial office, some in the dignity and labours of the Episcopate.

Now, as I have already pointed out, we have amongst us to-day in Ireland living witnesses, Priests and Bishops, who were themselves students of the College, not merely within the first half-century of its existence, or before the year 1835, but in the first quarter, nay, *in the first decade*, of this century. I must, indeed, confess myself utterly unable to comprehend how

a writer to whom these facts are known, can nevertheless consider that such statements as those he has made regarding the theological teaching of the College could possibly be true, if the existing members of the Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland had in no sense been affected by the baleful influence he has so justly stigmatized.

And, following up the chain of proof thus placed in my hands, may I not appeal to my readers, many of whom, I have no doubt, have a distinct recollection of no small section of the Irish clergy of forty or fifty years ago? The clergy of that day numbered, of course, among them many who had been students of our College in its earliest years. Were those venerable men "Gallicans to the core?" Did they recognise "*but little even of spiritual authority in St. Peter and his successors?*" Were their "feelings of allegiance to the true centre of Catholic loyalty *at least* sensibly weakened, if not entirely estranged?" And, if not, what, I may ask, becomes of the so-called "fact," that a "baleful influence" "inevitably" leading to those sad results was exercised by the College not only in its early years, but for well nigh the first "half-century" of its existence?

And here, perhaps, I should mention, as I am sure I may venture to do without being deemed guilty of any breach of confidence, that from one most venerable member of the Irish hierarchy—whose words, final and conclusive, as regards the main issue raised in this discussion, I have elsewhere quoted,* and shall again have the honour of quoting, in much ampler form, before the close of this Paper—I have received, since the opening of this most unpleasant controversy, a warm Letter of congratulation on my having come forward in "defence of the old theological teaching of Maynooth." The testimony thus brought into court has other value besides the forcible illustration with which it furnishes me of the connection that subsists between the existing Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland, and the very earliest days of our collegiate history. For it is the testimony of a witness who entered the College as a student in the year 1808; who began and completed his theological course under the professorship of Dr. Delahogue, the "French refugee," now arraigned as having introduced into Maynooth the baleful influence of the alien theology of the Sorbonne; of a witness, in fine, who more than fifty years ago, before the Royal Commission of 1826, gave sworn testimony, formally and decisively negating the allegation, now once more resuscitated, that any such line of teaching had been followed by Dr. Delahogue, or by any of the

* See Letter in the *Tablet*, November 15th, 1879.

theological professors of the College, of whom he had himself been one for no less than eleven years.

I do not know, indeed, whether I am not over-sanguine in my hope that by the overwhelming array of evidence I am now enabled to adduce, I shall succeed in convincing the writer of the Article that he has been grievously mistaken in the view he has formed of the early history of our theological school. At all events, with a view of more effectually securing his attention to the documentary evidence I am about to adduce, I must ask him, and, I trust he will pardon me for thus pressing the matter on his attention, to remember that— notwithstanding his public and repeated professions of his readiness to receive information or correction, whether publicly or privately tendered,* and to withdraw his statements if a refutation of them be forthcoming,†—he has hitherto ignored the important and, as it seems to me, conclusive testimony to which I have now referred, although it had already, in the most formal and explicit manner, been publicly brought under his notice.‡ I may add that he has also, and in the same manner, evaded, by ignoring it, the other point, of scarcely less importance, to which I had on the same occasion given publicity, that Dr. Delahogue, in his Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*,” so far from “faithfully expounding the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne,” on the contrary, most formally declines to defend or to propound either of the two leading distinctive theological tenets of that paradoxical system—the alleged fallibility of the Pope when acting as supreme teacher of the infallible Church of Christ, and the alleged subjection of his supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction to that of a so-called “General” Council, acting in opposition to his authority. I think, indeed, I have some fair grounds of complaint, that, after I had taken no little trouble in endeavouring promptly to put an end to all possibility of further controversy by thus plainly setting forth these two substantial points of evidence, the only response was a Letter in the *Tablet*, emphatically reiterating the statements originally made, and challenging a refutation of them, while utterly ignoring the fact that any evidence whatever had as yet been adduced in reply to them, on the part of the College.§

If I were engaged in a merely personal controversy I should perhaps feel justified, and even called upon, to close it here. But, as my main object in writing is to place, upon permanent

* See Letter in the *Tablet*, November 8th, 1879.

† Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

‡ Ibid. November 15th, 1879.

§ Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

record, in the pages of the DUBLIN REVIEW, a statement of the evidence by which the allegations made against the College, are so abundantly refuted, I must not allow my former ill success in convincing their learned author to deter me from now proceeding to set forth, as I am publicly pledged to do, a fair and full statement of at least the leading points of the extant documentary evidence by which the statements of the Article are so unanswerably disproved.

As to this third statement, I feel that it is unnecessary to add another word to what I have now written in refutation of it. But I may, I trust, be excused for expressing a hope that what I have thus written has fully prepared the readers of my Paper for the conclusion to which the remaining portion of it will lead, that the *first* and *second* counts of this elaborate indictment are no less devoid of foundation and no less plainly at variance with demonstrable facts, than the history and public fame of the Irish Episcopacy and Priesthood during the present century so plainly demonstrates the *third* of those statements to be, and as, I may add, this statement is now, indeed, confessed by its learned author himself to be, if understood in what I have pointed out as its obvious, and, indeed, its only possible sense.

§ 4. *Reply to the First Count.—The Alleged Cultivation in Maynooth, for nearly half a century, of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne.*

Before proceeding to set forth the evidence in refutation of the statement I have transcribed from the Article on this point, I would ask my readers to bear in mind that in the year 1794—the year immediately preceding that in which the College of Maynooth was founded—the well-known Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in condemnation of the Jansenist and “Gallican” Synod of Pistoia, was issued by Pope Pius VI. Among other points, the Bull condemns the Synod for having inserted in its Decree on Faith this very “Declaration of the Gallican Clergy, 1682,” justly described in one of the passages I have quoted from the Article in the October number, as the “authorized expression” of the dogmatic “Gallicanism” therein described. The following are the words of the Bull :—

Neque silentio praetereunda est insignis ea, fraudis plena, synodi temeritas, quae pridem improbatam ab apostolica sede Conventus Gallicani Declarationem anni 1862, ausa sit . . . in decretum *De Fide* inscriptum . . . includere, articulos in illa contentos palam adoptare . . . et solemnī professione obsequare.

Quo sane non solum gravior longe se nobis offert de synodo, quam praedecessoribus nostris fuerit de comitiis illis expostulandi ratio, sed et

ipsimet gallicanae ecclesiae non levis injuria irrogatur, quam dignam synodus existimaverit cujus auctoritas in patrocinium vocaretur errorum quibus illud est contaminatum decretum.

Quamobrem quae acta conventus gallicani praedecessor noster Innocentius XI. . . . post autem *expressius* Alexander VIII. . . . proapostolici sui muneris ratione *improbarunt, resciderunt, nulla et irrita declararunt*: multo fortius exigit a nobis pastoralis sollicitudo recentem horum factam in synodo tot vitiis affectam adoptionem, velut temerariam, scandalosam, ac praesertim *post edita praedecessorum nostrorum decreta, huic apostolicae sedi summo opere injuriosam* reprobare ac damnare, prout eam praesenti hac nostra constitutione reprobamus et damnamus, ac pro reprobata et damnata haberi volumus.

The learned writer of the Article has given public assurance—an assurance which I, on the part of the College, have not the slightest difficulty in accepting—that his intention in writing, and “the plain scope of his Article,” was “to exalt Maynooth,” and “to do honour to the living, without reflecting any discredit on the dead.” And, in thus explaining his personal view of the matter, he adds that “it must be remembered that Gallicanism was not, some forty or fifty years ago, in the bad odour in which it is at present, when *the Church of France itself* has repudiated it.”* Now, I had already shown, from the Episcopal testimony which he has so strangely ignored, that, quite irrespective of any action of the Church of France, this “Gallicanism” was, *more than fifty years ago*, in such “bad odour” in Maynooth, that an Irish Bishop—who, even at that early date was able to speak with the experience of *eleven years* in the Professorship of Theology—declared before the Royal Commission of 1826, that the doctrines so designated had never been adopted in the College, and this on the ground that they were regarded as leading to consequences “*subversive of the due independence of the Church.*” The learned writer of the Article of course may not, when writing it, have been aware of this important testimony; but we cannot suppose him to have been unaware of the strong indication of Pontifical disapproval of the Declaration of 1682, contained in the Dogmatic Bull *Auctorem Fidei*.

I must again, then, confess myself unable to comprehend the position he has taken up. In that Bull, surely we find a much more cogent reason for holding “Gallicanism” in bad odour than is furnished by the fact of its being now rejected by “the Church of France;” we find, too, a reason which, in the year 1795, when the College was opened, was fully as cogent as it is to-day. I trust, then, that he will have no further difficulty—as he seems, indeed, hitherto to have

* See Letter in *Tablet*, November 22nd, 1879.

had—in understanding why we in Maynooth should be unwilling that not merely “the *existing* Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland,” but also every previous generation of the Irish clergy, so far back at all events as the time when the College sent forth its first contingent of Irish-trained ecclesiastics, should be freed from the reproach thus sought to be cast upon them, and that the College, too, should be freed from the reproach sought to be cast upon her, that it was through her teaching they were imbued with the tenets, embodied in the ill-famed Declaration of 1682, a document, the adoption of which by the Synod of Pistoia, had, in the very year preceding the opening of the College, been stigmatized by the supreme teaching authority in the Church in terms of the strongest reprobation.

Might I not, indeed, assume that even if no evidence were forthcoming in defence of the College, it would be regarded as simply incredible, that in any ecclesiastical institution, even tolerated by the Archbishop of the diocese in which it was placed, and by the other Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, a theological system thus—I will not say condemned, but, to use a milder term—discredited, by the Holy See, should have found a footing for even a single year, much less that it should have been “carefully cultivated for nearly half a century.”* But, as I have already

* I have before me, as I write, a Letter of the Most Rev. Dr. Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, and of the other Irish Bishops, trustees of the College, dated 17th November, 1796, written in acknowledgment of the paternal kindness of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda in sending a message of congratulation to the Bishops, on the boon conferred on the Catholics of Ireland by the Irish Parliament, in the establishment of the College of Maynooth.

In their reply, the Bishops, referring to the unhappy condition of the troubled times in which they lived, declare their conviction that such evils must be encountered “with the Word of Life, in sound doctrine.” In reference to the youth called to the inheritance of the Lord, to be trained up in the College in sacred discipline, “it is,” they say, “as your Eminence wisely remarks, a matter of the utmost importance to have them nourished with the food of sound doctrine, and restrained from noxious or suspected food.”

They also deplore that “even amongst those who profess themselves Catholics are found some who . . . endeavour to smooth down and weaken the dogmas of the church.” “To such,” they add, “we shall constantly oppose that renowned saying of Augustine, ‘That the doctrine of truth is placed in the chair of unity,’ and that, therefore, it is not lawful for any true Catholic to withdraw himself from the teaching of the Apostolic See, from which alone that great doctor, Jerome, earnestly desired to receive the rule of belief and of profession.

“This salutary rule of belief and of profession we have received from our predecessors, who were ever foremost in acknowledging and defending the divinely instituted supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff over

stated, the absence of evidence is altogether on the other side. The allegations I am forced thus to combat rest solely on the unsupported statement of the writer of the Article. In reply to them, most fortunately for the theological reputation of the College, evidence in abundance is forthcoming—not merely the indirect testimony I have already adduced in the living evidences of the work of the College in the ecclesiastical training of the main body of the Irish clergy ever since the beginning of the present century, but, as I shall now proceed to set forth, direct documentary evidence of the most conclusive and irrefragable kind.

In adducing this evidence it is hardly necessary to premise that I do not for a moment think of asserting that in the earliest days of the College the full circle of doctrine defined in the Council of the Vatican was explicitly taught in Maynooth, as a theological creed in regard to which no difference of opinion could be allowed: in regard to some of these points, as for instance the infallibility of the Pope, the question was for many years—but by no means for so long a period as the learned author of the Article seems to suppose—treated, not merely as open to discussion within the limits of orthodox faith, but as one on which it might safely be left to the discretion of theological students, having before them a fair statement of the arguments on both sides of the question, to adopt the side which commended itself to their reason and judgment.* And here, perhaps—although, of course, it is by

all the faithful of Christ; the most sacred deposit of which dogma . . . was committed to us, and we shall faithfully guard it inviolate, to be so transmitted to our successors."

The Letter is signed also by the Very Rev. Dr. Hussey, the first President of the College. And it may not be uninteresting to note, as a curious coincidence, that the Cardinal Prefect to whom the Letter was addressed, was none other than Cardinal Gerdil, best known to theologians as the author, and subsequently the able defender, of the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in connection with the reference to which I have been led to transcribe this extract from the Letter of our Irish Bishops.

* It is interesting, and, I think, not altogether irrelevant, here to note that at the Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1826 the following evidence was given by the eminent Jesuit, Father Peter Kenney, who, I may add, was Vice-President of the College in the year 1812, under the Presidency of the Most Rev. Dr. Murray, then Coadjutor-Archbishop of Dublin—a combination of circumstances, indeed, that might almost justify me in treating the statements regarding the "Gallicanism" of the College in those days as scarcely needing disproof.

The following are the questions and answers in the Examination of Father Kenney, to which I would call attention:—

"In what Seminary were you yourself educated?—I studied in Palermo: I studied Theology there.

"Was the College at Palermo at that period under the care of the

no means necessary for the purpose for which I have undertaken to write—it may not be out of place to mention that a different, and more fully satisfactory method of dealing with the question was adopted in Maynooth at a much earlier period than the writer of the Article is at all aware.

A venerable dignitary of the Irish Church, who was a student of the College just fifty years ago, has authorized me to mention a fact regarding himself which, even if no other evidence were in existence, would be absolutely decisive on this point. "At the close of my College course," he says, "I was appointed to a place on the Dunboyne Establishment, but I went in preference to Rome, where I was anxious to study for a few years in the Schools of Theology. Dr. Cullen, who was then Rector of the Irish College, suggested to me, before coming home, that to give our Archbishop a proof that I had not mis-spent my time in Rome, I should make a public defence of the usual kind, to obtain the degree of Doctor in Theology. I was then directed to prepare a list of forty propositions, and, among them, as a matter of course, I put down the infallibility of the Pope, *a doctrine of which I had not, and could not have had, a moment's doubt or uncertainty from the time I had read that portion of the Treatise, "De Ecclesiâ," under my professor, Dr. O'Hanlon, in Maynooth.* The defence was made in the Collegio Romano—Father Perrone and others being the objectors. It so happened that the proposition selected for discussion was this very doctrine of

Jesuits?—Yes: my studies were performed in that College, which was a College of the Jesuits.

"Were you taught, either at Palermo or at Stoneyhurst, that the Pope was infallible, when teaching *ex cathedra*?—The proposition *did not come in the regular course of study.* I recollect it *was not to be found in the printed author that contained the entire course of our theological studies*; but I am not quite sure that the Professor *may not* have expressed his own opinion, or at least given arguments for and against it. I am, however, quite certain that he left every one to follow the opinion that *each one*, after mature consideration, *deemed best*; and thus each man exercises his own judgment in deducing arguments for his own opinion from the Holy Scriptures, and from the authorities cited in the defence of *either side of the question.*

"The question was rather whether any particular doctrines taught in those places of instruction with regard to that point were of that character as would *naturally lead* a young man to adopt the idea that the Pope was infallible, always admitting it was a matter of freedom whether he should believe it or not?—*I do not recollect any other instruction, public or private, given for that object.*"

We shall afterwards see how strikingly similar to this line of teaching was that pursued in Maynooth in the early days of the College. See pages 226 and 229, for the evidence of Drs. Anglade and Slevin; see also the evidence of Dr. Higgins (p. 232) as regards the Roman University.

the Pope's infallibility. *I defended it there in the Roman College, simply and solely from what I had learned in Maynooth; for, as it happened, from my being engaged in the study of other portions of the theological course, I had never received a word of instruction about it, or heard a reference to it, during the two years that I was in Rome.*"

But the question, as I have already said, is not, whether, fifty years ago, the doctrines defined in 1870, by the Vatican Council, were then explicitly taught in Maynooth, but whether then, and for long afterwards, the College, as alleged, was on the contrary engaged in "carefully cultivating" the discredited system of Gallicanism, and in cultivating it so as inevitably to imbue, with its baleful tenets, the Irish clergy, to the core. On this issue, then, I proceed to set forth the leading heads of the direct, documentary evidence still extant—taking, in the first place, the evidence given by the Theological Professors of the College before the Royal Commission of 1826—evidence, it must be remembered, given under circumstances where all the interests of the College and of its staff would obviously suggest that, so far as could be done within the limits of truthful statement, every evidence of an "Ultramontane" tendency in the teaching of the College should, as far as possible, be kept in the background, and every evidence of a contrary tendency be brought forward in the strongest light.

Under these circumstances, then, Dr. Anglade, the Professor of Moral Theology, and himself a "French refugee," was examined by the Royal Commissioners. Almost at the outset of his examination he was asked whether as a member of the Sorbonne he had "subscribed" the Four Articles of the Gallican Church. His answer is significant, and is so strongly suggestive of the well-known passage in which the great "Sorbonne" theologian Tournelly practically acknowledges the hopelessness* of attempting to reconcile the doctrine of the Fourth Article of 1682 with the records of early ecclesiastical history, that it may be of interest to transcribe it here:—

You are a member of the Sorbonne?—I am.

As a member of the Sorbonne, did you subscribe the Four celebrated Articles of the Gallican Church?—I do not think we were obliged to *subscribe* anything; but we were *obliged* to defend them in our theses, *otherwise our theses would not have been easily admitted.*

* "Non dissimulandum, difficile esse in tanta testimoniorum mole, quae Bellarminus et alii congerunt, non recognoscere Apostolicæ Sedis seu Romanæ Ecclesiæ certam et infallibilem auctoritatem; at longe difficilius est ea conciliare cum Declaratione Cleri Gallicani, a qua recedere nobis non permittitur."—TOURNELLY, "Tractatus de Ecclesia," Quaest. 5, art. 3. (Tom. 2, p. 134, Ed. Paris, 1739.)

Then, after some questions regarding the First of the Four Articles (which denies the *temporal* power* of the Pope in the dominions of other sovereigns, outside his own temporal States), Dr. Anglade's examination turned on the points raised by the Second Article, affirming the subjection of the Pope's authority to that of a so-called General Council.

Will you have the goodness to state whether, according to your experience, you think the principle of the Second Article is generally held at Maynooth?—*I do not think that question was ever discussed. . . . The clergy of France did not wish to say that doctrine was to be held by all nations.*

You cannot say what is the prevailing opinion at Maynooth, as to whether the Council be or be not above the Pope?—*I never heard anything about that Article : the essential Article was the First.*

But it must be remembered that Dr. Anglade was Professor, not of Dogmatic, but of Moral Theology, and we shall afterwards see that in reference to this Second Article the Professor of Dogmatic Theology was able to give most explicit testimony as to its rejection in Maynooth. Then, after some questions regarding the Third Article, not relevant to our present inquiry, the Commissioners proceeded to examine Dr. Anglade as to his views regarding the Fourth Article, and, "French refugee" though he was, he could give no more favourable testimony, as regards the "cultivation" of "Gallicanism" in Maynooth, than this :—

In your opinion is the principle of the Fourth Article held at Maynooth in general?—*I think that is the general opinion ; but one may be for one side, and another for the other ; we disclaim it entirely as an article of faith.*

The answering in cross-examination by which this portion of the evidence is followed up, shows plainly enough of what a moderate type was the "Gallicanism" of this "French refugee," at least so far as regarded the other Articles, outside the question of the Pope's universal Temporal Power :—

Do you hold it possible that anything can become an Article of the Catholic faith which you now swear to be erroneous?—*I do not.*

* I do not dwell on this point ; for it is, of course admitted, by the writer of the Article that the transition from "Gallicanism," which he supposes to have taken place at the close of the period specified in his Article, did not involve any change of teaching as regards this special point. In the evidence given before the Royal Commission of 1853, I find it stated on authority that I am sure he will not question, that "we [the Professors of Theology of that day] hold that the Pope has no temporal power, direct or indirect" (Evidence, Part 2, p. 57). And again :—"Perrone, a living author, a decided Ultramontane . . . omits entirely the question of the Pope's temporal power" (Ibid. p. 354).

You now swear that the Pope has no civil or temporal power?—
I do.

Do you hold it possible that it ever can be stated by the Church to be an article of faith that the Pope has civil or temporal power?—*No.*

If the Pope and a Council properly constituted were to declare to-morrow that *the Pope was infallible*, would it not then become an article of faith, binding on all good Catholics?—*It would.*

With regard to *the deposing power* . . . if the Church should declare that, in holding that doctrine to be erroneous, you and others, who are of the same opinion, have been mistaken, should you, as a good Catholic, feel bound to lay aside that opinion?—I think the Church can never decide that; therefore, with respect to the supposition what I would do if the Church define it, *that supposition never can be realized.*

But, fully convinced as I have always been, from the personal testimony of those whose memory goes back to those early days, as to the utter absence of “Gallicanism,” as regards the *teaching* of even the French professors, I confess that it was not until recently, on carefully reading through the Report of the Royal Commissioners of 1826, with the view of ascertaining how far the evidence then given corresponded with my previous impressions, that I became aware of the extent to which those founders of our theological school shrank from adopting, *even as a matter of decided personal opinion*, the “Gallican” view of doctrines such as the Infallibility of the Pope.

Thus, towards the close of his examination, Dr. Anglade was asked many questions regarding this doctrine.

In France (he says), I *think* it is the more *general* opinion that he is not infallible; as to what takes place in *other countries* it would be difficult to form a judgment . . . *we are not obliged to believe that he is not infallible.*

Can you form *any judgment* as to which opinion is considered the more probable at Maynooth?—*I could not tell that.* I can judge for myself; but I cannot tell what is in the mind of others.

May we ask, which do *you yourself* consider the more probable opinion?—*I could not precisely decide positively.*

Can you say whether either of the two opinions is taught at Maynooth, as being “probabilior,” that is, *more probable* than the opposite opinion?—*I do not think anything like that is taught in Maynooth*; they confine themselves to the proposition such as it is announced in the Treatise. [This proposition, as we shall see, instead of setting forth, as alleged in the Article in the October Number, a “faithful exposition” of the Sorbonne theology, was nothing more than a carefully-worded justification of the clause in the oath of allegiance then taken by Catholics, that the doctrine of the Infallibility was not an article of Catholic faith—as, of course, it was not until defined at the Council of the Vatican in the year 1870.]

On this testimony of Dr. Anglade, then, the only one of the French refugee Professors examined before the Commission, I make but one comment, asking, as I must, how the teaching of Maynooth, as thus described by this so-called "Gallican," differed from that of the Jesuit College of Palermo as described by Father Peter Kenney?*

The evidence of Drs. Slevin and Higgins, so far as regards the alleged "cultivation of Gallicanism" is substantially to the same effect as Dr. Anglade's.

With regard to Dr. Slevin's evidence, I am aware that an enormous, and, indeed, an almost incredible, amount of misconception prevails. I should wish, then, to note the following points in reference to him—premising, however, as perhaps I ought to do, that, as regards the refutation of the statements in the October Number of the REVIEW, I am in no sense concerned with any testimony or with any opinion of his:† at the date of the Commission he had been but three years in the College, and he died in little more than a year afterwards: he had never been a student of Maynooth, nor had he been a "pupil" of "the French refugees;" he had made his studies in a Spanish college, that of Salamanca, and whatever influence he could by any possibility be supposed to have exercised in the way of "Gallicanizing" the Irish clergy during the four years of his connection with the College, would represent the influence not of France, but of Spain. Having premised all this, I note the following points:—

In the first place, Dr. Slevin's testimony is concerned almost exclusively with the question of "the deposing power" of the Pope, and the cognate question of the supposed Papal claim of authority to set free the Catholics of Ireland from their allegiance to the sovereign of these realms.‡ Voluminous as his evidence is, occupying no less than eighty-two pages of the Official Report, the references to the Pope's *spiritual* power are exceedingly few and scant.

Secondly, Dr. Slevin—whatever may have been his views regarding Papal prerogatives—never was, in the ordinary sense of the term, "Professor of Theology" in Maynooth. His

* See above footnote, pp. 223—4.

† It may not be altogether out of place to add that the observation thus made in reference to Dr. Slevin is also applicable to the one or two prominent Irish ecclesiastics of the earlier portion of this century—in no way connected with Maynooth—whose theological views, as we learn from the records of the time, were unmistakably tinged, to a greater or less degree, with "Gallicanism."

‡ See above.

official status was that of Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment; his influence, therefore, such as it may have been, extended only to the few students who, at the close of their theological course in the College, attained the distinction of election to the Dunboyne Establishment, and whose number he sets down, in one of his answers to the Commissioners as amounting, at that time, to only *eleven*.

Thirdly, there is not, from first to last, in Dr. Slevin's voluminous evidence a single word to indicate that he *either taught to his students, or accepted as the principles of his own theological opinions*, the body of doctrine set forth in the Gallican Declaration of 1682—the document which, it will be remembered, is explicitly named by the writer of the Article as the “authorized exposition” of the theological system alleged by him to have been “carefully cultivated” in Maynooth.

Fourthly, even as regards the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, it is perfectly obvious that Dr. Slevin's evidence, so far from showing that the “Sorbonne” doctrine was taught generally in Maynooth, on the contrary, shows plainly that *it was not taught by Dr. Slevin himself*, and that, even as regards his own individual *opinion* on the point, while it is plain that he leaned somewhat towards the negative view, and, to a certain extent, regarded it as the *more probable* opinion, he expressly guarded himself against having it supposed that he at all undervalued the strength of the arguments by which the doctrine of the Infallibility is maintained. The statements to which I refer are the following:—

Is it your opinion that the majority of Catholics think that the Pope may err?—*So far as my knowledge extends, I think the majority of Catholics are inclined to embrace the opinion that he may err.*

When you say that they are *inclined* to embrace that opinion, the Commissioners would naturally conclude that you do not mean to say that they have actually embraced it, but that they consider it a matter of great doubt?—I mean to say that they consider it the *more probable* of the two opinions: on such a point it is impossible to decide with certainty. . . . *I think the majority of Catholics consider this opinion as the more probable.* I speak from *my own* experience.

Do you mean to say that it is a probable opinion that he may be infallible?—I mean to say that the majority of Catholics consider the other opinion as the *more probable*; speaking, *however*, from *my own* experience.

Do you mean to say that they are both probable, by the expression “more probable”?—*I do* mean that both opinions are probable; opposite opinions may both be probable when *cogent reasons* weigh on both sides.

You have said that you think the majority of Roman Catholics

with whom you are acquainted are *inclined* to the opinion that the Pope is fallible?—I have stated that as my *opinion*.

Of course there is a considerable number, though according to your impression not the majority, who are not of that opinion?—*Certainly so*.

Have you any means of forming a judgment what proportion of the present Roman Catholic Bishops of Ireland may be of opinion that the Pope is infallible?—I do not know the sentiments of our Bishops on that head.

Then for aught you know they may be unanimously of opinion that the Pope is infallible?—They may be so.*

On a subsequent day the examination, or perhaps I should rather say the cross-examination, of Dr. Slevin on this point was resumed. In the course of it, the witness pointed out the distinction between rejecting a doctrine as untrue, and declaring merely that it is not an article of faith.

We merely declare in the oath of allegiance (he says) that we do not hold it as an article of faith, but we may hold it as an opinion. . . . It is one thing to say that a doctrine is *not certain*, and another to declare that it is *false*. . . . We declare that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility is *not certain*, but we do not abjure it *as false*.

Then in a foot-note he adds a remark, which, like the similar observation made by Dr. Anglade, as quoted on page 227, is not uninteresting to note, as conclusively disposing of a difficulty by which even many Catholics felt embarrassed when it was raised by Mr. Gladstone some few years ago. I allude to the allegation that, before the granting of Catholic Emancipation, the State had been assured by the representatives of the Church in England and in Ireland, that not only was the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility not then an article of Catholic faith, but that it "*could not become*" one, that it "*was no part of the Roman Catholic Faith, and never could be made part of it.*"† I mention this matter here, not, of course, for the sake of merely repeating what has so often been stated, that Mr. Gladstone's statement was absolutely devoid of all foundation in

* The severe comment of the *Quarterly Review* on the general character of this portion of Dr. Slevin's evidence will be found below, on page 235.

† "Vaticanism," by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. London, 1875 (pp. 49 and 109). It seems worthy of at least brief mention here that, when collecting, as he did, with such painstaking care, every vestige of evidence he could discover in support of his statements that, in the period preceding Emancipation, the Catholics of these countries had given it to be understood that they rejected the "Ultramontane" views of the Pope's spiritual authority, Mr. Gladstone was unable to adduce even the smallest fragment of evidence in his favour from the Reports of the Maynooth Commissions. It was not that those Reports escaped his notice; for in his pamphlet on "Vaticanism," he makes, in regard to another matter, no fewer than *nineteen* references to one of them.

fact, but rather for the sake of calling attention to the distinct declaration to the contrary thus formally made by the Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment, as well as by the Professor of Moral Theology, and recorded in the Blue Book of the Royal Commission of 1826. For, in connection with Dr. Slevin's exposition of the distinction between declaring, as was then declared with truth, that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility was *not an article of faith*, and declaring that it was *not true in point of fact*, he states most formally in a foot-note,—*subsequently* added, and thus showing his conviction of the importance of guarding himself against possible misconception on the point,—the following most noteworthy declaration:—

What is at one period only a matter of opinion . . . *may afterwards become an article of faith*, when by a declaration of the Church we acquire *evidence* of the point having been revealed.

But to proceed. Dr. Slevin is examined as to his own method of dealing with the question in class.

The students [of the Dunboyne Establishment] are at present *eleven* in number: the Commissioners beg for your opinion as to what proportion of that number of eleven do actually believe, without being bound to believe, that the Pope is infallible in spiritual matters?—A matter of opinion can never be an object of divine *faith*, and therefore (accurately speaking) cannot be *believed*; it may be held as a mere opinion . . . therefore none of my students can *believe* the infallibility of the Pope, speaking with correctness; *they may hold it as an opinion*; whether any of them do, in fact, hold it as an opinion, *I cannot positively say*, but I am *inclined* to believe they do not.

Not one of them?—I am *inclined to think* none of them hold it, as the more probable opinion . . . I am *inclined to think* so, *but I cannot positively assert this*, because it is a maxim with me in all matters of opinion, after explaining the reasons *pro* and *con*, to leave it to their judgment to adopt which opinion they please. . . .

Have you explained to them the grounds *pro* and *con*, with respect to that opinion?—When the question was discussed in our class we weighed the arguments advanced on both sides, without coming to any decision. . . . I will state that in favour of the infallibility of the Pope *very strong* texts of Scripture are quoted.

Here, then, again I ask, how, even in Dr. Slevin's case, the method pursued in Maynooth, of treating this question, differed from that of the Professors of the Jesuit College of Palermo, as described by Father Kenney?

We now come to the evidence of Dr. Higgins, who was the Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the College at the time of the Commission. His evidence is instructive in more ways than one. One of the strangest and most unaccountable misconcep-

tions under which the writer of the Article labours, is that during what he terms the short period of transition from the evil days when Gallicanism was so carefully cultivated in the College to the better time when "Dr. Patrick Murray with his associate professors lectured on dogmatic theology of another stamp in the *fifth, sixth, and seventh decades*" of the present century,—“the Irish-born theologians of the College” having by that time “forced their way through the lines of Gallicanism,” and “formed a successful junction with the grand theological army of the Catholic Church,”—there was “no local discountenance of the old teaching,” “no importation of professors trained up in other schools,” &c. &c. Has the name of Father Edmund O'Reilly, and the memory of his career as a theological professor in Maynooth, been so soon forgotten? He, surely, was an “imported” professor, trained up in other schools; for he came to us from the Roman College of the Jesuits; and I need not say that coming to us thus, he needed no change of opinions to entitle him to a place in that “grand theological army,” in which he at once became a trusted leader.

But, long before the time of Father O'Reilly, the Chair of Dogmatic Theology in Maynooth was filled by a professor trained in the Roman schools. In the very beginning of his examination, Dr. Higgins informed the Commissioners that before coming to Maynooth as professor he had spent five years in Rome, during three of which he was engaged in attending the theological lectures at the Roman University, in preparation for his degree of Doctor in Theology.

Unfortunately, Dr. Higgins was not in a position to give testimony as to the actual teaching of Maynooth, for he had been appointed professor but a few weeks before. But his evidence is of vital importance in another aspect, as contributing a further proof that the mode of treatment then adopted in Maynooth in regard to doctrines such as the infallibility of the Pope was in full accord with that pursued even in Rome itself.

In reference to the teaching in the Roman University, Dr. Higgins says :

I studied in the University at Rome ; all I can say with regard to those doctrines is that I was as much at liberty to discuss them freely in Rome as I could be at Maynooth ; . . . because, as they do not form any part of our faith, we treat them as mere opinions, and as opinions they were *perfectly open to discussion*. I do not mean to say that any professor *taught* the Gallican doctrine . . . but those of the University gave an exposition of the arguments *pro* and *contra*, leaving the students to determine for themselves.

Again, he is asked :—

Is it maintained at Rome that the Pope has civil or temporal power out of his own States?—*I never heard it maintained.*

Was the doctrine taught?—I did not hear the contrary doctrine taught: I heard the arguments exposed.

Will you state what was your own opinion?—As to the doctrine of the temporal power of the Pope, my own opinion was that it was perfectly erroneous . . . and I can add also that such was the opinion, as far as I could ascertain, *of all the students in the University without any exception.*

Do you subscribe to the principle [in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise] that it is no article of the Catholic faith that the Pope is infallible?—I do; because it is the truth that it is no article of the Catholic faith.

The question is a mooted question in the Roman Catholic Church?—Yes, it is a question *left free for professors or students to discuss as they may think proper.*

Under this head—as I am, of course, confining my extracts to the evidence of those who were engaged in the actual teaching of Theology in the College—I shall quote but one other witness, the Most Rev. Dr. MacHale, the present venerated Archbishop of Tuam, then Bishop of Maronia and Co-adjutor of Killala. His Lordship was examined partly as an Irish Bishop, but chiefly as an ex-professor of Dogmatic Theology in Maynooth. It would, indeed, have been difficult to select a witness more competent to testify as to the actual teaching of the house; for he had been for *eleven years* in charge of the class of Dogmatic Theology, during the first six of which he had thus held office as the assistant, and occasionally the *locum tenens*, of Dr. Delahogue. The professorial career thus indicated began so far back as the year 1814: Dr. MacHale had entered the College in 1808; surely, if “Gallicanism” had ever flourished in Maynooth, it must have been in full vigour then.

Dr. MacHale's examination, which turned chiefly on such questions as the disestablishment of the Protestant Church, and the authority of the Pope to depose the King of England, was exceedingly protracted. It lasted four days, and occupies thirty-eight pages of the Official Report. At its close, the Bishop was asked whether there was “anything further that he wished to state to the Commissioners,” and in these circumstances—a point of no little importance to bear in mind, as showing that the statements made in reply were, in the fullest sense of the word, volunteered—he spoke as follows:—

My examination . . . turned partly on the authority of the Pope to depose kings; and I wish distinctly to state that on that subject my conviction is that the authority of kings, or whatever name the supreme magistrate may be called in any country, is supreme, and totally independent of any spiritual authority. . . . I can *therefore* state that

the Ultramontane opinions were not taught in the College of Maynooth. . . . But, at the same time, *I wish distinctly to declare that we did not adopt* what are generally called the opinions of the Gallican Church, contained in the four propositions of 1682, which are connected with the Gallican liberties.

The opinions of the Ultramontanes would seem to us to be destructive of the authority of kings; and the other opinions, if pressed to the consequences of which they seem susceptible, would appear also to be *subversive of the due independence of the Church*.

In reference to this observation, the Commissioners interposed a question. The interruption afforded the Bishop an opportunity, of which, fortunately, he fully availed himself, to place beyond all possibility of question the inaccuracy of the view that "Gallican" opinions were cultivated in Maynooth—a view which even then, as we shall see, was entertained by persons not familiar with the actual working of the College.

Can you point out in what particular principles the Gallican Church appears to you to go too far?—In saying that the opinions of the Gallican Church appear to me to go too far, I refer *principally* to a proposition in which they say that they will defend the decree of the Council of Constance, regarding the superiority of Councils over Popes. . . . The Council of Constance was convened at a time when the peace of the Church was distracted by the contending claims of three rival pontiffs, and therefore it was necessary to restore peace to the Church by an exertion of power beyond any former example. . . . The case is solitary in the history of the Church. . . . To extend the principle of that extraordinary case to ordinary occurrences in the Church seems to be a principle *pregnant with danger*. . . . That justifies me in saying that I would think it *dangerous* to embrace the Gallican liberties. . . .

I may further state, *as a fact*, that in the full sense of the term *they never were taught in the College of Maynooth*; nay, Dr. Delahogue himself, a native of France, showed one of those minds that are superior to prejudices of country or of education; and, content to follow the defined line of Catholic doctrine, *he did not obtrude particular opinions on the College*.

It may be well also to add that in his work on the Evidences of the Catholic Church Dr. MacHale has expressed himself to the same effect in still stronger language. I regret that the passage, which is a long one, is also one to which I could not do justice without transcribing it in full, and thus still further extending my Paper beyond the limits of reasonable moderation—limits, indeed, which I fear I shall be deemed to have already very notably transgressed. But I may briefly mention that in the course of the passage, the Gallican doctrine, affirming the subjection of the Pope's authority to that of the General Council of the Church, is designated by such epithets as "*re-*

volutionary," "unnatural," "fraught with schismatical consequences," and "repugnant to the language of our Redeemer, and to the usages of the first and purest ages of the Church."*

Here, then, so far as regards the testimony of the witnesses examined by the Royal Commissioners in 1826, I close my case; and I feel that I can safely afford to close it without a word of comment of my own. If comment, however, were needed, it would be amply supplied by the paragraphs in which the *Quarterly Review* of the day summed up the evidence regarding the theological teaching of the College, in a review of the Parliamentary Blue Book then recently published. I acquiesce in the suggestion which has been made to me, that I ought not to lose the opportunity of bringing forward a testimony that is so singularly explicit. The passage is as follows:—

The doctrines [commonly known as Ultramontane] are, indeed, directly opposed by what are termed the Gallican Liberties, which are contained in four propositions drawn up by the French clergy in 1682. The first very clearly denies the temporal power of the Church; the second insists on the supremacy of General Councils over the Pope; the third affirms that laws and usages in the Gallican Church, and also in others, should subsist with variation; and the fourth, that the judgment of the Pope is not above being reformed or revised unless it has obtained the assent of the Church.

To these doctrines all were obliged to subscribe who took degrees at the Sorbonne; and few, if any, of the French prelates ever disputed their justice and propriety.† *It has so often been said that the Irish clergy* also had agreed to them, that we really supposed this to be the case; and we have consequently been surprised to find that the policy

* See the entire passage in the 2nd Volume of the work referred to—“Evidences and Doctrines of the Catholic Church,” by the Right Rev. John MacHale, D.D., Bishop of Maronia and Coadjutor Bishop of Killala, Dublin, 1828. (Vol. ii. pp. 49–53.)

† We need not be surprised at this error in the statement of a Protestant reviewer. It is by no means uncommon even among Catholics, more or less fairly informed as regards general views on the historical aspect of “Gallicanism,” to treat “Gallican,” and “French ecclesiastical of the 17th or 18th century,” as synonymous expressions. Ecclesiastical history, no doubt, has always borne explicit testimony to the necessity of distinguishing between them; but the full extent to which that distinction must be recognised, remained to be pointed out by M. Gerin in his marvellously interesting work revealing the secret history of the “Gallican” Assembly and Declaration of 1682, and of the tyrannical proceedings to which Louis XIV. and the Court party of the day were obliged to have recourse, to crush the manly resistance of the Sorbonne.

I may mention, as an illustration of the confusion of ideas that has suggested this note, that within the last few days I have met, in a work of unquestionable merit, and of established and well-deserved reputation,

of that Church has uniformly tended to support the Transalpine doctrines.

We do not in the least doubt that such is the case—*notwithstanding the equivocating answers of Dr. Slevin*, who “imagines” that the Roman Catholic Bishops do assent to them; for, when the only Bishop who appears as a witness is examined—Dr. MacHale—he states distinctly that he does not approve of those doctrines; that when he was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Maynooth he never taught them; and during his whole residence there (seven years as student, and eleven as lecturer and professor) he never heard them inculcated. [Then is subjoined a foot-note setting forth the passages I have already quoted from Dr. MacHale’s evidence, and ending with the remark, “Dr. MacHale is, at all events, fair and explicit.”]

In this he is supported by other witnesses who add that even Dr. MacHale’s predecessor, Dr. Delahogue, an emigrant Frenchman, and a Doctor of the Sorbonne, where he must have subscribed them, did not attempt to urge these particular tenets.

“Who can doubt that this person’s conduct in thus surrendering his own opinions was influenced by the knowledge he possessed of the secret, if not the avowed, wishes of the Trustees? . . . *No more we think need be said to prove that the Irish Church does not, as a body, admit these articles, or permit them to be taught.**”

§ 5. *Reply to the Second Count.*—“*Dr. Delahogue’s Treatise ‘De Ecclesiâ,’ the faithful exponent of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne.*”

It should be unnecessary for me to enter upon any formal examination of such an allegation as this, after the explicit

a passage plainly showing that the writer regarded even Fénelon as a Gallican! Without mentioning the name of the writer, which is by no means needed for the purpose of my illustration, I may transcribe the passage.

“In the list of *Classic Theologians* there is not to be found the name of a single Gallican. As an influential Churchman and finished orator, *Bossuet* occupies some space on that page of Church history; and for his gentleness of spirit, and polished scholarship, and noble docility, *Fénelon* is a man that his country should be proud of. But *neither* of them was a name of weight in Catholic Schools of Theology.

“As for the denial of Infallibility, it was quite open to the *Gallicans* to deny it at the time, but a sorry fate indeed they were able to put on their arguments against it.”

* *Quarterly Review*, March, 1828, Article “Maynooth” (vol. xxxvii. pp. 471, 472).

In reference to the concluding observations of the Reviewer regarding the action of the Irish Church in regard to Gallicanism, I will add that to have acted otherwise would have been to manifest a singular disregard of some of her most glorious ecclesiastical traditions. A deeply interesting Article by the late Most Rev. Dr. Conroy, Bishop of Ardagh, in the “*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*” (June, 1870, vol. vi. pp. 501, &c.), sets forth the details of the persistent but fruitless efforts made in 1666 by the Duke of Ormond, then Viceroy in Ireland, to induce the Irish Bishops and

1845, but for many years afterwards.* Is it to be supposed that any Board, consisting—as regards a matter of this nature—exclusively of Irish Bishops, would have thus sanctioned the perpetuation of so baleful an influence as that which should inevitably be exercised by a theological class-book, the faithful exponent of “an alien theology,” recognising “but little even of *spiritual* authority” in St. Peter and his successors, and “*at least* sensibly weakening, if not entirely estranging, the feelings of allegiance” of the great body of the Irish Clergy “towards the true centre of Catholic loyalty?” I am fully confident that the learned writer has not even yet realized the full extent of all that is implied in the statements he has made, and has since so steadfastly persisted in characterizing as “facts.”

It may, nevertheless, be deemed advisable that I should here make some short reference to the abundant and satisfactory evidence in disproof of the statement on this head, which is to be found in the Treatise itself.

In the first place, then, let us take these two distinctive, fundamental, theological tenets of Gallicanism, the alleged fallibility of the Pope, even when acting as supreme authoritative teacher of the Church, and the alleged subjection of his supreme authority to the authority of a so-called “General” Council—doctrines so utterly at variance with the fundamental principles of the Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*,” that the mere omission of them, and of the special pleading by which the “Gallicans of the Sorbonne” endeavoured to impart to them some air of plausibility, was almost in itself sufficient to insure the practical adoption of the opposite doctrines, now defined dogmas of Catholic faith.†

* In the Board Book of our Trustees, I find a Resolution of November 11th, 1847, directing the President of the College to contract for the printing of a fifth edition—consisting of 1000 copies—of Dr. Delahogue’s Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*.”

† There is a sad interest in reading a statement bearing on this aspect of the “Gallican” controversy, which I find in the evidence of 1826—the person examined being a former student of the College who had unhappily apostatized from the faith.

Inaccurate, as might be expected, in many statements of fact, his evidence on this matter shows a clear appreciation of the untenableness of the Gallican tenets—an appreciation which I am sure was by no means singular among the students of the house, and which in itself would have formed a most serious obstacle to the “Gallicanizing of the Irish Clergy,” if any “French refugee” had thought of attempting such an experiment in Maynooth.

“There is a doctrine,” says this witness, “taught in the Maynooth Treatise, that the Pope is the *centre of communion* for all Christian Societies, that is, *they can never break with him nor from him*. . . . Now, as long as the Pope is regarded as the centre of union, round which all other Christian

How, then, does Dr. Delahogue deal with those fundamental articles of the Gallican creed? *He distinctly and formally declines to defend, or to propound, them at all*, merely referring for an exposition of the questions at issue, to three or four writers whom he names, and foremost among whom—strange as it may seem to those whose only impressions regarding his Treatise are those derived from the Article in the last Number of the REVIEW—he names in the first place, Cardinal Bellarmine! So that, in fact, the only thesis or statement on those topics in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise is one in which, not without apology, he formally proves that the Gallican doctrine on those points was not in any sense *heretical*. His proposition, then, does not deny the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility; it asserts merely, what was then unquestionably true, that it might be denied without the guilt of heresy or schism. Dr. Delahogue in a prefatory note, apologizing, as I have said, for introducing the question in this form, mentions that the defence of the proposition, as thus laid down, was necessary for the justification of the clause in the Catholic Oath of Allegiance which as then prescribed by Act of Parliament (33 Geo. III.) contained the clause, "I declare that it is not an article of the Roman Catholic faith, neither am I thereby required to believe or profess that the Pope is infallible."

Again, it may not be uninteresting to note that the references, in another portion of the Treatise, to the questions regarding the famous Letters of Pope Honorius are, perhaps, scarcely less significant than the formal omission of the Gallican thesis just mentioned.

In the absence of a formal thesis maintaining the infallibility of the Pope, Dr. Delahogue might well have spared himself

Churches must rally, *the doctrine of his infallibility follows of course*, as it appears to me, because if the Church can never break with him, he must be infallible, or the Church may err in adhering to him, and this would arraign the infallibility of the Church itself, as maintained by all Roman Catholics."—Evidence of the Rev. John Cousins. Maynooth Report, p. 354.

This, indeed, was the famous argument by which Fénélon confuted the "Gallicans" of 1682.

"Omnes Cisalpini [*i.e.*, Gallicani] unitatis amantes credunt apostolicam sedem esse, ex institutione Christi, æternum catholice communionis fundamentum, centrum, atque caput.

"Atqui luce clarius est apostolicam sedem non fore æternum catholice communionis fundamentum, centrum, atque caput, si definiret aliquid hæreticum a tota ecclesia credendum.

"Ergo omnes Cisalpini unitatis amantes credunt, aut saltem credere debent, apostolicam sedem ex institutione Christi nunquam posse definire aliquid hæreticum a tota ecclesia credendum" (Dissertatio de S. Pontificis Auctoritate, cap. 3).

the labour of dealing with those Letters at all. As affecting the general doctrine of the infallibility of the Church, they present not the shadow of a difficulty : most unquestionably they were not "accepted by the Universal Church ;" on the contrary, when produced in the sixth General Council of Constantinople, they were received, at least by the Bishops there assembled, with the strongest marks of disapproval. But, not satisfied with this one line of defence, strong and unassailable as it is, Dr. Delahogue, Fellow and ex-Professor of the Sorbonne though he was, adopts the course—which is anything but "Gallican"—of contending, in the first place, "*against Bossuet and others,*" that the charge of Monothelism cannot be established against the Pope ; and, secondly, of maintaining in a distinct proposition that the Letters in question, even if it could be shown that they contained erroneous doctrine, were *not* issued by the Pope *ex cathedrâ* as dogmatic decrees.

However else this mode of dealing with such questions may be justly designated, at least it cannot be regarded as a "faithful exposition" of the theology of the Declaration of 1682, nor as in any way calculated to estrange or to weaken the feelings of allegiance of the Irish Clergy to the Holy See.

But I feel that I have dwelt too long upon a point which I had commenced by apologizing with such good reason for undertaking to discuss it at all.

§ 6. *The alleged "Gallicanism" of Maynooth in Moral Theology.*

Although I feel that I have more than sufficiently dealt with those portions of the Article which affect the theological reputation of the College as regards its dogmatic teaching, it will, I dare say, be considered that my task is not yet completed.

For, the founders and early teachers of our theological school have been charged also with what is called "Gallicanism" in Moral Theology—a designation under which the writer of the Article explains that he refers to the "exorbitantly severe" or rigid system that undoubtedly for many years held its ground in Maynooth. And I happen to know that while all those who have any recollection of the College in the period to which the Article refers are loud in their testimony as to the general groundlessness of its statements, some, at all events, of the staunchest friends of the College, not familiar with the circumstances to which I am now about to refer, are of opinion that on this branch of the case—as regards the rigid tendency of the system of Moral Theology cultivated in Maynooth for many years—he has succeeded in making a point

against the estimable men by whom our Irish theological school was founded. It gives me pleasure then to think that in this respect especially, it has fallen to my lot to do justice to their memories.

Here are the leading statements of the Article on this head :—

Maynooth got her first professors *from France*, and with them an importation of *genuine French* theology. *French* theology was exclusively studied by her *alumni*, and *French* theological authorities alone consulted by them for generations. . .

We must be understood as speaking of the *French* theology of the *past*; for, the French theology of our times has, almost universally, wisely assimilated itself to the *received standards* of the theological teaching throughout the Church.

But a *bitter set* of exclusivists were those early French professors. . .

Liguori himself, even after his beatification, was not safe from censure. A student on one occasion venturing to quote an opinion of his was abruptly checked by the professor, who gave his estimate of our great guide in moral theology thus:—"Homo equidem eximie pietatis, sed perditæ laxus."

And this professor was *only the pupil of the Frenchmen*.

What an unreasoning intolerant was that *Gallicanism*!

Gallicanism in dogmatic theology, *Gallicanism in moral theology* . . . was the teaching brought to Maynooth by the French professors, and there *carefully cultivated* for nearly half a century (pp. 454, 455).

The French theology of the eighteenth century exhibits two anomalous departures from the common teaching: First, Gallicanism [in dogmatic theology]; second, an exorbitantly severe system of ethics . . . the latter rendered the following of our Lord anything but a "*jugum suave*" . . . In this part, however, it was *not altogether* as singular as in its [dogmatic] Gallicanism. Its position was *not entirely* as isolated (pp. 456, 462).

At first it would seem on reading this admission that the writer was about to acknowledge that Maynooth might *possibly* have derived at least her system of Moral Theology from some other less tainted source. But, no; for he immediately adds :—

The schools of Maynooth, and through them the Irish priesthood, *of course*, imbibed the French ethics *from the same sources* that had imparted to them the French dogma! (p. 462).

And then, after some further observations to the same effect, and many expressions of regret as to the evil wrought by the direction given at the outset to our teaching of Moral Theology, the Article is brought to an effective close by an extract of a few words from one of the old College class books, recording in unmistakable terms the strength and sincerity of Dr. Delahogue's antagonism to the system of Probabilism, opposed,

as he believed it to be, to the pure morality of the Christian law.

This then is the branch of the case with which it now remains for me to deal.

Now, I am of course not going to deny or to question the obvious and unquestionable fact that, of the two schools of Moral Theology—that which is designated sometimes as “the benign” or “moderate,” and sometimes as “the probabilist,” school, from the general character of its teaching, or from its distinctive fundamental tenet of Probabilism; and that which, on the other hand, is, for the corresponding reasons, designated as “rigid” or “Antiprobabilist”—the latter, and not the former, continued for many years to give the tone to the teaching in our classes of Moral Theology in Maynooth.

But, I must ask, what has all this to do with Gallicanism? I have, I think, in the preceding portion of this letter, made it sufficiently obvious that if any system of theology had presented itself for acceptance in Maynooth, or in Ireland, with no other credentials than the *testamur* of “the Sorbonne,”* its chances of obtaining a footing amongst us would have been slight indeed.

It is no doubt true that the Moral Theology which found most favour in France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was that of the more rigid school. It is even true that among the theologians of that nation, the current of opinion in the direction of rigid and of antiprobabilist views ran so high as to bear away with it some of the most eminent writers of a school whose normal leaning was as decidedly in the opposite direction—the theologians of the Society of Jesus—a fact, in proof of which, if proof were needed, it would suffice to mention the name of Antoine, a theologian unquestionably entitled as a dogmatic writer to no mean place even among his brethren of the Society, but, as a moral theologian, so decidedly rigid in tone as to be selected by St. Alphonsus on more than one occasion as a typical, and indeed as an advanced, representative of the views of the rigid and Antiprobabilist school. But even if it

* To avoid the unnecessary introduction of new elements of controversy, I have throughout my reply acquiesced in the use of the phraseology employed by the learned writer of the Article in designating the theological system embodied in the Gallican Declaration of 1682.

I have, however, acquiesced in it only under mental reserve, and with the purpose of entering, as I now do, a formal protest against it before the close of my letter.

M. Gérin, in his work on the secret history of the transactions connected with the Assembly of 1682, has made it plain beyond question that the Faculty of the Sorbonne, not only steadfastly and courageously resisted the Four Articles, but in truth never received them.

were true that every French theologian who had ever written was an extreme and uncompromising advocate of the most rigid code of morals ever formulated within the communion of the Church, all this would be absolutely of no avail in an attempt to connect in any way with Gallicanism the tendency to rigour which characterized, in its earlier years, our school of theology in Maynooth. For, in this respect, as those who are familiar with the early history of the College are aware, Maynooth is, if it be possible, even more thoroughly proof against the allegation of "Gallicanism" than, as I have shown, she undoubtedly is in regard to her school of Dogmatic Theology.

Let us consider for a moment the incident of the rebuke administered by one of the Professors of Theology, as mentioned by the writer of the Article, in the case of a student who had quoted some opinion of Saint—or, as he then was, the Blessed—Alphonsus. The name of the Professor is not mentioned in the Article; but as the incident is one with which we are all familiar, as handed down by tradition among the College *notabilia* of former days, I fortunately have no difficulty in supplying the omission, and in stating that the Professor in question—Dr. Magennis—was one, the mere mention of whose name is sufficient, in the minds of all who knew him, to overturn at once the entire structure so carefully built up in the Article, as to the connection of the rigid principles of our school of Moral Theology, with the alleged predominating influence of "Gallicanism" in the College. Noted among the Professors of his day, as Dr. Magennis was, for the decided, not to say extreme, character of his views on every subject of which he undertook to treat, and for the emphasis of the language in which he usually gave expression to them, he was, I am assured, not more decided in his views or more emphatic in his language on any other topic than in his outspoken maintenance of unmistakably "Ultramontane" opinions in Theology. It is, indeed, a somewhat curious coincidence that of the many interesting and valuable communications I have received from Irish priests, old students of *Alma Mater*, bearing to me the expression of kindly wishes, and directing my attention to sources of evidence and to facts that might prove useful in her defence, the last is one that has reached me only to-day, the writer of which says—"When I was reading my first year's Theology, under Professor Magennis—now over forty years ago—he one day *denounced Gallicanism in the most earnest manner and in the strongest language*. Having given us a thorough history and explanation of the matter, he concluded by saying—'This, gentlemen, is what is called Gallican liberty, but what I call Gallican slavery.'” Applicable then to "Gallicanism" as

such epithets as "intolerant," and "unreasoning" may be, their application will have to be justified on some other grounds than the rigorism—however we may deplore it—of so decided an anti-Gallican as Dr. Magennis of Maynooth.

Thus then we are brought face to face with the question, What influence was it that so favoured the more rigid views, as to secure their acceptance as the groundwork of the Moral Theology of Maynooth, and to enrol under the standard of Antiprobabilism men who otherwise differed so widely as the refugee Doctors of the Sorbonne and their Ultramontane "pupil"?

The answer to this question will come, I have no doubt, on many as a startling surprise. Hitherto, I dare say, it has been known to few besides the older members of our College community. But for many reasons I am satisfied that the time has come to make publicly known, as I am now afforded a singularly favourable opportunity of doing, that the influence which guided—and we need have no doubt in the circumstances wisely guided—the footsteps of our infant school of Moral Theology in the direction of the more rigid, rather than of the milder, views of Christian morality, was an influence that was not likely in Maynooth, or in Ireland, to be disregarded, or to be lightly shaken off—the influence of the voice of the Holy See, speaking to us, all but directly, through its official organ the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda.

And here perhaps it may be well to make mention of a fact that probably is but little known except to those who have been led in the discharge of their professional duty as Professors of Theology to investigate the history, in its varying phases, of the prominence attained at various periods of the Church's history, now by one, now by the other, of the great rival schools in Moral Theology.

It is not easy indeed now to realize it, but it is nevertheless an unquestionable fact, that the period is by no means remote when even in Rome, and in Colleges, like that of Propaganda, most directly subject to the personal influence of the Sovereign Pontiff, the class book—not merely in use, but held in high esteem—was the Moral Theology of Antoine, a work in which the views of a decidedly advanced section of the "rigid" school were propounded, and those of the "moderate" theologians, even to their fundamental tenet of Probabilism, were repudiated and refuted as carefully and as emphatically as might have been looked for in the writings of Anglade or of Delahogue himself. Antoine, in his Treatise did not of course deny that the following of our Lord is described by Himself as a "jugum suave." But, as he expresses it when answering, in his defence of Antiprobabilism, an argument deduced by the Pro-

babilist writers, in favour of their moral system, from those consoling words of our Lord: "*Jugum Christi est equidem suave; sed non per laxitatem doctrinæ.*" Such then was the tendency and teaching of a work which, until a comparatively recent date, was in daily use as a class book by the Professors and students of the Propaganda and of other Colleges in Rome—a testimony of high approval, intensified not lightly by the fact that the edition which was thus used, and from which I have just quoted, bore upon its title-page and in its introductory leaves, a formal announcement that it had been specially prepared for the use of the students of Propaganda,* under the personal sanction of so learned a Pontiff as Benedict XIV.†

It is in fact no exaggeration to say that at the time of the foundation of our College and for long afterwards, the "rigid" theology was as carefully cultivated in some of the Roman schools as even the learned writer of the Article himself could have imagined the Gallican dogmas ever to have been in Maynooth. The Colleges of the city comprised in fact two sets of schools in Moral Theology, the "rigid" and the "moderate," as clearly marked in their characteristics, and as definitely localized, as were the schools of the Thomists and the Scotists, the Augustinians and the Jesuits, in regard to certain disputed points in dogmatic theology. Hence warm discussions,

* In his introductory letter to Benedict XIV., the Editor refers to the high esteem into which Antoine's work had come, in no small degree as the result of the commendation of his Holiness, "quo," he says, "*præ ceteris digna habita est quæ in Collegio de Propaganda Fide adolescentibus ad sacras missiones destinandis explicaretur.*"

† Towards the end of the article in the October number of the REVIEW, the learned writer speaks of "*Benedict XIV. and St. Alphonsus Liguori*" as "two names standing for more in theology than all the rigorist writers together," and of having by their "authority" and their "arguments" "finally excluded rigorism from the schools."

He surely cannot have been aware of the fact mentioned above. Indeed, but for his reference to the work "*De Synodo Diocesana*," I should have supposed that the name of Benedict XIV. was thus introduced by a slip of the pen, in place of some other name intended by the writer. Benedict XIV. was most decidedly not an advocate of the "moderate" views: on the contrary, his leaning, as can easily be inferred from his writings, is unmistakably in the opposite direction.

As to "the whole of the eleventh book of his *Synodus Diocesana*," being "devoted to the confutation of rigid opinions," I cannot even conceive on what grounds the statement has been made. There is certainly no foundation for it in the work itself. In the edition now before me, the book in question occupies 172 pages. The first seven chapters, occupying 109 pages, have reference to a totally different subject. The remaining seven chapters, thus occupying 63 pages, are no doubt occupied with the examination of questions as to the alleged undue rigour of certain Episcopal decrees. But of the entire seven, no fewer than five, occupying 44 pages out of the entire 63—so far from being written in support of the allegations

when the occasion presented itself, in the Conferences of the Roman clergy, on such questions as the granting of absolution to children of tender years—discussions, no less warm, in the more restricted circle of one or another of the national Colleges, among those who, as priests or as students, had been indoctrinated in the moral teaching of schools representing conflicting views on this and similar questions—were, I am assured by one who lived as a priest in Rome, not more than forty years ago, incidents by no means of rare occurrence, even at that comparatively recent period. And if we go still further back, for thirty or forty years, to the time when Maynooth was founded, we come upon a period when the Antiprobabilist and rigid views were sustained by influence so strong and so widespread that it would have needed all the theological instinct of a great Saint and Doctor of the Church like Saint Alphonsus himself, to foresee that within so short a period as has since elapsed they would have been practically banished from the schools.

It was then at a time when the actual position and future prospects of the conflict between Probabilism and Antiprobabilism, with their attendant sequels of “moderate” and “rigid” views throughout the entire field of morals, were involved in deep obscurity, that the opening of the new theological school of Maynooth, and the direction to be given to its teaching, occupied the anxious thoughts of the Bishops of Ireland.

Bearing in mind, indeed, the circumstances of that troubled

in question, and thus of the more “moderate” views—are occupied with an elaborate defence of those Episcopal enactments, and in confutation of the charge of undue rigour brought against them! Thus then there remain but two chapters—occupying 19 pages out of the entire 172—which could by any possibility be regarded as affording any shadow of foundation for the statement made regarding the whole book: and even those chapters do not, *except in one solitary point*, deal with the theological question, properly so called, as to the general existence or non-existence of an obligation, but discuss solely the propriety of the action of a certain Bishop in introducing the obligation in diocesan Synod, by a legislative act of his own. I should perhaps add that there is not throughout the entire Treatise referred to, any other Book to which the statement could be regarded as intended to refer.

A singular commentary on the other statement, that “everywhere throughout his writings Benedict XIV. quotes with respect and approbation the representatives of benign opinions,” is furnished by the fact that the learned Pontiff is, on the contrary, specially remarkable for the respect and approbation with which he quotes the writings, not merely of moderately “rigorous” writers, but even of those who for their rigour are classed among the representatives of the Jansenist school. I need mention the name only of Van Espen, and refer to the terms of characteristically strong emphasis in which Father Ballerini, in his Notes on Gury (Part ii. § 778), has expressed his disapproval of this feature of the writings of Benedict XIV.

time, we may well doubt if the thought had even occurred to any Bishop in Ireland that the standard of Probabilism and of moderate views should be set up in the new College. But we can have no doubt that if such a thought had been for a moment entertained, it was promptly abandoned on the receipt of the first official communication from the Holy See to the Episcopal Trustees of the College. I have already referred to this letter in connection with another point: we shall now see that it is a document of no less avail to us as regards the moral, than as regards the dogmatic, teaching of the College.

The official instruction conveyed by it to the Bishops is definite and unmistakable. It is no homily on the text of the "jugum suave." Nor does it give the uncertain sound of a vague admonition to steer a safe middle course between the excessive laxity of some and the excessive rigour of others. It warns the Bishops of one danger only, the danger on the "liberal" side, admonishing them merely to take heed that "the excessive and wanton *liberality* of some in laying down the rules of morals" shall be so "*avoided*," that "the mildness and suavity of Evangelical charity *shall never be dissociated from that salutary severity which is characteristic of Christian teaching.*"*

In the circumstances of the time such an admonition could have had but one meaning. But if any doubt were possible as to the "salutary severity" to which the Cardinal Prefect referred, it would have been dispelled by the knowledge of the fact that the Cardinal Prefect himself was an advocate, by no means undistinguished in the schools, of the more rigid or Antiprobabilist views—a fact of which no moral theologian will call for ampler evidence than is presented by the Treatises on Human Acts and on Conscience, in the tenth volume of the ordinary twenty volume edition of his Eminence's erudite and well-known works.

Moreover I should mention that in addition to the letter of the Cardinal Prefect, an indication, if possible more decisive, of the leaning of the authorities at Propaganda, was conveyed to the Bishops by the gift, for the use of the College of a large number of copies of the "*rigid*" and "*Antiprobabilist*" *Treatise of Moral Theology by Antoine*, to which I have already had occasion more than once to refer.†

* Letter of the Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda to the Episcopal Trustees of Maynooth College, 19th July, 1796.

† In the Catalogue of Authors, prefixed by the Redemptorist Father, Haringer, to the Ratisbon edition of the Moral Theology of Saint Alphonsus, published in 1846, the name of Antoine is marked with the symbol * † employed by the learned compiler to designate "auctores

Such then is the true story of the origin of that tendency to the more rigid opinions, which no doubt for many years in its earlier history characterized the teaching of Maynooth. And painful as this controversy has been to me, I cannot but feel that it has had at least this one aspect that I am able to contemplate without regret. It has given me an opportunity to bring forward, and place on record, as I have now done to the best of my ability, the evidence that will, I trust for ever, dissipate the idea—entertained, as I have discovered, by many who have studied in the College in comparatively recent times—that our school of Moral Theology had during no short period of its early history remained subject to an influence that from its infancy had given to it a direction at variance with the mind of Rome.*

And may I not ask what now are we to think of the statement with which I undertook to deal in this section of my letter, and which indeed so many kind friends of *Alma Mater* had assured me was the only allegation in the Article that could present any difficulty to me in my reply, that in regard to the “notable departure of the Theology of the French Church from the common teaching,” “in the excessive rigour of its moral theology,” the schools of Maynooth, and through them the Irish Priesthood, *of course* imbibed the French ethics *from the same source* that had imparted to them the French dogma? We now know that “the French ethics,” with its rigour which at present seems to us so excessive, was imbibed from the Moral Theology of Antoine, which had been the College class-book for many years, and which had come to us from Rome herself.†

rigidos.” And Antoine is explicitly, and indeed most justly, described as an “*auctor valde rigidae sententiae*.”

Gury, in his List of Authors, gives the following description:—“*In severiores generatim doctrinas propendit ultra modum.*”

Saint Alphonsus repeatedly refers to him as a decidedly advanced “rigidist.” Thus, for instance in the *Homo Apostolicus*, Tract. 16. n. 108, Antoine and Habert are cited as “*auctores doctrinae valde rigidioris.*” And in the “Moral Theology” (Lib. 6. n. 505.), he is cited thus:—“*Antoine qui inter rigidos auctores nostri temporis non infimum habet locum.*”

* Since this was written, I have received a letter from the Rector of the Irish College in Rome, stating that he has ascertained, by careful inquiry, that Antoine was the text-book at Propaganda certainly as recently as 1830, and perhaps later.

† A revered Irish Bishop wrote to me thus, a few days ago:—

“I can say that when I was a student in Maynooth, Gallicanism was not taught, nor, as far as I know, held by any of the College authorities.

“The only Professor who could be charged with what is called “Gallican” strictness in Moral Theology was the Professor of the first year’s class of Theology, Dr. Magennis, with whom Antoine was a favourite.

“But on such questions as the infallibility and authority of the Pope,

§ 6. *Conclusion.*

Little more remains for me to add except indeed to express my thanks for the kindness which has afforded me the opportunity of placing before the readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW this statement of the justification on which the College relies.

I have throughout endeavoured—and I trust not unsuccessfully—to keep within the terms of the only restriction that accompanied the editorial intimation, so kindly given, of compliance with my request that such an opportunity should be afforded. I have abstained from “breaking new ground,” and have confined myself to “a refutation of the statements made in the October number of the REVIEW, in regard to the theological teaching of the College within the period therein specified.”

I trust I am not over sanguine in my hope that the public have heard the last of this unpleasant discussion. I am not indeed without some confidence that the learned writer of the Article will himself feel satisfied that its statements cannot be maintained. The actual testimony of those very professors of theology, whose teaching has been called in question—especially when we bear in mind that this testimony was given in a direction altogether divergent from that of prejudice and of personal interest—ought surely to be accepted as conclusive on that branch of the case which regarded the doctrines that they taught. And no less confidently may I claim that, on the other branch of it regarding the source from which those

he was certainly most sound; so, I need not tell you, were the others, Doctors O'Hanlon, Carew, McNally," &c.

This testimony is important in more ways than one. First, it puts into plain words the idea that exists in a more or less hazy form in many minds, as to the teaching of the College having once been “Gallican” in Moral Theology. Its teaching was Gallican, inasmuch as it retained the spirit of Antoine—the class book sent to us from Rome. Antoine, no doubt, was a Frenchman and a “rigidist”; but he was, in the technical sense of the term, no more of a “Gallican,” than Fénelon, or M. Louis Veuillot.

Moreover the testimony is important inasmuch as it deals with the very period that has been singled out for special denunciation by the learned writer of the Article. The Professor of Moral Theology referred to as noted for his advocacy of “rigid” opinions, is the same who was introduced to the readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW, as “only the pupil” of “the Frenchmen,” and as consequently justifying, by his strange and unhappy words in regard to the “Blessed Alphonsus,” the reviewer’s application to “Gallicanism,” of the epithets “unreasoning” and “intolerant.”

Facts such as this—and I could, if space permitted, adduce many similar instances—may help me in endeavouring to convince the learned writer of the Article, of the impossibility of writing of Maynooth as he has done, without referring, of necessity, to many members of “the existing priesthood and Episcopacy of Ireland.”

principles that unquestionably influenced the Moral teaching of the College were imbibed, the unimpeachable testimony of contemporary documents shall be regarded as no less conclusive. At all events I feel that if I have not succeeded by this twofold array of evidence in bringing home conviction to the minds of all whose interest in the maintenance of the reputation of the College has led them to follow the course of this lengthened discussion, it would be utter waste of time on my part, and a most unjustifiable demand on the kindness of the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, for me to think of prolonging this controversy by another letter or another line.

So far as I am concerned, then, the controversy is at an end. In this I speak, of course, in reference solely to the statements already publicly made, with which alone I have felt called upon to deal. But I feel confident that even if their learned author should deem it advisable to prolong, by another letter, the discussion he has raised, the observance of the same editorial rule which so far has exercised its salutary influence in keeping the discussion within its original bounds, will preclude the possibility of its entering upon any new phase which would involve the necessity of a further reply on behalf of the College. The statements to which I have taken exception are singularly clear and circumstantial. I claim to have thoroughly disproved them. I am confident they will not be reaffirmed. And I most earnestly trust that if they be withdrawn, it will not be to replace them by others—whether substantially different, or differing from them only as modified statements of what they so emphatically and so circumstantially allege—a result which, of course, could not fail to impose upon me the doubly painful duty of a further reply.

Even at the risk of seeming unduly to prolong this letter, I do not wish to bring it to a close without assuring the learned writer of the Article that on one point at least he need not fear that any possibility of misconception exists which should render it necessary for him to reiterate an assurance he has already so formally and so unreservedly given. He has publicly stated that in his Article he had no thought of writing anything derogatory to Maynooth; that, on the contrary, he meant rather to exalt the College; that his object in writing was to do honour to the living, and that he conceived he was doing so without in any way throwing discredit on the dead. He had no doubt charged them with having not only taught, but carefully cultivated, the theological system whose authorized exposition is the Gallican Declaration of 1682; but even in this he did not consider he was discrediting them, for in his view

of "Gallicanism," it was not "forty or fifty years ago"—that is to say, from 1829 to 1839—"in such bad odour as it is at present, now that it has been repudiated by the Church of France."

All these assurances, so frankly tendered, I feel confident that I, on the part of the College, am justified in most unreservedly accepting. Indeed it is not too much for me to say that I know of no one to whom it should not be matter for regret that anything should have occurred in connection with this painful controversy, that could have even suggested the idea that any such assurance should not be regarded as altogether superfluous. But, at the same time, I must ask to have it remembered that the question involved is not a question of intention, but of actual statements, most publicly made, and again and again reiterated; that those statements did not regard the theological aspect, odious or otherwise, of "Gallicanism," but the alleged "fact" that it had been taught, and even "carefully cultivated" in our College; and that the prompt denial, and now the explicit refutation, with which I have felt it my duty to meet these statements, are but the natural results of my knowledge of how utterly at variance those statements were with historical fact,* and how injurious to the reputation of our theological school they are deemed to be by many of its oldest living *alumni*.

By one of these my attention has recently been directed to a testimony of vital importance in this controversy—the evidence given by the late Most Rev. Dr. Furlong, when he was examined, as one of the then Professors of Theology, before the Maynooth Commissioners of 1853. By a fortunate coincidence it happens that he had been examined also before the previous Commission of 1826. Here then we have a witness with whose testimony I may well bring this letter to a close. His

* At a risk of retracing to some extent my steps over ground already traversed, I wish to insert here a reference to a truly invaluable piece of evidence, which has just been placed in my hands by a venerable priest who was a student of the Dunboyne Establishment more than fifty years ago.

It contains the "Theses" selected for public defence by the Dunboyne students in the year 1819. As regards the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope, the proposition is worded in exact conformity with that in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise. And it is immediately preceded by a thesis affirming—in direct contravention of the Second Gallican Article—the supreme authority of the Pope, *in universam Ecclesiam*—that is to say, over the entire Church, not merely as regards its *individual* members, but in its *collective* capacity in the widest sense.

Dr. Murray in the Prænotanda to the very proposition selected from his treatise on the Church, by the writer of the article, as conclusive evidence on the thorough revolution that had taken place in the teaching of

first examination was at a date anterior to that "forty or fifty years ago" to which I have just now referred; and he was then a student of the Dunboyne Establishment, having fully completed his College course, commenced so far back as the year 1818. His second examination was in 1853—a date decidedly subsequent to that supposed revolution in the teaching of the College, the result of the struggle described in the fancy sketch of the learned writer of the Article, in which he represents the Professors of Theology as "forcing their way through the lines of Gallicanism," and thus effecting "a successful junction with the grand theological army of the Catholic Church." At all events, we need not be surprised to find that Dr. Furlong was appealed to by the Commissioners of 1853 as a witness of great experience. Here then is his testimony:—

You were examined before the former Commission, were you not?—Yes.

You have now had a considerable experience of the College: Is there any change in the class of doctrines taught upon dubious points within your knowledge?—*I know of none.*

The same spirit prevails now which did at the time of the former investigation?—*Yes; I am not aware of any difference, save that a more decided bias prevails generally in favour of the infallibility of the Pope and his authority in spiritual matters.*

Here then we have the conclusive testimony of a witness speaking from actual personal knowledge of the two periods which it was the aim of the article in the October number of the REVIEW to bring into such sharp contrast. He, though he had lived in the College as student from 1818 to 1825, as Dunboyne student from 1825 to 1827, as Dean from 1827 to 1834, as Professor of Rhetoric from 1834 to 1845, and as Professor of Theology from 1845 to the date of his examination in 1853, knew nothing of the deadly conflict which the learned

the College from its early days—the Proposition affirming the supremacy of the Pope over the entire Church even in its collective capacity—tells us with his usual clearness that the distinctive note of the Gallican doctrine on this point was their refusal to adopt the phrase *in universam Ecclesiam*, insisting, as they did, that the Pope, though superior to each portion of the Church throughout its entire extent, *in universa Ecclesia* did not possess jurisdiction over the universal Church—in *universam Ecclesiam*—as a whole. (*Tract. de Ecclesia*, tom. iii. p. 747.)

In this phrase, in fact, we have as distinctive a note of anti-Gallican teaching on the really fundamental point at issue in the controversy, as the word *homousios* or *consubstantialis* is in the rejection of Arianism.

And this distinct, unmistakable, rejection of the Gallican theory we now find recorded in the most authentic and trustworthy source of evidence—the Thesis Book of the Dunboyne Students in the year 1819.

writer of the Article so graphically describes as having been fought out within the College at some date, not specified indeed except by vague reference to the fifth decade of this century, but thus necessarily comprised within the period covered by Dr. Furlong's experience. Yet Dr. Furlong knew of "no change" in the class of "doctrines taught in the College" through all that long experience, from first to last. *More decided*, no doubt, as we have already seen, had become what he describes as the *bias* in favour of the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility: this was, of course, the natural tendency of the train of thought sure to prevail in any Irish Theological College where free scope was afforded for its development; and the incident mentioned in the earlier portion of this letter shows at what an early date in our history that full development was attained in Maynooth.

Thus, then, I bring my Paper to a close. I cannot do so without an expression of the deep regret which, in common, I am sure, with all who are zealous for the honour of *Alma Mater*, I feel that, especially on an occasion such as this, she should have been deprived of the services of one who could have sustained her cause in a manner worthy of its greatness. But, fortunately for her fame, it was a case in which there was little need for aids that are beyond my reach to furnish—for the graces of rhetoric or the resources of literary skill; and in which, therefore, without much risk of disaster, she might afford to dispense with the pleading of an abler advocate, and to rest satisfied with the only service that it has been in my power to render—a plain, straightforward statement of the evidence on which she relies.

WILLIAM J. WALSH,
Vice-President of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.

LETTERS OF POPE LEO XIII.

LETTER ON THE STUDY OF ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN,
AND A NEW EDITION OF HIS WORKS.

*Venerabili Fratri nostro Antonino Episcopo Prænestino,
S. R. E. Cardinali de Luca, Sacro consilio Studiis regundis præfecto,*

LEO PAPA XIII.

VENERABILIS FRATER NOSTER SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

JAMPRIDEM considerando experiendoque intelleximus, teterrimum quod adversus Ecclesiam ipsamque humanam societatem modo geritur bellum, citius feliciusque, opitulante Deo, componi non posse, quam rectis sciendi agendique principiis per philosophicas disciplinas ubilibet restitutis; ideoque ad summam totius causæ pertinere sanam solidamque ubique locorum reflorescere philosophiam. Litteras idcirco Encyclicas ad universos catholici orbis Antistites nuper dedimus, quibus pluribus ostendimus hujus generis utilitatem non esse alibi querendam, quam in philosophia christiana a priscis Ecclesiæ Patribus procreata et educta, quæ fidei catholicæ non modo maxime convenit, sed etiam defensionis et luminis utilia adjumenta præbet. Eam ipsam, decursu ætatum, magnis fecundam fructibus a S. Thoma Aquinate, summo Scholasticorum Magistro, quasi hereditario jure acceptam commemoravimus; in eaque ordinanda illustranda et augenda mentis illius vim virtutemque sic enituisse, ut cognominis sui mensuram Angelicus Doctor cumulate impleisse videatur. Majorem autem in modum Episcopos hortati sumus ut, collatis Nobiscum viribus, excitare aggrediantur motam gradu et prope collapsam philosophiam illam veterem, scholisque catholicis redonatam, in sede honoris pristini collocare.

Nec mediocrem animi lætitiā ex eo percepimus, quod Litteræ illæ Nostræ, divina ope favente, prorum ubique obsequium et singularem animorum assensum nactæ sunt. Cujus rei testimonium Nobis luculentum impertiunt plures Episcoporum ad Nos ex Italia præsertim, ex Gallia, Hispania, Hibernia, perlata epistolæ, sive singulares, sive plurium ejusdem provinciæ vel gentis communes, egregia animi sensa præferentes. Nec doctorum hominum suffragium defuit, ultro et reverenter datum, cum insignes eruditorum Academiæ eundem plane ac Sacrorum Antistites animum Nobis scripto declaraverint.—In his autem litteris placet maxime obsequium auctoritati Nostræ et huic Apostolicæ Sedī præstitum; placent mens et judicia ab auctoribus prolata. Una est enim omnium vox, una sententia, notari et tuto designari Litteris illis Nostris quo tandem loco sit præsentium malorum radix, et unde petenda remedia. Omnes consentiunt humanam rationem, si a divina fidei auctoritate discesserit, dubitationum fluctibus et præsentissimis errorum periculis esse propositam; hæc

autem pericula facile evasuram, si ad catholicam philosophiam homines perfugerint.

Quamobrem, Venerabilis Frater Noster, illud Nobis est magnopere in optatis, ut S. Thomæ doctrina, fidei veritati apprime conformis, cum in omnibus catholicis Athenæis quamprimum reviviscat, tum maxime in hac Urbe, principe catholici nominis, quæ ob eam causam, quod est sedes Pontificis Maximi, debet optimarum doctrinarum laude ceteris antecellere.—Huc accedit quod Romam, catholicæ unitatis centrum, soleant adolescentes ex omni terrarum loco frequentes celebrare, nullibi, quam penes augustam B. Petri cathedram, germanam incorruptamque sapientiam satius hausturi. Itaque si philosophiæ christianæ, quam diximus, largiter hinc copia defluerit, non unius Urbis finibus conclusa tenebitur, sed ad omnes populos, velut abundantissimus amnis, manabit.

Sic igitur primo loco curavimus ut in Seminario Romano, in Lyceo Gregoriano, in Urbaniano aliisque Collegiis, Nostræ adhuc auctoritati obnoxii, philosophicæ disciplinæ secundum mentem et principia Doctoris Angelici, enucleatæ dilucide, copiose tradantur atque excolantur. Et maxime in hoc omnem vigilare curam et contentionem doctorum volumus, ut quas ipsi doctrinæ opes ex voluminibus sancti Thomæ diligenter collegerint, easdem explicando, dilatando, suaviter, et fructuose auditoribus impertiant.

Sed præterea quo magis hæc studia vigeant et floreant, curandum est ut amatores philosophiæ Scholasticæ in ejus gratiam sedulo, quod possunt, enitentur; maxime autem in societates coeant, cœtusque identidem habeant, in quibus studiorum suorum fructus singuli in medium adducant, et in communem afferant utilitatem.

Hæc autem judicia mentemque nostram Tecum communicare volumus, Venerabilis Frater Noster, qui sacro Consilio præes studiis disciplinarum regundis, certa spe freti, nec industriam, nec prudentiam Tuam hac in re Nobis defuturam.—Te profecto non latet doctorum hominum cœtus sive Academias, nobilissimas veluti palæstras fuisse, in quibus viri ingenio peracri et doctrina præstantes cum se ipsi utiliter exercerent de maximis rebus scribes ac disputantes, tum adolescentes erudirent, magno cum scientiarum incremento. Ex hoc optimo more institutoque jungendi vires et intelligentiæ lumina conferendi, extiterunt illustria Doctorum collegia, alia pluribus simul disciplinis addicta, alia singularibus. Vivax fama et gloria eorum permansit, quæ, Romanis Pontificibus non uno nomine faventibus, ubique floruerunt, ut in hac Italia nostra, Bononiæ, Patavii, Salerni, et alibi alia. Cum igitur tanta fuerit laus et utilitas in voluntariis hisce hominum cœtibus ad excolendas perpoliendasque disciplinas coeuntium, cumque ejus utilitatis et laudis plurimum adhuc supersit, certum Nobis est eodem uti præsidio, quo consilia Nostra plenius perficiamus.—Scilicet auctores sumus, ut cœtus Academicus in Urbe Roma instituatur, qui S. Thomæ Aquinatis nomine et patronatu insignis, eo studia industriamque convertat, ut ejus opera explanet, illustret; placita exponat et cum aliorum philosophorum sive veterum sive recentium placitis conferat; vim sententiarum earumque rationes demonstret; salutarem doctrinam pro-

pagare, et ad grassantium errorum refutationem recensque inventorum illustrationem adhibere contendat.—Idcirco Tibi, Venerabilis Frater Noster,¹ cujus perspecta habemus ornamenta doctrinæ, celeritatem ingenii, studiumque rerum omnium quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, id negotii damus ut propositum Nostrum exequaris. Interim rem altius consideres; cumque rationem excogitaveris quæ consiliis Nostris opportune respondeat, litteris expressam Nobis inspiciendam subicies ut probemus et auctoritate Nostra muniamus.

Demum quo latius spargatur ac disseminetur Angelici Doctoris sapientia, constituimus omnia ejus opera de integro in lucem edere, exemplo S. Pii V, Decessoris Nostri, rerum gestarum gloria et vitæ sanctitate præclari; cui quidem in ea tam felix contigit exitus, ut Thomæ exemplaria jussu illius evulgata, permagni sint apud viros doctos, summoque studio requirantur. Verum quanto plus editio illa est rara tanto magis alia desiderari coepta, quæ nobilitate ac præstantia cum Piana comparari possit. Ceteræ enim cum veteres tum recentiores, partim quod non omnia S. Thomæ scripta exhibeant, partim quod optimorum ejus interpretum atque explanatorum careant commentariis, partim quod minus diligenter adornatæ sint, non omne tulisse punctum videntur. Certa autem spes est, hujusmodi necessitati consultum iri per novam editionem quæ cuncta omnino sancti Doctoris scripta complectatur, optimis, quoad fieri poterit, formis litterarum expressa, accurateque emendata; iis etiam adhibitis codicum manu scriptorum subsidiis, quæ ætate hac nostra in lucem et usum prolata sunt. Con-junctim vero edendas curabimus clarissimorum ejus interpretum, ut Thomæ de Vio Cardinalis Cajetani et Ferrariensis, lucubrationes, per quas, tamquam per uberes rivulos, tanti viri doctrina decurrit. Obversantur quidem animo rei gerendæ cum magnitudo, tum difficultas; nec tamen deterrent quominus ad eam magna cum alacritate quamprimum aggrediamur. Confidimus enim in re tam gravi, quæ ad commune Ecclesiæ bonum magnopere pertinet, adfore Nobis divinam opem et concors Episcoporum studium, et prudentiam atque industriam Tuam, spectatam jam et diu cognitam.

Interim præcipuæ dilectionis testem, Apostolicam benedictionem Tibi, Venerabilis Frater Noster, ex intimo cordis affectu impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum, die 15 Octobris an. 1879, Pontificatus Nostri Anno Secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

LETTER ON THE WORKS OF ST. ALFONSO.

*Dilectis Filiis LEOPOLDO JOSEPHO DUJARDIN et JULIO JACQUES,
Presbyteris e Congregatione Sanctissimi Redemptoris.*

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTI FILII, SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

LICET universum iam orbem pervaserint, non sine amplissimo christianæ rei emolumento, scripta Sancti Doctoris Alphonsi Mariæ de Ligorio, dilecti filii, ea tamen magis adhuc magisque vul-

gari desiderandum est et ad manus omnium traduci. Scitissime nam Ille catholicas veritates omnium captui accommodavit, omnium morali regimini prospexit, mirifice pietatem omnium excitavit, et, "in media saeculi nocte errantibus viam ostendit, qua, eruti de potestate tenebrarum, transire possent in Dei lumen et regnum." Et sane firmis-
simis argumentis divinam revelationem munivit contra Deistas; veritatem Fidei nostrae strenue defendit; efficacissime asseruit Immaculatum Deiparae Conceptum; nervosissime propugnavit Romani Pontificis Primatum et Infallibile Magisterium; divinae Providentiae consilia in comparanda per Iesum Christum hominum salute docte pieque illustravit; Psalmos et Cantica aptissimis ad fovendam Clericorum pietatem commentariis exposuit; Ecclesiae gloriam ostendit in triumphis Martyrum; editis historia Haeresum et Opere Dogmatico acriter perstrinxit haereses omnes, sed praesertim Jansenianos et Febronianos profligavit errores tunc maxime gliscentes, et monstrosarum illa opinionum segete graves, qua nunc religiosae civilisque societatis fundamenta quatiuntur: et quam ipse iam tunc ea perspicacia fuit insectatus, ut pleraeque e *propositionibus* post saeculum in *Syllabo* damnatae ab eius scriptis nominatim refutatae conspiciantur: imo "praedicari verissime possit, nullum esse nostrorum temporum errorem, qui, maxima saltem ex parte, non sit ab Alphonso refutatus." Et ne quid dicamus de Morali Theologia ubique terrarum celebratissima tutamque plane praebente normam quam conscientiae moderatores sequantur, frigescentem Ipse caritatem per crebras doctasque lucubrationes asceticas, veluti subditis igniculis, fovit, aluit, provexit; ac praesertim erga Dominum Nostrum Iesum Christum eiusque dulcissimam Matrem, quorum amore, miro cum fidelium profectu rigentia quoque corda succendit. Et in hisce omnibus "illud in primis notatu dignum est, quod, licet copiosissime scripserit, eiusdem tamen opera inoffenso prorsus pede percurri a fidelibus posse, post diligens institutum examen, perspectum fuerit." Gratulamur itaque, dilecti filii, vos dogmatica omnia et ascetica sanctissimi et doctissimi Parentis vestri scripta, sive latine sive italice edita, in gallicam vertisse linguam, tum quia haec omnibus ferme populis nota latius proferre poterit fructus laborum egregii Doctoris, tum quia vobis potissimum arduum id munus demandatum fuit, qui et alias iam de indole, doctrina, sanctitate eorundem operum scribere debuistis, et, uti filii facilius et plenius aliis assequi poteratis spiritum Parentis. Imo ipsi quoque gratulamur incepto vestro, eo nomine, quod cum Sanctus Auctor saepe in scriptis suis Angeli Scholarum doctrinam se sequutum fuisse gloriatur; ex huiusmodi recentioris Ecclesiae Doctoris erga illum obsequio nova Sancti Thomae doctrinae laus accedat et gloria, quae gravius etiam commendat instaurationem illam christianae philosophiae, quam Nos studiosissime per recentes encyclicas litteras Nostras ad Angelici Doctoris mentem exigendam suasimus. Successum itaque nuperae isti operum Sancti Alphonsi editioni* ominamur amplissimum

* "Œuvres complètes, dogmatiques et ascétiques, de St. Alphonse de Liguori." Traduites par les Pères Dujardin et Jacques de la Congrégation du très Saint Rédempteur. Twenty-eight volumes. Casterman, Tournai.

Nostrisque et votis vestris plane respondentem; ac interim superni favoris auspicem vobis, dilecti filii, ac toti Sanctissimi Redemptoris Congregationi Benedictionem Apostolicam paternae Nostrae benevolentiae testem peramanter impertimur.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die 28 Augusti 1879, Pontificatus Nostri anno secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE
"SOCIÉTÉ SCIENTIFIQUE" OF BRUSSELS.

*Dilectis Filiis Praesidi ac Membris Societatis Scientificae Bruxellis
constitutae*

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTI FILII SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

GRATAE Nobis advenerunt litterae vestrae una cum Annalibus et Quaestionibus a vobis editis, quas in obsequentissimum erga Nos et Apostolicam Sedem pietatis testimonium obtulistis. Libenter sane agnovimus Societatem vestram quae a scientiis sibi nomen fecit, et quae tribus tantum abhinc annis laetis auspiciis ac Jesu Christi Vicarii benedictione Bruxellis constituta est, magnum iam incrementum cepisse, et uberes fructus polliceri. Profecto cum infensissimi religionis ac veritatis hostes nunquam desistant, imo magis magisque studeant dissidium rationem inter ac fidem propugnare, opportunum est ut praestantes scientia ac pietate viri ubique exurgant, qui Ecclesiae doctrinis ac documentis ex animo obsequentes, in id contendant, ut demonstrent *nullam unquam inter fidem et rationem veram dissensionem esse posse*; quemadmodum Sacrosancta Vaticana Synodus, constantem Ecclesiae et Sanctorum Patrum doctrinam affirmans, declaravit Constitutione IV^a. de fide catholica. Quapropter gratulamur quod Societas vestra hunc primo finem sibi proposuerit, itemque in statutis legem dederit, ne quid a sociis contra sanam christianae philosophiae doctrinam committatur; simulque omnes hortamur ut nunquam de egregio eiusmodi laudis tramite deflectant, atque ut toto animi nisu praestitutum Societatis finem praeclaris exemplis ac scriptis editis continuo assequi adintantur. Deum autem Optimum Maximum precamur, ut vos omnes caelestibus praesidiis confirmet ac muniat: quorum auspicem, et Nostrae in vos benevolentiae pignus, Apostolicam benedictionem vobis, dilecti filii, et Societati vestrae ex animo impertimur.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die 15, Januarii 1879. Pontificatus Nostri Anno Primo.

LEO PP. XIII.

Notices of Catholic Continental Periodicals.

GERMAN PERIODICALS.

(By Dr. BELLESHEIM.)

1. *Katholik.* August—November.

DR. HENSE finishes his speculative treatise on the Fire of Hell. Without failing in respect for the scholastics, he proceeds, in explaining the nature of the fire, from the results obtained by modern science. According to Professor Tyndall it is not only by fire that warmth can be produced, but also by the motion and friction of matter. Fire exerts its power by entering between the parts of which a body is made up, and communicating to them its own movement. The effect is, that whenever the expansion of the body has attained a certain degree, some parts of it will be attracted by oxygen in the air, whilst the remaining parts become coal and ashes. Applying these principles of physics to the Catholic doctrine, we can easily conceive eternal punishment as a fire, although not material, excited and maintained by the vibratory movements of the atmosphere, "as an ocean of fire, burning as long as the movement is kept up." On the other hand, Christian teaching informs us that after the resurrection the bodies of all men will be incorruptible, since by an ordinance of Almighty God their single molecules will cling together with such cohesion as to resist even the most formidable dissolving power. But, for this very reason, the punishment of the damned becomes all the more intense, from the perpetual conflict between the fire, which tends to burn and dissolve them, and the gift of incorruptibility, which neutralizes every opposite power. The idea of some German divines, of a "more spiritual fire," cannot be accepted. Another momentous question, carefully treated by Dr. Hense, touches on the possibility of any *pure spirit* being liable to the torments of fire. Since burning can only be conceived as a movement, and finally as a dissolution and consumption of certain parts of a body, the question arises, how the fire can exert its power on the human soul, which from its very nature, being most simple, excludes composition of parts. We may concede that a material agent like fire, under certain circumstances, could exercise its powers and become, in a certain sense, an impediment to the soul; but we deny that it ever could produce in the human soul, when separated from the body, any *sensitive* pain. To such pain the soul can only be subject when it is in the state of a *forma completa*, united with its complement, the body. After death, of course, it cannot lose its sensitive faculties, since they are rooted in its substance; but what it is temporarily deprived of, is the possibility of making use of them. S. Thomas answers the question, "*Utrum anima separata pati*

possit ab igne corporeo?" in the following words :—"Patiantur igitur ab igne corporeo substantiæ incorporeæ per modum *alligationis* cujusdam." (Suppl. qu. 70.) The material fire, according to S. Thomas, is like a fetter, detaining the soul in a certain place. It cannot be denied that this punishment is a grievous pain for the spirit, inasmuch as by its nature it can move wherever it likes. Its essence being totally simple and most noble, it necessarily experiences a profound reluctance to be tied down to matter which is not its form. Our author, although fully adopting S. Thomas's doctrine, does not fail to bring into prominence the development it has received from Soto, Suarez, Lessius, and Petavius, who unanimously teach that besides this "imprisonment" caused by the fire, there is also positive pain from the fire.

Professor Brück, of Mayence, author of a well-known class-book of Ecclesiastical History, continues his studies on the Emancipation of Catholics in Great Britain and Ireland. These are very clever and most useful contributions, gathered from a good many English books hitherto almost totally unknown in Germany, and containing excellent lessons for German Catholics in our own days. It is to the so-called Irish Veto that we attach the deepest interest. The English Government was very willing to concede emancipation; but unfortunately this benefit was to depend on certain conditions which gave rise to eager dissensions amongst English Catholics themselves, and between English and Irish Catholics. The Government stretched out one hand to help Catholics, but with the other they sought the right of interfering with the nomination of the Catholic Bishops. In England the Government met with assistance on the part of some Catholics; only one prelate strongly opposed it and fought on the side of the Irish, who declined to accept a State endowment rather than admit any State influence in the appointment of the Bishops. This great man was Bishop Milner, who, after being calumniated and strongly opposed by the opposite side was, on his arrival in Rome, duly praised for his courage and patience by Pius VII. Much confusion was excited and fuel added to the fire by the letters of Mgr. Quarantotti, whilst Pius VII. by his letters, February 1st, 1815, to Archbishop Troy, of Dublin, soothed the passions of the Catholics, by declaring that a Veto could not be denied to the Government of Great Britain, and would not, if duly exercised and within certain limits, endanger the interests of the Church. Most fortunately Catholic Emancipation was obtained from Parliament without any condition, and by a Pontifical decree, dated June 1st, 1829, the so-called "domestic election" of the Bishops was instituted for Ireland. The Irish Veto afterwards at several times came up in the transactions of the Holy See with Prussia, Hanover, and the States of the Ecclesiastical province of the Upper Rhine. The Pope enjoined the Cathedral Chapters not to elect as bishops any person "minus grata" to the Government, and previous to the election to inform themselves about those persons who might be "minus grata" to the Government. In practice the Chapters obeyed

this command of the Pope by sending up to Government a list of the candidates, asking them to expunge those who might not be agreeable. But German Catholics have to complain that, under the influence of political passion and the instigation of hostile lawyers, a new unconditional Veto has been excogitated. Hence the See of Fribourg in Baden is now vacant for more than ten years.

I contributed to the *Katholik* an article "Edinburgh and Presbyterianism," describing the beautiful capital of Scotland and commenting at greater length on the transactions of the "Assemblies" held in Edinburgh during the month of May. I also laid before the Catholic public an exhaustive account of the "Scelta di atti episcopali del Cardinale Gioacchino Pecci Arcivescovo-Vescovo di Perugia, ora Leone XIII. Sommo Pontefice." This precious compilation has been published by special command of the Holy Father, who not only from the exalted position he occupies, but also for the vastness of his learning, his unflinching courage in defending the inalienable rights of the Church, and the sanctity of his life, claims our deepest veneration. The collection consists of homilies, pastoral letters and remonstrances sent either by himself, or in unison with his brothers in the episcopacy, to the Italian Government, which from the very beginning of the new kingdom was very heavy on the diocese of Perugia. Very instructive is the Pastoral Letter on the Temporal Government of the Holy See, and the attempt to establish Protestant schools in Perugia. Worth reading also is the long Pastoral dated March 1st, 1864, "On Errors against Religion and Christian Life." It may justly be styled an anticipation of the "Syllabus Errorum," since it refutes most of the errors condemned in that solemn Pontifical decree. A special interest belongs to the Pastoral "on the position to be held by the clergy in our times." One point prominently insisted on by Cardinal Pecci is the *liberty of the Church*, which, being an institution of the supernatural order, never can degenerate into a mere slave, or instrument (vassallaggio) of any secular power. Lastly, we become acquainted with Cardinal Pecci as patron of the study of S. Thomas's works. He instituted the "Accademia di S. Tommaso" in Perugia, whose statutes are here laid before us.

2.—The *Historisch-politische Blätter* (September-December) afford two contributions by Dr. Zoerg, the principal and well-known editor of this Review. They treat the work of the Rev. Professor Janssen, of Frankfort-on-the-Main—"The History of the German people from the end of the Middle Ages," and Dr. Pastor's "Attempts at Reunion in the Reign of Emperor Charles V." I propose contributing to the next issue of the DUBLIN REVIEW a thorough criticism of Janssen's most learned work, which has been hailed by the whole of Catholic Germany as a first rate specimen of historiography. Dwelling at present on Dr. Pastor's book, I remark that he is a worthy disciple of Professor Janssen: his history of the Reunions breathes the same spirit, and shows similar scholarly attainments. It is gathered from the best sources, at first hand, and from a good many unprinted docu-

ments in Roman and German archives. The several "Interims" are accurately examined, and it is clearly shown that the doctrine of the "justitia imputativa," taught by Gropper at Regensburg, was not of Italian origin, but, on the contrary, due to Albert Pighius, a Flemish divine, the teacher of Gropper himself. We often meet, in the German diets and religious disputations of that time, the name of the future Archbishop of Armagh, Vauchop (Vaucopius, of Dr. Moran, *Spicilegium Ossoriense* I., 13). Dr. Pastor will go on to examine, in the following volumes, the attempts at reunion made afterwards by Bossuet, Spinola, Molanus, and Leibnitz. Owing to the kindness of the late King George V. of Hanover, he will be able to bring out a good many unknown documents. Other articles give lengthy accounts of the late Professor Gfroerer's posthumous work, "Byzantine Histories." This author was a convert from Protestantism and ranks foremost amongst German scholars by his great work, "Gregory VII. and his Time." The second volume of the "Byzantine Histories" consists of two separate parts: the first dwells on the neighbouring peoples, as the Serbs and Bulgarians; the second on the foundation and development of the Eastern Empire. The author lays before us a picture of the Cæsaropapismus, which by degrees poisoned the life of the State, and in this period resulted in those unhappy efforts of iconoclasm which alienated the Italian people from Byzantium, and led to the foundation of the temporal power of the Holy See. Very striking, but very true, is the comparison traced by the author between the condition of the Byzantine Empire under Justinian, and the unhappy state wherein France was plunged by the autocrat, Louis XIV. The third volume describes the condition of the empire from the time of iconoclasm till the downfall of Constantinople.

3.--*Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*. (August—December). F. Bauer continues his instructive comments on the French Jansenists. They published, from 1732, an ecclesiastical review under the name of "Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques," a small paper which went to the utmost lengths in calumniating the church and bishops, and mocking at her institutions. One of the principal editors was Bellegarde du Pac, Canon of Lyons, who, after abdicating his canonry, proceeded once a year to Utrecht, in order to defend the interests of his party. He also often travelled into Austria, where he conversed with the Josephine reformers, chief amongst whom were Van Swieten and Abbot Wittola, editor of the "Vienna Ecclesiastical Gazette," a paper which closely resembled the "Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques." The editor of the French paper was seized and thrown into the Bastille. Afterwards the Review gave rise to a long contest between the king and the parliament of Paris. After the Restoration, the "Nouvelles" came out as "Revue Ecclésiastique," and then as "Observateur Catholique," the principal editor being Abbé Quettée, the author of an ecclesiastical history of France in twelve volumes, which was solemnly condemned by the second provincial Council of Bordeaux, 1850. F. von Hummelauer contributes an essay on "The Christian Past Ages and Physical Science." F. von Hummelauer leads us through all centuries, showing how the

Fathers and Doctors of the Church cherished the study of nature, whilst they protested against those who subjected this noble study to their preconceived theories, and banished the Creator from the work of His hands.

4.—The *Literarische Rundschau* gives a review of F. Nilles's "Kalendarium Manuale Utriusque Ecclesiæ," Vicomte de Meaux' "Luttes Religieuses en France," and Canon Morgott's "Mariology according to S. Thomas of Aquin." I beg to call particularly the attention of the Catholic clergy in England to this valuable book (120 pp., Herder, Freiburg), of which an Italian translation is now in the course of preparation. The author, with incredible diligence, sets forth from the manifold works of S. Thomas whatever the great Doctor has left written about the Mother of God; his book is founded on the great commentators of S. Thomas, whilst modern Italian, German, and Spanish scholars are largely consulted. In regard to the question whether S. Thomas taught the Immaculate Conception or not, Canon Morgott is very successful in proving that the doctrine of the saint, although differing in words from the dogma, can be substantially reconciled with it. The scholastic doctors, as Benedict XIV. remarks, distinguish between "generatio activa et passiva;" by the first, the vegetative and sensitive part of the soul, by the second, the soul as gifted with reason and free will, is infused in the body. The dogmatic Bull of Pius IX., therefore, denying the conception of Mary in original sin refers to the "generatio passiva." S. Thomas, in admitting it, speaks only of the "generatio activa."

ITALIAN PERIODICALS.

La Scuola Cattolica. 31 Ottobre, 1879. Milano.

The Necessity of Public Life.

BOTH the *Civiltà Cattolica* and the *Scuola Cattolica* have been lately treating of the important subject of the intervention of Catholics in public life, the former in its number of October 18th, and the latter in that of October 31st; but, while the article in the *Civiltà Cattolica* treats in particular of the public life of Catholics in Italy, and is addressed as a kind of salutation and encouragement to their brethren about to assemble in the Fifth General Congress at Modena, the article in the *Scuola*, keeping the same object in view, the desirableness, nay, the necessity, of Catholics taking part in public life for the defence of their vital interests, both as members of human society and as Christians, treats the subject in a more general way. It shows, first, the necessity of this public life; next, it inquires who are the persons called upon to have a share in it; and, finally, it points out what ought to be the qualities of the proposed athletes. Under all these heads it has excellent remarks. We must content ourselves with a brief allusion to the second section, where a conclusive reply is given to those who would have the clergy stand entirely aloof from public life, and on no account intervene in any political question. The

writer here points out that the questions which now divide men into two opposite camps can no longer be called political. They are social, moral, and religious. He proceeds to enumerate a few questions which might be regarded as appertaining exclusively to the political domain, and pertinently asks whether such is the field of modern controversy. Everything that concerns human existence in society is now called in question; all is to be recast in a fresh mould. It is no longer a conflict regarding matters of practical detail, the distribution and allotment of duties and rights, but there is a clamour for the abolition of all rights and duties. Marriage, the family, the rights of property, everything which concerns man's social and moral being is menaced. The controversy of the day is, moreover, eminently a religious controversy, since, if heretofore this or that branch of the sacred tree was assailed, either by the pretensions of human reason or by heresy, now it is atheism which would lay the axe to the very root of the tree itself. What means lay instruction, a State without religion, legislation which makes abstraction of all religious belief, humanity constituted as its own end? What does all this mean but the abolition of all religion and the repudiation of Christian principles in the government, in the family, and in every social relation. But are not the clergy the teachers of Christian principles, the natural guardians and judges of religion and morality, whether as applied to government, the family, or the individual? An atheist may deny this; but a Catholic never can without ceasing to be such. The very atheist himself, while denying it in his own person, and rejecting ecclesiastical ministrations for himself, cannot, in virtue of liberty of conscience, which he admits, refuse to recognize in Catholics the right to refer to the clergy in all those matters. The writer then proceeds to show most clearly how the clergy is not a foreign body, something which has, as it were, dropped from another planet, but an organic portion of the nation, sprung from its bosom and united to it in a most intimate manner; that its maxims are the sole civilizing maxims, that its interests are identical with those of morality, order, public and private peace. Or shall it be said, asks the writer, that the clergy are aliens from the nation because the nation has taken to following another road? Could a father be described as having become an alien to his children when they have chosen to leave his house and give themselves over to a licentious life?

30 Septembre. *Administrative Elections of 1879.*

IN the number of the *Scuola Cattolica* for September 30th there is a notice of the last administrative elections, which it had deferred thus late that it might act as an incentive to Catholics now that by means of parochial committees they are about to begin their preparations for next year's elections. Many advantages have been obtained, but greater may be in store if care be taken to avoid the faults that have been committed, and profit be derived from past experience. The administrative elections of 1879 have certainly been far more success-

ful to Catholics than they were during former years. Rome, Venice, Naples, Florence, Palermo, and other minor cities may be pointed to as examples; not to speak of many little communes. And even where it has not been possible to procure the election of Catholic candidates, the number of votes in their favour is largely increased. The policy generally pursued by the electoral committees has not been to limit themselves in their list of candidates purely to Catholics, a proceeding concerning which the reviewer has a caution to give later on. The Revolution, which deluded so many incautious persons in its early stages by its false theories and corrupt philosophy, has begun now to manifest openly the disastrous consequences ensuing on a general subversion of ideas, principles, authority, institutions; and this is leading all worthy, honest, and sensible people to look about them, and feel serious apprehensions. The menace directed against the natural institution of the family has alarmed Italians much, and they have come forward to gather round that larger family, the commune, which as it is the aggregate and centre of individual families, so also is it their natural and firmest support. The commune comprehends the most vital interests of all citizens, and since no impediment as regards conscience exists in its case, nor any necessity to have an express authoritative permission to intervene in its affairs, all are at liberty here to combine in joint action. Catholics, however, do not merely know that this is lawful, but they have the additional incentive of the Holy Father's expressed desire that they should take their part in municipal affairs. With them the manifestation of such a desire is equivalent to a command.

The increased electoral movement has, besides, received a fresh impulse from the extension and consolidation of the new organization of Catholic action in Italy. It is not sufficient to draw up at the last moment a list of Catholic candidates to be proposed to electors; the electoral movement, to be successful, needs a patient and diligent revision of that list, as well as other preliminary measures. Hence the parochial committees, which, in their double character of circumscription and of permanence, are so admirably fitted for this task, have been found to afford very opportune assistance. It is to the municipalities that one must look for the means of emerging from the present miserable state. Upon them principally depends the good or bad turn of public affairs. Let the municipalities be renovated; this is the great work now for Italians to achieve. The administrative elections are, moreover, a school of discipline and organization which will prepare Catholics (if the time should come when that may be allowable through the permission of the Holy See, which at present it is not) to take part in political elections. But, apart from this, the concurrence of Catholics in the municipal elections is an object in itself, and a perfect work in itself. Many Catholics think it desirable, in drawing out the lists of candidates, to include as much as possible the names of men belonging to the most moderate of existing parties, in order to glean in their camp some votes, and thus have better prospects of success. Certainly the immediate object of any party in an electoral contest is

success. But if, to attain this end, transactions and compacts amongst each other may suit the revolutionary parties, Catholics ought to be very cautious in entering into any such combinations with them. Catholics ought to be on their guard against uniting in any common action with the notorious enemies of their faith. Catholics cannot boast of a triumph when the successful candidates are Liberals, albeit accepted by themselves. Neither can they boast of a triumph when, to secure the success of candidates accepted by them, the electors of other parties concurred. It is not to be denied that even amongst our adversaries there may be found honest men, men who have good intentions, and are sincerely desirous of the public welfare. But such men are very rare, and it is not very easy to recognize them with any security. This, however, is not the question. Catholics have two objects in taking part in the administrative elections; the one material, that is, good administration; the other moral, to secure a worthy representation in public affairs. It is clear that the moral object must always be far superior to the material. Now although honest Liberals may, through their ability and integrity, satisfy the requirements of material administration, they assuredly cannot satisfy those of a worthy representation of the faith and sentiments of Catholics. If, therefore, the second object cannot be attained, still more, if, with the certainty or at the expense of losing it, the first is alone aimed at, this is wrong. Rather ought the first object to be renounced. No doubt the ruin of finances, the waste of public money, and the wild extravagance of the municipalities, are matters which ought to move and interest all. But if it be most important to get men into them who will repair all this ruin, and arrest the progress of the evil, more desirable still is it to effect the moral regeneration of the municipality, that in it society may find its much-needed safeguard. The Christian spirit must enter into the commune, manifest itself in the teaching of the schools, in the management of pious works, in filial relations with the Church, in resistance to the revolutionary spirit, which would be the destruction of society. He only whose own breast is warmed by Christian charity can understand all this, and respond to such a mission. Catholic electors ought to unite to give their suffrages to men of this character.

The writer concludes by recommending most strongly to Catholics the establishment and propagation of committees for the work of Catholic Congresses. They have already effected signal good; and incalculable advantage may be anticipated from their multiplication and increased efficiency.

There have been a series of solid articles on the Syllabus and the Rule of Faith appearing for some months past in the *Scuola Cattolica*. Both that periodical and the *Civiltà Cattolica* have, of course, noticed at considerable length the Encyclical of the Holy Father. They have also given several able articles in succession on the subject of Emile Ollivier's insidious and mischievous book, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*.

FRENCH PERIODICALS.

Revue des Questions Historiques. Oct. 1879. Paris.

La Date et les Recensions du Liber Pontificalis.

UNDER this title the Abbé L. Duchesne, of the Catholic University of Paris, writes, chiefly in reply to an article by G. Waitz in the "Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde" (T. iv. part 2), "On the Different Texts of the Liber Pontificalis." In 1877, the Abbé Duchesne had published an essay* on the same "Liber," inquiring into its date, the MSS., and the sources of it. The German writer thinks differently from the French on several "important points." The French writer is not convinced and writes again. He hopes to put forth his opinions in better form in the annotated edition of the "Liber Pontificalis," which he has already commenced.

The Abbé looks for the date of the first edition of the "Liber" between the years 514 and 530. The first date is given by the passages borrowed from compositions evidently written during the contest of Pope Symmachus († 514) with the antipope Laurence. The second date from the Felician abridgment, which evidently saw the light about 530. But, for other reasons, the "Liber Pontificalis" is judged to have been drawn up before 530: 1°. The synchronism of Popes with the Emperors, and the consular dates which are wanting after Pope Damasus and reappear towards the end of the fifth century. As to the consular dates for Hormisdas, John I., and Felix IV., they reproduce exactly the formulæ found on the Roman epitaphs of the same years: an indication that the author of the "Liber" did not copy tables of the consuls, but followed the usage of his own time. 2° The character of the composition before and after the commencement of the sixth century. The composition grows more exact and historical from the time of St. Leo (440), whilst, previously, legendary documents are frequently made use of; but about the time of Anastasius II. and Symmachus the narrative differs little from history strictly so called, events being narrated as from personal acquaintance. 3° The same conclusion is strengthened by the polemical character of the "Liber Pontificalis;" in defending the Popes and carefully detailing the contentions of the anti-popes. During one of the agitated periods of rivals to the Papal authority it evidently was written; doubtless during that of Laurence against Pope Symmachus, which lasted a dozen years, and profoundly troubled the Roman Church. The crisis gave rise, we know, to a whole literature; and there is even a collection of the lives of the Popes written after the death of Symmachus by a partizan of Laurence. This last work indeed is the Laurentian "Liber Pontificalis," and challenges comparison with the Catholic! And if the former is really of the time of the schism, which no one doubts, why not also the Catholic?

* "Étude sur le Liber Pontificalis," in the Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome. Année 1877, 1er fascicule. Paris, Thouin.

As to the *first* compilation (*redaction*) of the "Liber Pontificalis," the Abbé Duchesne argues as follows:—There are two classes of MSS. At the head of the one stands that of Lucca (A), at the head of the other that of Naples (B). What is called the Felician Catalogue (F), or recension of 530, is not a first copy afterwards added to, but only an abridgment of, an earlier copy. The same may be said of the Verona manuscript, published by Bianchini, and which is here called the Cononian (C), because it ends at Pope Conon (687). Waitz contends that the text A has given by abbreviations the texts F and C, but that the text B, compared with A, is nearer the common original. The Abbé contends that the text A (Lucca) is both the more ancient and complete. This he proves, by detailed comparisons of the texts, thus—C and F are shown to be abridgments (but by independent writers, isolated and probably unaware of each other's work) of an older text, which is designated FC, and A and B, recensions of an anterior text, designated AB. The comparisons show that F and C have many omissions in common; but, strangely, both resume the narrative in the same terms. And this coincidence is only in those parts where the complete text AB may be lawfully suspected of not being primitive. FC is not, therefore, a *résumé* of AB, but a reproduction of an anterior manuscript. The article gives these comparisons, carefully instituted at length, with passages relating to the "Life of Symmachus," "Life of Hormisdas," of "John I," of "Felix IV," &c.

Having established a complete distinction between AB and FC, the Abbé decides that FC is anterior to AB. The gaps in the latter, in notices regarding Hormisdas, Symmachus, and John I, show that FC cannot be derived from it. This admission is made with regret, for does it not diminish the authority that we had believed might be attributed to the "Liber Pontificalis"? However, there still remain to be determined—if FC represents the original abridged, and AB the original altered—first, the connection between the two, and, secondly, the date of the latter. This double determination will show that the authority of the "Liber Pontificalis" loses little by this new conclusion, and that its testimony acquires in some cases a greater precision. For, from the discussion of these two points of connection and date, the learned author concludes:—

First, that the "Liber Pontificalis" was compiled shortly after the death of Pope Symmachus (514).

Secondly, that there were manuscripts of the first edition (*redaction*) (FC) which ended with the notice of Felix IV. This is very ingeniously proved (p. 518).

Thirdly, that these manuscripts no longer exist, but from them were made the abridgments ending with Felix IV. and with Conon.

Fourthly, that the actual text (AB) represents, up to the death of Felix IV. inclusively, a recasting (*remaniement*) of the primitive text, executed about the year 539.

And lastly, that of the two families of manuscripts of the actual text, that which has the Lucca (A) manuscript as its type is the nearest to the common original.

It is impossible in a brief *résumé* to compress the minute and lengthened argument on texts, style, &c. The article is both well and pleasantly written, and an admirable example of close observation and original research.

Notices of Books.

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.A., M.P. London: Macmillan.

A MOST healthy reaction shows signs of setting in against the Antitheistic Philosophy. Of late years, it seems to us, Theists have exhibited a good deal too much deference to that philosophy. They have urged, indeed, most forcibly and inexpugnably, the utter wreck of *morality* which would inevitably ensue, if the principles, now so current among scientific men, were to spread throughout the community: but of those principles on their *intellectual* side, they have spoken (it seems to us) with very misplaced deference. And this deference is the more regrettable, because the scientists themselves are much given to swagger. These commonly speak, as though their own intellectual position were impregnable and even unassailable; nay, as though their method of argument might be taken as a standard, by which all other methods should reasonably be measured. Mr. Mallock has set an admirable example of resistance to this pretentious bounce; and, in the DUBLIN REVIEW of last July, a contributor commemorated the singularly great value of his labours. Mr. Balfour, whom we are now to notice, is very far from possessing that keen theological insight, or that epigrammatic brilliancy of expression, which distinguish Mr. Mallock. But, on the other hand, he is a good deal more versed in hard philosophical thought, and in solid philosophical studies. In fact, we shall be a good deal surprised, if this work do not originate a new era in English philosophy.

How contemptuous is his tone towards the philosophical system of existing scientists, will be plain by a few specimens. "The system" of these scientists, "is, as a whole, incapable of any rational defence" (p. 315). "I am not acquainted with any kind of defect to which systems of belief are liable, under which the existent scientific system of belief cannot properly be said to suffer" (p. 293). "Science, as it is now cultivated, is a system of belief which, for anything we can allege to the contrary, is wholly without proof" (p. 287). Nay, the existing scientific system, as a whole, is "self-contradictory and therefore impossible" (p. 292). Certain "eminent authors" are "anxious to purvey for that apparently increasing class of persons, who aspire to be advanced thinkers, but who like to have their advanced thinking done for them. . . . Yet it would have required, I should have thought, much less philosophical know-

ledge and philosophical acumen than that possessed, for example, by Mr. Leslie Stephen or Professor Huxley, to suggest to their mind doubts as to the rational character of the dogmatic system in which they so confidently put their trust" (pp. 308, 309). And all these statements derive ten-fold importance from the fact, that they do not proceed from some ignorant and random writer, but on the contrary are based on a course of abstruse and searching philosophical investigation. We do not deny that some of Mr. Balfour's successive statements impress us as being over-strained. But taking them on the whole, we are quite confident that the existing race of scientists—including such psychologists as Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Bain—will find themselves entirely unable to resist his knock-down assault. Nor would it at all surprise us if they shirked the difficulty by preserving profound silence on Mr. Balfour's volume; and if they indulged in a hope (some-what like that of the proverbial ostrich) that the book will escape the notice of others, because *they* are afraid to look it in the face.

Few occupations would have interested us more, than that of examining Mr. Balfour's structure as a whole, and dwelling in detail on our respective points of agreement and disagreement with him. In particular we should have liked to compare his criticisms of Mr. Stuart Mill with those which we have ourselves put forth from time to time. But we have neither leisure nor space for this; and we must content ourselves with a brief statement, on one or two salient and critical points.

We have already said, that Mr. Balfour's *destructive* criticism is (in our humble judgment) as regards its essential particulars entirely irresistible. But his *affirmative* position is (to say the least) eccentric. This position is explicitly exhibited in his chapter on "Practical Results"; but it is implied in many earlier parts of the volume. There are two great co-ordinate and rival "systems of belief"—he considers—the system of "Religion" and the system of "Science." Neither of these can be truly said to rest on any solid basis of reasoning whatsoever. Nevertheless I "feel a practical need for both" (p. 320); and for this reason accept them both as true. Not, indeed, that any "legitimate argument can be founded on the mere existence of this need or impulse" (p. 320). Still "men ought not to give up on speculative grounds" "any great principle" (p. 145). Since, therefore—such is Mr. Balfour's conclusion—neither "Religion" nor "Science" has as yet received any kind of reasonable proof, and yet a belief in both is to me a necessity of existence, I *will* believe in both. As centuries pass on, perhaps one or other, or the two, may receive satisfactory proof; and, if so, things will be in a very much more satisfactory state. Such is the outcome of Mr. Balfour's argument; and it presents a memorable instance indeed of the straits to which non-Catholic philosophy may drive a singularly fair and upright mind. On our side we would reply in some such way as the following.

As far as Religion is concerned, we dissent more strongly than we can well say from Mr. Balfour's assumption, that no sufficient grounds can be drawn out for its truth. Whether it be Theism, or Christ-

ianity in general, or Catholicism in particular, we are quite confident that superabundant intellectual warrant can be exhibited for firmest belief. This, however, is a question which obviously it did not fall within Mr. Balfour's plan to discuss. As regards "Science"—for the most part no doubt we are heartily at one with Mr. Balfour in his crushing criticism of the various philosophical theories on which scientists have rested their speculations. But still we have two adverse comments to make even on this head. First, it seems to us that the author quite amazingly underrates the amount of proof furnished to the truth of "Science," by the experienced *verification* of its various conclusions, and by the opportunity given to every one of repeating that verification. In page 303, indeed, he seems alive to the force of this consideration. In speaking of "Science," he refers to "the palpable witness which material results bear to the excellence of its methods." But, in page 147, he says that "verification is not a separate or distinct kind of proof." Surely it is a kind of proof *entirely* separate and distinct. When "Science" tells me (see Mill's "Logic") that the combination of any oil and any alkali produces a soap—surely the fact, that I can try the experiment on any oil and any alkali I please, gives me a proof different in kind from any which I can have, *e.g.*, for the Blessed Trinity. There may be entirely conclusive arguments for the fact, that this latter dogma is divinely revealed: we are confident there *are*. Still there is not this particular argument.

As regards the philosophical basis of "Science"—we wrote a few words thereon in an article on "Ethics" which appears in the present number, before we had read Mr. Balfour's book. Our humble view is briefly this: In the first place, the scientists of this day generally pride themselves on the logical satisfactoriness of their philosophical position; and regard with a contempt, which is itself contemptible, every appeal to *implicit* grounds of belief. This swaggering and self-confident attitude is shown triumphantly by Mr. Balfour to be ludicrously indefensible; to be more like the ranting of a tyrant in burlesque, than the utterances of any grave thinker. Nevertheless, we can by no means go Mr. Balfour's length, in regarding the conclusions of "Science" as destitute of full foundation in reason. And this is our second adverse criticism on Mr. Balfour's attitude towards the scientists. We will take two doctrines in particular, on which (as he truly says) the whole fabric of "Science" rests; viz., (1) the persistence of the universe, and (2) the uniformity of nature. We may concede to him that as yet no course of argument has been explicitly exhibited, which conclusively establishes these two doctrines. But then we appeal to what Catholic philosophers call the "*sensus naturæ communis*." See, *e.g.*, *Liberatore's "Logic,"* n. 201. The intellect is so formed, says that philosopher, as to arrive at truth by the working of its own laws, whether or no it *reflect* on its various movements. If, therefore, it be found that there are judgments universally accepted by all mankind—and which only became more deeply rooted as one generation succeeds another and as knowledge makes advance—we may be certain that those judgments are true; even though

we may not have succeeded in analyzing the process, whereby man's intellect has advanced to their formation. Prominent in their number are those of which we speak: the persistency of the universe, and the uniformity of nature. The true philosopher (we consider) takes for granted the truth of these and similar judgments, and labours as best he can to transform implicit reasoning into explicit argument. We cannot, however, here enlarge on this theme, which will occupy an important place in future articles of our philosophical series.

There is one other particular in Mr. Balfour's volume, to which we are very desirous of calling attention. Most reasonably the author lays great stress throughout on those "*ultimate* beliefs," which are necessary as the foundation of all possible knowledge. Now (as he most acutely points out)—although these beliefs have no *reason* other than themselves, because (by hypothesis) they are *ultimate*—yet they certainly have *causes* other than themselves. As he tersely puts it (p. 291), they are "products," though they are not "conclusions." But now may not their *causes* be such as to throw doubt on their *trustworthiness*? My mind is so constituted, as to account certain judgments self-evidently true. But how *comes* my mind to be so constituted, according to the theory of evolution, which is just now in fashion? No other cause can be conceived for this momentous fact, except that the prolonged operation of psychical and physical causes has duly issued in this result. But what power have I of knowing, or even of reasonably guessing, that a mind thus generated possesses the singular privilege of exemption from false vouchments? And this difficulty is by no means exclusively urgent against the theory of *evolution*. Suppose we fall back on (what we of course account the true) doctrine of *creation*: the same difficulty recurs in a different shape. "We might imagine it to be a conclusion derivable from our ultimate beliefs, that those beliefs are implanted in us by a being, who had the power, and invariably had the wish, to mislead and deceive us" (p. 275). And even as things are, what power have I of knowing, or even of reasonably guessing, that I have not *in fact* been created by such a being? It is simply impossible to escape from this dilemma, until we take refuge in that theory of certitude, which was universally held by the philosophers anterior to Descartes. If our readers will look at the earlier part of our article on "*Ethics*," they will see more clearly what we here intend. And we offer this theory as a *terra firma* to Mr. Balfour, who seems grievously in *need* of a *terra firma*.

We repeat, however. The eccentricity of Mr. Balfour's affirmative position in no degree lessens the incontrovertible force of his destructive arguments. We only long for the day, when Mr. Herbert Spencer, or Dr. Bain, or Professor Huxley shall attempt an express reply to the volume.

W. G. WARD.

De Virtutibus Infusis. Prælectiones quas habebat CAMILLUS MAZZELLA, S. J. Romæ. Typ. Propaganda Fide. 1879. Londini: Burns et Oates.

FATHER MAZZELLA'S name as a Professor of Theology and as a writer is too well known to require any commendation from us of this new work from his pen. Holding, as he does, the important Chair of Theology in what ought to be the Roman College, he has given to the world, as he formerly did when at Woodstock, the fruits of his professional lessons in a volume of some eight hundred pages. His subject is the "Infused Virtues;" and we have an elaborate discussion of Faith, Hope, and Charity, with a short Article on the "Gifts of the Holy Ghost." After the preliminary observations, the author chiefly expends his labour in the important subject of Faith, which occupies by itself some 450 pp. out of the volume. We find discussed the "object" of Faith, the "act" of Faith, the office of the Church in regard to Faith (including a fairly complete treatise on the inspiration and interpretation of Scripture), and the office of Reason before and after Faith. Every theological reader will know at once how fertile is each of these grand divisions. Father Mazzella is both learned and practical. He knows how to uphold the lofty traditions of his chair, and to handle, in the spirit of his great predecessors, the most intimate and difficult problems of scholastic theology; as witness his clear exposition of the controversy between Suarez and De Lugo in regard to the "ultimate" analysis of the act of Faith. And he is not above giving full and useful explanations in such matters as the various "notes" with which the Church is accustomed to brand condemned propositions.

Father Mazzella is not a Petavius or a Franzelin. We do not expect to find in his pages that immense mass of orderly learning which has been left behind him by the former, or those luminous generalizations from Scripture and the Fathers which the latter has given to a generation that had almost ceased to believe in the possibility of novel treatment in theology. Father Mazzella is a teacher; he weighs other men's words; he analyzes the arguments of by-gone giants; he enforces on neophytes the necessary knowledge without which they cannot be called educated divines. There seems to be an unusually large amount of quotation in this work. If we had a fault to find it might be that he confines his citations to one region alone of the scholastic universe. St. Thomas of Aquin, of course, is an exception; but, after that exception, it is seldom we meet any name cited at length save the great Jesuits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The great Dominican school is hardly referred to; the Franciscans are quoted, but very rarely. In regard to the form of the work, we cannot but think that Father Mazzella's excessive use of the explicit syllogism is apt to be repulsive to readers. We are enthusiastic advocates of strict syllogistic discussion in the class-exercises of students, but in a published work, which is not meant as a mere manual for class, a freer manner would have both saved valuable space and made it more easy for the reader to follow the argument.

Das Salomonische Sprachbuch. Uebersetzt und erklärt, von Dr. AUG. ROHLING, Professor der Theologie an der K. K. Carl-Ferdinand Universität in Prag. Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1879. (Solomon's Proverbs, translated and explained by Dr. AUG. ROHLING, Professor of Theology in the University of Prague. Mayence: Kirchheim. 1879.)

WE are still suffering from the havoc which the Revolution wrought in the monastic orders and in Catholic universities. To a great extent learning has fallen into the hands of the Philistines, and nowhere is this disastrous result more easy to perceive than in the field of Old-Testament exegesis. The vast majority of Hebrew grammars, of commentaries on the Hebrew Scriptures, of introductions to the Old Testament, which have appeared during the century, have come from Protestants and Jews. Mostly, these books are written in an infidel or semi-infidel spirit. Even the better Protestant commentators are Protestant after all. We have often wished that we had at least one commentary on every book of the Hebrew Bible, written in a Catholic spirit, and at the same time abreast of recent historical discoveries, and of that great advance which has been made during the last sixty years in Hebrew philology. For this reason we welcome Dr. Rohling's present work with the most sincere pleasure. He has given us a commentary on a very difficult book of Holy Scripture, a commentary which is written in an eminently Catholic spirit, and which at the same time supplies the young scholar with all that he need have, to master the difficulties of the Hebrew text.

In a very clear introduction of some twenty pages, Dr. Rohling clearly states the different views entertained by modern critics on the authorship of the book. He conveys an intelligible and fair idea of the arguments adduced by Ewald, Hitzig, Delitzsch and other well-known critics, and he defends the traditional view with strong and sensible reasons. We have found the commentary itself, which covers nearly 400 pages, exceedingly clear. Pains are taken to develop the connection of ideas; points of grammar and lexicography are carefully considered, and much matter of great theological importance will be found—*e.g.*, in the treatment of the famous chapter on the Eternal Wisdom.

There is a valuable appendix in which Dr. Bickell's theory on Hebrew metre, which Dr. Rohling adopts, is tested by being applied to the book of Proverbs throughout. We do not possess Dr. Bickell's book, and we could have wished that Dr. Rohling had explained the theory of this distinguished Catholic scholar on Hebrew metre more fully. We must also protest against Dr. Rohling's habit of using Roman letters to express Hebrew words, a purpose for which Roman letters are utterly unsuitable. To write Greek words in Roman letters would be barbarous, but to write Hebrew under the Roman character is a sheer impossibility. Indeed, Dr. Rohling covers his Latin letters with a series of dots and marks, so that he, in fact, invents a new and very ugly alphabet. We are also disposed to regret Dr. Rohling's habit of digressing from the subject in hand, and

making remarks upon things in general. But after all these are slight blemishes in a very useful and excellent commentary.

Die Prophezei des Joel und ihre Ausleger von den ältesten Zeiten bis zu den Reformatoren. VON ADALBERT MERX, Doct. Theol. et Phil.; Beigegeben ist der äthiopische Text bearbeitet von Prof. S. A. DILLMANN. Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses. 1879. (*The Prophecy of Joel and its Interpreters, from the Earliest Times down to the Reformers.* By ALBERT MERX, Doct. Theol. et Phil.; with an Appendix, containing the Ethiopic Text, by Prof. Dr. A. DILLMANN. Halle: Published at the Orphanage. 1879.)

THERE can be no doubt about the learning and industry which this book displays. By far the larger part is occupied with a history of all that has been written on the prophet Joel, by Fathers of the Church, by Jewish Rabbins, by Catholic mediæval writers, by Luther and Calvin. This part of his work Dr. Merx, already well known as one of the most distinguished among Syriac scholars, seems to have done most thoroughly and completely. In fact, he has supplied us with a very useful introduction to the history of Old Testament exegesis. It has always appeared to us that there are few things less interesting than a long catalogue of opinions culled from authors of all sorts and all ages on the meaning of a particular text. The reader becomes wearied with the interminable series of divergent interpretations; he finds them hard to follow at the moment, and impossible to remember afterwards. But Dr. Merx has made his history of interpretation at once interesting and instructive. Each commentator is treated separately. An account is given of his method of interpretation. We are told enough about his life and circumstances to make us understand his position, and the influences under which he came. Then we have a full analysis, with considerable extracts, from his commentary on Joel, so that we end with a tolerably clear idea of his way of looking at Scripture, and the reasons which led him to take a particular text in a particular way. Many will welcome the account given of the Rabbinical commentaries. This is a subject which is beyond the reach of most students, and in which Dr. Merx is evidently quite at home. Even the theologian will find much useful information in this section of the book. We may refer especially to the account given of the views which Maimonides held on prophecy, and the comparison of his views on this subject with those of St. Thomas. Of course Dr. Merx writes like a Protestant, but on the whole he is fair and dispassionate.

We cannot say so much for the first hundred pages of the book, in which Dr. Merx attempts to ascertain the date of Joel and the meaning of his prophecy. There is nothing in the text of Joel himself which absolutely obliges us to place him at any definite period of Jewish history; but it is plain, from the place assigned to him among the Minor Prophets in the Hebrew Canon, that early Jewish tradition regarded him as one of the earliest prophets. The Septuagint places him later, but still

before the exile. Modern scholars as a rule have been content to follow the early tradition on this point; and we cannot but think they are right. Joel had seen the land of Judah desolated by drought and by swarms of locusts; he summons the people to penance; he warns them that the "day of the Lord" is near. The people seem to have been obedient to the Divine call. "The Lord hath been zealous for his land and hath spared his people" (ii. 18; so the Vulgate, and this is undoubtedly, as Dr. Merx himself admits, the sense of the Hebrew text as it stands). Then Joel tells the people that the day of the Lord will indeed come, but that it will be a day of wrath—not for the Jews—not at least for the "residue whom the Lord will call" (ii. 32), but for the heathen. God will judge them in the valley of Josephat, while upon the true Israel he will pour out his Spirit. All seems to indicate an early date. The enemies of Judah are not the Assyrians or Chaldeans, but Tyre and Sidon, and the Philistines. Joel counts upon the submission of the people. He does not speak to "a rebellious house," like Ezekiel. He has not even the difficulties which beset Isaias. As we have said, we do not believe it possible to fix an exact date; but when Ewald places him in the early part of the reign of Joas, *i.e.*, about the middle of the 9th century B.C., he probably makes a good guess at the truth.

Dr. Merx, on the other hand, places Joel about 400 B.C. He supposes that the locusts were merely seen in apocalyptic vision, with an allusion to Exod. x. 14. "The prophet," says Dr. Merx, "places himself (in imagination) at the end of time, and addresses himself to the generation which is to see the last judgment." Nothing can be more forced. "Tell you of this," the prophet says, "to your children, and let your children tell their children, and their children to another generation." We wish we had space to consider Dr. Merx's supposed indication of a late period in the prophecy. We must be content with a single specimen; it is a fair sample of the arguments employed. Joel puts great stress upon the "meat offering," while the earlier prophets, according to Dr. Merx, who holds the most extreme views on the late origin of the Pentateuch, never mention the "meat offering" with respect. Surely when Isaias says, "Bring no more a meat offering of vanity" (Is. 1—13, Heb. text), he does approve of the meat offering and objects to its profanation, otherwise we must suppose that Isaias rejected every part of the temple service, a conclusion too extreme for Dr. Merx and much too extreme for common sense.

Compendium Theologiæ R. P. Thomæ ex Charmes, Ordin. Minor. Cap. Ad usum Examinandorum edid. Dr. DE ESSEN. Ratisbon: Manz.

TO those who are preparing for passing their examination before taking holy orders, we recommend this new edition of a small but valuable manual of theology. F. Thomas ex Charmes, together with F. Gervasius, of Breisach, both of them Capuchins of the seventeenth century, have left us excellent manuals of theology, distinguished

by a simple, clear, but correct explanation of the Catholic doctrine. This present edition is accurate and beautiful, and deserves a wide circulation.

Meletematum Romanorum Mantissa. Recensuit Hugo Laemmer. Ratisbon. Manz. 1875.

THE author of this work, widely renowned in Germany for his scholarly attainments, was formerly Professor of Protestant Theology in the University of Berlin, but as early as 1858, when comparatively a young man, was converted to the Catholic Church. His conversion was prepared by his book on the "Pre-Tridentine Catholic Theology at the Time of the Reformation," on which the Berlin professors passed a most eulogistic judgment. In examining whatever had been published on the part of the Catholic divines at the time of the Reformation before the Council of Trent, Dr. Laemmer very soon detected that they exactly agreed with the Canons of that Council itself. Being ordained priest he betook himself to Rome, and with unrivalled diligence began to examine the archives and libraries of the centre of Christendom. Mgr. Marini used to say that the archives of the Holy See, from the vast quantity and immense value of their documents, excel all other archives in Europe, being the archives not of one country, but rather of every Christian land. For thorough knowledge of the immense manuscript treasures heaped up in Rome, there is amongst German divines, not even excepting the late Father Theiner, none to be compared to Dr. Laemmer. In the course of time he published a new and accurate edition, with Latin translation, of Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History, "Anecdota Romana," "Monumenta Vaticana, una cum fragmentis Neapolitanis et Florentinis," "Für Kirchengeschichte des 16 und 17 Jahrhunderts," "De Leonis Alatii Codicibus qui Romæ in Bibliothecâ Vallicellanâ asservantur Sohedi-asma," "Scriptorum Græciæ Orthodoxæ Bibliotheca selecta," and "In decreta Concilii Ruthenorum Zamosciensis animadversiones Theologico-canonicæ." When the Prince-Bishop of Breslau, Dr. Foerster, celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his priesthood, he was presented by Dr. Laemmer with the "Mantissa." I will first indicate the contents of the book and afterwards touch on the most prominent matters, principally those in which English Catholics may be interested. After the Prolegomena follow—(1) De constitutione Joannis XXII. quæ incipit: Quia vir reprobus. (2) Apparatus ad Græciæ Orthodoxæ Scriptores Critici. (3) Analecta Tridentina. (4) Ex actis consistorialibus et diariis pontificalibus. (5) Anecdota Borghesiana. (6) Ex Schedis Sirleti, Baronii, Bellarmini. (7) Spicilegium Jansenisticum et Quietisticum. (8) Segmina varia. The Mantissa opens with two important documents taken from *Cod. Vatican.* 7187, a criticism of Cardinal Bellarmin on the aforesaid Constitution of John XXII., and a reply written, by command of Paul V., by Mgr. Penia, Spanish auditor of the Rota. Bellarmin adduces as his principal argument for this bull not being inserted in the *Corpus* of the Extrava-

gantes, its departure from the Bull of Nicholas III., "Exiit qui seminat." Penia is very severe, sometimes, it seems to me, too severe, in confuting Bellarmin. But, after all, we agree with Penia's view: "Neither Nicholas nor John did err; each of them has spoken truly and in accordance with the Gospel about the poverty of Christ and the Apostles . . . because Christ has instituted two states of poverty for two classes of the perfect, and it was these divers states which the Pontiffs were explaining in their respective constitutions." *Cod. Vallicel.* 61, gives a minute account of the discussions held in the consistory June 10th, 1521, about the title to be conferred on Henry VIII. of England, in recognition of his book on the Seven Sacraments. Cardinel Wolsey, in a letter to Leo X., asked for such a distinction. Several propositions were made; for instance, to give the king the title "Orthodoxus" or "Gloriosus." It was finally agreed to bestow on him the name of "Fidei Defensor," a title borne by the English monarchs to our own days. *Cod. Corsin.* 42, contains the solemn decree by which Clement VII. declared the marriage between Henry and Catherine to be valid and indissoluble. *Cod. Corsin.* 680, gives a succinct history of Mary, Queen of Scots, written in Italian, whilst the acts of Consistory in *Cod. Corsin.* 145, refer to the death of the unhappy princess in a very unusual manner: "Elisabetha vero, ut immanitatem magis indicaret expleretque suam, ejus caput in cubiculum ad se afferri jussit, eoque ipso die per civitatem regia pompa equitavit" ("Mantissa," p. 232). On the contrary, Queen Mary's body was interred in Peterborough Cathedral and brought to Westminster Abbey only in the reign of her son James I. From "Mantissa," page 261, we may gather the effect produced in Rome by the βασιλικὸν δῶρον of King James I. The claim on the part of princes to unlimited power over the religion of their subjects was supported, though unconsciously, both by a great many English Catholic priests, who thought it to be lawful to take the oath of allegiance, and by the book published in France by Barclay "De Potestate Papæ: an et quatenus in reges et principes seculares jus et imperium habet." The Nuncio at Paris, Ubaldini, writing to Cardinal Borghese, styles the book which the English Arch-priest had written with a view to justify himself, "pestilentissimo in favore del giuramento." ("Mantissa," 256, 295.) From several letters directed by the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Nuncio in Belgium we learn how great was the solicitude of the Holy See for the English exiled for their faith. The section, "Ex Schedis Sirleti, Baronii et Bellarmini," presents us with several precious documents of those great ecclesiastics, hitherto unknown. We cannot but be deeply impressed in reading the nine short but thoughtful letters of Baronius, at a rather advanced period of this religious life, to his beloved parents. From a letter of Cardinal Bellarmin we learn that it was he himself who asked Cardinal du Perron to urge on the Pope the necessity of dissolving the Congregation de Auxiliis, because most Catholic divines disliked the doctrine of the *prædeterminatio physica*. The Pope followed this advice. In the "Spicilegium Jansenisticum et Quietisticum," we meet with the "judicium Cardinalis de Lugo de libro de frequenti communione" (published

by Arnould), the letter written by the Louvain University in order to prevent Urban VIII.'s Bull against the Jansenists from being published, a report of the recantation of Molinus, and a long account written by Bossuet, "de Quietissimo in Galliis refutato," in order to vindicate the course he had followed in his difference with Fénélon.

B.

De Martyrologio Romano Parergon Historico Criticon. Scripsit Hugo Laemmer. Ratisbon: Manz. 1878.

THE student of liturgy will take no small interest in Dr. Laemmer's last work on the Roman Martyrology. For a long time our author has been said to be occupied in writing Cardinal Baronius's biography. Certainly he would be the right man to undertake a task encompassed by considerable difficulties. Perhaps no one in Germany is so thoroughly conversant with the manuscripts of the Roman archives concerning Baronius. This learned treatise on the Martyrology is for the most part filled up with details about Cardinal Baronius. Dr. Laemmer principally dwells on two points. He inquires, first, who were the men appointed by Gregory XIII.'s decree, 14th January, 1584, to prepare the new edition of the Martyrology. Secondly, he directs himself to the establishing of those principles of criticism by which the members of the Commission were guided in their important work. Laemmer refutes Father Theiner's opinion, who erroneously thought Baronius to be the only editor, mistaking a copy of the Martyrology with notes by Baronius for the autograph itself. On the contrary, there were in the Commission, besides Cæsar Baronius, Silvius Antonianus, Ludovicus de Torres, Aloysius Sirletus, Gerhardus Vossius, and others; but Baronius, whom Cardinal Sirletus had appointed a member, was foremost amongst his colleagues. The results of their labours are not entirely free from objection; but whatever, according to the literary means of that time, was in their reach, they have fully attained. D'Achery and Martène had not then edited the "Martyrologium Hieronymianum," nor Rosweyd the "Martyrologium Romanum Parvum," nor had the Bollandists published the true Martyrology of Bede purified from the arbitrary editions of Florus. Besides his occupation as member of the aforesaid commission, Baronius devoted his energy to supply the new edition with notes, both critical and historical, some of which by command of the Pope were attached to the edition of 1584. Lastly, Baronius wrote a learned introduction to the Martyrology, prefixed to the new edition of Benedict XIV. and Pius IV. It was his brother in religion, Giovenale Ancina, who afterwards assisted Baronius in bringing out a new edition of the Sistine Martyrology at Antwerp, from the Plantinian Press. We are deeply indebted to the immense exertions of Dr. Laemmer for having put before us the pains taken by Cardinal Baronius in performing his great task, and the intercourse he entered into with divines in Italy, Spain, France, and Germany. Dr. Laemmer ends with a criticism of the recent

editions of this liturgical book. May the *πάρεργον* very soon be followed by the *ἔργον*, viz., the long expected biography of Cardinal Baronius. B.

Ungedruckte Anglo-Normannische Geschichtsquellen. Herausgegeben von F. LIEBERMANN. Strassburg, 1879. 8vo. (Inedited Materials of Anglo-Norman History. By F. Liebermann).

WITHOUT attempting to deny the present advantages of the plan adopted for the publication of the Rolls series of "Chronicles and Memorials," its warmest advocate cannot but feel that it is attended with drawbacks that must seriously detract from the permanent value of the collection. It is hard to complain of an undertaking of this nature, which, in twenty years, has added to the library shelves its goodly row of more than a hundred and fifty volumes; yet the fact remains, that, however excellent the editions of some authors or chroniclers may be, the value of others is seriously affected by the failure to observe a due order in selecting the works for publication. There was good reason in the rule first laid down, that inedited materials should have the preference. Much depended, however, on the immediate choice of such materials. This choice, it is to be feared, was not always determined by a single view to future usefulness. There is one class of English historical memorials which was neglected by the editors of the 17th and 18th centuries, and which has hitherto been almost untouched in the Rolls series, viz., the *minor annals*. It is quite natural that editors should not have readily turned their attention in this direction. There is nothing to invite, and little to reward their labour: the documents are scattered; the MSS., from the number of later entries in various hands, are frequently troublesome; and, whilst the matter is meagre, the task of tracing much of it to its sources is laborious and irksome; finally, after this process is completed, there is little new in what is left, since these annals have themselves been frequently adopted as a foundation, or have been otherwise worked up, by later compilers.

But in this relation, precisely, of the greater to the lesser annals lies the importance of these latter; a relation to the clearing up of which hardly anything has as yet been done in England. Whilst engaged in preparations for an edition of portions of some English chronicles for the *Monumenta Germaniæ*, the editor of the volume now under notice found himself under the necessity of examining these long despised minor annals, in order to gain a basis for the criticism of better known and more generally favoured works. Without aiming at systematic completeness, he has found means—(to use the words of a competent judge, Professor Pauli, in the Göttingen *Nachrichten*, 1879, p. 330)—of at last letting in light on the smaller English annals.

The minor annals here collected are fourteen in number. Those from Canterbury, as being partly (up to the year 1130) in Anglo-Saxon, hold the place of honour; others follow from Reading, Peterborough, St. Edmundsbury, Colchester, St. Albans, Winchester,

Rochester, St. Augustine's Canterbury, Chichester, Battle, and Plympton; these last being one of the rare and scanty remnants of historical memorials from the monasteries of Devon. Each piece is preceded by an introduction, giving an account of the MS. from which it is derived, with a notice of such new, original, or corrected information as it may afford; the sources are indicated in the margin, and the borrowed matter is shown in the text, by variations of type, with a minuteness which may perhaps not fully commend itself to an English eye; the text is illustrated by abundant notes; the index is excellent.

The editor has bestowed particular care on his print of the older Winchester Annals (p. 61, *sqq.*), and on those of Rouen (p. 35, *sqq.*) The interest of both is purely literary; the former for their connection with the ancient Latin annals which preceded the extant Saxon Chronicles, and which seem to have found their way to some Continental monasteries in the ninth century; the latter, which were brought to England at the Conquest, as forming the groundwork, henceforward, of so many English annalistic compilations. The discussion on the later "Winchester-Waverley Annals" (pp. 173—182) deserves attention, as bearing on the origin and mutual relation of several of the important works comprised in Dr. Luard's "*Annales Monastici*."

The St. Edmundsbury Annals are of considerable value for the reign of King John. The years 1200 to 1211 are derived from the same (lost) source as Roger of Wendover's Chronicle; while, therefore, affording few additional facts, their importance is not slight in enabling us in some degree to see how the St. Alban's monk, by insertions here and there, or at times by a slight twist in his statement of facts, gave the particular colouring to his narrative, which has been unreservedly allowed by later historians. The resemblance to Wendover ends with 1211. The events of the year 1212 are told at considerable length (pp. 150—155) by a contemporary, who had the best sources of information: unfortunately, the mutilation of the MS. has deprived us, at a critical moment, of the help of a writer, whose trustworthy guidance in the all-important events of the next few years would have been of the greatest value.

The Chichester Annals (p. 87) afford a succession of Bishops of Selsey somewhat different from that generally received. To the hagiologist the notice of a hitherto unknown translation of the relics of St. Grimbald in 934, will be of interest (p. 88); as also the examination in Anselm's absence of the relics of St. Elfege, at Canterbury, in 1105 (p. 5), which the editor, in all probability rightly, brings into connection with the celebrated dispute in Lanfranc's time as to the sanctity of the English archbishop.

The three last pieces in the volume are of a different character: Hermann's "Miracles of St. Edmund the Martyr," the second part of Eadmer's "Miracles of St. Anselm," and three fragments of Matthew Paris's "Life of Stephen Langton." The late Sir Frederick Madden some years ago discovered a single scrap of this lost "Life"; the present editor has had the good fortune to find two more leaves. He has subjected these remains to a sharp criticism, which does justice to Matthew's methods, but is not calculated to raise our esteem for his scrupulousness, or his accuracy in this particular case.

Of Hermann's miracles of St. Edmund, a small portion (not here

repeated) had already been printed (not in England, but) by Martène in the 6th volume of his "Amplissima Collectio;" the larger and most interesting part of the work appears for the first time in Dr. Liebermann's book. The author was not an Englishman by birth, though, like his contemporaries, Folcard and Goscelin, he had become in many ways English in thought and feeling, and used his pen to celebrate the glory of an English saint. This change does not prevent him from casting back, now and then, a longing glance to the glorious land of France (pp. 231, 244): Paris is to him a spot in all things bright as paradise (p. 231), whilst London is only the wealthiest of English cities—a home of the great and powerful, but with no saints of its own (p. 235). Though in a strange land, and himself apparently not a Norman, Hermann made his way in the world. He became secretary to Bishop Herfast, of Elmham, to whom he would seem to have been somewhat akin in character. The sounding wordiness of the servant corresponded to the pomposity and pretentiousness of the prelate, his master, as described by Malmesbury. From his confidential position, Hermann was privy to all Herfast's designs, and of course deeply concerned in that scheme of his for transferring the Episcopal See (which eventually passed, through Thetford, to Norwich) from the old decayed town of Elmham to the richly endowed Abbey of St. Edmundsbury. The Abbey was the more an object of desire, inasmuch as its privileges, exemptions, and pre-eminences gave it a position of independence not at all in accordance with the views of the diocesan. Much of the burden of the long and bitter struggle fell on Hermann; it was he who conducted the correspondence with Rome, and he was continually at the Bishop's side when urging on his suit in William's court at home. St. Edmund carried the day, but Hermann remained with his master up to his death. Then he saw his opportunity, and going over straight from the Bishop's chancery into the ranks of the opposition, he joined the community of St. Edmundsbury. Here, too, he was not suffered to remain long in obscurity: he became the Abbot's official in spiritualities, and Abbot Baldwin's right-hand man, as he had been Bishop Herfast's.

Although its inflated style makes the work anything but pleasant reading, the author has known how to relieve the sameness of the stories he has to tell by so many interesting incidents and personal notices that he throws a welcome side light on English life, and some points of English history of the second half, especially, of the 11th century:—

Canute's care for the education of young clerics (p. 236); Edward's encouragement of learning (p. 238); a graphic picture of a swaggering Danish noble (p. 243). The sea passage in the eleventh century is described: the ship holds about 60 passengers; six-and-thirty beasts, sixteen horses with a heavy cargo of merchandize, complete the equipment; in a three days' storm all these last (with the exception of the horse of the hero of the tale who takes care not to let him go) are thrown overboard (p. 262). Elsewhere (p. 281) another such boat is mentioned as carrying about 64 people, who were all on their return home from Rome. The pilgrimage thither was not confined to the higher classes. A villanus of St. Edmundsbury is noticed as making the journey—a man doubtless

in a comfortable position in life since he brings back with him from the holy city some crystals which were fine enough to be offered to his patron (pp. 270, 272). The treatise contains several notices of the cultus of this English saint abroad, notably at Lucca, in the Cathedral of which city an altar was raised in his honour:* incidentally we learn that the floor of that church was at times strewn with fragrant thyme leaves, instead of the straw or rushes used in our Northern clime. Dr. Freeman may find a word or two on behalf of a favourite idea, though Edward perhaps is hardly an "imperial king" (p. 238) according to his mind. Of course the great personages concerned in the St. Edmundsbury struggle are not forgotten.

The Miracles of St. Anselm are of inferior value, though any memorial of a man of the capacity and eminence of Eadmer, especially when he comes to speak of himself, cannot fail to be of interest. The editor has prefixed to this section a carefully drawn up and appreciative account of this Canterbury monk, who played a not unimportant part in the history of his time; and if we may detect here and there (p. 214 *sqq.*, pp. 298, 299) echoes from a region where the omnipotence of the State is an article of faith, and the omnipotence of God is practically regarded as an exploded belief, they will be overlooked in view of the desire so scrupulously manifested to do no injustice to the personages whose character is discussed. We may conclude by repeating the wish expressed (p. 302) for a new and complete edition of the works of Eadmer; and would add, for ourselves, a hope that the task may fall to one so competent for it as the Editor of the present volume.

Irish Saints in Great Britain. By the Right Rev. PATRICK F. MORAN, D.D., Bishop of Ossory. Dublin: Gill & Son. 1879.

THIS work is a brief record of services rendered to England and Scotland by Irish Saints, more than a thousand years ago. Its interest and importance from an historical point of view are very great. Saints' lives are the main element in the history of the formation of Christendom, and around their names the battle between faith and unbelief is ever going on. In our own times a complete revolution has taken place in the historical literature of England, to be attributed, in great part, to the Oxford movement which, with its reverence for antiquity, has brought the reign of Hume and Gibbon to an end. In 1852 the leader of that movement gave his services to Ireland, and from the foundation of the Catholic University we may date the emancipation of Irish history from the withering influence of the infidel and Protestant tradition.

In 1864 Bishop Moran, then residing at Rome, brought out his *Essays on the Early Irish Church*. Just six years before that time, in 1860, O'Curry, under the inspiration of Cardinal Newman, had electrified the literary world by the publication of his lectures on the *Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History*, and in Mgr. Moran's

* From the difference of style it would seem probable that Hermann has adopted (pp. 258—261) the actual words of his informants' narratives.

work, which is a model of erudition and severe criticism, we find the relationship and harmony of the traditions of Rome and Ireland.

In a popular style, but with careful adhesion to authority, the present work deals with the historical relations of the Sister Islands in a somewhat similar manner. The roving and settlements of the ancient Scot are difficult to follow until the time when, converted to Christ by St. Patrick, the mother country sent messengers to sanctify and civilize her scattered children. High up in the North at Caithness, where, as Lord Strangford tells us, "the old women are to this day singing songs about the O'Driscolls of Cork,"* Bishop Moran has found authentic records of the labours of St. Finbar, the patron of that city (p. 180). He follows the gentle and glorious St. Aidan (p. 222) from the sacred isle of St. Senanus, where the Shannon wrestles with the Atlantic, to Iona and Lindisfarne, and the regions of Northumbria, which the Saint won to Christ, and so with a long line of Sainly Missionaries whose names are links in the golden chain which bound the two islands together in days when Saints were the leaders of the people.

We may add that not the least remarkable portions of Bishop Moran's work are the specimens which he gives in the notes (pp. 15, 25 and 28) of blunders on the part of incompetent and careless writers of Saints' lives. It is carrying disregard of ancient authorities too far to imagine that they can be used without a knowledge of the Latin language in which they are composed.

Reviews and Discussions, Literary, Political, and Historical: not relating to Bacon. By JAMES SPEDDING. London: C. Kegan Paul. 1879.

IN this volume Mr. Spedding has collected nineteen essays written by him for various periodical publications during the last forty-five years. The subjects which they discuss are exceedingly varied, ranging as they do from "Negro Apprenticeship in 1838," to "The Merchant of Venice at the Prince of Wales's Theatre in 1875:" from "The Wakefield Theory of Colonization," to "A Question Concerning a Supposed Specimen of Shakspeare's Handwriting." The author is conscious that with the occasions which elicited them, "the particular value which they then possessed has passed away." He thinks, however, that they still have their use. "Each of them," he writes, "may be regarded as a chapter in the history of the question it deals with; and as they were all written carefully, and upon good information, and with no other object than to represent the case truly, as it then appeared to me, it has been thought worth while to collect them into a volume, where they may be found by those whom they concern" (Pref.). One of the most generally interesting essays is that on Mr. Tennyson's Poems, and it must be satisfactory to Mr. Spedding to find that now, in the year 1879, the popular verdict fully recognizes the

* "Philological Letters and Papers," p. 178.

justice of the highly appreciative judgments passed by him, in 1845, in the "Edinburgh Review," not without the excitement of a certain amount of trepidation in the editorial breast, as appears from a rather amusing introductory note. This paper is full of sound and judicious criticism, as a specimen of which take the following passage :

All that is of true and lasting worth in poetry must have its root in a sound view of human life and the condition of man in the world; a just feeling with regard to the things in which we are all concerned. Where this is not, the most consummate art can produce nothing which men will long care for; where it is, the rudest will never want audience, for then nothing is trivial; the most ordinary incidents of daily life are invested with an interest as deep as the springs of emotion in the heart—as deep as pity, and love, and fear, and awe. In this requisite Mr. Tennyson will not be found wanting. The human soul, in its infinite variety of moods and trials, is his favourite haunt; nor can he dwell long upon any subject, however remote apparently from the scenes and objects of modern sympathy, without touching some string which brings it within the range of our common life. His moral views, whether directly or indirectly conveyed, are healthy, manly, and simple; and the truth and delicacy of his sentiments is attested by the depth of the pathos which he can evoke from the commonest incidents, told in the simplest manner, yet deriving all their interest from the manner of telling. See, for instance, the story of "Dora," and "The Lord of Burleigh." What is there in these that should so move us? Quarrels and reconciliations among kindred happen daily. Hopeless affection, secretly, without complaint, cherished to the end, is a grief commoner than we know of. Many a woman marries above her natural rank, and afterwards dies of a decline. How is it that we do not pass these stories by as commonplace—so like what we see every day that we want no more of them? It is because they are disclosed to us, not as we are in the habit of seeing such things, through the face they present to the outward world, but as they stand recorded in the silent heart, to whose tragic theatre none but itself (and the poet) may be admitted as a spectator. And many a lighted drawing-room is doubtless the scene of tragedies as deep as Hamlet, which pass into the long night unwept, only for want of some *vates sacer* to make them visible (p. 288).

The Last Days of Bishop Dupanloup. Edited by LUCIAN EDWARD HENRY, B.A. London: R. Bentley & Son. 1879.

THIS small volume of about seventy pages contains a record of the last days of the great Bishop of Orleans, written by friends who were with him when he died. Criticism is disarmed by the prefatory statement that the pages were originally not intended for publication. The Archbishop of Albi thought, however, that they threw light "upon the side less known and most to be admired of the soul of the great bishop," and obtained permission to give them to the world. This statement explains both the matter of these records and the manner in which they are penned; the latter is eminently French; but English readers, bearing the above in mind, will not care to criticize an excess of sentiment and exclamation, and some other peculiarities of style.

The book does throw light on what is doubtless little known of the Bishop of Orleans, and what certainly, when known, will command admiration—his minute fidelity to his priestly duties, his wonderful spirit of prayer, his simplicity, charity, and consuming zeal for souls and the Church. It is a precious record, lifting the veil of obscurity from the intimacy of friendship and the last solemn days of illness, and the translator deserves our thanks for making it more accessible to the English public.

The last visit that Bishop Dupanloup paid, away from the friends with whom he died, was to the house of a neighbouring priest, who however was out when the bishop arrived. The latter sat down to read his Breviary whilst waiting, and presently overheard a girl asking for the priest to go at once to her dying mother, who lived in a poor cottage on the mountain near. In spite of his years and infirmities, of the distance, of the approaching night and already-falling rain, the bishop set off to this sick-call, confessed and consoled the poor woman, and then set out for the home of his friends, who were already anxious on account of his delay. Night overtook him; he was soaked with rain. Along the lonely and often dangerous mountain paths, with only a boy-guide, he had to make his way in the utter darkness, at no little peril to himself. He only thought of thanking God that he had found such faith and well-instructed piety in that humble and remote cottage.

During the last weeks of his life it was written of him by his intimate friends—

We invariably find the activity of his intellect to be intense; his hours of labour alternate with those of prayer at stated times, in spite of physical weakness which might have been supposed to interfere therewith. At the same time, each morning, when walking on the terrace, his orison was duly paid, followed by preparation for mass; then mass, and afterwards the hymn of praise and thanksgiving; this was succeeded by three hours and a half spent in hard study in his room before lunch. During the afternoon, letters, as usual, were perused and answers dictated; reading, pencil in hand, was gone through, including the Breviary, study of the Holy Bible, and the rosary; for this bishop, accused of "being more of a politician than a priest," spent five hours daily in his devotions, and not more than thirty minutes in running over the newspapers.

There is much in the book which we have not space to quote—his opinions of men, books, and events, anecdotes and traits of character—that will be of scarcely less interest than the picture of his holiness. When souls whom he knew were in peril or sin, he pleaded for grace or conversion with the wrapt constancy of a saint. He offered up "almost continuous prayer, departing, even on principle, from the most stringent of his arrangements in order to prolong his vigils, to repeat again and again the long rosary (of fifteen decades), and so to calm the paternal anguish which consumed him."

His last words, just before he was seized with the attack which almost suddenly killed him, were: "To-day, again, I have succeeded

in going through my Breviary." Then he took up his beloved rosary. Very soon after, he breathed his last. "His rosary remained in his hands. He had gone to heaven to finish it."

Lancashire Memories. By LOUISA POTTER. London: Macmillan. 1879.

A REVIEWER at the present day has a stereotyped phrase wherewith to confer the citizenship of the republic of Letters upon a meritorious book,—“It should be in every library.” But, alas! like so many other formulæ, this consecrating phrase, too, has grown to so mere a form—like the title of “Esquire”—that a critic instinctively avoids it. Besides, one’s library nowadays must be a reflex of the wide world,—a curious medley of things old and new, things useful and practical, whether to draw from or to refute. But then, we would have a “sanctum” in one corner of our library; a choice case, close by the fire’s glow, and within reach of the easy chair; a case of none but choicest and dainty volumes. Not books for study, or reference, or criticism, nor books of “one reading;” but books to be taken up again and again in leisure moments, ever fresh and ever delightful. Herein should he housed, warmly and honourably, our “Friends in Council,” our Longfellow and our Tennyson, our Bacon, and our “Don Quijote,” and our “Alice in Wonderland.” And—not to make a catalogue—we should certainly find a place in it for “Lancashire Memories.”

In one sense “Lancashire Memories” recalls strongly “In my Indian Garden,” itself a treasure of our fireside book-case, and which we introduced to our readers last year. That is to say, Mrs. Potter’s book breathes just as delightfully, quaintly, naively, of old Lancashire, as Mr. Robinson’s does of India, and yet two books could hardly be more strangely unlike. The charm of “In my Indian Garden” was a sweet out-of-door breathing of garden life; it was a perfume of the vegetation of an Indian garden, mingled with the droll humour and philosophy of its animal life, so intensely realized as to make us feel as though we had experienced it all ourselves. But all this sympathy with nature as such is absent in Mrs. Potter. Her’s is another charm—it is entirely human. It is no mere garrulous and amusing gossip of an old woman of eighty summers, but it is all this, with a crispness and smartness of epigram, a freshness of naïveté and candour, and a glow of good-humour and kindness. In epigram she is good enough to recall George Eliot. How terse and telling are these little bits:—

A high fruit-wall was covered with plum-trees . . . very good in themselves, and all the better from a little difficulty in getting them (p. 29).

Or;—

If one straw had got into that lanthorn, we must inevitably have been suffocated; but no straw did. We incurred dangers that would have sent

the mammas of the present day into hysterics; but we had no mammas and no fears (p. 34).

Or better still:—

Our visits to her occurred at all festivals connected with good things to eat (p. 51).

At the village church the Countess of Riverton and her friends looked so apart from the rest of us, and so supremely above me, that I was a little startled once when she used her pocket handkerchief, as common people are in the habit of doing (p. 97).

We have marked many passages for quotation—one in almost every other page; but it will not do to go on. Yet who could refrain from citing this?—

I wonder what constitutes gentility? Not always birth; there are many vulgar people high-born. Certainly not money; for the “vulgar rich” has almost passed into a proverb. It is not talent; for authors and authoresses, though they may be clever, are not necessarily genteel. What is it? What is this myth that every one is so anxious to grasp? I believe in assuming to yourself and class that you are genteel; and only assume it enough, and all around you will come into the belief (p. 124).

And just one more:—

What wonders the putting in or leaving out a letter achieves in a name! That valuable *e* final to Smith and Brown is next best thing to a coronet. The omission of the *p* in Simpson, the *k* in Jackson, or the *i* in Jamieson, makes a wonderful difference in their gentility; it is only a pity the sound is the same. . . . What would Aylmer, or Leycester, or Wygrave be without their *y*'s? It adds centuries to the age of the family without further notice (pp. 138-9).

Could George Eliot do better?—

But Mrs. Potter is of no sarcastic mould. Her very banter is good-natured. How charming are her quaint, old, odd stories of Peggy Baines and “my Cousins,” of John the butler at Maudeslys! But not the least charm of the book is that, with all her freshness and humour, she is so perfect a “laudatrix temporis acti;” for is it not “remarkable how fruit has deteriorated” since her early days? and what modern girls can work as well and as much as “our cousins” did then? and “there are no real old grandmammas now; the race has gone out;” whilst, finally, “there is much less individuality now than there once was, that is certain. If I were to live to a hundred I should never see another Aunt Dorcas.” And if we were to live for very long, we should not meet many such companions as Mrs. Potter and her “Memories.”

The Roman Breviary. Translated out of Latin into English by JOHN, MARQUESS OF BUTE, K.T. Two Vols. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood and Sons. 1879.

THESE two splendid volumes, the fruit of nine years' work, and the worthy tribute of a cultured Catholic to that Church which he has had the gift to recognise as his mother, are deserving of more than the brief notice we can at this moment accord them. When we state that each volume contains some 1500 pages (a portion, however, viz., the "Common" Office, being repeated), that there is an average of at least one foot-note, or reference, and at least five translator's annotations to the text, in every page, and that the great majority of these notes are concerned with matters of name, date, and citation; and when we consider that the whole text of the Breviary has been translated, newly and freshly, from the original Psalms, Hymns, Lessons, Anthems, Responsories, and Collects, the reader will easily understand that the labour must have been very great. We should hasten to add that Lord Bute has used the versions of others (chiefly Cardinal Newman) in the rendering of the hymns, and that in the Psalms, and in translating Holy Scripture generally, he has freely adopted existing translations when he considered them good.

A translation of the Breviary seems, doubtless, to some a little uncalled for. There is an idea that the Breviary is a book for priests, and perhaps, also, that there is just the slightest suspicion of a heterodox leaning in wishing to put a "Service Book" into the vernacular. This is a feeling which may be expected to vanish in its absurdity the moment it is reflected upon. No doubt there is some slight reason for it in the fact that there is a large party in the Church of England which is now extensively imitating, in English, our liturgical services, and which makes it a sort of reproach that we use an unknown tongue. There are times when innocent acts must be abstained from on account of scandal. But there is really nothing of the sort to be apprehended in the present case. A few Ritualistic clergymen will no doubt use this translation, and revel in the quaint effect of the antique phraseology in an English garb. A few "sisterhoods," and even congregations, will perhaps struggle for a short time with the big volumes and the small print; but it will do neither any harm. It will certainly not keep them a day longer from "going over." And, after all, the sacred words, the "prayers" of the Church, the uncompromising legends, and the influence of holy names, may be expected to be more than neutral—to be active—agents in preparing the way for the Faith. The Breviary is neither a secret formula nor a collection of mediæval legends. It contains, in its most authentic form, the spirit and mind of the Catholic Church as regards prayer and praise. Its selections of Holy Scripture are the most appropriate, its presentment of saints' names and virtues are the best and most deliberately considered, and its forms of invocation, adoration, and petition are the most truly and essentially Catholic of anything that exists outside the Missal and the Pontifical.

Lord Bute's work as a translator, let us say it at once, has been admirably done. His plan of proceeding is the only one really practicable. In rendering Scripture he has translated the Latin of the Breviary, not the Hebrew or the LXX., although he has made plentiful explanatory reference to both. In the Lessons of the second and third nocturns he has given, not a word-for-word translation, but a free and readable version, which, however, preserves, in a remarkable manner, the spirit of the original. It is in the rendering of the Legends of the Saints (the Lessons of the Second Nocturn) that he seems to have succeeded best, and to have really performed a feat in translation.

It would be easy to point out matters of detail, in an immense work like this, where difference of opinion might be expected. The Breviary is a sufficiently large subject to afford opportunities for infinite questioning. Many will resent "Elijah" and "Elisha." It is difficult to blame the translator for the occasional quaintness of his version. A work must be taken as a whole. If you build in a certain style you may have strange gargoyles and curious *bizareries* in figures and faces. The rule as to where quaintness is no longer affectation is not easy to lay down. Perhaps the question is one of degree. If you are consistently quaint, you are not quaint but archaic. At any rate, the occasional names and verbs which, in Lord Bute's excellent English, make themselves felt with a slight shock on the unaccustomed ear, even in the general flow of his evenly old-fashioned diction, have the effect of adding wonderful life to the picture. Doubtless some minds, afflicted with importunate associations, will be amused or offended with some of his expressions. But this wears off, and the real power of the translation comes home, more and more, at every reading.

Even the clergy may learn a great deal from a translation of the Breviary. It is not merely that they will find in this version useful and pregnant notes, numberless brief bits of information, supplied just at the right moment in the fewest words, exact references to the Homilies and other writings of the Fathers, which, perhaps, will send them to the original to finish what the Breviary merely begins; but the effect of seeing the familiar—too familiar—Latin turned into new forms of speech will be, as De Quincey says, to "brighten its suggestiveness," and give it a new power over the imagination. As for the laity, they have here what they never had before—the whole Breviary in English. But even if it were of no use whatever, this translation would be welcome as a work of art. To the Breviary itself it is what engraving is to painting. A noble monument of the past, not antiquated, but only ancient, has here been reproduced with loving and laborious devotion, and the result is worthy the long spaces of studious leisure and seclusion which the work has required.

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

APRIL, 1880.

ART. I.—THE BIRTHPLACE OF ST. PATRICK,
APOSTLE OF IRELAND.

1. *Fac-similes of National Manuscripts of Ireland*, selected and edited under the direction of the Master of the Rolls in Ireland. By J. T. GILBERT, F.S.A., &c., Public Record Office of Ireland, Dublin. Part I. 1874. Part II. 1878. Part III. 1879.
2. *An Inquiry as to the Birthplace of St. Patrick*. By T. H. TURNER, M.A., a Paper read for the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, and published in "Archæologia Scotica." Vol. V. Part I. Edinburgh. 1874.
3. *Three Middle-Irish Homilies*, on the Lives of SS. Patrick, Brigit, and Columba. Edited by WHITLEY STOKES. Calcutta. 1877.
4. *Loca Patriciana*. By the Rev. JOHN FRANCIS SHEARMAN. Dublin. 1879.
5. *The Life of St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland*. By M. F. CUSACK. Dublin. 1870.
6. *The Life of St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland*. By Rev. W. B. MORRIS, Priest of the Oratory. Second Edition. London. 1879.

IT is only a little more than half a century since the opinion was first broached that Boulogne-sur-Mer, in the north of France, was the birth-place of our national Apostle St. Patrick; and yet so great was the learning and ability of the Rev. Dr. Lanigan, who propounded this opinion, and so highly esteemed were his labours in the revival of the study of the Ecclesiastical History of our country, that it at once took a firm hold of the

popular mind, and has ever since been generally adopted by the popular writers of our history. Far different, however, was the opinion generally held for the past by those who had devoted their lives to illustrate the antiquities and the literature of Ireland. Colgan, in the seventeenth century, the golden age of Celtic studies, pointed to North Britain as the country hallowed by our Apostle's birth; and he declared this to be the common opinion of all who hitherto had written on the subject.* A century later the illustrious Innes was able to assert that "the learnedest of the Irish and other foreign writers" were agreed in assigning Kilpatrick, near Dumbarton, as the precise place where St. Patrick was born,† and Petrie and O'Donovan and O'Curry, the great masters of Irish literature in our own days, have adopted the same opinion.

The question is one of fact, and like other historical questions must be decided by the weight of the evidence that is produced in its favour. It is one, however, in which the spiritual children of St. Patrick take the deepest interest. Few nations have cherished for the first Fathers of their faith such love and reverence and honour as the Celtic race at home and abroad has ever shown to its great Apostle. The persistent efforts which, during the past years, have been made by Protestant writers to misrepresent his teaching, have only served to enliven more and more the ardour of the affection of his devoted sons, and perhaps there never was a time when his name was so honoured and each memorial of his blessed life so cherished, as at the present day.

To proceed with some order in our inquiry, I propose first to cite, with as much brevity as the matter will permit, the various passages of our writers, down to the close of the twelfth century, that bear upon this subject. I will then endeavour to recapitulate under a few heads the evidence which these witnesses of the tradition of Ireland shall have presented to us; and in conclusion I will add some remarks on the principal modern theories regarding the birthplace of our Apostle.

I.

Testimonies of ancient writers.

A.—I will commence with the testimony of St. Patrick himself. His "Confessio" or "Declaration of the Mercies of God,"

* Colgan, "Verior et communis nostrorum domesticorum, et exterorum Scriptorum sententia est, S. Patricium in Majori Britannia natum esse." Trias, p. 221.

† Innes, "Civil and Eccles. Hist. of Scotland," edited by the Spalding Club, p. 34.

which all our writers now admit to be his genuine work,* thus begins: "I Patrick, a sinner, the most unlearned and the least of all the faithful, and held in contempt by very many, had Calphurnius, a Deacon, for my father, the son of the late Potitus, a presbyter, who lived in the village of Bannavem Taberniæ. He had, close by, a small villa where I was made a captive (qui fuit vico Bannavem Taberniæ, villulam enim prope habuit, &c.)." I have followed in this passage the text of the Book of Armagh, which is more than a thousand years old and professes to be copied from the original written by St. Patrick's own hand. The MSS. in the Bodleian Library and the British Museum have "Banavem Taberniæ." The Bollandists read "Bonaven." The text published by Ware adds "villulam Enon prope habuit," which, if correct, would give us the name of the villa from which St. Patrick was led into slavery.

In the tenth chapter of the "Confessio" we read: "After a few years, I was again in Britain with my kindred (in Britanniam eram cum parentibus meis) who received me as a son, and earnestly besought me that then, at least, after the many tribulations I had endured, I should not go away from them any more." Again, in the nineteenth chapter: "Wherefore though I should have wished to leave (Ireland) that I might go unto Britain (in Britanniam), a journey most desirable to me as unto my country and kindred (quasi ad patriam et parentes), and not thither only, but that I might go as far as Gaul (usque Gallias) to visit my brethren and to see the face of the Saints of the Lord."

In his letter to Coroticus, a British chieftain who had led away some of his converts into captivity, our Saint writes: "Among barbarians I dwell a stranger and an exile. . . . for them I have given up my country, and my kindred, and even life itself unto death if I be found worthy. . . . I have written and composed this letter to be sent and delivered to the soldiers to be forwarded to Coroticus, I do not say to my fellow-citizens (non dico civibus meis), nor to the fellow-citizens of the Roman Saints, but to the fellow-citizens of demons through their evil deeds. . . . companions of the Scots† and apostate Picts: . . . who is it that compelled me, constrained by the

* The whole of the text of the "Confessio" as found in the Book of Armagh, and in the Bodleian MS. (Fell. 1, fol. 7, *seq.*) is given by Gilbert in "Nat. Manuscripts of Ireland," part 2nd. The text printed by the Bollandists from a MS. formerly preserved at the Abbey of St. Vaast, at Arras (ad diem 17, Mart.), is considered to be the most accurate and complete now extant.

† This was a pagan colony of Irish Scoti, who settled in Argyleshire in the third century. The Christian colony of Scoti did not proceed thither till the end of the fifth century.

Spirit, to give up all intercourse with my kindred? . . . I was of noble birth, according to the flesh, my father being a Decurio; but for the benefit of others I bartered my nobility. I do not blush on that account, neither do I regret it. I am now given over to a foreign people for the ineffable glory of unceasing life which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, although my own people ignore me (*etsi mei non cognoscunt*)."

B.—I shall assign the next place to St. Fiacc's Irish poem in honour of our Apostle.* St. Fiacc was a disciple of St. Patrick, and his demise cannot be placed later than the year 540. His poem is preserved in the "*Liber Hymnorum*," or ancient collection of "*Hymns of the Early Irish Church*," which probably was compiled by Adamnan towards the close of the seventh century, and of which two MSS. copies of the tenth century have been preserved. In both these MSS. the poem is complete, and in both a preface is prefixed which assigns it to St. Fiacc, "*Bishop of Sletty, and disciple of St. Patrick*." A fragment of the poem is given in the "*Leabhar Breac*" (fol. 99, b. l.) which Petrie styles "*the oldest and best Irish MS. relating to Church history now preserved, or which perhaps the Irish ever possessed*;" and here too St. Fiacc is named as its author. Portions of the poem are also met with in the other ancient Celtic MSS. in the British Museum, and elsewhere, as Mr. Curry informs us, and all concur in assigning the authorship of the poem to St. Fiacc. Now, this venerable authority attests that St. Patrick was born in Nemthur:—

"Patrick was born in Nemthur: it is this that has been declared in histories;

A child of sixteen years when he was brought under tears:

Succat his name, it was said; who was his father is to be known:

Son of Calpurn, son of Potitus, grandson of Deacon Odiase."†

C.—In the MSS. of the "*Liber Hymnorum*," just now referred to, the following important Irish gloss is added on the name Nemthur in the first strophe of St. Fiacc's Hymn, "*·i· cathir sein feil imbretnaib tuaiscirt ·i· Ailcluade*," thus translated by Colgan, Gilbert, and Stokes: "*Nemthur is a city in North Britain, viz., Ailcluade*." The authority of these glosses is very great. The two MSS. of the Book of Hymns, although dating from the tenth century, were copied from independent sources, as is manifest from the different hymns which they contain and the

* The original text and translation have been published in the "*Irish Eccles. Record*," vol. iv. p. 269, and more recently by Gilbert in "*National Manuscripts of Ireland*," part i.; and by Stokes "*Goidelica*," 1872.

† Petrie, "*On the History, &c., of Tara*," p. 74.

‡ I have adopted the literal translation of Stokes, "*Goidelica*," p. 130.

different texts which they present. Nevertheless, several of the glosses like that which we have cited are the same in both manuscripts, and are adjudged by the best Celtic scholars to belong to a very early age, dating probably from the first compilation of the hymns in the seventh century.

In the St. Isidore's MS. of the "*Liber Hymnorum*" another gloss is added on a subsequent strophe, of which the following translation is given by Dr. Todd: "This was the cause of the servitude of Patrick; his father was Calpuirnn; Conches, daughter of Ochmuais, was his mother, and the mother of his five sisters, namely, Lupait, and Tigris, and Liamain, and Darerca, and the name of the fifth was Cinnenum. His brother was Sannan. They all went from the Britons of Alcluaid, across the Iccian Sea, southwards on a journey to the Britons who are on the Sea of Icht, namely, the Britons of Letha, because they had brethren (*i.e.*, relatives) there at that time. Now the mother of these children, namely, Conches, was of the Franks, and she was a near relative to Martin. At that time came seven sons of Sectmaide, King of Britain, in ships from the Britons, and they made great plunder on the Britons, viz., the Britons of Armoric Letha, where Patrick with his family was, and they wounded Calpuirnn there, and carried off Patrick and Lupait with them to Ireland."* This gloss is not found in the Trinity College MS., and can be accepted only as dating from the tenth century.

The value of these glosses was but little known in the time of Dr. Lanigan, and hence he dismisses them with but scanty courtesy. Two instances he adduces in proof of their being of no authority. In the first place, he says the word "Letha" receives two contradictory explanations, being at one time referred to Armoric Gaul, whilst at another it is used to designate Latium or Italy. To this I reply that modern research has proved the explanations given by the glosses to be quite correct. The name Letha was, by our early writers, applied equally to Italy and to Armoric Gaul,† and the error lies with Dr. Lanigan, and not with the author of the old Irish glosses. The second example which he gives is that the phrase "*Dar modhebroth*" is explained to mean "God is able to do this if he chooses;" whilst immediately after it is explained by "Be God my Judge." Here again the error is to be imputed, not to the Irish gloss, but to Dr. Lanigan. The phrase, "*Dar modhebroth*," is a form of solemn asseveration frequently made use of by St. Patrick, as may be seen in the Tripartite Life, and in the other ancient records of

* Todd's translation, "*St. Patrick*," p. 360.

† Curry, "*Lectures*," p. 502; Todd, "*Irish Neunius*," p. 69. Italy was called Southern Letha.

our Apostle's life; and in using it he appeals to the unerring judgment of God in proof of what he declares to be true. In the gloss the phrase is at first left untranslated, being pre-mitted to the words, "God is able to do this if he chooses," which Dr. Lanigan mistook for a translation of the phrase, "Dar modhebroth;" but having given the full words of the Apostle, the gloss again returns to this phrase, and then assigns its correct meaning, precisely as given in Cormac's glossary,* the Leabhar Breac, and other ancient authorities.

D.—The "Vita Secunda," thus styled in Colgan's series of "Ancient Lives of St. Patrick," records that our Apostle "was born in the town called Nemthor." It adds, "Patrick was born in the plain of Tabern, that is the 'Campus Tabernaculorum,' which derived its name from the tents which at a certain time the Romans had erected there during the cold of winter."† This document is highly prized by the Bollandists and Colgan, who assign to it a very early date. Dr. Todd, judging from the details of its narrative, considers that the writer had the Book of Armagh before him, but does not assign to it an earlier date than about the year 900.‡

E.—The "Vita Tertia" repeats verbatim the words of the document (D) just cited. It gives Nemthor as the name of the town where St. Patrick was born, and it designates the district as "Campus Tabuerni, id est campus Tabernaculorum." It adds, however, in chapter 12, "Patrick, therefore, who was also called Suchet, was of the race of the Britons, and his country and place of birth were not far from the sea. His father, Calburnius, was the son of the venerable man Potitus."

F.—The "Vita Quarta," which is proved by intrinsic data to have been written before the year 774,§ and is assigned by some of our writers to St. Eleran, enters somewhat more into detail regarding the subject of which we treat. "Some affirm," it states, "that St. Patrick was of Jewish descent. For, when our Lord had offered up His life for the salvation of man, the Roman army, avenging His death, devastated Judea, and the Jews who were led into captivity were scattered over the whole world. Some of these settled among the Armoric Britons, of whom St. Patrick is said to have been born. And this would seem to be set forth in the Book of Epistles, which he wrote, when he says, 'We have been scattered unto the extremities of the earth for our sins, for we did not keep the law of God nor observe His commandments.' But it is more true and correct

* Stokes, "Cormac's Glossary," p. 106; where he cites also the passages from the "Leabhar Breac," &c.

† Colgan, "Trias," p. 11.

‡ Todd, "St. Patrick," p. 293.

§ Todd, p. 298.

that he here speaks of that dispersion which the Britons suffered at the hands of the Romans, when some of them settled in the territory known as Armorica, near the Tyrrhene Sea. In that dispersion, therefore, his parents proceeded to the district of Strathclyde, in which territory Patrick was conceived and born, his father being Calphurnius, and his mother Conchessa, as he himself attests in his Book of Epistles, &c. St. Patrick, therefore, was born in the town of Nemthor, which name may be interpreted 'turreis coelestis,' and this town is situated in the plain of Taburnia, which was called 'campus Tabernaculorum,' because the Roman army at a certain time fixed their tents there. But in the British tongue it is called the plain of Tabern. He is said, moreover, to have been born on a stone which is there held in honour. . . . The inhabitants of the place erected a church over the fountain in which he was baptized, and those acquainted with the place say that the fountain which is beside the altar is in the form of a cross."*

G.—The Life of St. Patrick by Probus is the next document to which I will refer. This writer belongs to the ninth century, and as his narrative closely follows the very ancient fragments preserved in the Book of Armagh, his authority has been justly reckoned of the greatest weight. He thus begins his narrative: "St. Patrick, who was also called Sochet, was a Briton by birth, and having suffered many things in his youth, he became unto all his people and country a source of salvation. He was born in Britain (in Britanniis natus est), his father being Calpurnius, a deacon, the son of Potitus, a priest; and his mother was called Concessa. They were from the village Bannave, in the Tiburnian district, not far from the Western Sea, which village we have ascertained beyond doubt to be situated in the Nentrian territory, in which the giants are said to have dwelt in olden times (quem vicum indubitanter comperimus esse Nentriae provinciae, in qua olim gigantes habitasse dicuntur)." A little later he thus writes: "Whilst Patrick was as yet in his own country with his father, Calpurnius, and his mother, and with his brother, Rucchi, and his sister called Mila, in their city Arimuric, there was great disturbance there; for the sons of King Rethmit from Britain laid waste Arimuric and the other neighbouring places, and murdered Calpurnius with his wife Concessa, and having led off captives their sons Patrick and Rucchi with their sister, landed in Ireland."†

H.—The Irish "Tripartite Life" as it has come down to us must be assigned to the tenth century, although many parts of it belong undoubtedly to a much earlier time. Its statement

* Colgan, "Trias," p. 35.

† Colgan, pp. 47, 48.

relating to St. Patrick's birthplace in Mr. Hennessy's valuable translation, is as follows: "Patrick was of the Britons of Alcluaid by origin. Calpurnn was his father's name; he was a noble priest. Potid was his grandfather's name, whose title was a deacon. Conceis was his mother's name; she was of the Franks, and a sister to Martin. In Nemthur,* moreover, the man St. Patrick was born." It subsequently states that St. Patrick was reared in Nemthur (nutritus est in Nemthur), and it adds, whilst narrating some facts of his infancy, that: "one time the King of Britain's steward went to command Patrick and his nurse to go and clean the hearth of the Royal house in Al-Cluaid."†

I.—It is only a few years since the genuine text of our ancient chronicler, Maelbrigte (better known under the name of Marianus Scotus), was published by Pertz in the "*Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*."‡ Marianus was born in the year 1028, and was educated in the monastery of Moville in the County Down. He died at Mayence, in Germany, in 1082. The autograph of his Chronicle is preserved in the Vatican Library, and from it I have taken the following entries, which, however, are accurately given by Pertz. Under the year 372 Marianus registers the birth of St. Patrick in the island of Britain: "Sanctus Patricius nascitur in Britannia insula, ex patre nomine Calpuirn," &c. Again, under the years 388 and 431 our Saint is styled, "Sanctus Patricius, genere Brittus."

K.—In the "*Leabhar Breac*" there is a homily or sketch of our Saint's life composed before the twelfth century, which has recently been published with a translation by the eminent Irish scholar, Mr. Whitley Stokes.§ The following is the account it gives of St. Patrick's place of birth: "Patrick's race was of the Britons of Ailcluaid. Calpurn was his father's name, a high priest was he. Otid was the name of his grandfather; he was a deacon. But Conchess was his mother's name; daughter was she of Ochbas; of France was her race, that is, she was a sister of Martin's. . . . At Nemthur now was he born, and as to the flag-stone on which he was born, when anyone commits perjury thereunder, it sheds water as if it were bewailing the false declaration. . . . The holy Patrick was reared at Nemthur during his childhood." Then follow the miracles which he performed in childhood. One of these is said to have been performed when "Patrick went with his foster-father to a

* Colgan's text adds that Nemthur, according to the etymology of the name, means "*coelestis turris*."

† "*Life of St. Patrick*," by S. M. F. Cusack, pp. 373, 375.

‡ Pertz, "*Monumenta*," vol. vii. p. 540.

§ Stokes, "*Three Middle-Irish Homilies*," 1877, p. 3, seq.

meeting of the Britons." Another, like that of the Tripartite Life, refers to his foster-mother being ordered by the King's steward "to cleanse the hearth of the palace at Ailcluade;" it became at once so clean through the prayers of Patrick that he exclaimed, "If all the firewood of Britain were burnt on the hearth, it need not be again cleansed till doom."

L.—The "Book of Lismore," another venerable repository of the early records of the Irish Church, has also a fragment of an ancient Celtic homily for the feast of our Apostle, in which we read: "Patrick's father was of the Britons of Alcluaid; Potaide Deacon was his grandfather; Conchess was his mother's name, daughter of Ochmas of the Franks, and she was sister of Martin; and in Nemthor he was born; and the flag upon which he was born, when a false oath is made upon it, sheds water as if it were lamenting the false oath; if, however, the oath be true, the flag remains unchanged," (MSS., R.I.A., fol. i. col. 6).

M. — O'Curry in the second series of his "Lectures" assigns, on the authority of the Four Masters, to Flann of Monasterboice, who died in the year 1056, the following short genealogical poem on our own Apostle:—

Son of Calphrann, son of Fotide,
Son of Deisse, not liable to reproach;
Son of great Cormac, son of Lebriuth,
Son of Ota, son of Orric the good,
Son of Moric, son of Leo, full of prosperity;
Son of Maximus, why not name him?
Son of Encretta, the tall and comely;
Son of Philistis, the best of men;
Son of Ferenus, of no mean repute;
Son of Brittan, otter of the sea,
From whom the passionate Britons descend;
Nemthor was his native town.*

N.—In the valuable MS. marked H, 3.18., in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, there is a short notice of St. Patrick corresponding in part with the "Leabhar Breac." It thus sets forth his place of birth: "The radiance, the blaze, and the bright gem, and the brilliant lamp that gave light to the Western World, *i.e.*, Sanctus Patricius. Patrick now was of the Britons; Alcluade was his native place; Calpurn was his father's name, a noble priest; Fotid was his grandfather's name; Deochan his family name, *i.e.*, his surname."

There is another short but very ancient notice which Mr. O'Curry found in his researches among our old Irish MSS. As I have not the special reference, I may be permitted to insert it

* O'Curry, "Lectures," 2nd series, lect. viii. p. 166.

here: "In a village, the name of which is Hurnia, in Britain, near the city of Empter, Patrick was born." ("Ir. Eccles. Record," iv. 283.)

O.—Jocelyn, towards the close of the twelfth century, composed from the then existing records a very full life of our Apostle. The first chapter thus begins: "There was a certain man, Calphurnius by name, the son of Potitus, a priest, a Briton by birth, dwelling in the village called Taburnia, situated in the Campus Tabernaculorum, so called from the tents which the Roman army had erected there, near the town Empthor,* bordering on the Irish Sea (secus oppidum Empthor degens, mari Hibernico collimitans habitatione)." The circumstances of St. Patrick's birth are then detailed; and it is added that the well at which he was baptized was called St. Patrick's Well, "secus limbum maris, super quem posteriorum diligentia aedificavit oratorium habens altare in modum crucis extractum."† The place is further identified in the eleventh chapter, where it is said that there stood, on a certain promontory rising above the said town Empthor, a fortification, "of which some ruins still remain. . . . This place is famous, situated in the valley of the Clyde, and called in the language of that country Dunbreaton—*i.e.*, the rock of the Britons. (In quodam promontorio supereminenti praefato oppido Empthor, munitio quaedam extracta, cujus adhuc murorum apparent ruinosa vestigia. . . . Est autem locus celebris in valle Clud situs, linguâ gentis illius Dunbreaton, id est, mons Britonum.)"

II.

Evidence given by these authorities.

Having thus given in full all the references to the birthplace of St. Patrick which are preserved in the records of our country down to the close of the twelfth century, I will now recapitulate under distinct heads the special evidence which this long series of ancient authorities presents.

1. The first place shall be assigned to the clear testimony of our ancient chronicler Marianus Scotus, who attests that St. Patrick was born "in the island of Britain." Even if the testimony of Marianus were to stand alone it could not be easily set aside, for he had devoted his life to historical studies, and the various entries in his Chronicle which have reference to Ireland are all found to bear with them the impress of indisputable authority.

* Colgan prints the name Nempthor, but adds in the notes that the MSS. have it Empthor.

† Colgan, "Acta," p. 65.

2. Several of the other ancient records call St. Patrick "a Briton," and state that he was born "in Britain." Our Apostle himself calls Britain his country, and uses the plural name *Britannias** to designate it. Moreover he distinguishes between his native Britain and Gaul, for which he again uses the plural name *Gallias*.† Now it would be difficult for St. Patrick writing in the fifth century to express in clearer terms that we are to look for his birth-place in the island of Britain. The portion of Britain which was subject to the Romans had been gradually formed into five distinct provinces, that is *Britannia Prima* and *Britannia Secunda*, and three other provinces distinguished by the addition of imperial names. Hence the plural form of the name was at this time commonly applied to the island of Britain. It may be true indeed, as Dr. Lanigan contends, that the first inhabitants of Britain came to their home in the British Isles from the north of Gaul or Belgium; but it still remains true that it was only at a comparatively late period that the name *Britannia* began to be applied to any part of the Continent. The learned Benedictine Lobineau affirms that it was only after the middle of the fifth century that this name began to be used to designate a portion of the Gaulish territory. "About the year 458," he writes, "the inhabitants of the island of Britain, flying from the swords of the Saxons, gave to a portion of the territory of Armoric Gaul the name of *Bretagne*."‡ Even then, however, the plural form of the name continued to be restricted to the island of Britain; and there is no example of its being used in reference to *Bretagne* in France until the close of the sixth century.

As regards the plural form of the name *Gallias*, it must be borne in mind that the Gaulish territory was also divided by its Roman masters into several provinces, having the city of Treves for their capital, and comprising not only the present territory of France, but also the modern Belgium and some parts of Germany. The distinction which St. Patrick draws between *Gallias* and his native country excludes every portion of French territory from the claim of being his birth-place. We find precisely the same form of expression used by Catullus to designate the island of Britain and Gaul:—

Hunc Galliae timent, timent Britanniae.

* "Book of Armagh" "in Britannis;" Bodleian MSS., "in Britannis." The Bollandists have in the first passage, "in Britannia," but in the second have "in Britannias."

† Jocelyn uses a somewhat similar phrase, when speaking of our Apostle proceeding to the school of St. Germanus; "*Natale solum Britanniae pertransiens Galliarum fines adivit.*" (Colgan, "*Trias*," p. 66.)

‡ Lobineau, "*Histoire de la Bretagne*," vol. i. p. 5.

No one will hesitate to admit that it would be incorrect at the present day to use such a phrase; "I will proceed to Normandy and will even go as far as France;" and equally incorrect would be the form of expression used by our Apostle in the fifth century, in the hypothesis of those who contend that his native place must be sought for not in the island of Britain, but in some part of the territory of Gaul.

3. From the gloss in the "*Liber Hymnorum*" and from the testimony of the *Tripartite Life*, the "*Leabhar Breac*," the "*Book of Lismore*" and other records above cited, we learn that *Alclyde* was the birthplace of St. Patrick; and from the manner in which this name is used in these records it is manifest that it was supposed to be familiar to Irish readers from the seventh to the twelfth century, the period during which these writings were composed. Now there cannot be any doubt as to the place to which this name refers. The name itself indeed implies a high rock on the banks of the Clyde. Colgan explains it: "*Al-Cluid, id est, Rupis seu Petra Cluidæ*" ("*Trias*," p. 222), and elsewhere he writes: "In the ancient Gaelic or Irish language, *Ail* is equivalent to 'Saxum' or 'Petra;' and the fortress placed on the high rock near the river Clyde is called *Ailcluit*."* So also Stokes, "*Ail-Cluaide, literally Rock of Cluad, now Clyde*;"† and O'Reilly in like manner explains *Aill* and *All* to mean "a high mountain, a great steep, a precipice, a rock or cliff."‡ We find, moreover, the same name often used elsewhere by mediæval writers, and their unvarying testimony refers it to the strong fort and city which some centuries ago was known as *Dunbritton*, but is called *Dumbarton* at the present day. No name indeed could be more appropriate to this precipitous rock of basalt which rises to the height of about three hundred feet on the north bank of the Clyde: "it rises sheer up, from the circumjacent low, flat, marshy tract, and it stands completely isolated from any other elevations."§ Towards the summit it forms a double peak, and is cleft by a narrow deep chasm. Venerable Bede more than once mentions it under the name of *Alcluith*. In the first chapter of his "*Ecclesiastical History*" he describes the Clyde "as a very large gulf of the sea, which in former times divided the Picts from the Britons, which gulf runs from the west far inland, where to this day stands the strong city of the Britons, called *Alcluith*."|| Again, in the twelfth chapter, he speaks of "the city *Alcluith*, which in the language of the Britons signifies the Rock of Cluith, for it is situated close by the river of that name:" he adds that the

* Colgan, "*Acta, SS.*," p. 188. † Stokes, "*Three Homilies*," p. 4.

‡ O'Reilly, "*Irish Dictionary*," ad voc.

§ O'Hanlon, "*Lives*," &c., iii. p. 463. || Bede, "*H. E.*," i. 1.

famous wall or vallum which separated the Picts from the Britons commenced to the east at Penneltun and stretched across to the Clyde on the west near the city of Alcluith, "juxta urbem Ailcluith."* It was also known to Adamnan, who Latinizes the name by "Petra-Cloithe," that is "the Rock of the Clyde."† Hoveden, in his Annals under the year 756, narrates how Egbert, King of Northumbria, and Unnust, King of the Picts, led their united armies to Alcluit and there compelled the Britons to submit: "Duxerunt exercitum ad urbem Alcluit, ibique Britones in deditionem receperunt prima die Augusti." A century later the siege and destruction of the fort of Alclyde by the Northern pirates are duly chronicled by the British and Irish annalists. Thus in "Brut y Tywysogion," "eight hundred and seventy was the year of Christ, and Caer-Alclut was demolished by the Pagans:"‡ and in the "Annales Cambriæ:" "Arx Alt-Clut a gentilibus fracta est." The Annals of Ulster in the same year have "The Burning of Al-Cluade," whilst in the "Ogygia" the entry is given "Obsessio Aili-Cluith."§ In the "Four Ancient Books of Wales" this fortress is often mentioned under the name *Alclud*:—

There will come from Alclud, men, bold, faithful,
To drive from Prydein bright armies.||

Camden in his "Britannia" speaking of Dumbarton says: "Hæc olim Alclud, sed postea a Britannis, qui eam longo tempore contra Scotos tenuerunt, Dunbritton id est Brittanorum oppidum dici coepit."¶ These extracts from British and Irish writers seem to me such as enable us to identify beyond all controversy the city of Alclyde in which St. Patrick was born.

4. In the poem of St. Fiacc and most of the other ancient documents already cited, Nemthur or Nemthor is assigned as the birth-place of St. Patrick. The gloss of the "Liber Hymnorum," as we have just now seen, gives this as the name of "a city in North Britain, otherwise called Ailcluade." The Vita Quarta further states that Nemthor was situated "in the territory of Strathclyde." By the name of Strathclyde, the kingdom, half Celtic, half British, that sprung up in the Roman province of Valentia, with Alclyde for its capital, long continued to be known. It was only in the tenth century that this kingdom

* Bede, H. E., i. 12.

† Adamnan, "Vita S. Columb.," i. 8.

‡ Ithel, "Brut of Tywysogion," or "The Chronicle of the Princes," edited for the Master of the Rolls, 1860, p. 15.

§ O'Flaherty, "Ogygia," p. 485.

|| Skene, "Four A. Books," i. 441. See other extracts in "Arthurian Localities," by Stuart Glennie, Edinburgh, 1869, p. 88.

¶ Camden, p. 666.

ceased to exist. In the year 946 the Annals record that "Strathclyde was ravaged by the Saxons," and in 973 its last King, Dunwallon, died a recluse in Rome.* I may add that the "Leabhar Breac," the "Book of Lismore," and the "Tripartite Life" all serve to identify Nemthur with Alclyde.†

There has been considerable discussion from time to time as to the origin and etymology of this name, Nemthur. In several of the ancient texts which we have cited, it is explained to mean "coelestis turris," that is, a heavenly tower. Taking the Celtic name as it stands, and in its literal meaning, this explanation is quite accurate. We know from the old Irish glossaries that the Celtic *Nem* corresponds to the Cymric and British *Nen*, and to the Latin *coelestis*.‡ So, too, the Celtic *Thor* is often used as an equivalent of the Latin "Turris;" thus in O'Reilly's "Dictionary" we have *Tor* and *Tur* explained by "a tower, a castle, a spire, a steeple." Frequently, however, in proper names in Ireland as in Britain it refers to a high rock, or mountain peak, as in *Torinis*, now Tory Island, so called from its rocky peaks, and in *Tor St. Michael*, near Glastonbury, and the *Tors* of Devonshire, and the many Tory hills which are met with in various parts of Ireland. Dr. Lanigan, indeed, finds fault with the interpretation of the name given by the ancient writers, and affirms that, in order to mean "coelestis turris," the name should be written *Nerthur* in the aspirated form.|| This statement, however, only serves to prove that our illustrious historian was but little skilled in the old Celtic language. It was at a much later period that the aspirate was introduced, but in the ancient forms of the language, the name should precisely be written *Nemthor* for the Irish Celts, and *Nenthor* for the Welsh and Britons.¶

* See Skene, "Annals of the Scots and Picts;" and Shearman, "Loca Patriciana," Appendix 1st, p. 454.

† Rev. John O'Hanlon, "Lives," &c., iii. p. 419, refers to some of these texts as saying that Nemthur was "near Alclnuid." There is nothing, however, in any of the texts to justify this statement.

‡ Stokes, Cormac's "Glossary," p. 121; Turner, "The Cymric *Nen*, which was probably the word on which the name was formed, means a vault, and hence metaphorically heaven, the corresponding adjective being *Nenni*," p. 276. Hence the proper name Nennius and Ninias is often Latinized "Celestius."

§ Joyce, "Irish Names," p. 386; "in many parts of Ireland, as for instance in Donegal, it is applied to a tall rock resembling a tower, without any reference to an artificial structure." Of Tory Island he says, "the island abounds in lofty isolated rocks which are called *tors* or towers, and the name *torach* means simply towery, abounding in tower-like rocks." || Lanigan, i. 101.

¶ Todd. "Dr. Lanigan's criticism is untenable, and only proves his ignorance of the Celtic language. This sort of aspiration occurs in the modern Celtic only," p. 356.

Thus then the interpretation of the name given by our ancient writers corresponds to the literal meaning of the words which compose it, but, I must add, that this is no proof that such in reality was the origin of the name. Take for instance the name *Belfast*. Many of the inhabitants of that important town interpret the name as implying a "Bell set fast," and this interpretation is even introduced into the city arms. Now such indeed is the literal meaning of the words which compose the name, but no one at all acquainted with the Irish form of the name would admit that such was its true origin.* It was precisely so with the ancient writers to whom we have referred; they took the name *Nemthur* as they found it, and assigned its literal meaning, leaving to others to enquire into its true origin.

Some Celtic scholars with O'Flaherty have derived the name from *Nemidh*, one of the great founders of the *Tuatha-Danaan* race, who dwelt in this territory, and they interpret it to mean "*turris Nemathe*," the stronghold of *Nemidh*.† Others have sought an explanation of the name by reference to some hero called *Nem*, or *Nen*, of whom several are met with in the early history of the Celtic race. Such derivations, however, are arbitrary, based on mere conjecture, and have no ancient authority to support them.

More probable seems the opinion that it is a contracted form of *Nemeththor*, derived from *Thor* and *Nemeth*, that is "the chapel rock" for, in Cormac's "Glossary," *Nemeth* is explained to mean "a chapel, as if *Nem-iath*, or heaven-land."‡ Such contractions are not unfrequent. We have an instance at *Nenthorn*, in *Berwickshire*, which, as appears from old records, was formerly written *Naithans-thirn*. It is in favour of this opinion that from time immemorial there was a chapel on *Dumbarton* rock, dedicated to *St. Patrick*. Close to the burgh of *Lanark* there is an ancient township called *Nemphlar*. Our Glossaries explain the Celtic *plae* and the Cymric *ffle* to mean an inclosure, a meadow, a level place, "quasi a platea," as Cormac's "Glossary" has it; and hence we may not err in interpreting this name to mean "the chapel inclosure." Some have been struck with the similarity of *Nemphlar* to *Nemthur*, and have been disposed to consider it nothing more than a corruption of the latter name. It seems to me, however, to have quite a distinct etymology, the more so as it is difficult to conceive what connection there could be between *Alclyde* and *Nemphlar*.

The late Professor O'Curry, when examining the Celtic MSS. in the Bodleian Library and the British Museum, discovered

* See Joyce, "Irish Names," p. 348. † "Ogygia," part i. p. 12.

‡ Stokes, "Cormac's Glossary," p. 121.

that in some very ancient Irish texts, the name was written *Emthur*, and it has since then been generally admitted that the initial *N* is merely euphonious, being derived from the preposition or the article prefixed. It would be easy to multiply instances of proper names in which the initial *N* has been introduced in like manner: it is thus in *Nenagh*, *Nurney*, *Newry*, the *Nore*, the *Naul*, and several other names with which every one is familiar.* We have seen, in the extracts already given, that the name is written *Empthor* in the original Latin text of *Jocelyn*. I may add that the old *Parisian Breviary*, in its lessons, has, "in *Britannia natus, oppido Empthoria*;" and the *Armagh Breviary*, in like manner, "in illo *Britanniæ oppido nomine Emptor*."

This discovery of O'Curry has led to two interpretations of the name, either of which may be considered as quite satisfactory. The first of these assumes that *Em* is the old Celtic superlative particle, and hence explains the name *Emthur* as equivalent to "the great rock," or "the great fort;" and it must be admitted that no name could be more appropriate for the precipitous rock on which the impregnable castle of *Dumbarton* stands. The other interpretation adopts *Entur* as the original form of the name, and from "*En, i.e., Unus*," explains it to mean "the solitary rock." The numeral *En* is not unfrequently thus introduced in the Celtic proper names, as *an Endrum*, corrupted to *Nendrum*; *an Entreb*, "*unica domus*," the ancient name of *Antrim*, &c. This explanation has also the merit of being an accurate description of the singular basaltic rock which stands alone, arising almost perpendicularly, on the north bank of the *Clyde*. Nor can we wonder that the original *Nenthur* was softened to *Nemthur*. We have an instance to illustrate such a change, in the modern name of the same place: it is now only known as *Dumbarton*, whilst a century ago it was invariably written *Dunbarton*.

A difficulty here presented itself to *Colgan*, and *Dr. Lanigan* has not failed to make use of it, whilst endeavouring to reject the opinion that *St. Patrick* was born in *North Britain*. If *Nemthur* was a name of the strong British fort on the banks of the *Clyde*, how happens it (asks *Colgan*) that no trace of such a name is to be met with in any of the ancient records of British history? *Colgan*, indeed, could answer that only very few monuments of British history have been preserved that refer to this early period, and then it is but natural that the Roman name *Theodosia* should be used in preference, or the Celtic *Alclud*, or the later British name *Dunbritton*. Some trace, moreover,

* Reeves "*Eccles. Antiq.*," p. 116; Joyce, *passim*.

of the original name, Nemthur, may perhaps be recognized in the old Geographical Ravenna Treatise, which in its list of British towns gives us in one text the name, Nemeton and in another Memanturum,* which may not improbably be set down as corruptions of the name Nemthur. It is only, however, since the publication of the Black Book of Caermarthen (the most ancient manuscript of Wales) that this difficulty has been set at rest for ever.† We find there a poem of Taleissin, in which the very name of which we are in search is introduced. Rederech, the hero of the poem, sets out from Wales to recover the kingdom of Strathclyde, from which some years before he had been expelled. With his fleet he sails to *Nenthur*,‡ and there, on the banks of the Clyde, fights the battle which restores to him his lost inheritance. This passage not only supplies us with the name of this strong British fort, for which Colgan and Lanigan had searched in vain, but it leads us, moreover, to look for it on the banks of the Clyde, where precisely we should expect to find it, in accordance with the narrative given in the “Lives of St. Patrick.”

5. Several of the ancient texts affirm that St. Patrick's birthplace was situated in the “Plain of Tabern, or Taburn,” which the Celts would call Magh-Tabern, and which is Latinized Campus Taberniæ. The particulars which are added all seem to identify this plain with the rich valley which is watered by the Clyde, and from the rock of Dumbarton stretches for miles inland towards the Frith of Forth. Through this valley ran the famous wall erected by the Romans against the Picts:—

The isthmus between the Forth and Clyde (writes Mr. Skene) presents towards the west the appearance of a great valley, having the Campsie and Kilsyth hills on the north, and on the south a series of lesser rising grounds extending in a continuous line from sea to sea; while the hills on the opposite side recede as the valley approaches towards the east, till the view from the southern rising ground extends over the magnificent plain of the Carse of Falkirk, with the upper part of Frith of Forth stretching along its northern limit. The Roman wall was constructed along the ridge of the southern rising grounds, and the remains of this stupendous work have at all times arrested the attention of even the careless observer. This great work, as it presents itself to the inspection of those who have examined it minutely, consisted of a large rampart of intermingled stone and earth, strengthened by sods of turf, and must have originally measured twenty

* See Pinkerton's “Enquiry,” &c., vol. i. p. 430.

† Skene, “The Four Ancient Books of Wales,” 1868, vol. i.; and “Celtic Scotland,” vol. ii., 1877, p. 436.

‡ It is to be remarked that the MS. has a modernized text, and hence presents the aspirated form of the name. Mr. Ferguson, however, asserts that the reading of the MS. is Nenthur. “Congal,” 1872, p. 196.

feet in height and twenty-four feet in breadth at the base. It was surmounted by a parapet, having a level platform behind it, for the protection of its defenders. In front there extended along its whole course an immense fosse, averaging about forty feet wide and twenty feet deep. To the southward of the whole was a military way, presenting the usual appearance of a Roman causewayed road. This great barrier extended from Bridgeness, near Carriden, on the Frith of Forth, to Chapel Hill, near West Kilpatrick, on the Clyde, a distance of twenty-seven English miles, having, at intervals of about two miles, small square forts or stations, which, judging from those that remain, amounted in all to nineteen in number, and between them were smaller watch-towers.*

Such being the valley of the Clyde, we may inquire whether its history harmonizes with the account of the "*Campus Tabernæ*" as given in our ancient records. The documents D and E inform us that the plain of Tabern was so called from the huts or tents which the Roman troops had erected there. The *Vita Quarta* states that this plain was known to the Britons as *Magh-Tabern*, but was called by the Romans "*Campus Tabernaculorum*," from the number of huts erected there by the Roman army. Jocelyn gives the same explanation of the name. Now, this is precisely what we would expect to find in the valley of the Clyde. More than once the Roman legions had encamped there to repel the incursions of the Picts. We find the Emperor Theodosius sending his troops thither in the year 369, that by occupying its castella or outposts the Northern marauders might be kept in check. Again, in the year 396, when the Britons applied to the Roman commander, Stilicho, for aid, "a legion was sent to Britain, which, for the time, drove back the invading tribes, and garrisoned the wall between the Forth and the Clyde."†

Dr. Todd, in his "*Memoir of St. Patrick*," takes to task our ancient writers for giving such an explanation of the name. "Some of the biographers say," he thus writes, "that the place had its name of *Tabernæ* or *Taberniæ* from the tabernacles or tents of an antient Roman camp which was formerly there. This cannot possibly be so; for *Tabernæ* signifies booths or shops, not tabernacles or tents."‡

Now, it is not our ancient writers who have fallen into error, but Dr. Todd has been himself betrayed into a most singular mistake. In later times, indeed, a distinction was drawn between the *tabernæ* and the *tabernacula*; but strictly speaking, as the learned Latinist Facciolati writes, "*Taberna*" indicates "*omne utile ad habitandum ædificium*;" and the same

* Skene, "*Celtic Scotland*," vol. i. p. 77.

† Todd, p. 358.

‡ Skene, *ibid.*, i. 105.

writer adds the authority of Festus to prove that both words were originally the same: "*tabernacula dicuntur a similitudine tabernarum.*"*

The ancient writers, however, seem to imply that the Roman name of *Campus Tabernaculorum* was only a secondary one, superadded to the older British or Celtic name of Tabern, or Magh-Tabern, by which the valley of the Clyde was designated. The Rev. Duncan Macnab, in his "*Archæological Dissertation on the Birth-place of St. Patrick,*" inquiring into the etymology of this old Celtic name, derives it from the words *tabh*, i.e., "the sea," and *Erin*, so that Magh-Tabern would mean "the plain of the Irish Sea." This would, perhaps, be a satisfactory explanation if the plain in question were bordering on the Irish Sea, but extending as it does inland towards the Frith of Forth, it is not so apparent how such a name could be given to it.

The learned author of the "*Ogygia,*" writing two hundred years ago, when the Celtic traditions were much more vivid and more clearly defined than at the present day, records—not as a conjecture but as a matter of history—that the valley of the Clyde was at an early period known as Magh-Taburn, from Taburnus, the ancestor of the Tuatha-Danaann. "In former times," he writes, "in the territory of Alclyde, at Dunbriton, in Scotland, there was the '*Campus Taburni*:' in its town, Nemthor, St. Patrick was born. Wherefore, by the writers of St. Patrick's Life, it is written '*Campus Tabernaculorum*,' as if it were so called from the tents of the Romans who pitched their camp there; but it is to be held that the name was derived rather from that Taburnus (or Tabarn), the ancestor of the Danaans, who from that district of Britain passed over to Ireland."†

6. Probus, who is one of the most accurate of the historians of our Apostle's life, gives us the "*vicus Bannave*" as the place where Calphurnius dwelt. Some, indeed, have cited his words as if he placed St. Patrick's birth in the village Bannave, but Probus makes no such statement. He very clearly asserts that the parents of our Apostle, Calphurnius and Concessa, were "*e vico Bannave*" "from the village Bannave in the Tiburnian district, not far from the Western Sea." It is manifest that this "*vicus Bannave*" of Probus is the same as the "*vicus Banaven*" of St. Patrick's "*Confessio*," which is sometimes written Bonaven; for in our early Celtic pronunciation the *a* and the *o* are constantly interchanged.

Can we find any trace of such a name in the valley of the Clyde, whither all the past indications of which we have spoken have almost unconsciously led us to look for the scenes of St.

* Forcellini, "*Lexicon Totius Latinitatis*," ad voc.

† "*Ogygia*," part 3, cap. 13, p. 178.

Patrick's childhood? I unhesitatingly say, Yes. The name itself, indeed, implies nothing more than "the river's mouth;" as *Bun*, *Bon*, and *Ban* are constantly used to indicate the mouth or efflux of a stream, and *Avon* or *Awe* is the common name for a river or stream, in all the Celtic dialects. Thus we have the Avon-ree, Avon-mor, Avon-beg, and a thousand similar names. The well-known name, *Bunmahon*, in Irish "*Bunmachuine*," marks the village situated at the mouth of the river Mahon, still known in Irish as Machuin. So, too, with the names Buncrana, in Donegal; Bunratty, in Clare; Bundoran, Bunnamairgey, and others.

Looking now for some such name in the neighbourhood of the Clyde, we meet, in the Life of St. Cadoc, with the mountain *Bannawc*, near which, it is said, St. Cadoc erected his monastery. This has been identified with the range of hills, now called Catkin, which runs through the parish of Carmunnock, formerly Carmannac, down to the southern bank of the Clyde. The ancient name is still preserved in that of the parish, for in the Cymric dialect B passes into M in combination,* and thus the name Carmannoc is nothing more than *Caer-Bannauc*. So, too, we have *Bunawe* at the mouth of the *Awe*, where it falls into Loch Etive; and we find also *Banavie* in Lochaber. The latest Scottish writer on the subject, in a paper read before the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, says:—

As Scotchmen acquainted with the topography of the west country, we can be at no loss to indicate localities in plenty, of which one may have been intended. *Bannave* would answer admirably to denote the mouth of the Leven where it joins the Clyde, and *Taburnia*, or *Tiburnia*, is a designation most appropriate for a river district, or a *ross* placed between two streams. The most probable site for the Bonaven of St. Patrick is the confluence of the river Aven, or Avon, with the main stream of the Clyde, near which the present town of Hamilton stands. A more exact correspondence of locality with the name as it has been transmitted to us could not be desired. *Tabernia*, or *Taburnia*, would thus be the present district of Strathaven, or the upper course of the Clyde itself, which might well be so designated in reference to the Falls, presenting certainly one of the most striking combinations of beauty and grandeur of natural scenery contained within the bounds of our island.†

The instance here adduced of the river Aven or Avon which falls from the south into the Clyde seems indeed to bring us to the very name of which we are in search. The valley through which this river flows is still called Strathaven. And as the name *Bannave* or *Bonaven* is a generic one, perhaps we should

* "Four Books of Wales," i. 174.

† Turner, p. 275.

have here the reason why St. Patrick, to distinguish it from other villages of the same name, should have called it *Banaven Taberniæ*, and why Probus also should have described it as "the village Bannave in the Tiburnian district." Its distance from Dumbarton does not seem to me an insurmountable difficulty in the case, as it is not at all improbable that the residence of a Roman nobleman like Calphurnius would be situated at some miles distance from the capital of the province. It is deserving of remark that precisely at the confluence of the Clyde and Avon, there exists on the eastern bank of the latter stream an artificial hillock or mound which probably marks the site of an ancient village. Should, however, anyone find a difficulty in accepting this opinion, we must add that the River Clyde was supposed to fall into the sea at Dumbarton; "ad Dunbritton mare subit;"* and hence it should not surprise us that on that account some village on either bank in the immediate neighbourhood of Alclyde would have received the name Bannave or Bonaven.

7. Probus adds one other phrase which serves to define more particularly the territory in which Bannave and Tabernia are to be sought for. He states it was not far from "the Western Sea," "haud procul a mari occidentali." So, too, Jocelyn tells us that Nemthur was a town "bordering on the Irish Sea." Now precisely by these names do we find the sea that separates North Britain from Ireland designated by the early writers. The *Vita Quarta* seems to place this district "juxta mare Tyrrhæneum," which name generally designates the Mediterranean Sea. In the present text, however, it is probably a mere blunder of the copyist for the Latinized form of the Celtic *Iar* or *Iarthar*, which would be the precise Celtic word used in reference to the Western Sea.

8. The territory of *Nentria* is also a distinctive name which Probus's text presents to us. Mr. Turner makes an ingenious conjecture relative to the origin of this name. "Nentria I believe to be the primal or archetypal name of the district of Strathclyde. . . . It was probably derived from the Cymric *Nant* 'a valley' and *Dwr* 'water;' and the literal meaning would thus be the 'valley of the stream,' Strathclyde being the valley of the Clyde."† To me, however, it appears that *Nentria* is nothing more than a Latinized form of the name *Nentur* by which the Britons designated Alclyde, and thus the "*Nentria provincia*" would mean "the territory of Alclyde." This fortified town being the capital of the Scoto-British kingdom, soon gave its name to the surrounding territory, and we

* Camden, "*Brittania*," p. 666.

† Turner, p. 277.

find its rulers indifferently styled by the old Scotch writers the kings of Strathclyde and the kings of Alclyde.* It would be pretty much the same as when at the present day we speak of Dumbarton city and Dumbartonshire.

9. We must not omit the descriptive words which are added by Probus "in which (territory) the giants are said to have dwelt in olden times." It is a strange coincidence that in the passage already referred to in the Life of St. Cadoc, it is said that this saint when he visited North Britain and was engaged in erecting his monastery near the mountain, Bannawc, that is in the parish of Carmunnock, found there "the grave of a giant," who when raised to life said he had been king of the territory beyond the mountain Bannawc. We have also seen how the learned author of the "Ogygia," records the Irish tradition that the valley of the Clyde derived the name Taburnia from the great founder and father of the Tuatha Danaans, and that it was precisely from this district that this heroic race passed into Ireland. Now, these Danaans are the giants and heroes of our mythological history: "all the gods of Irish Pagan story are connected with their race."† Their sepulchral mounds at Moturra, in the County of Sligo, and elsewhere, are still popularly known as "the giants' graves."‡

10. We further learn from Probus that at the time that St. Patrick was led into captivity, the British marauders plundered "his city Arimuric and the neighbouring places." It has been generally assumed as a matter of course that these words have reference to Armoric Gaul. It is, indeed, beyond the reach of controversy that the sea-board territory of Gaul was called Armorica; and it is equally certain that it derived its name from the Celtic words, *Ar* "upon," and *moir* or *muir* "the sea." And Camden writes, "Armorica in the old Gaulish and now in the British signifies *by the sea side*." However, there is nothing in the text of Probus to lead us to suppose that he here refers to Armoric Gaul. He speaks not of a territory, but of a city, called by the name of *Arimuric*, and of a city so named there is no trace in Gaul. It seems sufficiently probable that in the present text the city derived its name from the Roman wall or rampart which stretched across the valley of the Clyde, of which we have already spoken. In "Cormac's Glossary" we find *Mur* explained to mean "a rampart."§ Even to the present day we find the name *Dalmuir* attached to the district

* Skene, "Celtic Scotland," vol. i. p. 235.

† Dr. Matthew Kelly, "Cambrensis Evercus," vol. i. p. 512.

‡ See "Annals of the Four Masters," by Dr. Donovan, ad An. M. 3330, 3370.

§ Stokes "Cormac's Glossary," p. 116.

close to the Old Kilpatrick, on the banks of the Clyde, where the fosse or wall terminated; and at a short distance there is a town called *Dalmuir*, a station on the line of railway between Dumbarton and Glasgow. Some Scottish archæologists affirm that the name *Dalmuir* corresponds in meaning with the old Celtic *Aridh-muir*, or *Arimuric*.

11. The name *Hurnia*, given, in N, to the village where St. Patrick was born, is a generic one, and is often met with in Celtic districts. It is derived from the word *urnaidhe*, and is generally used to designate a place of prayer or pilgrimage. Mr. Joyce gives us the following details on this name: "This word, which is variously written *urnaidhe*, *ornaidhe*, or *ernaidhe*, signifies primarily 'a prayer,' but in a secondary sense it is applied to a prayer-house; Latin *oratorium*. It takes most commonly the form *Urney*, which is the name of some parishes and townlands in Cavan, Tyrone, and King's County. The word often incorporates the article in English, and becomes *Nurney*, which is the name of several parishes, villages, and townlands in Carlow and Kildare. It occurs in combination in *Templenahurney*, in Tipperary."* The town *Nurney* in the County Carlow, is marked *Urney* in the old map of Ireland by Mercator: it was, in former times, a famous place of pilgrimage, and O'Curry writes that "*Urnaidhe*, in this instance, and whenever applied to a church as its name, means *Cillnahurnaignhe*, 'cella orationis.'"[†] Now from the "*Origines Parrochiales Scotiæ*," we learn that the church at Old Kilpatrick, near Dumbarton, was in olden times a famous place of pilgrimage. Before the twelfth century, Alwin, Earl of Lennox, "confirmed a grant to that church of all the lands of Edinbernian and Baccan, and others," which had been granted by his predecessors; and he added himself the lands of Cateconnen; and from the old deeds which are still preserved, we know that towards the close of the twelfth century these lands were in the possession of a person called "*Beda Ferdan*," who lived at *Monachkenneran*, on the Clyde, "in a large house of wattle;" and of three other persons, all of whom were bound for all service "to receive and entertain the pilgrims coming to the church of St. Patrick."[‡]

12. Jocelyn mentions the village "*Taburnia*." This perhaps is a mistake for *Urnia*, or it may have been another name for the same place, for it may be explained to mean a place of pilgrimage on the sea coast, which would appropriately be referred to Kilpatrick on the banks of the Clyde. All the other

* Joyce, "Irish Names," p. 309.

† Ordnance Survey Letters, Co. of Carlow.

‡ "Orig. Par.," i. 20, 501; v. 229.

details given by this writer clearly point to the neighbourhood of Dumbarton as the birth-place of our Apostle.

13. The name *Enon* is in one manuscript of the "Confessio" of St. Patrick given as the name of the villa in which Calphurnius and his family dwelt. This reading, however, is considered very uncertain, not being found in the oldest and most accurate texts. It is, however, a Celtic name, and would mean a villa on the river bank, precisely as we see so many villas at the present day called "river-view" or "sea-view," or some similar name. It may also be remarked that the Cymric *Yddon*, which would be pronounced Enon by the Celts, occurs more than once as a proper name in the "Four Books of Wales,"* and other early records.

I have thus endeavoured, as far as our limits would permit, to illustrate in detail the various places named in the ancient records in connection with the birth-place of our Apostle. They all lead us to the valley of the Clyde, and I have no hesitation in accepting the tradition of the Scottish Church which, from time immemorial, has marked out Old Kilpatrick as the hallowed spot in which St. Patrick was born. The Breviary of Aberdeen, the only proper one of Scotland that has been preserved, gives the seal of authenticity to this venerable tradition: "St. Patrick, the Apostle of Ireland (we there read), was born of Calphurnius, of illustrious Celtic descent, and his mother was Concessa, from Gaul, a sister of St. Martin, of Tours: he was conceived with many miraculous signs at Dumbarton Castle, but was born and reared at Kilpatrick, in Scotland, near the said castle."† In the Diocese of Glasgow there are no fewer than six ancient parishes dedicated to St. Patrick, and Dr. Forbes gives a list of ten other churches or districts which in various parts of Scotland have honoured St. Patrick as patron. This proves how popular and how widespread was the devotion of the Scottish Church to our Apostle. Kilpatrick on the Clyde is the oldest of these Scottish dedications. It is called Old-Kilpatrick, to distinguish it from another town a few miles more inland, called East Kilpatrick. It gives name to Kylpatrick parish, and has for its limit to the north the range of hills called the Kilpatrick hills. In the "*Origines Parrochiales*," we read that "of the places in various parts of Scotland, including six parishes in the diocese of Glasgow, which derived their appellation from the Apostle of Ireland, the most ancient and distinguished certainly was Kylpatrick."‡ Its present church only dates from 1793, but as we learn from the

* Skene, "*Four Books*," vol. i. p. 434; and vol. ii. p. 432.

† "*Brev. Aberdon.*," ad diem 17, Mart., fol. lxx. b.

‡ "*Orig. Parroch.*," vol. i. p. 20.

authority just cited, the church which it supplanted was at that date considered "a very ancient building, and erected on the site of one still more ancient."* Close to Old Kilpatrick is the plateau called Chapel-hill (formerly united with Kilpatrick) where also St. Patrick's memory is held in benediction, and where the remains of an old Roman town may easily be traced. The holy well, once dedicated to our Apostle, is situated a little to the south of the graveyard, in which the Church now stands, being separated from it, however, by the modern road from Dumbarton to Glasgow. It is probable that this was the well over which the original church was built, and to whose waters miraculous effects are ascribed in several of the old narratives relating to the infancy of our Apostle.

Kilpatrick† was an outpost of the great fortress of Alclyde. The ruins of Roman construction, which still mark the country around, attest its importance in former times. It was here too that the Roman wall or vallum terminated, as the Scottish Antiquaries are now agreed,‡ and four forts, which may still be easily traced, linked the extremity of the wall with the great fortress itself. This will serve to explain to us how it is that the ancient writers may well have named Nemthur or Alclyde as the place of St. Patrick's birth, although it is to Kilpatrick or its immediate neighbourhood that we must look for the precise spot which was rendered illustrious§ by that event. As an outpost it was in a manner identified with the fortress to which it belonged. At the present day, a person living at one of the suburbs or outposts of Paris is justly said to reside in Paris. It was precisely so in the matter of our Apostle's birth. We may take another instance from the references made to the Roman wall, which, as we have seen, terminated at Old Kilpatrick, but which, nevertheless, by the ancient writers, with Venerable Bede, is said to have joined the Clyde, "*juxta urbem Alcluith.*"|| Thus, then, writing at a distance as to time and

* "Orig." cit. It is added that, in the Clyde opposite the Church, there is a large stone called St. Patrick's Rock; and it is the tradition that St. Patrick's vessel, in full sail, struck on this rock, but sustained no injury.

† "The parish of Kilpatrick has been described in every account as peculiarly rich in Roman antiquities, and we are told on good authority that a sculptured cross, said to have been taken from near the Roman wall, was long used as a foot-bridge over a burn in these latter days of Iconoclasm." "The Labourer," September, 1865, p. 270.

‡ We have already given the words of Skene. Centuries ago Fordun, treating of this wall, had written: "*In ripa fluminis Clude juxta Kirkpatrick terminatur.*" "Scotichron," vol. i. p. 4.

§ A quarter of a century ago local tradition pointed to a ruin at Glenlucet, near Bowling, between Kilpatrick and Dumbarton, as marking the place where St. Patrick was born.

|| Bede, "Eccl. Hist.," vol. i. p. 12.

place, the historians of St. Patrick's life justly stated that he was born at Nemthur or Alelyde ; whilst those who wished more particularly to designate the precise spot declared that his birth took place at the town called *Hurnia*, famed as a place of pilgrimage, which, from the special veneration shown there to our Saint in after times became known throughout Scotland as *Kilpatrick*. It is not necessary to repeat here what has been said in the preceding pages, that the other circumstances which refer to St. Patrick's birth-place all harmonize with Kilpatrick : it was situated in the plain of Tabernia, not far from the Western coast and from the Irish Sea, and precisely where, towards the close of the fourth century, we would expect to find the Roman Decurio Calphurnius holding his half civil, half military command.*

III.

Remarks on some Modern Theories.

A few remarks on the other principal theories which have found adherents in later times, will now serve to place in bolder relief the consistency and truth of the opinion which we have here briefly explained.

Don Philip O'Sullivan Bearre, in his "*Patriciana Decas*," advanced the opinion that St. Patrick was born in Bretagne, or Brittany, in France. He was led to adopt this view by the statement of some ancient writers, as well as of several Continental Breviaries, that our Apostle was "*Brito natione*," which words he translated "a native of Brittany." Suffice it, however, to remark, that at the time of St. Patrick's nativity, the name of Bretagne, or Brittany, had not been as yet transferred to the shores of Gaul.

Mr. Patrick Lynch, Secretary to the Gaelic Society, contended in his "*Life of St. Patrick*," that Nemtur referred to the city of Tours, in France, and he translated it "*Holy Tours*." For this singular translation, however, he gives no authority. Indeed, there seems to be no reason for assigning a Celtic name to this flourishing city. In early times it was known by its classic name of *Cæsarodunum* ; and at a later period from the tribe of the Turones, whose capital it was, it was called "*Civitas Turonum*," from which title at a comparatively recent time the modern name was derived.

Dr. Lanigan was the first to contend that we must look to Northern Armoric Gaul for St. Patrick's native town, and, with

* It is a strange coincidence that as early as the year 162, a general named Calphurnius Agricola was sent to command the Roman troops at the Clyde. See Skene, "*Celtic Scotland*," vol. i. p. 79.

considerable display of historical research endeavoured to prove that the modern Boulogne, in Picardy, was the precise place rendered illustrious by his birth. In his proof he relies mainly on the words of St. Patrick regarding his father, Calphurnius, in the beginning of the "Confessio:"—"Qui fuit a vico Bonaven Taberniæ," from which he thus argues:—

Bonavem or Bonaven was in Armorica Gaul, being the same town as Boulogne-sur-Mer, in Picardy. That town was well known to the Romans as Gessoriacum; but about the reign of Constantine the Great, the Celtic name Bonaven or Bonaun, alias Bonon, which was Latinized into Bononia, became more general. According to Bullet, who informs us that Am, Aven, On, signify a river in the Celtic language, the town was so called from its being at the mouth of a river; *Bon*, mouth, *on* or *avon*, river. Baxter also observes that Bononia is no other than *Bonavon* or *Bonaun*, for *aven*, *avem*, *avon*, *aun*, are pronounced in the same manner. The addition of *Taberniæ* marks its having been in the district of Tarvanna or Tarvenna, alias Tarabanna, a celebrated city not far from Boulogne, the ruins of which still remain under the modern name of Terouanne. The name of this city was extended to a considerable district around it, thence called *pagus Tarbauensis*, *Tarvanensis regio*.*

Throughout Dr. Lanigan's argument there is this radical defect, that St. Patrick in his "Confessio" does not name *Bonavem Taberniæ* as his birth-place, but only as the place of the family residence, whence he himself was led into captivity. Even, therefore, if it were admitted that Boulogne-sur-Mer was indicated by "Bonaven Taberniæ," the historical argument which assigns the birth of St. Patrick to North Britain would remain unimpeached. Two of the ancient writers, in fact, state that our Apostle was led into slavery from Armorica Gaul; but they nevertheless affirm that he was born at Alclyde, and that his family, having gone from North Britain on business to Gaul, he was there made captive. Moreover, the etymological derivation of Bononia is not without its difficulties. Some, with Cluverius, wish it rather to be derived from the name Buenen, by which the Northern tribes of Belgic Gaul designated it; others derive it from the name of the river on which the city stands, which is now called the Liane, but it was known to the Romans as "Fluvius Enna," under which name it is marked on the ancient maps. This is also the name given to it by Malbrancq. Should either of these derivations be admitted, it would be vain to endeavour to refer Bonaven to Boulogne-sur-Mer.

But another insuperable difficulty here presents itself. How

* Lanigan, "Eccl. Hist.," vol. i. p. 93.

could the term *vicus* be applied to Bononia in those early times? And we must remark that, as well by St. Patrick in his "Confessio" as by Probus, this phrase is used—"e vico Bannave." Surely Bononia at the time we treat of was not a mere village, or *vicus*, but was rather an *oppidum insigne*—indeed, one of the most important towns of Northern Gaul. It had long been the chief military station of the Roman armies in Armoric Gaul. There they had marshalled their troops for the invasion of Britain. Carausius had made it the capital of his Empire in the West. Constantine, too, had for awhile sojourned there. A short time before St. Patrick's birth the Emperor Julian, the Apostate, had made it his headquarters in his expedition into Gaul. The remains of the Roman buildings which once adorned it still attest its importance. In the year 449 it was able to repel the assault of Attila. It was not till the ninth century, when it was destroyed by the Normans, that it ceased to be reckoned among the chief towns of France.*

Being thus a place of importance, both civil and military, its name was clearly defined. No names were more familiar than those of Gessoriacum† and Bononia; and St. Patrick, wishing to be understood, would assuredly have employed, not an archaic form, which centuries before might possibly have been in use, but the ordinary name by which the place was known to every one at the time when he wrote. Often as the city is referred to by ancient and mediæval writers, there is not a trace of the name *Bannave* or *Bonavem* having ever been used to designate it.

But in Dr. Lanigan's hypothesis what becomes of the second name, *Taberniæ*? We may pass over the singular mistake of our historian, who confounds together Tarvanna and Tervanna, though the former was the ancient name of Therouanne, thirty miles from Boulogne; whilst the latter designated the modern town of St. Pol, which is twenty miles farther on.‡ Both places were, however, of far less importance than Boulogne, and there is not a shadow of proof that the "*regio Tarvanensis*" ever extended to the sea-coast. But Dr. Lanigan contends that some such additional designation was necessary in order that the Bononia to which St. Patrick referred might be distinguished from Bononia in Italy and elsewhere. This might be true, indeed, if St. Patrick had made use of the name Bononia; but surely no one would ever have dreamt of applying the name Bannave

* See "Statistique Monumentale du Département du Pas de Calais," Arras, 1840; also "Congrès Archéologique de France," 27^e session, 1860, &c.

† Two centuries and a half later, it was called Gessoriacum by Venerable Bede, "H. Eccl.," Book i. p. 1.

‡ Paulinatti, "Comitum Tervanensium Annales," cited by Hoey, p. 123.

to the Italian city; and were some distinctive designation required, is it not some such term as *Marittima*, or *Gallica*, or *Armorica*, that would be applied to the seaport town, and not the unheard-of name, *Tabernia*?

Dr. Lanigan appeals also to the authority of Probus, but it is only by introducing a very important change into the genuine text of Probus that he brings it to bear on his novel theory. Probus, as we have seen, writes: "*Quem vicum (Bannave) indubitanter comperimus esse Nentriæ provinciæ.*" Dr. Lanigan, however, without assigning any reason, thus cites the text: "*Quem vicum indubitanter comperimus esse Nevtriæ provinciæ,*" and from the *Nevtria* thus introduced into the text he concludes that, according to Probus, the village Bannave was situated in the province of Neustria, in Gaul;* and that the same Neustria is indicated in all the various texts which refer to Nemthur. All this, however, falls to the ground when we look to the authentic text of Probus, in which the "*Nentria provinciæ*" admits of no explanation except that which we have given in the preceding pages. Even if we were to suppose that *Nevtria* was the genuine reading of this text, we should interpret it as a mere aspirated form of the Celtic Nemthur, and it should follow the interpretation already given of that name. It cannot, however, by any possibility, be referred to Neustria, a name which began to be used only in the sixth century, and which French philologists derive from "*Neuest reich*," the new kingdom which was formed in the north-west of Gaul, whilst Austrasia occupied the north-eastern territory.

Mr. Cashel Hoey, in an interesting paper read before the London Academia of the Catholic Religion,† adopts for the most part the opinion of Dr. Lanigan. Whilst, however, he admits that Bannave designates the modern Boulogne, he contends that *Tabernia* is to be sought for in the town of Desvres, which in the Middle Ages was Latinized *Divernia*, and pursuing the same etymological line of reasoning, he turns Nemthur into Tournahem, and he identifies with the town Enna, not far from Desvres, the small villa Enon, which in one MS. is introduced into the text of St. Patrick's "*Confessio.*" This theory does not explain away any of the difficulties that we have met with, in Dr. Lanigan's opinion; on the contrary, it only makes the confusion still more confused. Desvres is an obscure village about fifteen miles from Boulogne. It was known in ancient times as *Divonia*; for the name *Divernia* is nothing more than a very late attempt to give a classical Latin form to the modern French name Desvres. But strangest of all, as, according to Mr. Hoey,

* Lanigan, "*Ecccl. Hist.*," vol. i. p. 102.

† Hoey, '*On the Birth-place of St. Patrick*,' "*Essays*," &c., p. 106.

St. Patrick was born at Bonaven Taberniæ, we must be ready to admit that Boulogne and Tournehem are the same place, and that Enna is close by Boulogne, though it is in reality close by Desvres. Before, however, we dismiss this theory, I must warn the reader against a statement made by Mr. Hoey: "The opinion," he says, "that St. Patrick was born in France has always had a traditional establishment in Ireland. It is asserted in one of the oldest of his Lives, that of St. Eleran, and indicated in another, that of Probus."* Now the text of Probus has not a syllable to indicate any such opinion. The words which Mr. Hoey, improving on Dr. Lanigan's reading, assigns to Probus: "Quem vicum indubitanter comperimus esse Neustriæ provinciæ," may contain, indeed, some such reference, but they are not the words of Probus. And as regards St. Eleran, we have already given his text in full (see F. above); and although the author traces our Apostle's descent from those who dwelt in Armoric Gaul, yet he clearly and expressly states that his parents lived in Strath-Clyde, and that his native town was Nemthor in the plain of Tabern. Thus Mr. Hoey's reference to these two texts is plainly incorrect.

MM. Hancock and O'Mahony, editors of the second volume of the "Brehon Laws," affirm that St. Patrick was born in the neighbourhood of Bristol.† Their argument is one of the most illogical that has been of late years advanced in historical matters. Nemthur, they say, is identified, by the scholiast of the "Book of Hymns," with Alclyde. Now, the name Caer-Britton, given to Alclyde by the Roman-British writers, was also given to Bristol in the early Roman times. They, therefore, conclude that Nemthur, St. Patrick's birth-place, was none other than Bristol. This whole argument, as is manifest, hinges on the testimony of the scholiast of the "Book of Hymns." Now, this ancient writer does not affirm that our Apostle was born at Caer-Britton, which might, perhaps, justify in some way the line of reasoning which these writers have pursued; but he expressly states that his birth took place at "Alclyde, in North Britain." Suffice it to say that Bristol was not Alclyde, neither was it situated in North Britain.

There are two other theories which, though they do not directly refer to the question of which we now treat, yet cannot be passed over in the present controversy, for they seem, indirectly at least, to cut away the ground from under the position which we have taken. The first of these has been broached by Mr. Nicholson,‡ who on mere visionary grounds pushes back

* "Essays," &c., p. 110.

† "Ancient Laws of Ireland," vol. ii. (Dublin, 1869), p. xxii.

‡ "St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland," by R. Steele Nicholson, p. 3.

the date of St. Patrick's birth to the first quarter of the third century, and places his mission to Ireland in the year 254. This theory has nothing to commend it. Its avowed purpose is polemical, for Mr. Nicholson desires his readers to understand that St. Patrick had made our people a nation of Protestants in the third century, and that Palladius was sent to Ireland by the Pope in the fifth century to bring them from Protestantism into the pale of the Catholic Church. If the date thus assigned to St. Patrick's mission were true, it would undoubtedly be vain to look for Calphurnius, a Christian Deacon, holding the office of Roman Decurio in the frontier city of Alclÿde, early in the third century; but whilst glaring inconsistencies are met with at every step in this theory, one argument alone will suffice to refute it. Mr. Nicholson, when citing the "Book of Armagh," finds it necessary in order to preserve some appearance of truth for his theory to deliberately alter the ancient text which he professes to cite. Among the headings of the Annotations of Bishop Aedh, we find the following in the "Book of Armagh" (fol. 20, a. 1):—

De ætate ejus quando iens videre sedem apostolicam voluit discere sapientiam.

De inventione Sancti Germani in Galliis et ideo non exivit ultra.

De ordinatione ejus ab Amothorege Episcopo, defuncto Palladio.

Now, the second of these headings is thus altered by Mr. Nicholson: "De inventione sancti generis in Galliis et ideo non exivit ultra:" which he translates: "Concerning his finding a holy set of men in Gaul, and that, therefore, he went no farther."* It is not thus, however, that history is written. When such a deliberate alteration of an authentic text is found necessary to give some colour of consistency to a cherished theory, such theory stands self-condemned. The place of St. Germanus is clearly defined in the history of the Church; and it is sufficiently manifest that if St. Patrick was at the school of this great Saint in the fifth century, he could not have flourished as a great Christian missionary towards the middle of the third century. It is strange, however, that Mr. Nicholson did not advert to the fatal blow which is given to his theory by the concluding words of Bishop Aedh, who, so far from antedating the mission of St. Patrick two centuries before Palladius, expressly attests that it was not till after the death of Palladius that St. Patrick was consecrated for the Apostolate of our people.

The second theory to which I wish to refer has been quite recently advanced by the Rev. I. F. Shearman, in his work

* Nicholson, p. 24.

entitled "*Loca Patriciana*." Whilst, however, I reject Mr. Shearman's theory, far be it from me to say one word disparaging him or the valuable work with which he has enriched our Ecclesiastical literature. He has in many of its chapters rendered important services to the hagiology of the Irish Church, and by his unwearying toil in illustrating many obscure passages in the lives of our early saints, he is justly entitled to the gratitude of all students of the Ecclesiastical history of our country. But in the subject now before us, he has undoubtedly allowed his mature judgment to be outrun by a very fanciful theory. For fourteen centuries Ireland has honoured St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, as her chief Apostle. Now, however, Mr. Shearman tells us that we have been quite mistaken. The Apostle of our country, if his theory is true, was another saint of the name of Patrick, commonly designated in the Celtic records, St. Sen-Patrick, that is, St. Patrick Senior. It was only at a later period that St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, entered on the mission field; but, for some reason which it is not easy to understand, and which Mr. Shearman makes no attempt to assign, the writers of our early Church transferred to the later missionary all the important facts which belonged to the career of the real Apostle St. Sen-Patrick. If all this be true, our past inquiry will have been made in vain, for the St. Patrick of whose birth-place we have been in search was Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, whom, in Mr. Shearman's opinion, we have undeservedly styled the Apostle of Erin. Let it not be said that I have in any way exaggerated Mr. Shearman's theory; on the contrary, his own words seem to me far more forcible, when he writes, that the old authors whom we have cited "shut out from view the *real* Apostle Sen-Patrick, consigning him to obscurity and to an almost historical extinction."*

It would be out of place in our present inquiry to enter, at any length, on the refutation in detail of this singular theory. We have only to view it as it bears on the subject now before us; but whosoever calmly considers it under this respect, must unhesitatingly conclude that it arbitrarily ignores every record of our country's history, and is inconsistent with the witness of the Irish Church, for fourteen hundred years, as to the Father and Chief Apostle of our Faith.

The true place of St. Sen-Patrick is clearly defined in our early Celtic records. He was a native of Wales, and he adorned the schools and monasteries of that country by his learning and virtues. He was even for a time the tutor of our great Apostle, and was associated with him in evangelizing our people, but

* "*Loca Patriciana*," p. 434, note.

towards the close of life returned to his native Wales : a portion of his relics were in after times enshrined at Glastonbury ; another portion being preserved in Armagh. Whilst, however, his merits are thus extolled, there is not in any one of the Irish writers the smallest trace of his being considered the Apostle of our country.* On the other hand, all our writers are agreed in this, that St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, was Ireland's Apostle ; and they reckon it as St. Sen-Patrick's greatest eulogy that he was "the tutor of our Apostle." See how clearly the most ancient and venerable of our martyrologists, St. Ængus, in his "*Feliré*," assigns to each of these saints his proper place. On the 24th of August, the festival of St. Sen-Patrick, the following strophe commemorates his fame :—

With the relation of the host of Srenath (*i.e.* Glastonbury),
Whose history is made illustrious,
Sen-Patrick, a battle chief,
The amiable preceptor of our Patron.

But, on the 17th of March, St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, is thus commemorated :—

The blaze of a noble sun,
The Apostle of undefiled Erinn,
Patrick, with many thousands,
The bulwark of our poor people.

The testimony of St. Ængus should alone suffice to set at rest all question as to the apostolate of St. Patrick, son of Calphurnius. The "*Feliré*" was written in the eighth century. Its author, St. Ængus had devoted his life to the study of the lives of the saints of Erin, and hence this work, which has been handed down to us in authentic MSS. of the most venerable antiquity, bears with it an unquestionable authority.

So, too, another Irish martyrologist of illustrious repute, Marianus O'Gorman, in his "*Metrical Calendar*," whilst, on the 24th August, he merely gives the name of the Senior St. Patrick, on the 17th of March styles St. Patrick, son of Calphurnius :

Patrick, Apostle of Erinn,
Head of the faith of the Goedhil.

In the "*Leabhar Breac*" (fol. 99, b. 1), there is a brief chrono-

* Mr. Shearman's only authority is the Iolo MSS., with some bardic traditions of Wales. These MSS. and traditions, however, belong to a very late age, none of them dating earlier than the fifteenth century. We are not to be surprised that some of the Welsh writers would exaggerate the merits of their countryman, and ascribe to him some of the facts which belong to the Apostle of Ireland.

logical treatise, which is held in high repute by our antiquarians.* It thus begins: "We ought to know at what time Patrick, the holy bishop, and chief preceptor of the Scoti, began to come to Ireland to preach and baptize, and to resuscitate the dead and to cure all diseases, and to banish all the demons from Ireland, and to sanctify and consecrate, and to ordain and bless," &c.: and subsequently it designates him of whom it speaks, "Patrick, the son of Calphurn;" and it adds the testimony of St. Eleran, surnamed the Wise, who died at a great old age, in the year 664: "Here is the character given by Eleran of Patrick, when he brought an account of him to the religious of Clonard:

Meek and great was the son of Calphurn,
A vine branch bearing fruit.

The liturgy of our early Church also bears witness to the same St. Patrick, who is honoured on the 17th of March, being the Apostle of our people. In the "*Missale Vetus Hibernicum*," published a few months ago by Mr. Warren from the MSS. of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, the following prayer is given for St. Patrick's Feast on that day:—

O God, who in Thy Providence didst choose St. Patrick, Apostle of the Scoti, to lead the Irish nations (*Hibernenses gentes*) who were wandering in darkness and in the errors of Paganism, unto the true light of the knowledge of God, and to make them by the laver of regeneration, sons of the Most High God, grant we beseech Thee through his pious intercession that we may hasten without delay to those things that are holy, through Jesus Christ our Lord.†

The most ancient of our annalists, Tighearnach, is equally clear on this point. The earlier entries registered in his *Annals* have been more than once questioned by our ablest writers, on account of the conflicting texts presented in various MSS., but regarding the death of St. Patrick, the son of Calphurn, its genuineness is recognized by all. Tighearnach marks it under the year A.D. 493, and styles the Saint "*Patricius Archiepiscopus et Apostolus Hibernensium*," and adds the quatrain, which even in his time was considered ancient:—

From the birth of Christ, a pleasant period,
Four hundred above fair ninety,
Three noble years after that
To the death of Patrick, chief Apostle.‡

* It is printed in Irish with a translation by Petrie, "*History of Tara*," p. 74.

† Warren, "*The MS. Irish Missal*," London, 1879, p. 150.

‡ See Petrie, "*History of Tara*," p. 88.

Moreover, the various writers who have already attested for us the birth of St. Patrick in North-Britain, leave no doubt as to the apostolate of him to whose birth-place they refer. Thus St. Fiacc's Hymn, whilst registering St. Patrick's birth at Nemthur, in the 4th strophe styles him "the son of Calpuirn," and in the subsequent strophes sets forth as his eulogy that he brought "the people of Ireland from evil to life," that till Patrick preached to the "Scoti the sons of Emer and Emeron were in perdition," and "Until the Apostle came to them, on Ireland's people was darkness, the peoples adored false gods."*

The *Vita Secunda*, though it is incomplete, sufficiently indicates St. Patrick's apostolate when it attests that, not to Palladius, but to him, was given the conversion of our people.

The *Vita Tertia* tells us that Calphurnius was St. Patrick's father, and it adds the following eulogy of our Saint: "The Lord sent to this island this missionary St. Patrick, glowing with the fire of the Holy Spirit, that he might give life to our hearts, and convert us from darkness to light; and when all the Apostles will assemble with their peoples on Judgment Day, St. Patrick will go before us: for, he is given us as our Leader by God, he is our Pastor, our Judge, our Father, our Apostle."†

The *Vita Quarta*, in the fifteenth chapter, affirms that it was so arranged by a benign Providence that St. Patrick would be led a captive to our shores, that thus "he might learn, in his youth, the language of the nation whose Apostle he was destined one day to be."

Probus, at the very outset, states that St. Patrick was the son of Calphurnius; and in the subsequent chapters, repeatedly declares that he was our spiritual Father, the Apostle of our nation (chapter 32), by whose labours the faith of Christ filled the whole land, "*fides Christi omnia nostra loca implevit*" (chapter 26).

In the preface to the first part of the Tripartite Life, St. Patrick, the son of Calphurn, is called "one of those rays by which Jesus Christ, the Sun of Justice, has illumined the universe, the glowing and bright shining lamp of the Western world, the Father of the faith and of the spiritual life of the Irish people (*Pater fidei et spiritualis regenerationis Hibernorum*‡)." Almost the same words are repeated in the Life of our Apostle in the "*Leabhar Breac*:" "The people that sat in darkness beheld a great light: they that were in the land and in the shadow of death found a light whence came their illumination. . . . Now one of the splendours which the Sun of

* See Stokes, "*Goidelica*," p. 131.

† Colgan, "*Acta*," p. 29.

‡ Colgan. "*Acta*," p. 117.

Righteousness shed upon the world was the splendour and the flame, the precious stone and shining lamp which enlightened the West of the world, *Sanctus Patricius Episcopus*, to wit, holy Patrick, high Bishop of the West of the world, father of the Baptism and belief of the men of Ireland.*

But what should of itself suffice to set this question at rest, we may appeal to the witness of St. Patrick himself. In his "Confessio,"† which is now admitted by all authorities to be one of the most authentic and most precious records that have come down to us from the early centuries of our faith, he pours out his soul in thanksgiving to God for the wondrous mercies vouchsafed to him; and among these mercies and the blessings accorded to his humble ministry, he expressly mentions his mission to our people, and the conversion of Ireland from the darkness of Paganism to the holy light of Christian truth: "For I am truly a debtor to God (he thus writes), who has given me such grace, that many people should be born again to God through me, and that among them everywhere there should be ordained priests for this people newly come to the faith. . . . Wherefore behold how in Ireland they who never had the knowledge of God, and hitherto only worshipped unclean idols, have lately become the people of the Lord, and are called the sons of God What shall I render to Him for all the things that he hath rendered to me; but what shall I say or promise to my Lord? For I see nothing unless He gives it Himself to me; but He who searches the heart and reins knows that I ardently desire and am ready that He should give me to drink His chalice, as He has permitted others to do who have loved Him. Wherefore, may it never be permitted by my Lord that I should lose my people whom He has gained in the ends of the earth."

Thus, then, we have an uninterrupted tradition handed down from age to age, and beginning with the very first century of our nation's faith, that St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, was the Apostle of our people. In Mr. Shearman's theory, two things should be explained: First, how it is that the Irish Church, so remarkable for its love and reverence for the sainted Fathers of its faith, should have so completely ignored the life and the memory of its true Apostle: and secondly, how it could have come to pass that the various writers who chronicled the deeds of St. Patrick, sixty-six of whom are referred to by Jocelyn and by the "Leabhar Breac," should have conspired to assign to one

* Stokes, "Three Middle-Irish Homilies," 1877, p. 5.

† We have seen already how, in the very commencement of the "Confessio," he declares himself the son of Calphurnius, "*patrem habui Calphurnium*."

who was not our Apostle, the gesta, and the miracles, and the Life of the true Apostle.*

There were, undoubtedly, many saints of the name of Patrick in the early Irish Church ; so, too, there were many Bridgets, yet one stands forth alone the Patroness of Ireland. At least four St. Patricks may be reckoned in the very first age of our country's faith ; and yet, what is most remarkable, all of them receive some distinguishing epithet except *the one*. There is Palladius, otherwise called Patrick ; there is St. Patrick, known as Patrick Senior ; there is a little later St. Patrick Junior ; one alone is *the Patrick*, who requires no such distinguishing epithet, but is always honoured pre-eminently as the Father of our Faith : this is St. Patrick, the son of Calphurnius, who, by his sanctity and fruitful missionary toil merited to be styled the Apostle of Erin, whose birth-place we have endeavoured to illustrate in the preceding pages.

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ART. II.—HISTORY OF THE PRUSSIAN "KULTURKAMPF."

PART II.

LEGISLATION OF THE YEARS 1873 AND 1874.

ALTHOUGH the designs in contemplation at Berlin against the Catholic Church were kept as secret as possible, the events of the year 1872 showed plainly enough that nothing favourable was to be expected. Before the close of that year, indeed, the Prussian Government had given unmistakable signs of intended warfare. The deputies, Reichensperger and Mallinkradt, had addressed to the Government the interpellations : " By what pretext it was prepared to justify the banishment of Religious Orders of women from the public schools ? " and further : " Whether the Government were still minded to compel the Roman Catholic pupils of the gymnasium at

* The reader must be cautious in accepting Mr. Shearman's references. For instance, under the birth of St. Patrick Senior in A.D. 372, we have the reference to "Chronicon Mariani" ("Loca Patr.," p. 434). Now Marianus gives, indeed, in that year the birth of St. Patrick, but expressly adds that it was St. Patrick, the son of Calphurn. The following is the entry of Marianus : "Sanctus Patricius nascitur in Britania insula ex patre nomine Calphurn : presbiter fuit ipse Calphurn, filius diaconi nomine Fotid. Mater autem erat Patricii Conchess, Soror Sancti Martini de Gallia." (Vatic. MS.)

Braunsberg to submit to religious instruction from an Old-Catholic priest?" The debate upon both questions took place on the 27th and 28th of November.

The reply of the Minister Falk was as arrogant as if the Catholic Church had already forfeited her rights. He charged her with forcing on a conflict with the State, from which he himself, however, would not shrink, provided the people were prepared to stand by the Government. He insisted that "the Church, in common with everything else that belonged to the State, should bend to State legislation." He contended that the secular power should exercise the right of "examining for itself whether a priest excommunicated by his bishop were actually excluded from the communion of the Church." The Old-Catholic priest, Wollmann, concerning whom the question arose, he declared to be a member of the Catholic Church in spite of the excommunication formally and canonically pronounced against him. These views of the Minister, on receiving legal sanction in Prussia, would not only put an end to the liberty of the Church, but threaten her very existence. A prompt and decided remonstrance was returned by Mallinkratt, to the effect that "by this declaration the Government was opening a campaign not only with the party of the Centre, nor merely against Ultramontaniam, but against the entire Catholic Church."

The Protestant parties—Conservatives as well as Liberals—hailed with loud and eager applause the prospect of war with the Church. Diversities of opinion, and even hostility of principle generally, which formerly divided Prussian Conservatives and Liberals, disappeared in the common hatred of Rome. "Herod and Pilate," said the Catholics, derisively, "had again made friends with each other, as formerly in the condemnation of Our Blessed Lord." And so indeed it was. Throughout the land, the organs of Protestantism hounded each other on against the Church, unchecked by the least effort or remonstrance on the part of the Government. "The State was bound," said they, "to supervise the entire organization of the Roman Church, and especially to insist upon the subservience of the Clergy. All question of leaving the Church to go her own way would be high treason to the future of Prussia. These opinions, according to all appearance, were fully shared by the Government. Without any consideration for the interests of the parishes, and without mercy or regard for the much oppressed nuns, the teaching Sisters were driven from the primary schools. The law against the Jesuits was enforced with almost brutal recklessness. Scholastics then studying at Prussian Universities were not even allowed to continue their

studies; and, on the 23rd of November, the authorities at Münster threatened to "intern" four Scholastics if, by the 1st of December, they had not quitted the place. In the province of Posen the Government went so far as to interdict the Devotions to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Further decrees of persecution were also announced.

To all appearance, the designs of Bismarck met, at that time, with direct opposition on the part of the Emperor William; neither had the "alliance of the three Emperors," concluded a few months previously, sufficed to make matters smooth. The permission sought and obtained by Bismarck, at the close of the year, for release from public office, was universally attributed to the opposition of the Emperor to the proposed State interference in ecclesiastical matters. It is possible, therefore, that this disposition on the part of His Majesty might have prevented the prosecution of further measures, had not the Pope's Christmas Allocution been made use of to arouse his susceptibilities.

The approach of the heavy storm, threatening to lay waste the Church in Prussia, was felt throughout the whole Catholic world, and, from all parts, words of encouragement and consolation were addressed to the faithful in that country. The Bishops of England were foremost in salutations to their German brethren; the steadfast endurance of the German episcopate rejoiced their hearts as "*consanguinitate supernaturali per gloriosum Germaniæ apostolum ejusdem familiæ consortes.*" Writing from a land watered by the blood of martyrs for the freedom of the Church, they could say with truth, "*ii qui ecclesiam Catholicam vel aperte vel subdole persequuntur, omnimodæ libertatis matrem in servitutem conantur redigere.*"

On the eve of Christmas the voice of the Chief Pastor was also raised. Pius IX. reprimanded the newly-formed German Empire in terms so precise and distinct as to leave no doubt of his apprehension of the danger, and his desire that it should be fully realized. "In Germany," said he, "men seek to uproot the Church from her very foundations, combating her not by secret wiles alone, but by open force. Persons who not only are not numbered amongst the followers of our holy religion, but are entirely ignorant of her principles, arrogate to themselves the power of defining both the dogmas and rights of the Church."

Protestants were in the habit of ridiculing the Pope as a weak old man, whose words could have no possible force or influence beyond the walls of the Vatican; nevertheless, the utterances of this aged and feeble priest aroused a storm of fury, almost incomprehensible in those who had seemed scarcely to believe in

the Pope's existence. A similar temper was displayed by the Government. The passage above quoted from the Papal Allocution was everywhere diffused by means of the official telegraph offices; whilst, with mendacious hypocrisy, was added: "Consideration for His Majesty forbids our rendering the full sense of the words in German." Those newspapers which had published the entire text of the Allocution were prosecuted. This proceeding on the part of the Minister of Police was denounced as a mistake by the Press, as well as by the Landtag. They did not perceive that the one aim of the manœuvre was to excite the anger of the Emperor. Mallinkrath saw through it, however, and expressed his conviction in a few trenchant words to the Minister Eulenburg: "The object of the 'powers that be' is to make men believe that the majesty of the Emperor has been assailed, and that reparation is due to the injured feelings of the nation." The Ministers were not out in their reckoning. The Emperor gave his consent to the recall of young Lieutenant Stumm, the last representative of the former Prussian Embassy to the Holy See. Moreover, on the 8th of January, 1873, he accepted the draft of the Bill which was to regulate the relations of the Catholic Church to the State, and to "chastise the insolence of Rome."

On the 9th of January, the draft of the proposed legislation was laid, by Falk, before the Chamber of Deputies, with a request for speedy consideration, in order that the laws might come into force during the present Session, and so "the way be prepared for a firm and lasting peace." The slight sketch given by the Minister sufficed to assure the Liberals of the importance of the blow aimed at the liberty and independence of the Church; he was rewarded, therefore, by loud applause from that side of the House. The Protestant Conservatives, however, were silent, inasmuch as, from the legislation proposed, they could not but apprehend dangers also to the "Evangelical" Church. As for the Catholic members, they saw at a glance all that was involved. "It has been announced," said Mallinkrath, "that the object of the new laws is to bring about a firm and lasting peace. In reality, however, the object of the Bill is to establish, by external servility and internal revolution, and the consequent dissolution of the Catholic Church in this country, the peace of the grave." A stern sentence, this; but its truth was felt by every Catholic in the land.

By the rules of the new legal articles, ecclesiastical offices were to be conferred on those of the clergy only who had been educated at German universities, or in one of the seminaries recognised by the Minister. At the conclusion of their studies, candidates for the ecclesiastical office were to be examined by

Commissioners of the State in classics, philosophy, history, and literature. All ecclesiastical institutions for the training of the clergy were to be placed under State control. The Chief President of the province in which any such institution existed was to have the right of giving or withholding his approval of the regulations of the house, as well as of the plan of instruction. The *petits séminaires*, enjoined by the Council of Trent, were to be entirely suppressed.

The Chief President was to have the right of protest against the appointment as well as removal of all clergymen whatever. The bishop, it is true, was entitled to appeal to the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs against this protest, but he was bound to abide by the Minister's decision. The protest of the Chief President, moreover, was to stand good "when it was evident that the person in question was unsuited to the office from reasons appertaining to the claims of citizenship." On the occurrence of any ecclesiastical vacancy, it was to be definitively filled up within the space of twelve months. The power of enforcing clerical discipline was to be exercised by a court of *German* ecclesiastics only, whilst appeal to the State was open in all cases. Corrective measures with regard to the clergy were also to be subject to the control of the Government, and in no instance to be carried out contrary to State regulation, or decrees of the magistrates. Ecclesiastics whose continuance in their posts seemed to be incompatible with public regulations were to be deposed by a court of justice appointed *ad hoc*.

The Catholics of Prussia, though prepared for evil, had scarcely expected treatment such as this. Newspapers, though hostile to the Church, which retained any feeling for liberty, denounced these projects as "a relapse into sheer absolutism, and as the offspring of a fanciful bureaucracy, calculated to destroy the last traces of constitutional principles." At the same time, however, little doubt was entertained by Catholics of the assent of the majority to the new legislation, and of its being ultimately carried into effect. In the words of Windthorst, in the Chamber of Deputies, they were convinced that, "just as the Christians of the first centuries could not submit to the unlawful demands of Pagan supremacy, even so Christians of to-day were bound to withhold their submission to unjust and conscience-violating laws." That indescribable misfortune was hanging over the Church in Prussia was evident to all; but Catholics took comfort in the thought that, after all, the enemies and persecutors of the Church were mortal, and that the help of Almighty God would be given in His good time. Was it a happy presage that, on the very day on which Falk, by order of his master, Prince Bismarck, laid before the House the sketch of the pro-

posed legislation, Napoleon III., exiled and abandoned by his countrymen, was breathing his last in an unpretending chamber at Chislehurst? "Bismarck is assuredly no mightier than was Napoleon," said Catholics to each other.

To every thinking mind it was clear as day that the projected laws were a violation of the Statutes of the Prussian Constitution. It had been laid down by Article 15 "that the Evangelical and Roman Catholic Churches should be entitled to the independent regulation and administration of their affairs." Article 18 had pronounced the State to have nothing to do with the "appointment to ecclesiastical offices, either by nomination, selection, or confirmation." The very contrary was now decreed, inasmuch as the Church was, in every particular, to be subordinate to the State. "They propose to frame a code for enslaving the Church," remarked Reichensperger. In his speech on the introduction of the Bill, Falk suggested to the special consideration of the Deputies the question, whether a revision of the Constitution might not be necessary; an indiscreet suggestion, but one which met with much approval from the Liberal majority in the House. The existing Constitution had restored freedom to the Catholic Church in Prussia; that was sufficient reason for the Protestant parties to be eager for a change which might bring the Church into bondage. By the Catholic members the danger of such a step was vigorously demonstrated. Herr von Mallinkratt warned conscientious Protestants "to beware of making common cause with those who, by virtue of their principles, were the deadly enemies of *authority of every kind*." The special aim contemplated was, indeed, the annihilation of the Catholic Church; "but," he continued, "in a few years the State will have attained to absolute despotism over all that is most sacred to human nature. Liberalism will then find itself yoked to the car of Absolutism; once let the people take part in this triumphal procession, and immediately Liberalism will cease to exist." The warning was, however, in vain. Prussian Liberalism held itself immortal, and laughed at every suggestion of possible dissolution. With a temerity, characterized afterwards by Windthorst as "blasphemous," the reporter, Gneist, appealed to "the decision of eternal justice; inasmuch as the matter in question was one so pleasing to God as resistance to the decrees of the Vatican Council." Falk intimated his approval, adding that, "after much conflict and serious consideration with itself and with God, the Government had decided on taking this course." No one either within or without the House gave heed to this assertion. At Court it may, possibly, have met with some belief. The opinion of Catholics was expressed by the sarcastic speech of Windthorst: "It would be

well simply to do away with the Constitution altogether; and, in each case as it occurs, legislate according as the circumstances, considerations, and *passions* of the moment shall suggest."

The alteration of Articles 15 and 18 of the Constitutional Code was definitively settled on the 1st of March, 1873. In accordance therewith, the Catholic Church was still to maintain the right of independent administration of her own affairs, "*subject*," however, "*to the legally ordained supervision of the State*." The right of the State to the "appointment, selection, and confirmation" of candidates to ecclesiastical offices, was also to remain *suspended*; "*for the rest, however, the claims of the State with regard to the training, appointment, and dismissal of the clergy, along with the right of defining the limits of ecclesiastical discipline, were to be regulated by law*."

These additions were in direct opposition to the spirit of the original Articles, which were thereby, not changed, but simply cancelled.

The debate upon the revision of the Constitution was opened in the Upper Chamber on the 10th of March. The representatives of the old nobility—even those who were Protestants—vigorously opposed the attempt upon the liberties of the Church. The position of the defenders of the motion was, indeed, an exceedingly difficult one, inasmuch as they could produce no real grounds for a change in the Constitution. Count Landsberg called the attention of the House to the Bill in the following terms: "It is customary to introduce the proposal of a law by the demonstration of its necessity; I ask you, then, to consider the Bill in question. The first page is filled merely with information concerning the resolutions of the Chamber of Deputies; upon the second, there is nothing at all; the project in question is contained on the third page, and the fourth is again a blank."

It was not to be wondered at that those of the Upper Chamber who were chosen from among the "Professors" should find the necessity for a revision of the Constitution on the proclamation of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. A short time previously, Herr von Mallinkrath had defined the situation as the war of the Professors against the Church. But it seems strange that a man of so much intelligence and general experience as the Minister Count Roon, should condescend to a similar pretext, and say, "The claim to infallibility on the part of a human being is the occasion of the strife in which we are engaged." This chord once struck, it was echoed loudly and repeatedly by the Church's opponents. "We must have weapons against the Infallibility," was the cry of the Liberal

Burgomasters in the Upper House. It was said by others yet more clearly, "We must be on the defensive against the usurpations of a foreign Power, against the arrogant claims of the Roman Curia; by so doing we secure the consciences of our countrymen against the crime of deifying a man."

The House seemed to have completely lost sight of the fact that more than eight millions of the population of Prussia were Roman Catholics; an oversight which drew from Count Landsberg an outburst of noble indignation. "It seems," said he, "that the learned men of the day have no time to read through the Catholic Catechism; German Catholics cling closely to Rome, and will cling the closer the more obstacles are put in their way."

Prince Bismarck, who was present at the deliberations simply in his Ministerial capacity, ventured upon illustrating the dangers threatening Prussia from Papal influence by historical analogies; of so weak a nature, however, that it seemed doubtful whether they were made in earnest. "The conflict in which we are engaged," said the Chancellor, "is one between the kingly power and the priestly power; a conflict dating from an age considerably before the appearance of our Redeemer in this world. It was waged by Agamemnon with the seers of Aulis; it cost him the life of his daughter, and prevented the sailing of the Greeks for Troy." Bismarck bade his hearers also remember that in a struggle such as that in which they were engaged, the last of the Hohenstaufens had perished under the axe of a French conqueror in league with the Pope of that day. If, by these allusions, a word of warning was intended to the illustrious House of Hohenzollern, the Chancellor was certainly intelligible enough. But he ventured to speak still more plainly: "We ourselves were by no means far from being in an analogous position; had the French plan of invasion, the outbreak of which was simultaneous with the publication of the Vatican decrees, been crowned with success, there is no knowing what history might not have had to record of the *Gesta Dei per Francos* in Germany." Bismarck must have been more than ordinarily anxious to inspire his Imperial master with fear and horror of the Catholic Church, otherwise he would scarcely have allowed himself to give expression to surmises so repugnant to good taste. His admirers, however, pronounced this speech to be "one of the best and most significant" which he had ever made. The majority in the Upper House proved as favourable to the Government as that in the Lower. The revision of the Constitution was decided upon by eighty-seven votes against fifty-three. More than half of the members had abstained from taking any part in the deliberations.

The way to the promulgation of the new laws was now clear, and the Government had reason to be entirely satisfied with the zeal of their party. Their satisfaction was even greater at the rapidity with which the Church Laws were voted and passed.

The deliberations in the Chamber had begun on the 7th of March; by the 20th the work was accomplished. So hurried were the proceedings that the members of the Centre had with difficulty secured freedom of speech. As Mallinkradt said, "The minority was simply trampled under foot." A counterpart to that which occurred at Berlin on the 8th of March, 1873, will scarcely be found in the parliamentary annals of any Constitutional Government—namely, that the minority obtained a hearing only by the threat of insisting upon *personal* voting at *each* paragraph, if the majority should persist in proceeding so inconsiderately with the debate. "We demand," said Mallinkradt, "to be allowed first to discuss, and then to vote."

The *training* of the clergy in Prussia was in no way distinguished from that of the other learned professions. Ecclesiastical students, in common with those of law, medicine, and philology, were bound to pass the "final" examination at a Prussian gymnasium. Of ecclesiastical institutions in which the future clergy could pursue their studies, there were none in Prussia. At Gaesdonck (Diocese of Münster) there was, it is true, under the direction of the bishops, the Collegium Augustinianum, as a substitute for the gymnasium, but by no means intended exclusively for theological students. At Pelplin (Diocese of Kulm) there was also the Collegium Marianum, as a substitute for the lower gymnasiums. Otherwise, ecclesiastical students frequented without exception the public gymnasiums. In some few towns were to be found boarding schools, where boys were received at a trifling expense, and where they had the advantage of studying under regular clerical supervision. Both these institutions were just those which were regarded with special dislike by the Minister and by the Liberals. It was in vain for Catholic deputies to appeal to the fact that the most satisfactory results had been obtained from the pupils of these institutions; Mallinkradt furnished the Ministry with the special reports of the Government inspectors to that effect. The facts were such as Falk could not deny; he did not hesitate, therefore, to explain, through his commissioner, that his real motive for suppressing these institutions was on account "of their involving the question of education; the question whether the youths destined to the priesthood were to be trained as their religious superior wished." The suppression of these institutions, which was

decided upon at the request of the Minister, was nothing less than an encroachment upon the right of the Church to educate her priesthood, and also an attack upon her inner life and organization. This the Liberals knew full well. "We can by no means allow," said they, "that innocent boys, in the freshness of youth, should have their spirits broken by the discipline of a monastery, and be denied the right of deciding upon their own future."

Theological training, properly so called, was supplied to ecclesiastical students either at one of the universities dependent on the State, or by means of faculties, founded by those bishops to whom the right appertained, for the study of philosophy and theology. The unsatisfactory results experienced by the bishops with regard to the Universities of Bonn and Breslau made it very undesirable that they should be frequented by young theological students. Falk, however, on his part, was bent on preventing their studying at the institutions under episcopal control; he applied, then, for the right, which he obtained, of visiting these institutions, of laying down their plan of instruction, and of closing them at pleasure. The probable result of the theological course at the State universities may be guessed by the declaration of Falk: "The Government will not be prepared to depose professors of Catholic theology because their doctrine may not be quite in accordance with that of the bishop." The orthodoxy of the teacher as well as of the scholar was, therefore, to be at the disposition of the Protestant Minister of Public Worship!

In order to keep the matter of theological training firmly in hand, candidates were required to pass a special examination "as to fitness for their vocation by general knowledge, especially in the regions of philosophy, history, and German literature." As a matter of fact, there was no real ground for treating students in theology differently from students in law or medicine. As a proof of the zeal with which ecclesiastics pursued non-theological studies there was the fact, of which the Minister was aware, that a large proportion of the prize essays, both in philosophy and history, were annually carried off by Catholic theological students. Moreover, the bishops had always required of candidates for holy orders, especially in the first year of their academical course, special attention to philosophy, history, and physical science. As far back as the year 1863 an enactment of the Archbishop of Cologne was communicated to the theological students at Bonn, charging them to pursue those studies with ardour, "in order to lay the foundations of a solid and scientific education, so necessary to the priestly office, especially in these days." Falk was aware of this,

but his great aim was to infuse into the studies of ecclesiastics the spirit of "nationalism;" hence, his insisting on their examination by a State commissioner, in order to determine whether or no they were "national,"—that is to say, whether their minds had been formed according to the spirit of Prussian Protestantism. Reichensperger said with justice, "that it would be indeed a scandal to leave to the decision of the State the question who should be admitted and who should be rejected from the priesthood."

In order to take away the last remnant of the Church's independence, the right of protest against all ecclesiastical appointments, including provisional "supplies," was to be adjudged to the State. The bishop was to be compelled to yield to the protest of the Chief President, unless, indeed, the "Ecclesiastical Court of Justice" had pronounced against the said protest. Reichensperger exclaimed, in angry derision: "Why did not the Roman emperors decree that no ecclesiastical office was to be discharged without the consent of the Proconsul? This would have been an easy method of hindering the growth and activity of the Church, and of trampling her under foot." By Windthorst this act of legislation was described as "an unprecedented usurpation by the State of the mission given by Christ to His Apostles." The Government attempted to justify its pretensions by the announcement that, "since the Vatican Council, the State had to deal no longer with the Catholic Church and an independent episcopate, inasmuch as all power was handed over exclusively to the Pope, now pronounced infallible."

This idea was not a new one; it had already been expressed by Bismarck, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his circular despatch of May the 14th, 1872. His object was to incite the Governments of Europe to an entire change of policy in the event of a fresh election to the chair of St. Peter. With the astonishing hardihood so characteristic of himself when on the territory of religion, Bismarck had affirmed, "the Pope has now virtually stepped into the place of every individual bishop; the bishops are now nothing more than his instruments and functionaries, having no responsibility of their own. In their relation to Governments they have become officers of a foreign potentate, and of a potentate who, by virtue of his infallibility, is more absolute than the most absolute monarch in the world." The speech of the Chancellor was met by a reply of well-merited severity. In January, 1875, the German bishops issued a collective Declaration, in which they complained of the way in which the Chancellor of the Empire had held forth upon Catholic dogmas in the ears of Protestants, and of Catholics who had

left the Church. Proceeding to give the true explanation of the dogma of Papal infallibility, and with unmistakable reference to recent events, the bishops continued: "The Catholic Church can, with no shadow of justice, be charged with the immoral and despotic principle that submission to the Head releases the members from individual responsibility."

This assumed dread of an overbearing Papacy was a weapon of no small service to Bismarck in the object he had in view. He insisted repeatedly that his quarrel was not with the Church, but with the "party fighting for the temporal dominion of the priesthood." This was the pretext for depriving the bishops of their right of free appointment to benefices. From the very establishment of the Prussian Constitution an agreement had been made between the Government and the bishops, whereby the rights of patronage had been determined. In instances where the Government could prove an historically authenticated claim to the appointment of priests to certain benefices, the bishop was bound, provided no canonical impediment existed, to appoint the candidate proposed by the Government. This claim extended to some 500 benefices in the kingdom; all others were "*liberæ collationis episcopalis*."

The proposed new law, however, assigned to the Government the right of veto upon every clerical appointment whatsoever, even provisional ones, as also the right of resisting the desire of the bishop. The appointment of a priest to any charge whatever, without the previous consent of the Administration, was punishable by a heavy fine. If a priest, without permission from the Chief President, were to exercise any function, even the administration of the last Sacraments, he became liable to a fine of 300 marks: in the case of a bishop it was to extend to 3000. There is no denying that by the new law a skilful plan was laid for ensnaring the Church. The education of her priesthood was to be under the surveillance of Protestant functionaries, and the appointment of her clergy to be regulated by non-Catholic Ministers. Even from the Liberal ranks some voices were raised to protest that "in spite of the dread of Ultramontaniam, measures so arbitrary could not be sanctioned." This was, however, but the generous outburst of the moment; in the end, the Liberals fell in with every measure for destroying the Church's freedom.

A special law "concerning ecclesiastical discipline" was to secure to every priest unauthorized by the bishop the protection of the Government. By the terms of this law, moreover, the Pope could no longer exercise any ordinary jurisdiction in Germany, inasmuch as the right of enforcing discipline was to be in the hands of "German ecclesiastical magistrates" only.

These were bound to report every infringement of rule, the result being either a fine of upwards of 90 marks, or detention in a "house of correction" for upwards of fourteen days. Priests were to have the right of appeal to the State against the decisions of the bishop; and, with the view of compelling the Church to bend completely to State supremacy, the Government was to have the same privilege of appeal to "the Royal Court of Justice for Ecclesiastical Affairs." In no place and at no time had the Church allowed to her ministers the "*recursus tamquam ab abuso*" to secular judges. Pius IX. had specially, through the Constitution *Apostolicæ Sedis* of October 12, 1869, threatened with the major excommunication all "*impedientes directe vel indirecte exercitium jurisdictionis ecclesiasticæ sive interni sive externi fori et ad hoc recurrentes ad forum sæculare ejusque mandata procurantes.*" The new law gave therefore to the secular power a prerogative which ecclesiastical law forbade the clergy to respect; consequently the reproach of Mallinkrath was no unjust one when he said that "no one could venture to deny that the clergy were systematically encouraged in opposition and disobedience to ecclesiastical authority."

But the Government had yet harder measures in store. Whilst the episcopal right of enforcing discipline was to be confined to the narrowest possible limits, the State was to have the power of dismissing any priest "whose continuance in the exercise of his office should be found irreconcilable with the public regulations." Every exercise of his office on the part of a deposed priest was punishable by a fine of 3000 marks.

The Court of Justice, to be established for the express purpose of dealing with cases of this kind, was to consist of eleven members, of whom the president and five others were to belong to the judicature. The Government professed its intention to summon also to this Court "ecclesiastics of eminence." Subsequently, Protestant ministers who were taking part in proceedings against Catholic bishops, were numbered amongst its members. The prerogatives of the Court were almost unheard-of; it was empowered "to exact every information tending to elucidate the matter in hand;" and it was to give its decisions "according to its own conviction, without being bound by the rules of positive evidence." The president could, whenever it so pleased him, institute domiciliary visits, and interfere in matters of personal freedom, even as regarded letters and other private papers. Windthorst might well exclaim in reference to it: "This Court is endowed with prerogatives unequalled by *any other in the world*; and I do not hesitate to predict that soon we shall have a regular tribunal of the Inquisition established in the land."

Practically, the Church was indifferent to the proposed dealings of this most arbitrary tribunal, inasmuch as she could not possibly relinquish her rights, nor bend to the decisions of a secular court. "Do these gentlemen seriously imagine," said Windthorst again, "that the Church can be obedient to legislation of this kind? They might as well ask her to sign her own death-warrant! Men may despoil the Catholic Church in Prussia, persecute her, and trample her under foot; but compel her to commit suicide they never will!" The Government and the various Protestant parties, however, would brook no interference; their hopes were built upon the power of the State, that power which had conquered Austria, and crushed France. Was it likely, they boasted, that this power would yield to a band of refractory and arrogant priests?

The third law, "concerning the limits of the right to enforce ecclesiastical discipline and correction," was intended to afford the means of carrying the other laws out. By it the Church was to be prevented from enforcing ecclesiastical penalties upon disobedient members; in no instance were such to be decreed in matters "concerning the laws of the State, or regulations of the temporal power." Even the threat of ecclesiastical censure was strictly forbidden when occasion might thereby be given for "a fault of omission with regard to the State."

That this paragraph would subsequently entail the punishment of a heavy fine or imprisonment upon refusal to give absolution, scarcely struck its promoters at this stage of the proceedings. Such, however, was the case; a fact which, perhaps, more vividly than any other, illustrates the spirit of the entire legislation.

On the 9th of May, 1873, the debates were concluded and the laws approved in both Houses of the Diet; the sanction of the King was immediately given, and publication followed on the 15th of May. Loud expressions of rejoicing sounded from the Liberal ranks, and were echoed, though somewhat more faintly, by the Protestant Conservatives. The individual of all others who had cause for joy was, undoubtedly, Bismarck, whose hard and despotic nature must have felt itself satisfied. All the more forcible, by way of contrast, was the speech of Count Landsberg in the Upper House: "Do you remember, gentlemen, in whose hands was placed the welfare of the State at the time when Christians were compelled to take refuge in the Catacombs? In the hands of such men as Nero and Domitian. And this was no mere chance coincidence; for be assured, that when Christians are forced to fly to the Catacombs for shelter, nothing but tyranny and despotism can be in power." Count Landsberg proceeded to point out the true and real

motives of the conflict with the Church. The Chancellor had none but himself to thank for the satire with which he was overwhelmed in the words which follow: "The origin of this attack has been hidden under the legends of the Trojan War; but in reality it does not date from the time of the lying and political hypocrite, Calchas, but from that moment when the father of lies first made his appearance in this world, and man ventured to set himself up against the authority of God. Of this can truly be said '*natura mortalium imperii avida*;' and, looking around me now, I think I may quote the further words of the classic '*et præceps ad explendam cupidinem animi*.'" On the last day of the debate Baron Schorlemer also spoke in terms which did not spare his opponents. Alluding to a former expression of the Chancellor's with reference to the Liberals, that there were "too many Catilines" in Prussia, he continued, "I have not the least doubt that *we* are now numbered amongst the Catilines as enemies of the State; but let me say that, in my opinion, there is one special Catiline amongst us by whom the peace of the Fatherland is threatened." After this Bismarck certainly could not affirm that the Catholic Opposition had bent before him, or had given the slightest evidence of fear.

The laws were now ready; "the weapons are forged," said Mallinkratt, "and the Government can now begin its labours." The proceedings throughout had been characterised by an overbearing assurance, and no one doubted that the Ministers intended setting to work with rapidity and decision. One obstacle, however, lay in their path, disposed though they might be to ignore it—namely, the resistance of the Episcopate.

As far back as the 30th of January, the bishops had made a formal declaration to the Ministry that "the laws now under discussion were irreconcilable with the duties binding upon every bishop, and opposed to the conscience of each individual Catholic." What, then, would be the next step to be taken, supposing the Prussian Episcopate to refuse all co-operation in carrying out the laws? The last words addressed to the majority in the House by Catholic lips were those of Schorlemer: "Accept, then, if you are bent upon it, this new legislation; decree, if you will, this Draco-like Code; but of this I am very certain, you will never see it carried into effect, for we shall never yield." Falk affected to question this assurance; but at the same time he was obliged to ask himself what should be his next course of action, supposing the prediction of Baron Schorlemer to be fulfilled? This question expressed in the clearest manner the mistake into which the Protestant officials had allowed themselves, with their usual superciliousness, to be led by a few anti-Catholic professors.

The ancient rulers of Prussia, ever since the middle of the seventeenth century, had clung to the idea that they were "Chief Bishops," even over their Catholic subjects. It was considered an act of peculiar indulgence on the part of the Elector Frederick William, when, in 1674, he allowed the Catholic clergy at Cleves, "in causis fidei necnon in spiritualibus et sacramentalibus" to accept a foreign ecclesiastic as their *Ordinarius*. Under this Elector, as well as under his successors in the monarchy, the attempt was repeatedly made to find some ecclesiastic in the land to whom the ruler might delegate his "episcopal" rights. At each of these attempts special stress was laid upon the declaration that "neither 'Romano Pontifici,' nor 'Episcopo,' nor 'Metropolitano,' nor to any other individual would the least right be conceded." These efforts were all in vain, inasmuch as, in order to administer the Sacrament of Holy Orders, the Vicar-General of the kingdom must of necessity have been raised to the episcopal dignity, which could not be done without the Pope. The attempt to control the affairs of the Catholic Church by means of a "Central Office" at Berlin was still persevered in. In those districts of Prussia which had formerly belonged to Poland the rulers of the House of Brandenburg acted as absolute masters; allowing to the priests, it is true, the ordering of the "cultus internus," but granting to no bishop the "jura episcopalia." At that time the number of Catholics in Prussia was too small to enable them to resist this encroachment of the State. Moreover, the life of the Church was then so undeveloped in that country that the clergy themselves even were unconscious of their abnormal position. In the Catholic provinces afterwards annexed to Prussia the spirit of the Church was almost extinct. Consequently, upon the new regulation of ecclesiastical affairs in Prussia, in 1820, several matters concerning the Catholic Church were left in a condition which, when duly considered, was found to be an unlawful limitation of her rights. Meanwhile, a new population had grown up. Many circumstances had combined to fan the flame of genuine and fervent Christianity, which had seemed nearly extinct under the ashes of indifferentism; so that all at once—her enemies scarcely knew how—the Church arose glorious and triumphant. Scarcely had the restoration of political freedom in 1848 been joyfully welcomed, when the German Episcopate assembled at Würzburg, to lay down the principles of ecclesiastical liberty. The new Constitution of Prussia had restored to the bishops the right of regulating and administering the affairs of the Church, and they entered upon their task with an energy and ability almost surprising, considering that the field of labour was a new one. Few examples are to be found in the Church's history of

growth so rapid, so vigorous, and at the same time so healthy, as was manifested by her in Prussia during the thirty years from 1840 to 1870. It seems as if Almighty God had showered down upon her then a superabundance of blessings in order to strengthen her for the persecution which was to come in 1870. It was a time of preparation for the final struggle of Protestantism against the Church; that struggle which, in the prophetic words of Cardinal Wiseman, is to be fought out in the arid Mark of Brandenburg.

In all this the statesmen of Prussia saw nothing but the results of the Roman propaganda, and accused the Government of Frederick William IV. of criminal connivance with the "increasing arrogance of the Roman priesthood." They looked back with regretful eyes to the time of absolute State supremacy in Prussia; nothing, therefore, was more natural than that they should listen to Protestant and Old-Catholic lawyers when, after the Vatican Council, they asserted that there needed but a few bold and decisive measures to make the bishops compliant vassals of the all-powerful State. In the devotion of the Catholic clergy to their faith and principles, in the fidelity of the people to their pastors and their faith, the statesmen of Prussia believed not one whit. Döllinger had talked of the "thousands of clergy" who, like himself, were ready to fall away from the Pope as soon as they should be assured of the protection of the Government. And so Bismarck allowed himself to be beguiled into the imagination that the bishops, clergy, and Catholic people would, after a short contest, submit to the laws which were to make the Roman Church the slave of a Protestant State. The possibility of being met by persistent resistance never occurred to the Chancellor; therefore he did not so much as ask himself the question whether these new laws were in opposition to the doctrines and constitution of the Church; and herein he certainly showed a want of political wisdom and discretion, never more requisite than when dealing with questions of religious organization. When, therefore, the bishops, clergy, and Catholic people rose as one man in behalf of their faith, the position of Bismarck became a very critical one, and he was reduced to adopt measures to which he was driven, as it were, by the embarrassment of the moment. Hence, the peculiar character of animosity and arbitrariness which distinguished them. That he would shrink back, intimidated, no one for an instant supposed. Men of Prince Bismarck's stamp, of iron will and unrestrained love of dominion, know not how to give in or draw back, even when principle is concerned. Painful as is the contemplation of such a position, there is comfort in

the certainty that, if we but wait patiently, we shall witness the defeat of these Titanic minds. For how lofty soever be their intellectual edifices, they are built upon the shifting sand, and of such the Lord Himself said, "Et ruina ejus erit magna nimis."

Before the promulgation of the new laws in May, 1873, the bishops of Prussia, assembled at the tomb of St. Boniface at Fulda, issued a Pastoral Letter to the faithful of all the dioceses. They declared the aim and object of the proposed legislation to be, "the separation of the bishops from the visible head of the Church; the alienation of the clergy and people from their lawful pastors; the severance of the faithful in Prussia from the universal Church of the Incarnate God and Redeemer of the world; and the utter destruction of the Divine organization of the Church." At the same time they expressed their joy at the countless proofs of fidelity and devotion given both by priests and people; "this," they continued, "is our only consolation in the afflictions of the present time, and our ground of hope in the tribulations which threaten us." With a deep sense of their apostolical dignity, they added: "Mindful of the word spoken by the Holy Ghost Himself to the bishops, bidding them feed the Church of God which Christ hath purchased with His own blood, and remembering also our obligation to execute this commission of the Holy Ghost, we are resolved, as regards the government and constitution of the Church, to consent to nothing which shall be opposed to the precepts of the Catholic faith and the rights committed to us by God."

In these words was contained a last warning to the Prussian Government, bidding it refrain from the contest, or be prepared for the determined resistance of the Church. Upon the dismissal of the Diet, on the 20th of May, the President, Count Roon, declared that, "His Majesty's Government was most anxious that these laws should tend to promote peace amongst the members of the various religious denominations, and induce the Church to devote her energies more exclusively to the simple preaching of the word of God." Sentiments of a like nature were echoed by the *Provinzial Correspondenz*: "The Government confidently hopes that the Catholic bishops will by the spirit of their admonitions to their clergy induce them to conform to the principles and conditions laid down by these laws, and hereby secure to themselves a wider and more effective field of action." The Ministers trusted "to the conscientiousness as well as the prudence of the chief pastors of the Catholic Church to prevent a breach with the State."

It was a curious illustration of the peaceful intentions upon which the Ministers were so fond of insisting, that, on the

20th of May itself, a fresh blow was aimed at the Church's existence. The Chancellor pronounced the "*Congregatio Sacerdotum sub titulo Sanctissimi Redemptoris*," the Congregation of the Lazarists, the Congregation of the Holy Ghost, and the "*Société du Sacré Cœur de Jésus*," to be "affiliated to" the Jesuits, and decreed their dissolution within six months at the latest.

In the meantime the bishops, after deliberation at Fulda, had come to the irrevocable decision that the new laws were irreconcilable with the doctrines of the Church. In their earnest desire for peace, they had considered carefully whether it might be possible to accept *some* of the conditions proposed; they were forced to decide in the negative, inasmuch as they could not and might not recognise "the competence of the State to dispose of the affairs of the Church." On the 26th of May, they presented to the Ministry an Address, in which they declared without reservation that the laws in question were "an assault upon the liberties and rights bestowed upon the Church by the ordinance of God." "The Church," they continued, "cannot recognise or allow the Pagan principle that the State is the source of all power, and that the Church has a claim to those rights only which are conceded her by the State. A concession such as this would be a denial of the Godhead of Christ and of the divinity of His doctrines and institutions; it would be to make Christianity itself dependent upon the arbitrary will and pleasure of man." In this protest the Government saw "a fresh proof of Ultramontane arrogance," to which it was determined not to yield. In effect, however, in spite of all its efforts, the design of the laws could not be carried out without the co-operation of the bishops. Neither the amicable dispositions manifested by Bismarck towards Italy, nor his displeasure at the Presidentship of MacMahon, brought him any nearer to the realization of his hopes. The zeal with which the election of the Old-Catholic Bishop, at the beginning of June, was greeted at Berlin did not long escape even Protestant derision; whilst Bismarck's announcement that, upon the choice of a successor to Pius IX., he should institute inquiries as to the validity of the election, met with nothing but ridicule.

On the other hand, Catholics in every district took every opportunity of expressing at public meetings "their true and unswerving fidelity to their divinely-appointed overseers, the bishops, and to the Pope, the supreme ruler of the Church;" neither were they behindhand in proving to the Government that mere temporal force is of little avail against a people devoted to its religion.

Martin, Bishop of Paderborn, was the first to offer definite resistance to Government measures, by refusing to submit the seminaries of his diocese to the revision of the State. The consequences of such a refusal were well known to the noble-hearted prelate; the divine rights of the Church, however, were of more importance in his eyes than temporal advantages purchased by an unlawful concession. A fortnight later, his seminaries were deprived, by the Chief President, of State recognition and support. Melchers, Archbishop of Cologne, was simultaneously impeached for excommunicating two Old-Catholic professors. The Minister of Public Worship next took upon himself to instruct Förster, Prince-Bishop of Breslau; he required that one of the canons of the cathedral, expelled by the bishop, should be admitted to the deliberations of the Chapter, and retain his right to a voice in the future election of a bishop. The contempt with which this assumption on the part of a Protestant Minister was regarded by Catholics generally might have convinced the Government that the knowledge of the Church's doctrine and discipline had taken deep root in the minds and hearts of the people. Proof of this was in no way diminished by an attempt on the part of the Duke of Ratibor, who, in an address to the Emperor, alleged that in the Catholic Church itself were many friends of the new legislation. The statement was, naturally, gratifying to the Emperor; a week later, however, the Silesian Knights of Malta showed their appreciation of the Duke of Ratibor's attempt, by deposing him from his office as head of their Order.

Meanwhile the bishops continued to exercise their prerogative of appointment to clerical vacancies, regardless of the State decrees and of the penalties accompanying their infraction. Foremost amongst them was Count Ledochowski, Archbishop of Posen, who, at the beginning of August, had strenuously resisted the claim of the State officials to reorganize his ecclesiastical seminary. On the 24th of October, Falk found it necessary to issue injunctions to these magistrates, bidding them increase their vigilance with regard to "illegal" clerical appointments; "the more so, as the number of offenders was found to be increasing, and it was becoming necessary to proceed against them with greater severity than before." It was made compulsory on the magistrates to report "*every single exercise of office* on the part of one of such illegally-appointed priests; they were to be pursued by fresh pains and penalties until they should give in their submission to the laws." The officials did their best. By the autumn of 1873 the indictments were so numerous that the Law Courts had more work upon their hands than they cared for. The Government was evidently

in earnest in the proclamation that, "if necessary, they would resort to the severest measures in order either to bend or to break the arrogance of Rome upon Prussian soil." The question was, whether the Government would be in a position to do so. The penalty of fines, for instance, must necessarily cease when, as actually happened, the clergy were incapable of paying them. The fines imposed upon the Bishop of Treves amounted before long to 20,000 marks; the Archbishop of Posen was condemned to pay 60,000. Falk desired that imprisonment should be resorted to, and the clergy went to prison with a smile upon their lips, whilst their flocks redoubled in devotion to priests who feared not suffering in behalf of the Church.

On the 7th of August Pope Pius IX. had sent an autograph letter to the Emperor William, pointing out to him that the approval of measures so unconstitutional as those of his Government in the affairs of the Church would prove subversive to his own Imperial throne. Then followed the sentence so unwelcome to the ears of a Prussian Protestant, and, in particular, to the "Protector" of the Evangelical Church: "Parlo con franchezza, giacche la verita è la mia bandiera, e parlo per esaurire un mio dovere il quale m'impone di dire a tutti il vero, e anche a chi non è Cattolico, giacche chiunque è battezzato appartiene in qualche parte, e in qualche modo, che non è qui luogo a spiegare, appartiene, dissi, al Papa." To a Catholic even ordinarily well-instructed in his faith this was quite comprehensible. The Emperor protested against it, however, with a vehemence which, from his point of view, was natural enough, adding the assurance that "he was fully aware of his own responsibility to God as a Christian monarch." Then followed the accusation: "Many of the clergy in Prussia, subject to your Holiness, deny the obligation of obedience to the secular power." The Emperor further gave expression to the hope that "the Pope would make use of his authority to put an end to an agitation originating from a misapprehension of the truth, and from an abuse of sacerdotal power." Here let us remark that it might have been remembered that, before the promulgation of the new laws, the authority of the Pope had been ignored and, by the laws in question, specially attacked. With reference to the claim made by the Holy Father to the allegiance of every baptized Christian, the Emperor thought fit to add: "The Evangelical faith which, as is well known to your Holiness, I profess in common with my ancestors, and the greater part of my subjects, recognises no other Mediator between God and man but our Lord Jesus Christ." This profession had, in reality, no bearing upon the

argument of the Pope. The Catholic Church herself recognises no other Mediator except Jesus Christ, but she acknowledges and honours the Pope as the visible representative on earth of that Mediator. The reply of the Emperor was looked upon by the Protestants of the land as "a well-merited rebuke of Papal presumption," as well as a defence of the common interests of Evangelical Christianity; the Government, in publishing the correspondence, had probably foreseen this result. But the Ministers were greatly mistaken in anticipating a similar impression upon Catholics. Before the elections to the Diet, in the middle of October, the Minister of the Interior caused bales on bales of copies of the correspondence to be distributed, especially in the Rhine Provinces, in the hope of rousing party feeling against the Pope. The letter of the Holy Father was, however, quite in accordance with the minds of his Catholic subjects, who merely regretted the useless expenditure of money incurred by the Government in the circulation of the papers. The new elections increased the Centre party from 52 to 89 members: another proof that the Catholics of the land had not merely read, but appreciated the correspondence between the Emperor and the Pope.

The Government next attempted, but with no better success, to prove, from several pastoral letters of the French bishops, "an alliance of French and German Ultramontanists hostile to the State." Why, indeed, asked the Catholics of Prussia, should they be forbidden to receive expressions of sympathy from their brethren in other lands, when the resolutions of Protestant meetings in England and Scotland were accepted with pleasure in the highest circles of the Ministry? No one could assert that Mgr. Freppel, of Angers, or Mgr. Plantier, of Nîmes, had spoken with greater severity than Earl Russell or Sir John Murray, in Exeter Hall. It was, indeed, a special satisfaction to the German bishops to receive, as they did, expressions of approval and veneration from nearly every country in Christendom. England contributed, also, her share of Catholic sympathy. A meeting, presided over by the Duke of Norfolk, on the 6th of February, 1874, and attended by the most influential Catholics of the land, passed the resolution: "That the new ecclesiastical laws in Germany make it impossible for the Church to exercise in freedom her spiritual functions, and are contrary to the rights of conscience." The Pope, in like manner, in his famous Encyclical of the 21st of November, 1873, had declared: "*Novæ leges eo pertinent, ne ecclesia amplius possit existere.*"

Pius IX. rejoiced to be able to hold up as an example to the whole world the "invincible constancy" of the Catholics of Ger-

many, whom "neither affliction, nor oppression, nor imprisonment could induce to render obedience to laws which were contrary to the commandments of God." With the sense of having been wounded in the most sacred feelings of his paternal heart, the venerable Pope complained: "That he had been requested to use his authority to compel the bishops and the faithful to yield obedience to laws unjust and godless in the extreme; to do so would be with his own hand to persecute and scatter the flock of Christ." The Pope consoled his children by calling to their remembrance the words of an ancient doctor of the Church: "Quot tyranni ecclesiam opprimere tentaverunt! Ubinam sunt hostes illi? Silentio et oblivioni traditi sunt. Ubinam ecclesia? Plusquam sol splendescit."

What was now to be the next move on the part of the Government of Prussia? Towards the middle of August, 1873, an assembly of Protestant jurists, at Cassel, had demonstrated that the emoluments attached to ecclesiastical benefices and institutions "were so attached on condition only of obedience to State regulations; in the event of disobedience they could be withheld." All who were aware of the amicable relations of these gentlemen with the Minister of Public Worship knew well enough that their resolutions were indications of a coming storm. Accordingly, on the 19th of September, the Archbishop of Posen was deprived of the temporalities of his See, and three months later a similar sentence was passed on the Bishop of Paderborn. On the other hand, Reinikens, the Old-Catholic Bishop, who had been specially excommunicated by the Pope, was endowed with an annual income of 48,000 marks. Further, on the 22nd of November notice was given to the Archbishop of Posen that the Ministry were unanimous in deciding to carry out in his regard the law of the 12th of May. Ledochowski was required, therefore, to give up his archiepiscopal office, "inasmuch as his continuance therein had become irreconcilable with public regulations." It must have been mortifying to a Government which considered itself the most powerful in the world to be refused obedience by a simple ecclesiastic. "I venture to affirm," wrote the Archbishop, "that by this time the Government of Prussia knows me sufficiently well to be assured that I should esteem it a shame and a disgrace were I voluntarily to abandon my flock in the hour of danger, and allow it to become the prey of infidelity, heresy, and schism."

As a consequence of this refusal, proceedings for the deposition of the Archbishop by the State were forthwith entered upon. Being, moreover, no longer in a position to pay the fines he had already incurred, he was, on the 3rd of February,

1874, consigned to the prison at Ostrowo. The Bishop of Treves had preceded him there at the beginning of March, on the 27th of June the Suffragan Bishop, Janiszewski, and on the 6th of August the Bishop of Paderborn, shared the same fate. How long their punishments were to last was not stated, for fresh accusations, entailing yet severer treatment, were constantly being made. The penalties imposed upon parish-priests accumulated in like manner, and at the beginning of the year 1874, a number of Catholic parishes were deprived of their pastors.

The responsibility for this state of spiritual destitution was laid by the Government upon "the haughty princes and rebellious clergy of the Church, who had recklessly brought this calamity upon their flocks." It was scarcely wise to hazard an accusation of this kind. For some time the ill-sounding phrase of "Prussian craft and Prussian lying" had gone from mouth to mouth, and had been spoken loud enough to reach the ear of the Government. Falk complained to the assembled Diet that so violently had the susceptibilities of Catholics been aroused, that the word of the Government was no longer believed. The position was, in fact, aptly described by Schorlemer, in words spoken at a later period: "The measures of the State threw a dark shadow upon the relations between Catholics and their Sovereign. In Silesia, and within the last ten years in the Rhine Provinces and Westphalia also, there had grown up feelings of esteem and affection for the Royal House of Hohenzollern. All was changed by the legislation and harsh measures of 1873." Perhaps no charge aroused more indignation than the foolish accusation of "rebellion" of the bishops; a charge, however, which the Emperor seemed to confirm in his letter in reply to Lord Russell. The sheep knew their shepherds, and believed their words when, after the imprisonment of Archbishop Ledochowski, they declared: "We are no 'rebels;' the 'haughty princes' of the Church exist in the imagination only of those who have so called us. We have ever taught, and with our last breath shall continue to teach, that we are bound by the law of God to yield submission and obedience to existing authority, as well as love and fidelity to our country. But the same God who imposes on us the duties of obedience and fidelity to our King and country commands us to do nothing—no, not even by a tacit consent—which shall be opposed to His eternal laws, and to the doctrines of Jesus Christ and His Church. The new ecclesiastico-political laws are destructive, in matters of vital importance, to the divinely-appointed constitution and divinely-revealed doctrines of the Catholic Church." Convinced as

they were of the truth of this profession, Catholics took every opportunity of showing their attachment to their pastors. Men of every rank and condition went in hundreds and thousands to the episcopal residences to give personal demonstration of their zeal for the Church. These pilgrimages, reminding one of the best days of the ages of faith, were naturally displeasing in the extreme to the Protestant officials, and gladly would they have checked the applauding multitudes who attended the bishops at every step. Prudence and reason alike urged the Government even now to acknowledge its mistake and change its policy. But, with the rulers of the moment, passion has always predominated over reason, and rather than go back, Prince Bismarck preferred to supplement the injustice begun by measures still more unjust and arbitrary.

The bishops, clergy, and people perceived the fresh misery impending; they trembled, indeed, at the approach of the storm, but their courage and resolution never failed. "Even if, which God forbid, the Church, once so flourishing in our beloved dioceses, should be doomed to persecution and destruction, better far that this should come to pass at the hands of enemies and strangers, whilst we witness to the faith with our goods and our lives, than that we ourselves, as men would have us, should help to ruin and destroy the Church of God." Thus spoke the bishops, and their words found an echo in the hearts of the faithful. Meanwhile, the Archbishop of Posen was being proceeded against in the Court for the Regulation of Ecclesiastical Affairs, and little doubt was entertained that the sentence would be in accordance with the wishes of the Ministry. Then, it was felt, would come the turn of the rest of the Episcopate. Not content with what had already been done, the Government now made the fresh charge, that "the bishops, in spite of their deposition by the State, continued to exercise their episcopal functions, and the people to persist in regarding them as their lawful pastors." What, then, were the means to be adopted to prevent this "illegal" discharge of spiritual functions? They were found in the Penal Statutes of France and Spain, according to which ecclesiastics found guilty of determined resistance to State decrees were to be coerced by the threat of banishment. The Diet was now petitioned to enact a similar law for the German empire, and on the 30th of April, 1874, the Bill was proposed for discussion. The Government of each separate State was to have the right of banishing "refractory" ecclesiastics from specified districts of the province, or from the German empire altogether. That by a law of this nature all personal freedom was annihilated seemed to be ignored by the Ministers, who expressed the opinion that "a

sharp remedy was now required; a wound made by a sharp knife was more easily healed than one caused by a blunt instrument." "True," retorted Windthorst, "it is a sharp remedy indeed which you are proposing; the weapon of a despotism almost effete, but which flourished at the time of the Jacobins in France."

The speakers of the Centre appealed in vain to the sense of honour and love of freedom of their fellow-members in the Diet. Reichensperger went so far as to say that one step higher in the scale of punishments would terminate in the guillotine. All, however, was of no avail. Men who in other cases would have vindicated the rights of personal and civic freedom, now stifled every better impulse through hatred of the Church. "The Government *must* conquer; the Clergy *must* yield; there will be no lasting peace without the complete subjection of the clergy." Such was their cry. These gentlemen would, probably, have accepted the erection of the guillotine, and have considered it, with the Prince de Polignac at a period of like tyranny in France, "*une loi d'amour et de conciliation.*"

Bismarck had his will, and the law was passed. By its provisions, priests deposed from their offices by the State were liable to banishment from specified places, or from the German empire altogether. The Government was to have the right also of internment such priests at pleasure in any particular locality. The law was to be enforced against those who had exercised ecclesiastical functions contrary to State regulations, and after having incurred legal penalties for so doing. Moreover, the Government made it permissible to eject priests from their place of residence as soon as the "process of inquiry," on account of illegal exercise of ecclesiastical functions, should be set on foot against them. As a result of these most arbitrary regulations, priests have been compelled to wander homeless and houseless during more than five years from place to place, merely for having administered the sacrament of baptism, or performed the office of burial of the dead, contrary to the will of the State. In another case, a priest was excluded from his parish for years, during the whole process of inquiry against him, although twice during that interval he was pronounced not guilty. The instances in which the clergy were banished from their parishes for months at a time, by virtue of this law, may be reckoned by hundreds. Then, again, because the Government feared to trust to Catholic officials to carry out these measures, Protestants, or such Catholics as had shown themselves hostile to the Church, were frequently, in the Catholic provinces, intruded into office. Hence, a system of corruption which spread far and wide into the administration, and from which even the courts of justice were not exempt.

An attempt on the part of the Minister of Public Worship to take into his own hands the appointment of priests to those parishes deprived of their pastors by death or banishment, signally failed. By a special law of May 21st, 1874, the Government wished to award the right of nomination to a vacant benefice to the members of a parish, or to the person possessing the right of presentation to a benefice. If within two months the patron should make no use of his privilege, the nomination was to be left to the parish. "If," said Falk, "the people be really and religiously alive to a sense of spiritual destitution, they will gladly avail themselves of this provision." Five years later, however, on giving up his portfolio, the Minister was forced to own that this "religious feeling," according to his view of the matter, did not exist in a single parish. The few priests who, throughout the whole empire, had been found willing to accept benefices from an Old-Catholic patron, lived isolated in their parishes, and were universally despised. Practically, the law died at the moment of its birth; its aim had been to Protestantize the Church; but the Prussian Government was never more at fault than when counting upon the apostasy of the Catholic population. To complete the list of oppressive, though abortive, measures against the Church, must be mentioned the law for the administration of dioceses deprived of their bishops by the State. In the case of the Archbishop of Posen, deposed from his office on the 15th of April, the Government had been obliged to own that its decisions "were ignored by the Cathedral Chapter, which persisted in not recognising the vacancy of the See; it seemed probable, also, that this example would be followed by the majority of the clergy." It was also evident that, in the event of the bishop's death, the Chapter would have no regard to the State regulations in the choice of his successor. The Government therefore determined to take steps for preventing all intercourse with a "deprived" bishop, and for providing the administration of the diocese independently of the Bishop and Chapter, and this purpose was to be served by the law of the 20th of May, 1874, for the administration of Catholic Bishoprics, whereby every exercise of episcopal functions in a diocese vacant through the death or "deprivation" of the bishop was threatened with imprisonment for a term of from six months to two years. The law was applicable, not to acts of jurisdiction alone, but to the administration of the sacraments of confirmation and holy orders, as well as to the consecration of the holy oils. Consequently, the Suffragan Bishop of Posen was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for having consecrated the Holy Oils on Maundy-Thursday. The clause stating that "ecclesiastical functions thus exercised would be

invalid," sufficiently proves that the authors of the law were utterly ignorant of the life of the Church. For the administration of the revenues of the diocese, the Minister was to appoint a special commissioner to whom the dues of the bishop were to be assigned. During the vacancy of a see, parishes were to have the right of choosing their own pastors, should a vacancy occur. The disposal of the large sums which reverted to the State from episcopal sees was left entirely and unconditionally to the Minister. That the Cathedral Chapter would co-operate with the State in the choice of a bishop was as inconceivable as that a parish should choose its own priest in opposition to the decrees of the Church. The Government was reminded of the regulation of the Council of Trent: "*Sacerdotes qui tantummodo a populo aut seculari potestate ac magistratu vocati et instituti ad sacra ministeria exercenda ascendunt et qui ea propria temeritate sibi sumunt, omnes non ecclesie ministri sed fures et latrones per ostium non ingressi habendi sunt.*" The decrees of the Council of Trent were, however, of little importance in the eyes of the Prussian Government. Catholics were prepared for this, and as little expected a change of policy on its part as they contemplated the possibility of their own submission to the laws. Their temper of mind was aptly described by Mallinkradt, in the session of the Diet of February 7th, 1874; "Submission to these laws would be the greatest possible misfortune. It is far less prejudicial to the Church to be oppressed by enemies from without, than to let herself be poisoned and infected from within. In the former case, should she for a time be even banished from our country, she will, at the right moment, be ready to return, clad in the white robe of innocence. This she would forfeit were she voluntarily to submit to shame and dishonour."

The literary coadjutors of the Minister of Public Worship had, indeed, imagined that the educated portion of the Catholic population would speedily change its mind, and make common cause with the State. It was surely a disgrace to the mightiest Government in Europe to seek the fulfilment of its own designs through the treachery of Catholics to their Church. Bismarck was playing high, but his hopes and expectations were not to be realised. Disregard of the laws of the State, necessitated, indeed, by the prior obligation of obedience to the laws of God, was tending to destroy alike the prestige of the Government and all confidence in it. "This confidence," remarked Mallinkradt, "has in the Catholic districts of the Empire been so thoroughly shaken that it may be said *no longer to exist.*"

Obedience to the laws of the State in the recent legislation would have exterminated from the hearts of the people the

spirit of devotion to the Church. The Ministers had declared that "the *ecclesiastical* spirit ought to be done away with, whilst the *religious* spirit should remain:" they might and should have known that, for Catholics, the one cannot exist without the other.

In effect, the activity of this Ministry was destructive and pernicious in every direction. History will set its seal of truth to the admonition uttered by Reichensperger on the 5th of February, 1874: "It is my opinion that the present administrators of the power of the State have no intention of changing their course of action. I am convinced, therefore, that the *one* service they can now render to the country is to beg His Majesty to accept their resignation. The Ministers now in office have already thrown down the noblest pillar in our Constitutional edifice—the right of religious liberty. If they would save the country from further confusion and misery, let them resign!"

The Ministry, however, did not resign. The work of devastation and destruction was to proceed still further.

ART. III.—A PROTESTANT LIFE OF ST. HUGH.

1. *The Life of St. Hugh of Avalon, Bishop of Lincoln, with some Account of his Predecessors in the See of Lincoln.* By GEORGE G. PERRY, M.A., Canon of Lincoln. London: Murray. 1879.
2. *Magna Vita S. Hugonis.* Edited by Rev. J. F. DIMOCK, M.A. London: Longmans. 1860. (Rolls Series.)

A CURIOUS change is taking place in the minds of many Anglicans. When Elizabeth first established her new hierarchy its members little cared to claim descent from the previous occupants of ancient sees. Pilkington, the first Protestant Bishop of Durham, spoke with great contempt and in abusive language of St. Wilfrid, St. William, Lanfranc, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and St. Edmund.* Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, considered it a sad but undeniable fact that they had all been drowned in damnable idolatry for eight centuries at least. And the rest expressed similar opinions. Now, on the contrary, Protestant Bishops take every opportunity of proclaiming themselves the legitimate representatives of the ancient ecclesiastical rulers of England. Canon Perry dedicates his

* "Works," p. 587. Parker Soc. Ed.

Life of St. Hugh, "To the Right Reverend Christopher Wordsworth, D.D., Bishop of Lincoln, the successor of St. Hugh, alike in his virtues as in his see." Is this repentance? Is it a turning of the hearts of the children to the fathers? No. The lives of the English saints, which have appeared of late years from the pens of Anglican clergymen, are very different from those which in 1840-45 foretold the issue of the Oxford movement in reconciliation with the Church. With an air of conscious superiority, intellectual and spiritual, recent authors have condescended to choose some men of ancient fame, to rescue them alike from the superstitious veneration of Catholics, and the unreasoning vituperation of Protestants, to mete out to them praise and blame, admiration and pity, in equal portions. The modern Anglican considers himself the patron, not the client, of the mediæval saint.

One of the most offensive examples of this species of writing is the recent Life of St. Hugh of Avalon. It contains, indeed, some interesting and well-written pages. Had Canon Perry not a real admiration for St. Hugh he would doubtless not have occupied himself with his biography. Yet, when he meets with anything that goes against his Protestant prejudices, it never occurs to him to pause, to consider for a moment that *perhaps* the man, whose virtues he has been relating, *might* be right, and he himself mistaken. He blames at once either the saint or the doctrines and influences that warped his otherwise fine character. But worse than this. His praise is coloured by Protestant prejudice quite as much as his blame. Having undertaken to write a life which as a whole is intended to be laudatory, he naturally does not like to find many facts contrary to his ideal, and is on the look-out for traits of character which may assimilate his hero, in some respects, to the admired Protestant type. Hence he has made several curious blunders, and attributed opinions and acts to St. Hugh, quite at variance with historic truth. Thus, having narrated St. Hugh's eagerness to obtain relics, as related by the saint's companion and biographer, Abbot Adam, Canon Perry thereupon makes the following reflections:—

We wish we could think that it was of himself that he was writing rather than of Hugh, when he gives us so many and such disagreeable stories as to the Bishop's hunting after relics, his eagerness to possess the teeth or some bone of dead saints—an eagerness which occasionally led him into acts of positive dishonesty, as though any means were justifiable for one to obtain possession of these coveted, but somewhat nauseous, treasures. The caring for such things seems to exhibit the Bishop to us in a point of view which contradicts some of the most prominent and admirable parts of his character. He who

could despise reputed miracles, could rise superior to the superstition of the necessity of receiving the Holy Communion fasting, who showed in so many ways his superiority to the opinions of his age, is yet represented as running with puerile eagerness from one shrine to another, and striving by every possible means to add to his collection of the bones of the saints. We gladly turn from such matters to record some more agreeable incidents.*

Exactly so. But Canon Perry would have acted more wisely and consistently had he turned away altogether from "dead saints," like St. Hugh, to record matters where he would find less to blame, and whereon his praise would be more correctly bestowed, than it has been on the Catholic Bishop of Lincoln.† If he is in search of a priest of the Middle Ages, who rose superior to his times by such strength of mind as is implied in making light of miracles, and breakfasting before communion, why does he not write the life of Wickliff rather than that of a canonized saint? I will show presently that St. Hugh neither "despised reputed miracles," nor "rose superior to the superstition of receiving Holy Communion fasting." So that if, in his modern biographer's judgment, these are "some of the most prominent and admirable parts of his character," since they have no existence except in the imagination of Canon Perry, he ought not to set them over against those other traits of character, which he truly describes, but which offend and disgust him.

I do not care to exonerate St. Hugh from the charge of setting great value on relics. He would no doubt have willingly pleaded guilty. What Canon Perry says about his "positive dishonesty" is another matter. In a note he gives as an example, how the saint being at Fescamp, cut open a silken covering of a relic of St. Mary Magdalen, and then bit off a portion of it.

The monks were horrified (says Canon Perry) at seeing the Bishop put the bone into his mouth and bite off a piece of it, which he slipped into the hand of his attendant chaplain, bidding him carefully preserve it. To the monks, who were greatly scandalized, he made a plausible excuse, but he kept the relics, which, even in a mercantile point of view, were most valuable property.‡

* Pp. 301, 302.

† As Mr. Perry is not afraid to repeat the language of Vigilantius about the "bones of dead saints," and "nauseous treasures," we need not be afraid to address to him the language of St. Jerome's reply, "Thou lookest upon him as dead, and therefore blasphemest. Read the Gospel: 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living. . . . Is it ill done then of the Bishop of Rome, that, over the *venerable bones*, as we think them, over *vile dust* as you think it, of the departed Peter and Paul, he offers sacrifice to the Lord, and accounts their tombs Christ's altars?'" —*Adv. Vigil.*

‡ P. 301.

Now the "mercantile point of view" does not seem to have occurred either to St. Hugh, to the monks, or to the writer of the saint's life, who was the very chaplain who received the relic. As Canon Perry omits to give the "plausible excuse," it may be as well to state that the monks were scandalized, not at the theft of the relic, which was made quite openly, but at the apparent irreverence of biting it. St. Hugh's answer was this :—

If we have so lately taken with our fingers, however unworthy, the Body of the Saint of saints, and after It has touched our teeth and lips, have even swallowed It, why may we not confidently handle the members of His saints, since we do it both for their veneration and our own protection? And why may we not, when we have a chance, make them our own, that we may preserve them with due honour?*

But we are not concerned to defend St. Hugh against Canon Perry's blame, so much as against his praise. He has been much struck with two passages in the life of St. Hugh as written by Adam, in which he thinks that he has discovered an anticipation of Protestantism—contempt of reputed miracles and irreverence towards the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. Let us examine these two instances, though the result may be to lower the saint in the eyes of some who have just learnt from Canon Perry to admire him. The saint's contempt for miracles is thus related by Canon Perry :—

A still greater proof of true courage, because it shows a moral courage very rare in the men of his generation, was the way in which Hugh behaved when invited to inspect an alleged miracle. A priest once called upon him to inspect a miraculous appearance in the chalice, where it was said that the actual conversion into flesh and blood of part of the Host could be seen with the bodily eyes. Hugh indignantly refused to look at it. "In the name of God," he said, "let them keep to themselves the signs of their want of faith." He wanted no material proof of the virtue of the Blessed Sacrament; neither would he suffer his attendants, who were eagerly curious to examine the prodigy, to inspect the chalice. To a man so far raised above the common level, the ignorance and materialism of the priests with whom he had to do must have been a constant source of annoyance.†

Before giving a correct version of this history I must explain what Mr. Perry means by the "materialism" of the priests, which he considers so annoying to St. Hugh. He evidently means their belief in transubstantiation; for, in a previous chapter, in analyzing a work of Giraldus Cambrensis, he says, "A great portion of his treatise is occupied with the many revolting details which spring naturally from the *material view*

* "*Magna Vita*," p. 318.

† P. 235.

of the Holy Sacrament ;”* and, again, “ So completely *material* is the view taken of the Eucharist, that it is held that certain material conditions, even under circumstances of the greatest necessity, are required for a valid sacrifice.”† Therefore, as against the material view of the priests of the Middle Ages, Canon Perry records that his patron—I beg his pardon, his client—“ Wanted no material proof of the virtue of the Blessed Sacrament.” The point, then, of the anecdote is that St. Hugh believed in the *virtue* of our Lord’s Body, while his attendants, unable to rise so high, believed in the Real Presence, with an ignorance and materialism which must have been very annoying to so enlightened a man.

We turn to the “ *Magna Vita*” to examine this strange phenomenon, a Catholic canonized saint transformed into a half-Calvinist. Certainly, if Canon Perry’s history is to be trusted, he has found a miracle little less wonderful than that of the Host partly converted into flesh. The story, however, as told by Adam reads very differently.‡ St. Hugh was journeying from Paris to Troyes, in the year 1200, when he arrived at the little town of Joi. According to his custom he invited the parish priest to dine with him ; but he, a very old man, absolutely refused this honour. He came to the saint in the afternoon to explain the cause of his refusal, which was his unworthiness, and to ask the saint’s prayers. He was too overcome with shame to tell his story to the bishop himself, but to his attendants he gave the following narrative :—When he was a young priest, he said, he had committed a crime, and then dared to celebrate mass, without penance or confession. One day when his guilty conscience was reproving him in the very act of consecration, he was tempted by a thought of incredulity. He said to himself : “ Can I believe that He who is the Splendour and the spotless Mirror of eternal light allows His Body and Blood to be really consecrated, handled and received, by such a filthy sinner as I am ?” While he was revolving these stupid thoughts (*stolida*) in his mind, the moment came for dividing the sacred Host. He broke it, and blood began to drop from the division, and the particle in his hand took the appearance of flesh. In affright he let it fall into the chalice. He dared not touch it, but covered the chalice with the paten and finished the prayers. After the people were gone he went to the bishop, confessed his sin, and told of the miracle. Since that time the miraculous appearance in the chalice of the half of the Host converted into flesh and the blood which had flowed from it, had always continued, and

* P. 146.

† P. 147.

‡ “ *Magna Vita*,” p. 243.

people flocked from all parts of the country to see it, and to praise God, who alone works wonders. Such was the story of the old priest of Joi, and he asked those to whom he related it to beg the bishop's prayers for himself, and to invite him and his suite to come and behold the miraculous appearance. Those who carried the story to St. Hugh were surprised at his answer. "Well," he said, "in the name of the Lord, let them have these signs of their infidelity. But what are they to us? Shall we wonder at some partial representations of this divine gift, who daily contemplate with the most faithful gaze of our souls this heavenly sacrifice whole and entire? Let him examine with his bodily eyes those little fragments, who does not gaze upon the whole with the internal eyes of faith." Saying this he gave his blessing to the old priest and dismissed him. He thus reproved the curiosity of his attendants, and not only strengthened them in faith, but said to them that what faith teaches ought to be held by the faithful as more certain than what the visible light of day shows to us. This is a very different history from that of Canon Perry. St. Hugh shows no "contempt of reputed miracles." There is not a word to show that he either doubted of the reality of the miracle, or that he did not consider it a divine work. What he said was this:—His faith was so strong that he needed no miracle to confirm it. He believed, without a doubt, that our Lord's whole Body and Blood were in every consecrated Host. Why should he then go and gaze upon a particle? Such ocular proof might be necessary to men of little faith. What was it to him? Had it not been granted by God as a sign to an unbeliever? Let the unbeliever, then, keep his sign and be thankful to God for it. It was out of no contempt of miracles in general, or of this one in particular, that St. Hugh spoke and acted as he did. Had our Lord shown some sign to a saint in reward for his faith and devotion he would have felt very differently and perhaps gone to witness the prodigy, not as needing it to strengthen his faith, but as a token of God's love.

There is a very similar history related in Joinville's "*Life of St. Louis*." "The holy king related to me," he writes, "that the Albigeois once came to the Count de Montford, who was guarding that country for the king, and desired he would come and see the Body of our Saviour, which had become flesh and blood in the hands of the officiating priest, to their very great astonishment. But the Count replied, 'Ye who have doubts respecting the faith may go thither; but, with regard to me, I implicitly believe everything respecting the Holy Sacrament according to the doctrines of our Holy Mother Church. In return for this faith, I hope to receive a crown greater than the

angels, who see the Divinity face to face, which must make them firm in their belief.' "It is not at all unlikely that, as this event happened only a few years later than that related of St. Hugh, the Count de Montford may have heard of the Bishop of Lincoln's answer, and consciously imitated him. In any case he was influenced by a similar motive; for as the reported miracle had evidently been granted merely to silence or convert the heretics, he deemed it unworthy of his Catholic faith even to appear to put himself on their level. But de Montford did not "despise reputed miracles" any more than St. Hugh. He despised infidels and heretics, and men whose faith *in what the Church teaches* requires confirming by new evidence.

Adam, who was present on the occasion related of St. Hugh, makes the following reflection:—"From this and other words of his I am perfectly confident that not on one occasion only, as has been before related, but often it was granted to him, with the unveiled face of the interior man, to contemplate in a singular manner those things which, though invisible to us, we are all taught to hold with most sincere faith." The event to which Adam here refers has been related by him at considerable length, and it ought to have shown Canon Perry how little St. Hugh despised visions or miracles or apparitions in the sacred Host. A young cleric of holy life having been sent by repeated heavenly voices to speak to St. Hugh on the sad state of some of the clergy, while assisting at St. Hugh's mass twice saw the sacred Host in his hands assume the form of a lovely child. When he told his message and his vision to the saint they long wept together: the holy bishop bade him keep secret what he had seen, and counselled him to enter a monastery, "since it was not fit that he who had seen and heard such things should remain among the vanities of the world."†

It is evident, then, that Canon Perry has completely mistaken the meaning of St. Hugh's exclamation: "Bene, inquit; in nomine Domini habeant sibi signa infidelitatis suæ." What the saint said of one miracle, which God had worked as a rebuke to an unbelieving priest, Canon Perry has taken as a general maxim, as if the saint had some kind of Protestant unbelief in the power or will of God to work miracles, an unbelief which it pleases some to call enlightened faith. This one saying of St. Hugh is the only ground on which Canon Perry asserts that he "attributed the craving after miracles to a want of

* Joinville's "Memoirs of St. Louis IX.," p. 361. Bohn's "Chronicles of the Crusades."

† "Magna Vita," Lib. v. cap. 3.

faith,"* which may or may not be true, according as it is understood. Certainly there is nothing whatever to justify Canon Perry in saying that "the details of the miracles, said to have been worked at his tomb seem to accord but badly with the simple and truthful character of the bishop."† There is a double insinuation in these words quite unwarranted. The first is, that there was either some trickery in the performance or some falsehood in the record of the prodigies which testified to St. Hugh's sanctity. The second is that St. Hugh was a man who would have disbelieved such facts, or rebuked such narrations regarding another saint. It is clear, from the account given of him by Abbot Adam, that he would have taken great care to make sure of the miraculous facts, and to guard against imposture; but if once he recognised the hand of God, he would have rejoiced and publicly called on others to share his joy. And this is what happened after his own death. The author just mentioned tells us that when his body was exposed in the cathedral of Lincoln, before burial, it was announced that a woman long blind had recovered her sight by the touch of his body. Some immediately cried out that the bells must be rung and the *Te Deum* chanted. But Adam and the Dean, with whom he was conversing, would by no means allow it (vehementer dissensimus), for the woman was not known and might be imposing. They insisted that the truth in such cases should first be diligently examined, and not published until it had been most certainly proved.‡ The author adds, that in the case just mentioned the long antecedent blindness and sudden cure of the woman were afterwards established beyond doubt.

We may now pass to Canon Perry's second instance of St. Hugh's superiority to his own age, or, in other words, his precocious Protestantism or Anglicanism, in the matter of contempt for the Church's discipline. He writes as follows:—

Hugh would sometimes sit from early morning until late into the darkness of night without breaking his fast, intent upon his labour. But though he was thus careless of himself, he had thought for others, and during the hot weather would oblige the priests who said mass at great Church ceremonials to take some food before the celebration, though this was utterly shocking to the prejudices of his day. Rising in this, as in most other matters, superior to his time, Hugh would reprove the scruples of those who regarded such a direction with horror.§

These words contain a mistake, which is likely to get widely circulated, and though it is of no importance to us that High Church clergymen may be emboldened by it to take their sacramental bread and wine after breakfast, still it is as well that St.

* "Magna Vita," p. 365. † P. 328. ‡ P. 376. § P. 227.

Hugh should not be regarded as a contemner of the Church's discipline.* How eagerly Canon Perry's statement will be caught up may be seen from a review of his book in the *Academy* of July 19, 1879. Mr. J. Bass Mullinger, the reviewer, is so pleased with the saint and his new biographer, that he recommends schoolmasters to give this book to their boys instead of the "brilliant but misleading fictions of Scott's 'Crusaders,' or 'Ivanhoe!'" The reviewer, among the other excellent points in St. Hugh's character, mentions that "ascetic though he was, he thought it far better that a priest should break his fast before communion than be tasked beyond his strength in the performance of his functions." Evidently the thing is already growing. Mr. Mullinger's statement is far wider than Mr. Perry's. The latter limits the breakfasting to "hot weather" and "great Church ceremonials," the former allows a general discretion to the priests to take care not to overtax their strength, and assures them St. Hugh was quite decided on the matter. He thought it "far better" to say mass with a full stomach than to endanger health. And this too "ascetic though he was;" as if the fast of asceticism which is undergone in order to subdue the body to the soul were identical with the fast of reverence, which is prescribed for communicants. And yet the account given of St. Hugh's opinions and conduct both by Mr. Mullinger and Mr. Perry is as truly "misleading fiction" as anything of Scott's, though certainly not so "brilliant." What Adam, the contemporary biographer of St. Hugh, says, is this—not that the saint ever dispensed a priest to offer mass, or either a priest or layman to receive communion after breaking fast, for the saint had neither will nor power to do this, except for viaticum—but that he allowed or obliged *occasionally* his assistant priests, deacons, or sub-deacons, to serve at mass after a slight refection, but of course without communicating. First, I will give an exact translation of Adam's words, and then explain whatever may be obscure to modern readers.

Very often (he says) in the great heats of summer he forced some of the ministers of the altar to taste a little bread and wine. For he feared lest, being overcome by the heat, the fast, and the labour, they might not, after such oft-repeated circuits (as they make) in the dedication of churches, be able to assist and minister to the celebrant of the solemnities of the mass, without danger. And when he perceived that, after having at his order tasted bread, some of them felt a horror and a dread of touching during the canon the sacred chalice, or the Lord's winding-sheet (*i.e.*, the corporal), he reproved

* The present Article was written several months since, and before this blunder of Canon Perry's had been exposed in the *Tablet*. Canon Perry, in a reply to the *Tablet*, defended his view. His defence will be noticed in a subsequent note.

them as men of little faith and discretion, who had neither learnt to obey a superior without hesitation, nor could penetrate the reason of a prudent command (*circumspectæ jussionis*).*

Several things must be at once evident to any one who considers *attentively* what is here said. First, those who broke their fast were not the "celebrants of masses," they were "some of the ministers of the altar," which is especially the name given to deacons and sub-deacons, or to the priests who take the functions of deacons and sub-deacons at mass. And though the celebrant may also be called the minister of the altar, yet here the ministers are distinguished from the celebrant and have to assist him. Next, it is quite clear that they were not communicants. Otherwise the author, instead of relating their dread of touching the corporal and chalice (which are the especial functions of the deacon and sub-deacon) would have told of their horror at receiving our Lord's Body and Blood after eating. Further, the peculiar occasions on which St. Hugh departed from the ordinary rule are mentioned. He did not publish a general dispensation to all the ordinary ministers of the altar. It was only to some (*quosdam*)—to those, namely, who had to assist at his Pontifical Mass, after having taken part in the laborious ceremonies of the consecration of a church in summer. The frequent circuits (*toties repetitos circuitus*) are not frequent journeys in the country, but the circuits made round the church, both inside and outside, and round the altars with a thurible. The ceremony of consecrating a church with several altars may last from three to five hours. Besides the numerous circuits made by the assistant priests in company with the bishop, at each altar, after a certain point in the service, a priest with a thurible continues the incensation begun by the bishop, moving round and round, or from side to side, not for a few minutes only, but for an hour or more. It was probably those to whom this function fell who were excused from the fast, when, besides the part they took in the consecration of the church, they had to assist the bishop afterwards in the Pontifical Mass. Now, the command of the bishop that they should take a little refreshment was a *circumspect* one, not merely because the heat, fatigue, and giddiness, caused by this long and peculiar function, was a sufficient reason for dispensing, but especially because the bishop only dispensed in a matter to which his power extended. Since the Church, guided in this by the Holy Ghost, requires that the priest who celebrates mass, and the people who communicate, should be fasting from midnight at least, it is absolutely necessary that this rule should be enforced with the

* "*Magna Vita*," p. 140.

utmost rigour. Were there the least loophole of interpretation, or could circumstances justify a dispensation, in a very short time the exceptions would become so numerous, that the rule itself would disappear. Hence, from the earliest ages to the present day, one exception only has been admitted which lends itself to no abuse—viz., the case of those in extreme and dangerous sickness. The obligation is of course ecclesiastical, not Divine, and as such it is in the competence of the Sovereign Pontiff to relax it. But it is only on the rarest occasions that he has exercised this power. The authority of a bishop does not extend to the relaxation of a law so stringent and universal. Had, therefore, St. Hugh obliged priests who celebrated late masses to spare themselves by violating the rule of fast, his command would not have been circumspect but sinful, and his clergy would not have been free to obey him. It was otherwise as regarded the assistant priests, deacons and sub-deacons. The custom which then existed, that they should be fasting when serving at mass, was not of the same stringent nature as the law which bound the celebrant and the communicants. In the earlier ages, indeed, they communicated with the celebrant; but in the time of St. Hugh this was no longer the case, though those at least who acted as deacon and sub-deacon were still expected to be fasting. It was from this custom rather than obligation that St. Hugh dispensed. It is evident that the exercise of such a dispensing power was then unusual; but the saint had good reason for chiding the reluctant and scrupulous. If they could not appreciate his reasons, they might have trusted his judgment. At the present day, the custom or law of fasting, as regards the assistants at the altar, is no longer known, though that which binds the celebrant is rigidly observed. And this confirms what has been said regarding the necessity of rigour. History shows that where a dispensing power was once admitted, the gradual, but inevitable result in such a matter, was the final cessation of the law, or inobservance of the custom. Dispensation was given at first only under rare and urgent circumstances. But when a precedent could be found, and the authority of a saint alleged, the dispensations would be given and asked, under circumstances always less and less urgent; and thus becoming always more and more frequent, in no considerable time they were looked on as a matter of course, or, in other words, the law ceased to bind. So would it have been with regard to the celebrant's fast had St. Hugh acted as his modern biographer supposes. The law of fasting does press hardly on priests, and still more so on bishops. Were exception lawful in any case, there are many, very many circumstances in which it could be lawfully

granted. Frequently both bishops and priests have to remain without tasting food or drink until two o'clock in the afternoon. To fast until one o'clock is a usual occurrence. And often the distress of the long fast is increased by hours of labour or journey, by weakness or racking headache. There can be little doubt that the health of the clergy does suffer from this discipline. Yet if a remedy is desirable, it must be sought, not in a dispensation, which would soon lead to the destruction of a most wise, reverent, and holy discipline, but in a movement on the part of the laity. It is for their convenience that the priests say mass so late. In some cases this is necessary; but in very many, the late mass is imposed on the clergy merely by the indolence and luxurious habits which now prevail.

However, I have not to discuss the reasons of the Church's discipline, but matters of historical fact. The blunder of Canon Perry was not simply the result of inadvertence, but of that self-satisfied erudition which disdains to seek instruction. He was not obliged to know Catholic discipline; but if he chooses to write the life of a Catholic saint, he must not think to interpret it aright by his own lights.*

That Canon Perry should have blundered over one author is bad enough; but his determination to find Protestantism in mediæval writers is so great, that he has repeated the blunder where not even a shadow of ambiguity or difficulty exists. He points out that Gerald Barry, a contemporary and friend of St. Hugh, held exactly the same lax views as the Bishop of Lincoln about pre-communion fasting. Yet, in the work to which reference is made, Gerald says that no one except in danger of death may receive after breaking his fast: "Nullus nisi jejunos accipiat excepto mortis urgentis periculo."† Nor does he contradict himself in the place indicated by Canon Perry. He merely remarks that if a priest acted otherwise, his consecration

* Mr. Perry, in a letter to the *Tablet*, Nov. 1, 1879, defends his interpretation as "possibly the correct one," because for a very long period it was a common practice for priests to celebrate with the bishop, for which he refers to Martene. Such erudition is misleading. There was no such thing as concelebration in England in the twelfth century, except at ordinations. Mr. Dimock, who edited the Latin "Life of St. Hugh," has been far more modest and careful, and he has avoided such errors. His marginal abridgment of the passage of Adam, over which Canon Perry has stumbled, is as follows: "His consideration for others, compelling them to take food even before the celebration of mass." Though these words have probably misled Canon Perry, still they are accurate; for he does not say "before celebrating mass," which would indicate that they were celebrants. Yet, if the words cannot be charged with error, it would have been well had they been less ambiguous. "Before assisting at mass" would have been a more exact summary.

† "Gemma Ecclesiastica," v. 29. (Rolls Ed.)

would be valid, though illicit. "Hanc devotionem sacerdotes omnes exhibeant, ut contriti (et) jejuni celebrent. . . . Si quis tamen pransus celebraret nihilominus conficeret."*

The same Gerald, in order to amuse his readers, when discoursing on the necessity of clerical science, has given a list of blunders in translating Latin committed by illiterate priests. These were, of course, jokes current at the University of Paris, where Gerald had been educated, or in clerical circles all over Europe, just as at the present day the supposed blunders of undergraduates are collected in the *Art of Pluck*, or as good stories of Scotch and English ministers are strung together in books of anecdotes. One priest, for instance, confounds Barnabas with Barabbas, and instructs his audience that "he was a good man and a holy, but he was a robber." Another, referring to our Lord's words to Simon the Pharisee, about the two debtors, was unable to distinguish between the Latin numerals quingenta (500) and quinquaginta (50), and translated them both fifty. A shrewd magistrate who was present, on hearing Simon's reply that the debtor to whom most was forgiven would love his creditor most, objected that both were forgiven the same amount. The priest, however, was equal to the occasion, and silenced his objector by saying that in one case they were pence sterling, in the other pence of Anjou. Canon Perry has given a few of these stories to illustrate the extreme ignorance of the clergy in the twelfth century. It is to be hoped that no future historian will illustrate the literary attainments and critical acumen of Anglican clergymen of the nineteenth century, by means of the real blunders of Canon Perry.

I have shown that St. Hugh did not merit the praise bestowed on him by Canon Perry, but I do not so much care to defend him from blame, since the qualities which fall under the Canon's censure are often pre-eminently Catholic. Yet the censor's judgments are not always consistent, and when placed side by side present a strange contrast. Take his account of the entry of St. Hugh into the Carthusian order. In very early life he had been placed with the Canons Regular, but on making acquaintance with the Carthusians, when he was already a deacon, he felt himself greatly attracted to their austere life. As Mr. Perry puts it :—

The useful occupations in which Hugh was now engaged did not satisfy his mind. He craved for something higher, more romantic, more difficult, in the way of religious life. . . . For Hugh had completely imbibed the prevalent opinion of his age, that there was no true religion without complete self-immolation.†

* "*Gemma Ecclesiastica*," p. 25.

† Pp. 176, 177.

His prior became aware of his desire, and exacted from him an oath that he would not carry out his project during his (the prior's) lifetime. Hugh, accustomed ever to yield to obedience, took the oath. But on calm reflection he considered that he was not bound by it, since it interfered with a higher state of perfection, and his prior had no right to require it from him. Canon Perry, after relating this conduct of the saint, writes as follows :—

No plain person would hesitate to pronounce this a sinful action, yet the biographer of Hugh, in his too eager desire to make everything redound to his honour, pretends that he acted by an inspiration from on high. What is more remarkable is that the saint himself, when appealed to in after life as to whether he had ever felt any scruple as to thus breaking his oath, declared that it had never caused him any regret, but only joy. No doubt there is something to be alleged in excuse for Hugh as to this transaction. In the notions of those days plain morality held but a very low place as compared with the glories of the "spiritual life," and Hugh may have been utterly unable to see how any irregularity which led directly to great spiritual triumphs was to be condemned.*

I can only say that, if no better apology than this is forthcoming for St. Hugh, then Canon Perry requires to apologize for writing his life. Why choose for the subject of biography, among innumerable Christian men and women, one who is "utterly unable" to see that he must not do evil that good may come, one who can see no harm in what every "plain person" will condemn without hesitation; one whose first principles about morality and the spiritual life were confused and topsyturvy? To Catholics, indeed, who share St. Hugh's inability to take the unhesitating view of all plain persons, it will appear that the saint requires no apology. He broke no onerous contract, and he considered that an oath thus taken indiscreetly, and which was a hindrance to higher good, could have no binding force before God. I must add that I have been so accustomed to hear the conduct of such men as Cranmer and Luther lauded, that I am perplexed at this sudden outburst of Protestant zeal for the binding power of a promissory oath. But in a later page Canon Perry seems himself to have forgotten what he has said of St. Hugh's utter inability to take straightforward views, and of his contempt for ordinary morality in comparison with the spiritual life. For after relating how St. Hugh, when bishop, would retire periodically to the Carthusian monastery for prayer and mortification, he says—and here he copies the Catholic biographer, though not quite accurately :—

* Pp. 179, 180.

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth would speak, and his words would come forth like new wine, fiery and sweet, tempered with the honey of heavenly wisdom. To the laity, and to secular persons unable to practise the more perfect life, he would speak in this wise: "Not alone monks and hermits shall obtain the Kingdom of God. God will not require of any man to have been a monk or hermit, but to have been truly a Christian. That which is truly indispensable in all is that they shall have had love in their hearts, truth in their mouths, purity in their lives." Upon this teaching he would constantly dwell. He would tell the married that if they lived virtuously, they were to be held no way inferior to virgins.*

As regards this last saying, it is another proof how incompetent is Canon Perry to write a Catholic biography. He intends to set down what he finds in his authorities, but he cannot understand it, and, therefore, cannot reproduce it correctly. To say that virtuous married people are to be held no way inferior to virgins is either to assert what has no meaning or what is a heresy. If such a proposition is meant to regard *persons* it is foolish, for a married person may be of course far superior in virtue, in grace, in charity, in merit, and in glory, to a virgin. But if it is intended to speak of the *state* of marriage as compared with that of virginity, then it is a plain contradiction of the words of our Lord and of St. Paul to assert that the married state is no way inferior to virginity. St. Hugh, however, said something very different. "He taught married persons," says Abbot Adam, "that if they restrained themselves within the limits of what was allowed them, they would not be deprived of the beauty of chastity, but would receive the glory of eternal beatitude, together with both the virgins and the continent." Here is a perfectly Catholic statement that there is a conjugal as well as a virginal chastity, not that they are of equal excellence, though they will both find a reward in eternal glory. St. Augustine had long ago put the matter clearly in his own pithy language: "*Minorem locum habebit mater in regno cœlorum quoniam maritata est quam filia quoniam virgo est. Si vero mater tua fuerit humilis, tu superba: illa habebit qualemcumque locum tu nullum locum.*"† But to go back to St. Hugh's instructions, how does Canon Perry reconcile the statement that to the end of his life St. Hugh, being under the influence of low Catholic morality, never could see the evil of breaking an oath, though every "plain person" understands its sinfulness now without hesitation under the higher Protestant teaching, with his other statement that the saint's constant teaching was that it is truly indispen-

* Pp. 247, 248.† Serm. 354. *Ad continentes.*

sable in all to have *truth in their mouths*, as well as love in their hearts? And why does he in one place represent the saint as making naught of ordinary morality in comparison with the spiritual life, and in another place make him exalt ordinary Christian life to the same level as that of virgins? And if he was so intoxicated with the "glories of the spiritual life" as to lose common sense, how is it that all this sober teaching came from the abundance of his heart, just when he had drunk deepest of that life in a time of retreat?

This is but a specimen of the contradictions into which a writer must fall who tries to praise a Catholic saint from a Protestant point of view. The book abounds in contradictions. They begin in the dedication, in which Dr. Wordsworth, who has throughout his life been possessed with a mania of reviling the Holy See, and proving that the Church of Rome is the Babylon of the Apocalypse, is represented as the successor of the virtues of St. Hugh who was a most devoted adherent and subject of the See of Rome. Over and over again Canon Perry asserts the corruptions and degradation of the English Church were due to its slavery to Rome; yet, over and over again he brings facts, which show it was the influence of the Holy See which alone rescued it from the tyranny of kings and the corrupting influence of courtly bishops. He tells us how much better fitted secular canons must be to advise bishops than monks—"growing up in a routine of duties, which narrowed and dwarfed the mind, without any opportunity of seeing the world and studying the manners and minds of men."* And yet not only the subject of this biography was a monk, but all the greatest of his predecessors, and very many, if not most, of the great bishops of England; while the chroniclers whose keen remarks on "the manners and minds of men," he frequently quotes with approbation, are nearly all monks.

There is in fact an unreality, an inconsistency, I had almost said an insincerity, about these Anglican accounts of Catholic saints, which must necessarily tend to utter confusion as to doctrine, and consequently to indifference; while this giving of alternate praise and blame is destructive of any consistent standard of right and wrong. In a chapter devoted to the state of the clergy in the time of St. Hugh, Canon Perry has gathered out of a treatise of Giraldus a long list of possible, or actual, abuses or irreverences committed against the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar. He remarks that "Such tricks played about the holiest things gives us a very low idea of the reverence and devotion of the

* P. 11.

time.”* In this remark every Catholic will cordially agree, provided only that the historical authority of Giraldus is admitted. But we know too well his reckless exaggerations about Ireland, to trust him easily when he speaks of England, or even of his native Wales. Admitting, however, the facts as Canon Perry gives them, on the testimony of Gerald Barry and Walter Mapes, how do they in any way bear out Canon Perry’s view, that such deeds were the result of the low material views of the Eucharist—i.e., as he explains, of the belief in Transubstantiation? Nestorians used to write in language very like that of Canon Perry, regarding the “many revolting details which spring naturally from the material view of”—the Incarnation! And many infidels have enumerated the crimes of Christians as an argument against their faith. Christians at the present day take the name of their Redeemer in vain, abuse His festivals by profligacy and by quarrels, and persecute each other through a misconceived zeal for His glory. Suppose now that Canon Perry, instead of raking up the crimes of Catholics in the twelfth century, should have the moral courage to write a book like that of Giraldus, enumerating the crimes of men of his own time and his own Church, and should denounce them in the same bold and perhaps exaggerated language used by the priestly writers of the Middle Ages. And suppose that some writer of the twenty-fifth century, wishing to depict the life and times of Dr. Christopher Wordsworth, should discover this imaginary treatise of Canon Perry, and should pick out all its worst passages, and string them together, and call it a picture of the English Church in the nineteenth century. Suppose he should also indulge in reflections that such abominations are just what might be expected from the gross material belief in the Incarnation, which was then prevalent in the Church of England. And if, after these reflections, he should go on to eulogize Dr. Wordsworth, in spite of his having held the same views of the Incarnation which the author has pronounced low and degrading; and should do this by catching at certain words and acts, which he could twist into proofs that he was in reality superior to the superstitious views held by his Church in the nineteenth century, and did not really believe in the material view of the Incarnation at all—would Canon Perry consider this a fair proceeding? Yet if a writer in the twenty-fifth century should do this, he will simply follow the precedent set him by Canon Perry. For St. Hugh held exactly the same faith about the Blessed Sacrament and the Holy Mass which was held by the sordid and unworthy priests whom he

* P. 148.

denounced and suspended. But they joined to a true faith, irreverence, avarice, and impurity, whereas St. Hugh shows in his life what should be the conduct of a true priest, to whom such mysteries are committed. That is the simple, straightforward view taken by St. Hugh's contemporary biographer, Abbot Adam. I have shown how different, and consequently how inconsistent, and how false to history, is the view worked out by Canon Perry.

T. E. BRIDGETT, C.SS. R.

ART. IV.—RECENT RESEARCH ON THE NERVES AND BRAIN.

1. *La Psychologie Allemande Contemporaine : Ecole expérimentale.* Par TH. RIBOT. Paris. 1879.
2. *Lehrbuch der Physiologie der Menschen.* Von Dr. WUNDT. Stuttgart. 1878.
3. HERMANN'S *Handbuch der Physiologie.* Band II. and III. Leipzig. 1879.
4. *The Functions of the Brain.* By DAVID FERRIER, M.D., F.R.S. London. 1876.

AMONG all the labours of modern science few are more remarkable, and yet few are less generally known, than the attempts which have been made to approach the study of the mind from the side of its material instrument, the nervous system. The amount of labour bestowed on this subject during the last twenty years has been enormous, and although the positive results obtained are proportionately few, owing to its inherent difficulty, many of them are extremely suggestive, and all must have the greatest interest for every student of the human mind. So far as I am aware, no attempt has been made, in England or abroad, to give an outline of the subject in a form accessible to the general reader; and although it is certain that any such sketch must be very inadequate and fragmentary, I think it possible to convey some idea of the lines which recent investigation has taken, to all who will have the patience to follow me. I propose to do this in the next few pages; and I have also another object in view. Having given such an outline as I can of the experimental study of the relations of the brain to thought, I propose to show that none of the conclusions to which modern science leads are in any point opposed to that system of philosophy which is commended to

us by the highest authority. I may go farther, and say that the psychology of St. Thomas, in its general outlines, strikingly anticipated the results of modern physiology; and that the two harmonize and complement each other in a manner which is a strong evidence of the truth of both.

I must premise a few remarks on the nervous system in general. In the most elementary forms of animal life we find that the whole body is able to respond by appropriate movements to impressions made from without. But such movements are necessarily only of the simplest kind, and can exist only in animals of the smallest size; in order that any advance should be made beyond them, certain portions of the elementary substance called "protoplasm" have to be set apart for the reception of external impressions; while others are employed as means of communication between these sensitive organs and the contractile masses of protoplasm which become muscles. The next stage of development consists in a farther division of labour; some parts of the connecting protoplasm being devoted exclusively to the spontaneous origination of impulses to motion, while others have merely to connect these "automatic" centres with the surface of the body or with themselves. In all the higher animals, these two parts of the nervous system are clearly distinguished. The conducting portion, called the "*nerves*," is white in colour, and under the microscope is seen to be made up of small fibres, each composed of a delicate membrane containing a white tube, which in turn is filled with a transparent substance, the whole being about $\frac{1}{3000}$ of an inch in diameter. The originating portion consists of minute globules called "*cells*," many of which send out branches which become nerve-fibres; an aggregate of these cells is always grey in colour, and is called a *ganglion* or *nerve-centre*.

If the nerves are acted upon, either by these nerve-centres or by some stimulus from without, the impression is transmitted along the fibres so affected until some nerve-centre or muscle is reached. This propagation is ascribed to the existence of a special *nerve-force*, with the intimate nature of which we are no better acquainted than with the other physical forces. It is correlated to them, as they are to one another, and is included in the general law of conservation of energy, being produced by an expenditure of heat, light, electricity, and resulting itself in the production of one of them. It seems to resemble most nearly electricity; and the varying electrical conditions of nerves seem at first sight to justify the popular illustration, which likens the brain to a galvanic battery and the nerves to telegraph wires. But there are several important differences

between the two forces, the chief being the rapidity at which nerve-force travels. Numerous experiments of late years have proved that, far from reaching the marvellous velocities of light or electricity, an impression is transmitted through the nerves at the very moderate speed of 60 to 130 feet per second, varying considerably in different parts of the same nerve, and being accelerated by increase of temperature and greater intensity of the stimulus. The tendency at present is rather to look upon the nerves as made up of a series of molecules of unstable chemical composition; so that a change (probably oxidation) is propagated by a series of explosions all along the line. It has been farther shown, that the nerve-fibres will conduct indifferently in either direction.

I have said that nerve-force originates either in a nerve-centre or in an external impression, and results either in an act of consciousness or in motion. The best examples of spontaneous action are furnished by the ganglia contained in the substance of the heart and blood-vessels, keeping up the movements necessary to life. In the other case an impression may be transmitted up the sensory nerves, and movement may result, without being consciously recognised. The centres for these *reflex* movements, in which ascending impressions are changed into motor impulses, are in the spinal cord. Familiar instances of such reflex actions are sneezing, coughing, and the like; from which it will be remarked that the movements produced by very simple stimuli are often very complicated. They are often also so apparently purposive, particularly in the frog and other lower animals, that some physiologists ascribe a kind of consciousness to the spinal cord. But it is generally held that the total loss of sensation in those human beings whose spinal cord has been severed from the brain by accident or disease disproves this view; and it is more probable that the combination of many movements in one reflex act is due to the gradual connection, in many successive generations, of such as are beneficial to the individual. The higher nerve-centres possess another property of great importance: they are enabled to prevent or check any action produced by ganglia lower than themselves. This power of *inhibition* is difficult to explain; probably two currents meeting in the same nerve neutralize each other in a manner analogous to the "interference" of light or sound.

Bearing in mind these general properties of the nervous system, we shall be able to follow the principal lines which have been adopted for the study of *sensation*. First, as to the change which takes place in the sensory organs when an impression is made on them: there is an increasing probability that there is

in every case some movement of the protoplasm on their surface. This will be readily understood with regard to touch; Hensen has recently shown that the hair-like terminations of the nerve of hearing in an Arctic variety of shrimp vibrate in response to sound; and it is believed that the rays of light cause the pigment-cells in the eye to move, as similar cells move under the same influence in the skin of the frog and the chameleon.

Numerous experiments have been made in order to discover the "minimum sensible"—the least amount of external impression needed to produce a sensation. Thus, it has been found that, in the case of touch, the least weight recognised is $\frac{1}{100}$ th of a gramme, which is felt if placed upon the back of the hand: in the case of light (far more difficult to estimate), the least which can be perceived is about $\frac{1}{100}$ th of the brightness of the full moon: these figures being, of course, only averages and subject to great individual variations.

We have next to consider how far the intensity of any sensation corresponds to the degree to which the sense-organ is stimulated. It might be supposed *à priori*, and was actually stated by psychologists, that the two varied in the same ratio; so that, for instance, if one sound or light was double the intensity of another, it would always be felt twice as powerfully. But the matter is by no means so simple, as will be plain if we consider such cases as the following:—Sounds are heard in the dead stillness of the night, and stars are seen in its darkness, which we do not perceive in the day; we readily feel the difference in weight between one ounce and two, but if added to a hundred weight no one recognises a pound. These examples lead us to conclude that we have to take into account, not merely the degree of each sensory impression, but also that which had preceded it, and with which it is compared. The great physiologist Weber expressed this by saying that sensations increase equally in intensity by *relatively* equal increase of the stimulus; for instance, if to three ounces we add first one ounce and then an ounce and a half (one-third of four ounces) an equal increase of weight will in either case be experienced.

Fechner, continuing the study of this subject, was led to discover that the least increment which could be recognised between two sensations amounted, in the case of touch, temperature, and sound, to $\frac{1}{3}$, and in the case of light, to $\frac{1}{100}$; and he went on to enunciate what he called the *psychophysical law*, which has given rise to more discussion than any other subject of the kind, and probably more (most readers will think) than its importance warrants. It is this:—A stimulus must increase in geometrical progression in order that the corresponding

sensation may increase in arithmetical progression; or, more concisely stated, *sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus*. The searching criticism to which this law has been subjected has proved that it is only strictly true in the case of sight and hearing, and then only within certain limits. Granting these deductions, when we come to ask what is the origin of Fechner's law, we are met by two different explanations. It is held by some to be merely a result of the mode of action of our nervous system; while Wundt, in my opinion more plausibly, gives a psychical explanation. He considers that the mind is not capable of judging absolutely as to any sensation, but can only know it relatively to its predecessor. From this point of view, the psychophysical law is merely a particular statement of the relativity of our consciousness, like the recognition of the pitch of sounds or of the variety of colours. Whatever the ultimate fate of Fechner's law, his real merit consists in having shown (as Berkeley did for the *quality* of sensations) that their *quantity* is not a direct result of the amount of the external cause, but is, to a great extent at least, subjective.

Physiology has so far thrown little or no light on the different *nature* of our sensations as derived from the several organs of sense; but even here some points of psychological interest may be briefly stated. The sense of touch, which has its organ over the whole surface of the body, communicates to us two distinct sensations—one, whereby pressure or resistance is recognised, and another, which informs us whether external objects are warmer or colder than our own skin—these two series of impressions appearing to be conveyed upwards by different nerve-fibres. In the case of hearing, there is still much doubt how the pitch of different sounds is discriminated; the membrane upon which the hair-like ends of the auditory nerve are distributed varies in width, and therefore vibrates in different parts according to the rate of repetition which constitutes the pitch of each note. The different quality of sounds has been shown by Helmholtz to depend upon the number and loudness of the harmonics which accompany the fundamental note, so that the elements upon which our inference of the quality of each sound is based must be highly complex. In the case of sight, again, physiology leads us to discover that what appear to us the simplest sensations are very far from being so. The filaments by which the optic nerve ends in the eye are of two kinds, called, from their respective forms, rods and cones; and Schultze has lately shown it is probable that the impressions of light are transmitted by the rods, while colour is perceived exclusively by means of the cones. No thoroughly satisfactory explanation has been given of the manner in which different

colours are discriminated. It may be supposed, either that there are separate elements in the eye which are differently affected by the three fundamental colours, or (with Wundt) that the varying length of the undulations of light produces different movements in the cones, which we interpret as different colours. Probably the most interesting recent discovery in nervous physiology is that the retinal surface of the optic nerve is coloured by what is termed the "visual purple," which is changed by light into yellow. This visual purple is continually reproduced during life, but can be fixed, in the dead eye, by artificial means, when an "optograph" is obtained of the lights and shades last before it. This is most probably not a stage in the process of vision, but a device for "straining-off" (as it were) those rays of light which, from their intensity and chemical quality, would injure the delicate endings of the optic nerve. Smell and taste have been less studied: but, with regard to the latter sense, it has been discovered that different savours are recognised by different parts of the tongue, and are probably so discriminated.

The manner in which we obtain through the senses our knowledge of extension has been most keenly debated among the physiologists of Germany, who have devoted themselves to the physiological side of the question started by Berkeley. The hypotheses suggested have been classed by Helmholtz as "nativist" or "empiricist," according as they ascribe the origin of this perception either to the innate structure of the organs of sight and touch, or to some psychical process, making it therefore a result of experience. Lotze, who was the first to raise the question in Germany, pointed out that our perception of extension depends on our power of distinguishing between two simultaneous sensations of sight and touch (a power the other senses do not possess); and that for this we must suppose every impression on these two senses has a special character or "local sign," by which its position can be discriminated. He suggested that this local sign is a movement, or tendency to movement, towards any object, which always unconsciously follows upon its sensation. Lotze's theory has been variously modified: Wundt, for instance, considers the process is a conscious comparison between the sensations and the movements excited by them; while Helmholtz has urged that the *à priori* principle of causality is necessary to make the inference valid, by which we conclude these sensations are produced by an external cause, to which we afterwards attribute extension. The empiricist theory, though more generally held, has by no means supplanted the nativist explanation, which has been urged with great ability, particularly in the case of vision, by Hering.

The primary psychological importance of sensation has led me to dwell upon its physiological conditions at undue length. I must hasten more quickly over the rest of my subject.

The spinal cord is continued upwards into the head, where, in the space of less than an inch, it contains the centres for breathing, and for regulating the movements of the heart and blood-vessels. It then spreads out into two fan-like expansions which end in the surfaces of the two halves of the cerebrum, or brain proper. Below the cerebrum there are a series of nerve-centres, of which the cerebellum is the chief, and which have the double office of carrying out the details of the muscular actions decided upon, and of executing all those movements which, though not strictly reflex, are yet so habitual as to need no conscious will on our parts. I need not dwell upon the real complexity of even the most simple voluntary motions; but we are so little accustomed to consider the character of these habitual acts, that it is well to give some examples. Walking, decent eating and drinking, dressing, writing, playing musical instruments, are so many instances of complicated actions which we learn with much thought and labour, but which, after a time, are carried on without our adverting to them at all, the higher centres only originating or inhibiting them. These actions are called "secondarily automatic," to distinguish them from the primarily automatic actions of the spinal cord which I have described before, and which are the result of the experience of the race, as these are of the experience of each individual. They are of enormous importance, even in man and the higher animals, by relieving the brain of much conscious labour; and, as we descend in the scale of vertebrate animals, their proportion to strictly voluntary movements becomes greater, so that fish, reptiles, and birds may almost be called conscious automata. The only instance, in man, of an habitual action of this importance is the maintenance of equilibrium in all the varying positions of the body, which devolves upon the cerebellum. This centre is in close relation with the organs of touch, sight, and hearing; and is also connected with three minute semi-circular canals on either side of the skull, so arranged that the tension of the fluid they contain varies with the position of the head, which is thus directly indicated.

The surface of the cerebrum, or brain proper, is made up of grey matter to the average depth of one-fifth of an inch, and the irregular folds which divide it into "convolutions" greatly increase the amount of this cortical grey substance, so that (according to a trustworthy calculation) it contains some six hundred millions of nerve cells. In the lower vertebrates this portion of the nervous system may be removed without fatal consequences; and it is then found

that all the higher manifestations of life are lost. The animal apparently retains some imperfect sensation, and can execute all reflex and automatic movements; but it has lost all power of comparing sensory impressions, and of originating or regulating its actions. The brainless fish hurries straight on, regardless of obstacles and without any purpose; the frog utters a mechanical croak of satisfaction when stroked; the pigeon will die of starvation over a heap of grain unless its beak be plunged in it, or food be placed in its mouth. In man a similar condition is sometimes produced by disease; when the patient, in a state of trance (all mental activity being apparently suspended), automatically performs all those movements that have become habitual. But, when we come to study the functions of the cerebrum in detail, we are met with the difficulty, that large portions of it may be destroyed by accident or disease without any impairment of sensation and consciousness—nay, that an entire half may be lost without any other symptom than paralysis of the opposite side of the body. This long prevented any attempt to assign definite functions to separate parts of the brain, and the explanation now suggested—that for sensorial and psychical purposes the cerebrum is a double organ, either half of which may act independently—is not wholly satisfactory. The attempts made by phrenologists to localize the functions of the brain were also so unscientific, as to throw discredit on the whole subject, until a mass of evidence was gradually collected to show that destruction of a certain convolution abolished the power of speech. Following this clue, a series of experiments on animals (which Dr. Ferrier has carried out most extensively and successfully), have proved that one portion of the convolutions (corresponding, roughly, to the temples and side of the head) governs the different movements of the body. The motions required for speech are definitely connected with one part of this zone, while those of the face, limbs, and trunk have their several centres in the same region. There is still much debate as to the way in which these centres act; the chief question being, whether their action is direct, or merely indirect, by originating and controlling movements, which are produced by the lower centres; the evidence at present available favours the latter view. Dr. Ferrier has also made it seem highly probable that there are definite points in the hinder part of the brain connected with the several organs of sense and the general sensibility of the body, though little is known of their existence in man. Finally, he believes that the front of the cerebrum contains the centres for the higher mental functions, and his opinion on this head is specially noteworthy. He considers, in common with Prof. Bain and other

authors of the same school, that the faculty of attention is the basis of all higher mental education; and that it is an act of mental inhibition, whereby all psychical activity which is not to the point can be suspended. From the physiological point of view this mental inhibition belongs to the same order of phenomena as the inhibition of reflex and automatic actions; and, like it, demands the existence of special inhibitory centres, which he locates in the front of the brain.

Some very interesting researches have been pursued, into the time occupied by the more simple cerebral processes. These began with the discovery made by astronomers, that the method employed for registering the passage of a star across the meridian in a telescope, by comparing it with the beat of a pendulum, gave rise to an error, which varied in different individuals, but was constant in the same person under similar circumstances. This error, which has been called the "personal equation," is a complicated case, since the observer has to compare two different sensations. When the subject is examined systematically, it is found that the time required to register a sensation by some appropriate movement varies according to certain conditions: when the "minimum sensible" is employed, this time is about one-third of a second for all the senses; but under stronger stimulation it is reduced to about one-fifth of a second for touch and sight, and one-sixth for hearing. It is longer in old persons than in the young, in women than in men, in the uneducated than in those who are accustomed to concentrate their attention; it is also prolonged by fatigue, or by anything which distracts the mind. It is, on the other hand, shortened by a foreknowledge of what the nature of the sensation will be, and still more by its being produced at regular intervals, so as to be anticipated. It is possible to eliminate from the problem the time required for movement, by ascertaining what time must intervene between two sensations for them to be recognised as distinct; this is found to be greatest in the case of sight, least in hearing. The only other point I can here dwell upon is one remarked by Wundt, that if two stimuli are brought before the senses in immediate succession, they always appear to the consciousness as separated by a slight interval, in which neither is perceived clearly. This he ascribes to the time required to divert the attention from the former to the latter sensation.

If any one has had the patience to follow me through this dry summary of recent investigations into nervous physiology, which is all I have been able to give, he will be tempted to ask whether any conclusion of the slightest value can be derived from them, and whether they are not rather so many instances

of wasted time and labour. I can best answer this question by stating the inferences I should myself draw from them.

First, it is interesting to remark that consciousness is brought into contact with the external world at two points only—sensation coming from without, and motion proceeding from within—and at both those points its immediate connection is not with matter, but with force, with those undulatory movements in which there is transference of energy, but not of matter.

Second, the continuity of the nervous system implies the unity of the mind to which it corresponds.* The grey matter of the convolutions is no doubt more intimately connected with consciousness than any other part of the body, but it presupposes the existence of all the lower nerve centres and organs of sense, which may, so far, be also termed instruments of the mind.

Third, if with Bain, Ferrier, and others, we are to look upon the highest cerebral centres as inhibitory, we can only do so by assuming that there is something beyond the nervous system which causes that inhibition.

In these three directions physiology testifies to the existence, unity, and immateriality of mind, as distinct from its physical instrument. It is, however, to be noted (as Ferrier says) that “no purely physiological investigation can explain the facts of consciousness,” which must be approached by a different method.

Finally, the study of the physiological conditions of sensation leads us to the same conclusion as its psychological analysis, that our apparently simplest acts of perception are really highly complex, being made up of a series of more or less unconscious inferences. Our estimate of the *quality* of a sensation appears to be connected with the part of the sensory organs in which it originates; our opinion of its *quantity* depends upon the intensity of the preceding sensation; while the empiricist views of our knowledge of extension are even stronger evidences in the same direction. This is not the place to show how we are not hereby compelled to accept the consequences which Berkeley drew, and which would land us in absolute scepticism.

I must have already over-taxed my reader's patience, and will return to the subject on another occasion, when I hope to show the connection of these physiological discoveries with the psychology and general philosophical doctrines of St. Thomas.

J. R. GASQUET.

* Wundt, “Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie,” p. 714.

ART. V.—A NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD QUESTION.

1. *De Imitatione Christi : being the Autograph Manuscript of Thomas à Kempis, reproduced in Facsimile from the Original preserved in the Royal Library at Brussels.* With an Introduction by C. RUELENS, Keeper of the Department of Manuscripts, Royal Library, Brussels. Elliot Stock. 1879.
2. *De Imitatione Christi, Libri Quatuor.* Textum ex autographo Thomæ Kempensis nunc primum accuratissime redidit, distinxit, novo modo disposuit; capitulorum argumenta, locos parallellos adiecit CAROLUS HIRSCHKE. Berolini. 1874.
3. *Récherches Historiques et Critiques sur le Vêritable Auteur du livre de L'Imitation de Jésus-Christ.* Par Mgr. MALOU, Evêque de Bruges. Troisième Édition. Paris. 1858.
4. *The Authorship of the De Imitatione Christi.* By SAMUEL KITTLEWELL, M.A. Loudon. 1877.
5. *Della Controversia Gerseniana Notizia Illustrativa del P.* CAMILLO MELLA, D.C.D.G. Prato. 1875.

THESE are the veritable gold-letter days of critical scholarship. Only a week or two ago the Trustees of the British Museum won the gratitude of both scholars and students by putting it within their power to examine at their leisure, to take up and put down at their will, to keep on their book-shelves, to have in their own possession, the famous "Codex Alexandrinus," just as it was written, word for word, letter for letter, in the identical Greek characters used by Egyptian scribes more than thirteen hundred years ago. And now, whilst the Philological and Early English Text Societies, availing themselves of the generous trust of the French Government, are taking steps for the solution of linguistic and paleographical problems of high importance by procuring facsimiles of the most ancient record of our native tongue before they yield up the precious loan of the Epinal manuscript, we find, through the success of individual enterprise, the roll of facsimile publications enriched by the reproduction of one of the choicest and most interesting codices of the Royal Library at Brussels: the "De Imitatione," written by Thomas à Kempis himself in 1441.

The great value of this manuscript has always been firmly upheld in the fierce controversy concerning the authorship of the "Imitation" that, with only an occasional lull, has raged for

nearly three centuries ; but it has been reserved to a critic of later times to show that the Codex is in reality of far greater consequence than the early defenders of the rights of à Kempis ever dreamed of, by the discovery in it of a system of punctuation that gives with a delicate precision hitherto unknown in paleography, an insight into the structure of the "Imitation," and the working of the author's mind, such as it is difficult to conceive any one but the author could give, and such, so far as recent discovery can show, as no other author, before or since, ever has given to his readers. This discovery, it is obvious to remark, attaches a very special importance to the facsimile publication of Thomas à Kempis's most perfect copy of his most perfect work.

For nearly two centuries Thomas à Kempis was held, in both the literary and religious world, the undisputed author of the "Imitation." Even Mabillon says that in 1657 he still enjoyed the *fiduciary possession* that had been granted him from early times, whilst Thuillier was compelled to acknowledge that the consensus of public opinion was undoubtedly in his favour when the controversy first commenced. At the end of that time a little cloud arose. A work, erroneously attributed to St. Bonaventure, who died more than a century before à Kempis was born, was observed to contain lengthy citations from the "Imitation." The cloud grew ; it spread over Italy, and before it could be dispelled by the light of irrefragable fact, the eccentric Dom Constantine Cajetan, under its shadow, created his famous mythical author, whom he successively introduced to the controversy as the venerable John Gersen, Abbot of the Order of St. Benedict, and Dom John Gersen, Abbot of Vercelli.* This was the beginning of the long-protracted dispute between the great Orders of St. Benedict and of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine, unparalleled in the history of literature. Cardinal Richelieu despaired of its settlement when, the Benedictines having entreated him to acknowledge their claims for Gersen in his edition of the "Imitation" issued from the Royal Press at the Louvre, at the same time that the Canons Regular set before him the rights of à Kempis, Charles Labbé, charged by the Cardinal to examine into the question, decided against Gersen and Thomas à Kempis alike, and proposed another claimant for the honours of the hotly-contested authorship in the person of John Charlier de Gerson, Chancellor of Paris. But a reaction set in eventually, though not until the Congregation of

* Finally the Abbot of Vercelli received the additional appellation of "da Canabaco;" but he lost the title of Doctor of Canon Law, which he enjoyed for a short time at the expense of his more substantial brother monk, John, Abbot of Vincelles, in Burgundy.

the Index, the Parliament of Paris, and the French Academy, had each in turn been implicated in the controversy, when, without any definite decision having been come to, little more was heard of it for nearly half a century. In 1724, however, it was renewed with fresh ardour by the German Benedictine Erhard, who published a new edition of the "Imitation," and attributed it to John Gersen, of Canabaco, Benedictine Abbot of Vercelli. This drew forth a reply from no less a person than Eusebius Amort,* the wittiest, perhaps, as well as the weightiest and most exhaustive writer on the question. His first reply was quickly followed by the "Scutum Kempense," and later by his "Polycrates exauctoratus," which at last silenced the Gersenists, and brought about a fresh period of calm, which endured for thirty years. It was broken by the Abbé Valart, and Amort, then an old man, finding that his reply to Erhard, in 1625, had been resuscitated and attacked anew by Maerz, another German Benedictine, brought the power of ridicule to bear upon his opponent, and afterwards, in rapid succession, published his "Deductio Critica" and "Moralis Certitudo," the result of immense research, which, together with the "Plena Informatio," rank with, if indeed they do not surpass, the works of Rosweyde, of Carré, and of Héser.

In the present century M. de Grégory quickened the strife by the discovery in Paris of an undated manuscript, now well-known as the "De Advocatis," which, by a strong exercise of the imagination and no little disregard of facts, he proved to be the identical Codex of the "Imitation" mentioned in a still more marvellous find in Italy—the stray leaves of a diary of the de Avogadri family—dating from the middle of the fourteenth century: consequently, he argued, the "Imitation" could not have been written by Thomas à Kempis, and therefore it must have been written by Gersen. But in 1849 Mgr. Malou's work appeared, and gave promise of putting an end to the dispute for ever, by demonstrating to the last point the really unquestionable claims of Thomas à Kempis. Before the calm, steady gaze of the Bishop of Bruges the phantom Abbot of Vercelli vanished—

Et tenues fugit, ceu fumus, in auras.

Before the irresistible logic of his close reasoning and acute criticism the claims of Gerson dwindled away till there was nothing left but the memory of them; whilst the right of Thomas à Kempis to the glory of the book that ranks second to the

* Plena et succincta informatio de statu totius controversiæ, quæ de auctore libelli de "Imitatione Christi" inter Thomæ Kempensis Can. reg., et Joannis Gersenis Ord. S. Bened., abbatis patronos jam a centum annis agitur, etc., auth. E. Amort. 1729.

Bible alone,* attested by the strongest evidence that constitutes historic truth, stood forth in the clear light of reason, resting on the broad indestructible basis of fact and tradition. His masterly treatment of the vast amount of details and collateral evidence accumulated during the course of centuries is familiar to most readers; but since recent Gersenists† have revived the old legends and fancies and refuted arguments that captivated their predecessors, it is well to recur to it, especially now that one generation has passed away since the force of it was first felt.

I.

Step by step Mgr. Malou proved his case; and, starting with contemporary witnesses, he brought forward no less than fifteen to support it. Of these many were canons regular of St. Augustine, though members of other communities than that to which à Kempis belonged, and consequently witnesses of special weight. The most important is, probably, the chronicler Buschius, who, in 1420, made his religious profession in the Monastery of the Canons Regular at Windesem, which was not more than a mile from the Monastery of St. Agnes, where Thomas à Kempis then held the office of sub-prior. But there is something about the artless style of Brother Hermann Ryd that gives to his unconscious testimony a value of its own. Brother Hermann was a man well known for his piety and learning. In his description of the Convents of the Congregation of Windesem we read:—

The brother who wrote the book, “*De Imitatione*,” is called or named Thomas; he is sub-prior at the said monastery of St. Agnes, near Zwoll, in the diocese of Cologne; and situated a mile from Windesem, which is the Mother-house in which the canons regular of the province of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves hold their general chapter every year. This writer was living in 1454, and I, brother Hermann, of the monastery Novi Operis, near Halle, in the diocese of Magdeburg, having been sent in that year to the said general chapter, spoke to him.

It is wonderful the pride with which the simple monk records what is likely to have been one of the great events of his life—viz., meeting the man whose renown even in those days almost exceeded that of Gerard Groote: “and I, Brother Hermann, spoke to him.” But nothing could be more conclusive than the contemporary biography of Thomas à Kempis. The author relates how from his earliest years Thomas à Kempis

* The “*Imitation*” has been translated into forty-six different languages, and the editions it has passed through are counted by thousands.

† See P. Mella’s “*Notizia Illustrativa*,” and the abridgment of this by a Cassinese Benedictine in *The Tablet*, from Sept. 16 to Nov. 4, 1876.

made so great progress in virtue as to exemplify the words of Scripture: "Happy the man who has borne the yoke of the Lord from his youth;" and these words, he continues, were completely verified in the several treatises that he wrote, especially in his "*Soliloquium Animæ*," in which Christ converses with his soul, as with his spouse. This good Father, he proceeds, was wont to say, when walking with the community or with others: "My dear brothers, I must leave you; some one is waiting for me in my cell." And then he would go away and pray. And thus was fulfilled in him the promise: "*Ducam eum in solitudinem et ibi loquar cum eo*" (Osee. ii. 14); and Thomas himself would say to the Lord: "Speak, Lord, for Thy servant heareth" (1 Kings iii. 9). We know, further, what he used to say to the Lord, and what they said to one another, by his treatise: "*De interna Christi locutione ad animam fidelem*" (the third book of the Imitation), the second chapter of which commences: "*Loquere Domine; quia audit servus tuus.*" The recently-disclosed evidence of Adrien de But, however, is of perhaps even greater value. The Royal Commission of History of Belgium, whose publications correspond to our admirable Rolls Series, brought out in 1870, under the careful supervision of Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove, the Chronicles of Adrien de But, a monk of the celebrated Cistercian Abbey of Dunes, the friend and disciple of Gilles de Roye. These Chronicles date from the year 1431, and are continued up to 1488, the year of Adrien's death. Between the record of the projected alliance with England and Burgundy, sought by Margaret of York, Dowager-Duchess of Burgundy, in 1480, and the rebellion of the Venetians, tributaries of the Turks, against the Sovereign Pontiff Sixtus IV., that led Ferdinand of Arragon to declare himself the defender of the Church, and brought him into conflict with the Mussulman, occurs the following remarkable passage: "*Hoc anno frater Thomas de Kempis, de Monte Sanctæ Agnetis professor ordinis regularium canonicorum, multos, scriptis suis divulgatis, ædificat; hic vitam sanctæ Lidwигis descripsit et quoddam volumen metricè super illud: qui sequitur me.*"* Now, in the face of the positive, conclusive testimony of contemporary witnesses cited by Mgr. Malou—space forbids us to give more than three of the fifteen—and of the striking one we owe, above all, to the Royal Commission of History, Gersenists and Gersonists would cease to be, one would think, unless they could rebut it by the

* Commission Royale d'Histoire. Chroniques relatives à l'Histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des Ducs de Bourgogne publiées par M. le Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove. Tome i. Bruxelles. 1870.

numerical superiority of their contemporary witnesses. Gersenis and Gersonists exist; but neither can produce one single contemporary witness proving the right of Gersen or Gerson to the authorship of the "Imitation." Nay, the Gersenis have yet to prove that their man ever lived. The so-called decisive proofs afforded by historical tradition recently adduced in favour of Gersen are, we speak advisedly, simply worthless, and have long since been refuted over and over again; so that to give them a categorical reply would be a sheer waste of time. One or two examples will suffice to show this. The Cassinese Monk, to whom English readers are indebted for the version of P. Mella's "Notizia Illustrativa" that originally appeared in the "Civiltà Cattolica" says: "The ancient catalogues of Abbots of St. Stephen's in Vercelli give us the name of John Gersen as having governed that celebrated abbey from 1230 to 1245. In support thereof, we appeal to four unimpeachable authorities. First, the Bishop of Saluzzo, Francesco Agnostino (*sic*) della Chiesa, who held the office of historiographer to Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, surnamed by his own countrymen the Great. In his history of Piedmontese writers, published at Turin in 1845, he printed from the archives of St. Stephen's the names and dates of all its abbots from 1172 to 1536. At the year 1230 the catalogue gives us: "John Gersen, who wrote the book of 'The Imitation of Christ.' These archives perished at the French Revolution." Now, mark the words of Mgr. Malou answering this argument, which is merely a repetition of M. de Grégory: "Augustin della Chiesa made no mention of Gerson in his 'Catalogue of Illustrious Men of the Town of Vercelli,' published in 1614. It was not till 1648, four years after Dom Cajetan had published his last conjectures, that Augustin della Chiesa counted Gersen amongst the writers of Piedmont. Then he had so much confidence in the assertions of Dom Cajetan, that he affirmed, on the authority of this author, that the autograph manuscript of the "Imitation" still existed in the Monastery of St. Stephen at Vercelli, which had been destroyed a long time before the period at which he wrote. After the replies of Naude and Père Fronteau, Augustin della Chiesa omitted the name of Gersen in the editions of his "History of the Writers of Savoy," published in 1657 and 1660. We are told, moreover, that the Abbot Frova, interrogated by Amort concerning the Abbots of St. Stephen's, replied, in 1762, that the catalogue of the Abbot's did not exist, but that by his own researches he had succeeded in discovering in the archives of the town the names of the following Abbots:—Robald, from 1206 to 1219; Peter, Abbot in 1243; William, Abbot in 1320 till 1340. He did not discover any Abbot of St.

Stephen of the name of John before the year 1491. Hence the only list of Abbots extant in the eighteenth century shows that at the time when Gersen is said to have enjoyed the dignity of Abbot, Peter was Abbot. Again, P. Mella's translator says :—

The annals of the Franciscan Order, compiled by Father Luke Wadding, of Waterford, as we mentioned in our first Number, tell us that St. Anthony of Padua, and Adam Marisco, disciples of St. Francis of Assisi, studied under Abbot Gersen, at Vercelli. That these two children of St. Francis frequented the schools of Vercelli in Gersen's time is of absolute and undisputed historical certainty; that Gersen was himself a lecturer in the university is all but certain, as it is perfectly certain that he addresses part of his work to university students (!); hence the Franciscan tradition has every appearance of being authentic.

To deal with such loose writing is a very great exercise of patience. Gersen must have been Abbot of Vercelli, because the Annals of Luke Wadding as good as say that he was; the Annals of Luke Wadding must be true, because they as good as say that Gersen was Abbot of Vercelli. Is that what is meant? But where does Wadding mention the name of Gersen? All that we can find on the matter in his "Annals" is, that St. Anthony of Padua, accompanied by Adam de Marisco, was sent to Vercelli to study under the Prior of St. Andrew's, not of St. Stephen's, observe, whose name Wadding does not give. But though Wadding does not, Oudin, Fabricus, and Jöcher, not to mention others, all give us his name. The famous Abbot of St. Andrew's, under whom Antony of Padua studied mystic theology to such purpose that the pupil beat the master, was no other than Thomas, Canon of St. Victor's at Paris, and afterwards the first Abbot of St. Andrew's, at Vercelli, renowned for his commentaries and translation of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite. Once more, the Cassinese Benedictine endeavours to support the cause he has espoused by quoting the authority of Bellarmine. For this purpose he refers us to the 1613 edition of his "De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis." But why did he not refer us to the later editions of the Cardinal's work? Had he done so, far from giving us a witness in favour of Gersen, he would have introduced us to one dead against the claims of any one but Thomas à Kempis. We have been unable to meet with a copy of the edition printed at Cologne in 1621, and quoted by P. Strozzi and others; but in both the editions of 1657 and 1684 we find the same passage that they cite from the earlier edition :—

Scriptos et compositos esse ab eodem Thoma quatuor libros de Imitatione Christi supradictos, contrariis conjecturis eversis, demonstrat evidenter in vindiciis Kempensibus P. Heribertus Rosweyda : cujus

mihi et rationes plenissime satisfecerunt, et sententiam penitus amplector.

After this, it will be refreshing to go back to Mgr. Malou, and no one will complain if we quote at length the acute remarks with which he sums up this section of his subject. "A tradition well established for more than thirty years before the death of an author, and held without question for more than thirty years after his death, cannot be reasonably suspected. This tradition is, above all, legitimate and incontestable when it has been preserved by a body of men, a society, a religious order, all the members of which knew one another, helped one another, watched over one another, and could neither conspire together to deceive the public nor be deceived themselves concerning a fact that occurred under their own eyes."

It may be added that it is unheard-of in the history of letters, that an ancient work should be attributed to a modern author. Often a modern work has been attributed to an ancient author in order to win for the former greater authority; but the contrary has never been done, and never could be done. But this is just what, according to the Gersenists, would have taken place: the "Imitation," after having been in existence two centuries, would have been ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, who never wrote it. Such a plagiarism is impossible, especially in the case of so remarkable a work as the "Imitation of Christ."

It is necessary, therefore, to accept the contemporary, domestic, uncontested, universal tradition we have proved, or to fall into absolute historical scepticism.

To fully appreciate the value of the historical proof set forth, we must bear in mind—1st, that the partisans of Gersen and Gerson are unable to silence a single one of the fifteen witnesses cited; 2ndly, that the adversaries of Thomas à Kempis cannot produce a single contemporary witness in favour of Gersen or Gerson; 3rdly, that it is now superfluous to discuss proofs that can be drawn from manuscripts, idioms, and the contents of the work, because the cause of Thomas is absolutely gained before approaching this secondary and accessory kind of demonstration; 4thly, that the question relative to the real author of the "Imitation" is henceforth definitely decided; so that all ulterior discussion can only have for its object to confirm the demonstration already achieved, and to dissipate the illusions of the adversaries of Thomas à Kempis.

II.

Passing to the question of manuscripts, Mgr. Malou, admitting only those bearing the name of the author and a certain

date, or that supply for this by other material, incontestable evidence, cites no less than forty-five codices, including the oldest and most correct, that confirm the rights of à Kempis. Undoubtedly manuscripts are not of the same weight as historic evidence; but still we are far from sharing the opinion of M. Darch, that they ought to be disregarded because they obscure the question; nor can we agree with M. Vert, who maintains that in this controversy printed texts are preferable to manuscripts, which, like the chameleon, take too easily the colour of the carpet they touch, and lend themselves with extreme facility to the manipulations of expert forgers; rather we accept the judgment of the learned Rossi, that paleographical proof *used with discernment* is assuredly not without value, and once more follow the guidance of the Bishop of Bruges. The first and oldest manuscript of the "Imitation" Mgr. Malou draws attention to is the Kirkheim: at the foot of the first page it bears these notable words:—"Notandum quod iste tractatus editus est a probo et egregio viro, magistro Thoma, de Monte Stae. Agnetis et Canonico regulari in Trajecto, Thomas de Kempis dictus, DESCRIPTUS EX MANU AUCTORIS IN TRAJECTO; ANNO 1425, IN SOCIATU PROVINCIALATUS." This shows that there existed an autograph copy of the "Imitation," a copy evidently held in great esteem, in the Mother House of the Province before the year 1425; and that to this house people had resorted for the Kirkheim Codex, which owed its value to the fact of its having been copied from the autograph of Thomas à Kempis. Transcribed in the year 1425, the manuscript was written forty-six years before Thomas à Kempis died; and it is the oldest dated manuscript bearing the name of the author. The oldest dated manuscript bearing the name of Gersen, the Parma, is of the year 1464, that is—supposing Gersen ever lived, and supposing that he died the year he ceased to be Abbot of St. Stephen's—219 years after his death. The most ancient dated manuscript with the name of Gerson, the Sagermensis or Bretonianus, is of the year 1460—namely, thirty-one years after Gerson's death. So that the oldest dated manuscript bearing the name of Thomas à Kempis is older by thirty-five years than the oldest with the name of Gerson, and thirty-nine years earlier than the oldest bearing the name of Gersen. And nothing has been produced, we will not say to refute, but to impair this weighty deposition of Mgr. Malou. M. Loth's papers* may have appeared to some to do so; but his elaborate and fanciful argument, based on calculations made from a calendar acknowledged by

* "Revue des Questions Historiques." Avril, 1873; Janvier, 1874; Octobre, 1877.

himself to bear evident traces of error on the part of the scribe, is valueless. M. de Laborde first drew attention to the so-called 1406 manuscript in 1869, for a purpose very different from M. Loth's. The Codex contains, in addition to the first book of the "Imitation," two old engravings known to and valued by collectors as engravings *en criblé*. If these could be proved to be anterior to 1418, then Paris would possess a treasure more precious than the Madonna of the Royal Library of Brussels, the celebrated St. Christopher of Lord Spencer, the St. Sebastian of the Imperial Library of Vienna.* There lies the real history of the ingenious discovery of the 1406 manuscript of the first book of the "Imitation." For the rest, M. Charles Ruelens tells us that when he first opened the volume he at once exclaimed to M. de Laborde, "This MS. is of the sixteenth century."† M. de Laborde answered, "You are not the first of that opinion." And a closer inspection of it did not cause M. Ruelens to change his opinion. As regards the Rouge Cloître manuscript, belonging to Count Riant, the date affixed to it by M. Loth is purely arbitrary. The codex is, in fact—and here again we are indebted to M. Ruelens for our information—a *raparium*, a collection of treatises written at various times by various writers, and having nothing in common but the binding. One treatise alone bears the date 1416, and it is by a different hand to that of the first book of the "Imitation." Five different handwritings—and M. Loth has abstained from saying this—are contained in the manuscript, one of which belongs to the end of the fifteenth century. M. Ruelens has carefully studied it; he has had photographs taken of five separate pages, to show the variety of handwriting, which he has submitted to several paleographers, all of whom confirm his judgment: he sent them to us, and we in turn submitted them to Mr. Maunde Thompson, who says there is no doubt about the matter. However, as M. Ruelens has handed over all his notes relating to the matter to Dr. Hirsche, it is probable that before long we shall see it fully discussed in the forthcoming second part of the *Prolegomena*.

Next after the Kirckheim manuscript ranks the Gaesdonck, also of 1425, and then the famous 1441 Autograph, written throughout by the hand of Thomas à Kempis, and containing all the four books of the "Imitation." The Indersdorf of 1441 follows; it bears the inscription: "Tractatus qui intitulatur de Imitatione Christi; compilavit quidam canonicus regulæ Si. Augustini episcopi." But not to weary by the bare enumeration

* *Gazette des Beaux Arts*. Tom. prem. Paris, 1869.

† See also on this "Les Récentes Recherches sur l'Auteur de l'Imitation de Jesus Christ." Par Ad. Delvigne. Bruxelles, 1877.

of manuscripts that ought to be sufficiently well known to prevent any one being misled by P. Mella's* apparently formidable array, we would merely add that against the forty-five manuscripts in favour of the Monk of St. Agnes, comprising the most ancient with name and date, the Gersenists can bring only sixteen, including those where their author is designated Chancellor of Paris; the Gersonists quote twenty, two only of which are dated; whilst of the two hundred known manuscripts of the "Imitation," dated and undated, with and without the name of an author, three-fourths of them belong authentically to Germany or the Low Countries. Moreover, the intrinsic evidence that follows is so overwhelming that, were it compatible with a regard to veracity, it would be quite possible to play the very spendthrift in concessions to Gersenists and Gersonists alike in the matter of manuscripts, without in the least invalidating or even weakening the cause of à Kempis.

III.

Thomas Haemmerlein, commonly called à Kempis, who lived to the great age of 92, was born in 1379 at Kempen, in the diocese of Cologne. The school in which he was formed, and of which he was one of the most illustrious members—the school of Gerard Groote, of John vos van Heusden, of Florent Radewyns—was a celebrated one; it was marked by distinct characteristics; and its disciples were trained to the discharge of special duties. Now, what were the characteristics of this school? What was its origin? What manner of man was he who founded it? Gerard Groote was a very remarkable man; a man of immense force of character, of high intellectual gifts, of great generosity of disposition, of deep religious feeling. He passed a brilliant career at the University of Paris, eagerly devoting himself to every kind of knowledge within his reach. Nothing came amiss to him: theology, medicine, magic, astronomy, astrology; each in turn arrested

* With reference to the Augsburg MS., it may be well to remark that Denis (Bibl. Palat. Vindob. iii., DCXCVII.) far from ascribing to it the date 1383 (see P. Mella and *The Tablet*), sets it down to the XV. century; and elsewhere (ii., DLXXXIV.) commenting on another MS. of the same date he says: "Unde facile coævus Thomae de Kempis esse potest." Concerning the Wiblingen MSS., it is only necessary to say that Prof. Weigl, and the Abbot Martin Gerbert, have done anything but prove their dates. And it would have been more frank, to say the least, had the writer in *The Tablet* told us that the second Wiblingen MS.—one of the three "that, it is plain, are alone enough to set the question at rest for ever"—consisted of only the first chapter of the first book and a few sentences of the second, wretchedly torn ("misere etiam lacerati") when Gerbert saw it in the last century.

his attention. He spent large sums in the acquirement of rare manuscripts, and having at eighteen taken his Doctor's degree at the Sorbonne, he went to complete his studies at the University of Prague. Then he returned home, and, for a while, enjoyed the good things of this life—fame, wealth, honours. But a grave sickness fell upon him; and we gain a curious glimpse of the times when we read that, lying at the point of death, it was not without a struggle that he yielded up his precious manuscripts on magic and astrology to be publicly burnt, when his confessor required this sacrifice as the condition of his receiving the last Sacraments. The reward of the sacrifice was, it would seem, the power to make another. Influenced by his friend and former mentor at Paris, Henri de Kalkar, Prior of the Chartreuse of Arnhem, he resigned his rich prebends to the Pope, divided his patrimony, and the brilliant scholar who had surpassed all the Canons of Cologne in the magnificence of his laces and furs, clothed in a habit of coarse grey serge, went to learn in solitude, by the practise of severe austerities, the self-restraint that afterwards fitted him to be a ruler of men. He reformed himself before he attempted the reformation of others.

When he began his mission of reform, and first preached "Modern Devotion" (*Moderna Devotio*), a band of disciples quickly collected around him, prominent among them being Florent Radewyns, the dear master of Thomas à Kempis, a Canon-priest of St. Martin's of Utrecht, who gave up his canonry and became a simple Vicar of St. Labwin at Deventer, in order to enjoy the intimate companionship of his venerated guide, and Jean vos van Heusden, afterwards one of the first Priors of Windesem. Still possessed with his passion for learning and the acquisition of choice manuscripts, Gerard Groote picked out the best scribes from amongst the poor students, lay and ecclesiastical, who, flocking to the Capitular School of Deventer, were attracted by his teaching, and employed them in transcribing the most correct and perfect texts, which he spared no pains to secure for the valuable library—rich in the works of Cicero and Seneca, where the Epistles of St. Paul stood side by side of the lives of Plutarch, and Virgil, and Plautus in close proximity to the writings of St. Augustine and St. Bernard—which he ultimately left to the House of Deventer, on condition "that three Brothers should always remain in charge, to take care of the volumes and to lend them liberally." Under the organization and direction of Radewyns, inspired by Gerard Groote, these students, in the course of time, formed themselves into a Community. And this was the origin of the Institution of

the Brothers of Common Life, which spread throughout the Low Countries, in Flanders, in Westphalia, and even in Saxony.* The members were not bound by solemn vows, but they were obliged to practise obedience, poverty—that is, no one was allowed to hold property independently of his companions—continence, humility, and above all charity. Their hours of transcribing, and prayer, and work, and recreation, and sleep, were all carefully regulated. And so anxious was Gerard that the intellect should not be blunted by the prolonged mechanical labour of copying, that he required each clerk to make extracts of the most beautiful maxims of the Saints and Fathers, and to add his own reflections in certain books called *rapiaria*; and it is related that he himself, according to his wont of uniting example with precept, wrote and published many works of this kind, though hitherto none of them have been discovered. Who can fail to see in this ordinance the first step towards the compilation and composition of the “Imitation?”

The Brotherhood held regularly each year a general assembly of priests, clerks, and laymen, delegated by the various houses of the Low Countries, to elect the Rector of the whole Confraternity. After a time, the first disciples of Gerard Groote, in compliance with the dying wish of their master, adopted the rule of the Canons Regular, and so embraced the religious state strictly so called. But the Institution of the Brothers of Common Life was not abandoned: it worked on harmoniously in conjunction with the Canons of St. Augustine, and the Community of Florent Radewyns at Deventer became a sort of general noviciate for both Societies. The Monastery of Windesem, founded by Radewyns and Hendrik de Wilsem, quickly grew in importance. The rule of St. Augustine was rigorously observed there. Like the Brothers of Common Life, the Canons Regular occupied themselves with manual labour, agriculture, and other industries. And, like the Brothers of Common Life, they too became renowned for their penmanship; they were distinguished for their knowledge of sacred and profane literature; and their library, surpassing in the value of its codices every other of the Congregation, contained some of the most ancient manuscripts of the Vulgate, purchased at a great cost in Paris and the Convents of St. John of Jerusalem in Germany. To the Chapter of Windesem were quickly aggregated the Convents of St. John at Amsterdam, of Vredeswell near Münster, and, finally, that of St. Agnes, at Zwolle. In the following century all the convents of the Canons of St. Augustine in the Low Countries, in Ger-

* “Magister Gerardus Magnus primus fuit hujus nostrae reformationis pater, et totius Modernae Devotionis origo; versusque his novissimis temporibus hujus nostrae terrae apostolus. . .”—Chron. Windesem.

many, and in the north and south of France, became subject to the same Chapter.*

And now that we have before us something about the founder, something about the origin of the school of Modern Devotion, it is necessary to recall something of its other characteristics, its mental, its religious features. The pages of the authors of Windesem reflect the teaching of their masters, they are filled with the precepts of Gerard Groote, Van Heusden, and Radewyns. Both Thomas à Kempis and Buschius, not to mention others, inculcate without ceasing, in their several writings, the duty of imitating Jesus Christ, of walking in His footsteps, of meditating on His Passion, of seeking solitude and silence, of loving the cell, of avoiding vain and worldly conversation, of fleeing honours, of mortifying the flesh, of striving after perfection, of meditating on the Holy Scriptures, of walking in the footsteps of the Fathers. Now, if any should say they have read the "Imitation," yet do not see in it the amplification, the development of this teaching, nay, if they do not see in its ruling thoughts a perfect identity with the ideas that run through these precepts, they must have read it with their eyes shut; and we would beg them once more to consider the following extracts from the letter of John van Heusden, arranged by Mgr. Malou in parallel columns with passages from the "Imitation," and then to say whether there is not a similarity of thought and expression between them, altogether too remarkable to be the result of mere accident.

JOHN VAN HEUSDEN.

Vita D. N. Jesu Christi quæ nos præcessit, fons est omnium virtutum, qua mediante ad omnes virtutes citius pervenitur, sine qua ad veras virtutes et ad suum amorem pervenire non possumus. ("Ap. Buschium, Chron. Windes.," p. 221.)

Quia exercitium et cognitio pariunt amorem, idcirco necesse est ut prius in ea exerceatur, et qui ista negligit, quamvis haberet et sciret omnem *Bibliam* et *Scripturam*, et *Legem* unquam positam aut conscriptam, id minime sufficeret. (Loc. cit.)

THE AUTHOR OF THE "IMITATION."

Qui sequitur me non ambulat in tenebris; hæc sunt verba Christi, quibus admonemur quatenus *vitam ejus* et mores imitemur, si velimus veraciter illuminari, et ab omni cæcitate cordis liberari; summum igitur studium nostrum sit in *vita Jesu Christi* meditari. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 1.)

Qui autem vult plene et sapide Christi verba intelligere, oportet ut totam vitam suam illi studeat conformare. Si scires totam *Bibliam* exterius et omnium philosophorum dicta quid totum tibi prodesset? ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 1.)

* M. Bonet-Maury, to whom we are mainly indebted for these details, has published documents of considerable importance in his "Gérard de Groote, d'après des documents inédits." Paris. 1878.

Eorum inspicere multiplices et graves labores, et quam perfecte Deo obtulerunt *amicos et cognatos* omnes, et possessiones, temporalia bona et mundi *honores*. (Ibid., p. 230.)

Quid dulcius, O dilecte frater, quid securius, quid simplici columbæ salubrius, quam in petræ foramine, hoc est in *Christi Jesu vulneribus delitescere* et requiescere. (Ibid., p. 244.)

Ad externa officia nullatenus, dilecte frater, aspires, nec aliquam *prælaturam* affectes. (Ibid., p. 237.)

Libenter, cum potest fieri, *solus* sis. (Ibid., p. 218.)

Nihil penitus agas sine *consilio*; et plus semper expertis, quam tibi ipsi credas. (Ibid., p. 239.)

Humilis corde sis et apparatu, et *nimis multum non teneas de te ipso*. (Ibid., p. 241.)

Ama nesciri, et ab aliis contemni opta. (Ibid., p. 242.)

Juxta hunc modum fratres *devotarum congregationum*, et fratres in Vindesem, se solent exercere. (Ibid., p. 246.)

Intuere SS. Patrum *vivida exempla*. Omnibus divitiis, dignitatibus, *honoribus, amicis, et cognatis* renunciabant. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 18.)

Requiesce in passione Christi, et in sacris vulneribus ejus libenter habita; si enim *ad vulnera ejus devote confugies*, magnam consolationem senties. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 1.)

Multo tutius est stare in subiectione quam in *prælatura*. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 9.)

Pete secretum tibi; *ama solus* habitare tecum. ("De Imit.," lib. III., c. 53.)

Cum sapiente et conscientioso *consilium* habe; et quære potius a meliore instrui, quam tuas adinventiones sequi. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 4.)

Hæc est altissima et utilissima lectio, sui ipsius vera cognitio et despectio, *de se ipso nihil tenere*. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 2.)

Ama nesciri et pro nihilo reputari. ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 2.)

Utinam in te non dormiret profectus virtutum, qui multa sæpius vidisti *exempla devotorum*! ("De Imit.," lib. I., c. 18.)

It seems almost impossible to advance a step in this question without lighting upon a fresh proof of the identity of Thomas à Kempis and the author of the "Imitation." Take the concluding words of the final sentence just quoted, "*exempla devotorum*." The terms "*Devotus*," "*Devotio Moderna*," were distinctive of the disciples and institutions of Gerard Groote; and the former, whether as clerks or laymen they were undergoing their probation in the noviciate of Florent Radewyns at Deventer, or whether they had joined the Society of the Brothers of Common Life, or had been admitted into a monastery of Canons Regular, or of Carthusians, all equally bore the name of *Devoti*. The religious of the Congregation of Windesem frequently used it in their writings, in a distinct appellative sense; and Thomas à Kempis, a Devout of the Devout, uses the words

Devotio, Devoti, Devotorum, in this way no less than four hundred and forty times in his undisputed works. The author of the "Imitation" employs the words Devotio and Devoti in precisely the same significant way that they were used by the disciples of Gerard Groote and Florent Radewyns.

BUSCHIUS.

Sicut magister *Gerardus Magnus* origo fuit et pater primus omnium hominum *Modernæ Devotionis* hujus patriæ, ad quem Deo servire cupientes, securum semper habuere recursum, et post eum pater venerabilis, dominus *Florentius* Radervini, primus rector congregationis clericorum in Daventria, ita *devotus* pater noster, frater *Joannes de Heusden*, prior in Windesem eorum fidelis factus est successor, in cura consulendi, auxiliandi et defendendi. ("Chron. Windesh.," lib. I., c. 15.)

Devotus frater Johannes de Heusden jussus est ad altiora conscendere, et ad sacros ordines promoveri. . . . Factus presbyter *devotus* frater. . . . (Ibid., I. II., c. 12.)

Devotus pater Willelmus Wornecken circa Eucharistiæ venerabile sacramentum valde fuit timoratus. (Ibid., I. II., c. 49.)

Devotissimi fratris Gerlaci vitam describere aggredimur, cujus interna *devotio* externis indiciis sæpius resultare videbatur. . . . Addebat *devotus* Gerlacus Petri, ideo semper nova mentis renovatione ad hæc sacramenta debere *quemlibet Devotum* sese disponere, quod, &c. . . ("Chron. Wind.," lib. II., c. 55.)

THOMAS A KEMPIS.

Devotus pater Florentius, dum divina mysteria celebraret, Christus cor ejus et animam spiritualis lætitiæ vino potissimum replevit. ("Vita Florentii," c. 3.)

THE AUTHOR OF THE "IMITATION."

Quando recordor *Devotorum* aliquorum ad sacramentum tuum, Domine, cum maxima *devotione* et affectu accedentium, tunc sæpius in me ipso confundor et erubesco, quod non ita vehementer sum attractus et affectus, sicut multi *Devoti* fuerunt, qui præ nimio desiderio communionis et sensibili cordis amore, a fletu se non poterant continere. . . . Licet tanto desiderio tam *specialium Devotorum* tuorum non ardeo, tamen de gratia tua illius magni inflammati desiderii desiderium habeo. ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 14.)

Omnium *Devotorum* jubilationes, ardentis affectus, mentales excessus, et supernaturales illuminationes, ac cælicas visiones, tibi offero et exhibeo. ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 17.)

Offero tibi omnia pia desideria *Devotorum*. ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 9.)

Potest *quilibet Devotus*, omni die ad spirituales Christi communionem et sine prohibitionem accedere. . . . toties mystice communicat quoties Incarnationis Christi mysterium, Passionemque *devote* recolit, et in amore ejus accenditur. ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 10.)

Multi *Devoti* fuerunt, qui præ nimio desiderio communionis, . . . a fletu se non poterant continere. . . . ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 14.)

Quum igitur studii causa, in annis adolescentiæ Daventriam pervenissem, quæsi iter pergendi ad regulares in Windesem, ibique inventis fratribus Canonicis regularibus cum Germano meo, hortatu illius inductus sum adire summæ reverentiæ virum magistrum Florentium. Adjunctus tam *devoto* viro, et *devotis* ejus fratribus, quotidie *devotam* eorum conversationem attendi; numquam prius tales homines vidi tam *devotos*. ("Vita Joan. Gronde," c. 1.)

Non decet me inter *Devotos tuos* commemorari. ("De Imit.," lib. iii. c. 52.)

Utinam in te non dormiret perfectus virtutum, qui multa sæpe vidisti exempla *Devotorum*. ("De Imit.," lib. i. c. 18.)

Quando recordeor *Devotorum* . . . tunc in me erubesco. ("De Imit.," lib. iv., c. 14.)

Bearing in mind that Thomas à Kempis tells us himself, in his life of John Gronde, that he had been received amongst the Devout of Windesem, that he studied their devout life, which filled him with admiration, the cogency of these several passages becomes nearly irresistible; they constitute a body of cumulative evidence barely distinguishable from demonstration; and it would involve a violation of every principle of sound criticism to reject it.

IV.

But there are still more striking arguments drawn by the Bishop of Bruges from the terminology, the phraseology, the linguistic peculiarities of the "Imitation." He has proved its Flemish or German origin, on philological grounds that no after discussion has shaken; and though taken alone they cannot directly prove the authorship of à Kempis, they have an indirect confirmatory power far too important to be neglected, and go to the very quick of internal evidence.

To take the best known, a famous example in the first chapter of the first book of the "Imitation": "Si scires totam Bibliam *exterius* et omnium philosophorum dicta; quid totum prodesset sine charitate Dei et gratia?" Not one single translation has ever been able to give the literal, etymological force of *exterius* except the Flemish and German. The Flemish stands: "Al wist gy geheel de Schriftuer en alle de spreuken der wysgeren *van buiten*, waartoe zou dit alles u dienstig zyn, zonder de genade en de liefde Gods?"* Even if you should know the whole Bible *outwardly*—that is to say, by heart; for to know by heart in Flemish is rendered by to know *van buiten*, outwardly. But lest any one should take exception to this trans-

* Vier boeken van de navolging Christi, uit het latyn in't nederduitsch gesteld, door J. David, Brussel, 1844.

lation, as being a late one, and consequently open to suspicion, we will turn to the old Dutch edition of the "Imitation," printed at Antwerp, in 1505, by Henric Eckert van Homberch, of which there are two fine copies in the British Museum. The passage is here rendered: "Of stu connes di ganse bybele *van buyten* en alle die leer der heydenscher meesters," &c. There is no mistaking the literalness of the old rendering, as there is no gainsaying the idiomatic character of the modern and the peculiar connection of the Latin *exterius* with both. Next, taking up the German translation of Guido Görres, published in 1839, *exterius* reappears in *auswendig*, the idiomatic value of which is also unimpeachable. But what Frenchman or Italian would try to force an essentially Flemish idiom into his Latin composition to spoil the purity of his style? It is true that P. Mella holds that *to know outwardly* is an expression borrowed from the Lombard dialect, and used throughout Northern Italy, especially at Verona, where a school child, he asserts, will say "*saper da fuora*" when he can repeat his lesson without the aid of a book; but, as Canon Delvigne appositely remarks, a *patois* is not a real language. At any rate, Italian translators have not considered it such; and when the urchins of certain quarters of Brussels say, as they do say, "*M. le Curé, puis-je faire ma première Communion, quand je sais tout mon catechisme dehors?*" they may offer an interesting study to the philologist enamoured of curious survivals, but they do not speak French. No, we can yet say with Mgr. Malou, French and Italian translators have not understood the expression, "*Si scires totam Biblam exterius;*" the greater number, including P. Mella himself, have passed it over without attempting to give even an equivalent for it; and only in a Teutonic language can it be used in a strict etymologic sense. Literally translated, and used by a Fleming, it is clear, precise, and elegant: in French and Italian it is senseless.*

Again, to regard an event with indifference, is rendered in good Flemish by, to regard it with an equal countenance: the author of the "Imitation" says (lib. iii. cap. 25): "*Ita ut una aequali facie* in gratiarum actiones perman eas inter prospera et contraria:" literally in Flemish, "*Met een gelyk aengerzicht;*" or, to quote from the old Dutch version, "*Met eenē ghelijckē aensicht.*" The best foreign translators have failed to render the expression. M. de Lamennais translates: "*Regardant du même oeil.*" P. Cesari: "*Con uno stesso viso tu perseveri.*" Both are wide of the

* On this peculiar use of *exterius* Du Cange remarks: *Exterius Discere, pro Memoriter discere scripsit Buschius . . . germ. Auswendig lernen. Occurit passim in Lib de Imitat. Chr. Scire Exterius. Locutio Belgica, ut observat. D. Falconet, van Buyten leeren.*

accuracy of the quaint Flemish, which to the very letter gives the Latin text, which, in turn, manifestly derives its picturesque impressiveness from a Teutonic source. This same notion of indifference is expressed in polished Flemish by: "Ik val daer niet op," literally, "*I do not fall upon that*;" but meaning, "I don't care about it." The idiom occurs in the ninth chapter of the second book of the "Imitation": "Verus amator Christi et studiosus sectator virtutum *non cadit super consolationes*." The Flemish translator gives it *verbatim*: "De ware minnaer van Jesus valt op geene vertroostingén." M. de Lamennais and P. Cesari have both failed to give not merely the actual words, but the meaning of the passage. The one translates: "Celui qui a vraiment l'amour de Jésus-Christ *ne cède pas à l'attrait des consolations*;" the other, "L'amator vero di Cristo *non s'abbandona alle consolazioni*."

Finally, not to tire with illustrations that are far from being exhausted, the idea expressive of everything being dependent on one thing is conveyed in Flemish equally by the verbs *to lie* and *to stand*. The author of the "Imitation" (lib. ii., cap. 12) says: "Ecce in cruce *totum constat*, et in moriendo *totum jacet*." The Flemish gives the words as well as reflects the meaning: "*Alles bestaet* dan in het kruis, en in het sterven *ligt alles*." The French and Italian, on the other hand, give the words: "Ainsi tout *est* dans la croix et *consiste* à mourir; Ecco che nella croce *sta tutto*, a tutto nel morire *é riposto*." And even granting that *sta* is not here used in a forced sense, the antithesis of the *stare* and *jacere* which the Flemish preserves, has entirely disappeared.

We have chosen these examples from out of many others because they are so simple, so clear, so easy, that the merest tyro in French and Italian cannot fail to see how impossible it would be for any one thinking in either language, as in his mother tongue, and writing in Latin, to make use of expressions so foreign to them and so far removed from pure Latinity as almost to constitute a language apart.* And for those who are not masters of the niceties of the Flemish tongue, it would surely be no great tax on their faith to accept the word of a man of honour, a man distinguished in the Church and in Letters, that the most striking peculiarities of the phraseology of the "Imitation" are literal renderings of the classic idioms of his native tongue. But even this is not necessary; for whoever, ignorant

* "Le style de 'l'Imitation' n'est pas latin sans doute, mais il est plein de charme. C'est une langue à part qu'il faut prendre pour ce qu'elle est, très-peu classique, mais admirablement propre à rendre les nuances les plus fines de la vie intérieure et du sentiment." *Études d'Histoire Religieuse*. Par Ernest Renan. Paris, 1858.

of the language though he be, will take the trouble to refer to a good Flemish dictionary, he will be able at once to verify for himself the accuracy of Mgr. Malou's statements, to appreciate in a great measure the value of the examples cited, and to realize with facility that "they are not vague, insignificant words—words common to many languages, trivial terms, vulgar phrases—but idioms properly so called, expressions so essentially Flemish that they are foreign to every other tongue, and really untranslatable." If, as Mgr. Malou remarks, they were common also to the French and Italian languages, the accomplished men who have translated the "Imitation" would have seized the sense of such expressions perfectly, and have easily rendered it by analogous terms. We have said sufficient to show that they have failed to do so from the earliest down to the latest, and that the Flemish translator alone has been able to render faithfully and substantially the phrases that in the book of the "Imitation" diverge the most sensibly from the genius of the Latin tongue. It is a fact that compels our assent, lacking even other proofs. The author of the "Imitation" was neither a Frenchman nor an Italian; he belonged to the country that gave birth to the Congregation of Modern Devotion; and he thought in a language foreign to Gersen and Gerson alike. Intrinsic evidence is a stubborn thing; it cannot be tampered with; it cannot be repressed.

V.

In his interesting preface to the facsimile of the autograph manuscript that heads our present Article, M. Ruelens draws attention to a very important feature of the Codex, which, if it has not escaped their notice, has at least been disregarded by skilled paleographers, such as Mabillon, Silvestre de Sacy, and Arndt, who nevertheless have reproduced it in the paleographic illustrations of their different works. We allude to the peculiar system of punctuation discovered by Dr. Hirsche.

The history of punctuation in the Middle Ages has been hitherto very little investigated. We are, Dr. Hirsche says, standing at the very beginning of the investigation. And, indeed, the punctuation of manuscripts is one of the most thorny questions in paleography. It is impossible to reduce it to any definite system. The signs for the division of sentences were limited in number, but scribes seem to have used them pretty much according to their fancy. Each copyist, or rather each school of copyists, appears to have had its own rules. The Brothers of Common Life and the Canons of St. Augustin, who, as we have seen, received into their Order most of the early disciples of Gerard Groote, used greater method in their tran-

scriptions than almost any other body of copyists. They were emphatically "fratres de pennà"—that is, copyists of books of education and of piety. Both these kinds of works required particular care, especially the latter, which were destined for religious houses of ascetic or contemplative orders, and were read publicly to the community in the refectory or at chapter. To win the attention and fix his lessons in the memory of his hearers, it was the first aim of the trained Lector* to read with art and unction; and it was in order to help him to the attainment of this end that authors strove to give their writings an attractive form, a mnemonic form, so to say. They made them melodious, rhythmical, and introduced into them characteristic assonances that haunted the memory like the aria of an oratorio; "de là ces propositions où la rime flatte l'oreille et le rythme berce la pensée." And these phrases, these harmonious periods, were indicated to the reader of the Community by careful pointing, so that no pains were spared to ensure the perfection of a most impressive style, which, in short, became a sort of spoken music. This mode of reading to assemblies of men prevailed generally in the Low Countries, and belongs to the genius of the Flemish people. Their early writers in prose and verse used and abused assonances and rhymes without limit. The *Refereinen* of their rhetoricians from the fifteenth century are literally crammed with them; and they are all methodically divided, measured by a particular sign, a double bar, for the guidance of the reader. And at the present day in the various halls of rhetoric that still exist in the Flemish provinces of Belgium, poetry is read with an emphasis *sui generis*, the echo of old traditions.

Now, when Dr. Karl Hirsche was studying Thomas à Kempis's 1441 autograph manuscript of the "Imitation" for his critical edition, he discovered in it paleographical peculiarities comprehending a perfect system of punctuation such as he had never met with before. Continuing his search, he found the same system used in the other undoubted works of à Kempis, giving them an altogether unique, individual character; for though a more extended search showed that the system was used in the Middle Ages, this was very rarely the case, and even then almost exclusively by the Brothers of Common Life, amongst whose works and copies of works

* The office of Reader (Lector) was an important one: monks were carefully trained to fill it; and they were distinguished according to the greater or less skill they displayed in their calling, which is often alluded to in the obituaries of monastic institutions. "Fuit bonus lector," or "fuit bonus cantor," frequently constitutes the simple biography of a departed brother.

it is far from common, whereas in all the manuscript copies of the indisputably genuine works of Thomas à Kempis, written by his own hand, it is the sole system that, with a perfection not found elsewhere, prevails. Nevertheless, we are far from asserting Thomas à Kempis to have been the inventor of the system.* Dr. Hirsche has found it in a manuscript of the Vulgate, of the undoubted date 1315, and in a Carthusian breviary printed in Paris in 1643; and one of its peculiar marks, the clivis, is likewise to be found in Benedictine and Cistercian breviaries, printed respectively in 1518 and 1617.† But this in no degree militates against the fact that Thomas à Kempis, scrupulously following the precept of his master,‡ carried the system to perfection; and that in his works generally, and in the "Imitation" specially, he used it with a point, a force, a minuteness not hitherto met with elsewhere. And hence it merits the most careful attention, not only from its interest in connection with the authorship of the "Imitation," but also on account of its bearing on the history of punctuation in the Middle Ages.

The punctuation of Thomas à Kempis is above all rhetorical, as distinguished from grammatical; and used in conjunction with periods of the most perfect rhythm, and sentences balanced and rounded with assonances and rhymes of varying delicacy and strength, was calculated, whilst indicating to the readers of his day the pauses necessary to be observed, to lead them almost involuntarily to recite a "sentence in accordance with intention of the author, and to give it that effect, that cadence, that charm which speech requires to make it penetrate into the hearer's soul"—"dulcis, durabilis, clara, pura, secans aëra et auribus sedens."

In discovering this, Dr. Hirsche has furnished us with a key to the rare literary charm of the "Imitation," and a fresh means of interpreting the deep significance of the book that

* "Proegomena zu einer neuen Ausgabe der Imitatio Christi nach dem Autograph des Thomas von Kempen." Von Karl Hirsche. Berlin, 1873.

† Silvestre, in his "Paléographie Universelle," gives a facsimile page of Clement VII.'s Bible, where the clivis occurs once. Mr. Maunde Thompson has kindly had many of the MSS. in the British Museum, belonging to the XIV. century, and to the time of Thomas à Kempis, searched for traces of this punctuation, and at last he has found the clivis in a fine Italian MS. of the Vulgate of about the same date as that of Clement VII.

‡ "Quidquid est pro communi bono, sollicito custodire debemus sicut sacra vasa altaris. Libri sacræ scripturæ custodiendi sunt tanquam verissimus thesaurus Ecclesiæ. In scriptura non solum quærere debemus nos, scilicet ut bene scribamus, sed etiam utilitatem communis boni, ut libri sint correcti et bene *compunctuati* et distincti." (Epistola D. Florentii ad quondam regularem in Windesheim. Th. à K. Opera, ed. H. Sommalus. S. J. Colon, 1759.)

from youth to old age seemed ever new to the great Bellarmine. De Script. Eccl.*

Modern punctuation is occupied pre-eminently with the logical sequence, the bare literal sense of sentences, and the limits of propositions contained in them: the punctuation of Thomas à Kempis so far surpasses it, that it reveals the very spirit of the writer, and discloses the feelings that swayed him, as he wrote the terse, penetrating, piercing sentences that for nigh five hundred years have been the cherished maxims of saints and sinners; thrilling the hearts of men and women wearied with the stress of life, and fascinating the cultivated intellect of sceptics and unbelievers; at one time drawing out with new force the clear note of courage, the "sta firmiter," "esto robustus," "cessa conqueri," that, like the "viriliter age" of the Royal Psalmist, is never altogether absent from even the tenderest passages; now marking the striking antitheses that bring straight home to the mind of each one the anomalies of human nature and human life; or falling in with rhythmical movements of hope or despondency, grief and supplication, that baffle description, and are sought for elsewhere in vain.

All the editions of the "Imitation" now in general use consist for the most part of four books, divided into chapters, which chapters are again divided into paragraphs; and, in many instances, but not invariably, the paragraphs are sub-divided into versicles. The paragraphs were first introduced into the text in 1599, by Henry Sommalius, the Jesuit, and his paragraphs, almost unchanged, have passed into all the editions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries: in the seventeenth century several editors began to add versicles to the paragraphs of Sommalius. Both paragraphs and versicles are extremely defective, and tend to obscure rather than to elucidate the text, by separating kindred passages that naturally cohere, and approximating others that sensibly diverge. Nor is the punctuation to which we are accustomed, and which is likewise, for the most part, due to Sommalius, any more satisfactory. The remedy for all these defects, however, lies in the Antwerp codex. In the first place, Thomas à Kempis there supplies us with a double indication of the main division of chapters he intended to be observed: frequently the heading of the chapter shows it. The first chapter of the first book, for instance, consists of two chief parts that are simply an amplification of the twofold title—"De imitatione

* "Opusculum sane utilissimum est, ac jure in tota Ecclesia summo omnium consensu receptum, et frequentatum, et in omnes pene linguas conversum. Ego certe ab adolescentia, et usque in senectam hoc opusculum sapissime volvi, et revolve, et semper mihi novum apparuit, et nunc etiam mirifice cordi meo sapit."

Christi et contemptu omnium vanitatum mundi." Again, the ninth chapter of the first book, like the title, "De pace acqui-
renda et zelo proficiendi," is also divided into two parts. The other indication is the letter C, and occasionally the corruption of the Greek Π, which, placed at intervals in the context, clearly marks the line of argument and the chief points of a chapter.

But it is the punctuation, strictly so called, of Thomas à Kempis with which we are mainly concerned here. This, as we remarked just now, is essentially rhetorical, as distinguished from grammatical, and it indicated *pauses of greater or shorter duration to be observed in reading, and nothing else*. Such, at least, is the conclusion of Dr. Hirsche, after prolonged study of the question, extending over many years. Thomas à Kempis never makes use of the note of exclamation in the "Imitation:" he uses a note of interrogation common to the Middle Ages (∴) and four distinct stops. 1st, The punctum or full stop (.), followed by a small letter to indicate a brief pause; 2ndly, the colon (:), to indicate a pause of longer duration; 3rdly, the *clivis* or *flexa* (ʒ), resembling in form the old sign of that name belonging to the neumes of early musical notation, denoting a pause of still longer duration; 4thly, the full stop (.), followed by a capital letter, denoting the longest pause of all. This peculiar use of the *clivis* in conjunction with the note of interrogation, so exactly like in appearance the "podatus"—its companion in the musical notation of ancient times—as to seem identical with the twelfth century examples of it given by Coussemaker in his scholarly work on the harmony of the Middle Ages,* is very suggestive. And coupled with the fact that the four books of the "Imitation" are called *Musica Ecclesiastica*† in several of the early manuscripts, espe-

* Planches, xx., xxi., Histoire de l'Harmonie au moyen age. Paris, 1852.

† The beautifully written fifteenth century manuscript containing the first three books of the "Imitation" in the Lambeth Palace Library (No. 536) has the following title:—Hic est libellus qui vocatur musica ecclesiastica omnibus in virtute perficere cupientibus valde necessaria et dividitur in tres partes. The colophon is: Explicit liber interne consolacionis id est tercia pars libri musice ecclesiastice. In the British Museum (Royal Collection, No. 7, B. viii.) there is a French MS. belonging to the first half of the fifteenth century still more interesting than the Lambeth MS. The whole of the first page is filled with an illumination representing a Pope playing on an organ, the bellows of which are blown by a Cardinal. Behind the Pope stand an Archbishop and a Bishop, the former holding an archiepiscopal cross, the latter a pastoral staff and a book (from which both are singing). The codex has no general title, but the first of the three books commences: Incipit liber interne consolacionis qui vocatur musica ecclesiastica. Et dividitur in tres partes principales. The colophon repeats the title: Explicit tercia et ultima pars libri interne consolacionis: qui vocatur musica ecclesiastica.

cially those belonging to England, it almost inevitably gives rise to the presumption that the resemblance of the rhetorical to the musical signs is something more than accidental, that there is an analogy *intus* as well as *extra* between them, and that, serving a more extended purpose than the simple marking of a pause, the clivis of Thomas à Kempis retained its musical significance, and necessitated a fall of the voice, as the note of interrogation, the "podatus," unquestionably indicated a rise. We drew Dr. Hirsche's attention to the matter; he carefully tested the hypothesis; but his previous conviction that all the stops indicated solely different gradations of rest remained unchanged, and he proved with great clearness that the same inflexion and emphasis and accentuation of voice are not by any means invariably associated with the same signs. So that, though the interpunctuation of à Kempis assisted greatly to indicate the inflexion of voice to be observed in recitation, it did so indirectly—*i.e.*, by primarily marking pauses, the due observance of which elicited the thought of the author, the real guide on this point of the reader, who was, moreover, greatly assisted by the rhythmical flow of the words which would insensibly carry him on a long way to a correct interpretation, independently of any capital, or clivis, or colon, or stop warning him, by the degree of impressiveness attached to it, of the spirit of the text. Only a few illustrations are necessary to make this evident. We shall follow Dr. Hirsche's arrangement of the text, because it shows at a glance the metrical character* of the "Imitation," as well as the distinctive value of the stops:—

- Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas :
- 25 præter amare Deum et illi soli servire.
 Ista est summa sapientia :
 per contemptum mundi tendere ad regna coelestia.
 Vanitas igitur est divitias perituras quærere :
 et in illis sperare.
- 30 Vanitas quoque est honores ambire :
 et in altum statum se extollere.

* The metrical character of Thomas à Kempis's undisputed works is so generally acknowledged, that M. Tamizey de Larroque urges the absence of it from the "Imitation" as a proof that Thomas was not the author of it. "Une des grandes préoccupations dont on ne trouve pas la moindre trace dans 'l'Imitation,' et la réunion, à la fin de ses phrases, des mots sont l'assonance (italique de M. Tamizey) puisse flatter l'oreille. Nul écrivain n'a été possédé à un aussi haut degré de la manie de faire de la prose rimée. En agitant même les questions les plus graves, le sous-prieur du Sainte Agnès cherche encore à obtenir un agréable effet musical. (Récentes Recherches) Surely it was high time for Adrien de But to tell us about the "volumen metricæ super illud: *qui sequitur me.*"

Vanitas est carnis desideria sequi :
et illud desiderare unde postmodum graviter oportet puniri.
Lib. i. cap. 1.

Here we have two kinds of stop. The full stop, since it is followed by a capital letter, denotes the longest pause; the colon a rest of shorter duration. Neither indicates directly the modulation of voice to be observed. It is the sense of the words that mainly shows there must not be a fall of the voice at the colon, for, though an impressive pause is claimed, the sentence is not finished; and it is the sense of the words that shows a fall of the voice as well as a longer rest, where the longest pause occurs.

Et dixi.
Beatus quem tu erudieris Domine :
et de lege tua docueris eum.—Lib. iii. cap. 3.

In these lines we have two pauses of longest duration, the one after *dixi*, the other after *eum*. But in reciting *dixi* the voice must be sustained; at *eum* it should fall, as is manifest by the sense. Yet what better calculated to recall a wandering attention, and fix it on the words of the Royal Psalmist, than the long pause after the sharp *dixi*?

Again :—

Age age nunc carissime quid quid agere potes ♪
Quia nescis quando morieris :
nescis etiam quid tibi post mortem sequetur.—Lib. i. cap. 23.

Here we have three signs indicating three different degrees of rest. The reason of the clivis after *potes* is obvious: the first verse bears to the two following verses a relation quite different from that which these bear to one another: it is further removed from them in sense than they are removed from each other, and consequently they are separated by the briefer, though impressive, colon. But the passage that immediately precedes and leads up to these verses is so striking in the examples it offers of the beauty of this rhetorical punctuation that I have no hesitation in citing it at length, taking care, whilst closely adhering to the pointing of à Kempis, still to follow the disposition of Dr. Hirsche :—

Ah stulte quid cogitas te diu victurum ♪
quum nullum diem habeas securum ♪
90 Quam multi decepti sunt :
et insperate de corpore extracti.
Quoties audisti a dicentibus.
quia ille gladio cecidit ♪
ille submersus est :
95 ille ab alto ruens cervicem fregit :

ille manducando obrigit.

ille ludendo finem fecit :

alius igne.

alius ferro.

100 alius peste.

alius latrocinio interiit ˆ

et sic omnium finis mors est :

et vita hominum tamquam umbra subito pertransit.

Quis memorabitur tui post mortem ˆ

105 et quis orabit pro te?

Age age nunc carissime quid quid agere potes ˆ

Quia nescis quando morieris :

nescis etiam quid tibi post mortem sequetur.

It would be impossible to discriminate with greater nicety between the various forms of sudden death, and at the same time to mark their inter-resemblance. Violent death at the hand of the assassin is further removed from the two sorts of accidental death that follow than these are removed from one another ; again, how much closer still is the connection between those that succeed ; then, how marvellously the momentum of the passage is increased by the rapid enumeration of the several kinds of death that sweep away multitudes at once—fire, war, pestilence, accompanied, as they ever are, by the outrages of the plunderer—after which it sensibly diminishes in preparation for the pathetic simile of the 103rd line ; but only to be accelerated again in the vigorous, impetuous “age age nunc carissime quid quid agere potes ˆ,” where the absence of the commas of modern punctuation, which would only impede the speed of the movement, marks the swiftness with which the reader is to pass from word to word, and images with wonderful vividness the vehemence that stirred the writer as he gave utterance to the deep thoughts within him.

The next is a beautiful instance of graceful rhyme, as well as rhetorical punctuation :—

Nihil dulcius est amore ˆ

nihil fortius.

nihil altius nihil latius :

40 nihil jucundius nihil plenius nec melius in cœlo et in terra ˆ

quia amor ex Deo natus est :

nec potest nisi in Deo super omnia creatura quiescere.

Amans volat currit et lætatur ˆ

liber est et non tenetur.

45 Dat omnia pro omnibus :

et habet omnia in omnibus ˆ

quia in uno summo super omnia quiescit :

ex quo omne bonum fluit et procedit.

Non respicit ad dona :

50 sed ad donantem se convertit super omnia bona.

Lib. iii. cap. 5.

But a still more admirable instance of the power of representing the various changes in the swiftness of the writer's thoughts, the flow of affections, of feeling, occurs in the fourth chapter of the fourth book, where, moreover, the punctuation is made to give effect to one of those passages of psychological observation with which the "Imitation" abounds:—

Ego quidem laboro in sudore vultis mei.
dolore cordis torqueor :
peccatis oneror.
tentationibus inquietor 4
multis malis passionibus implicor et premor :
et non est qui adjuvet.
non est qui liberet et salvum faciat.
nisi tu Domine Deus Salvator meus 4
cui committo me et omnia mea :
ut me custodias et perducas in vitam æternam.

And here we must end. In a little while the long-promised memorials of the Congregation of Windesem will disclose all that history and tradition can tell us about the Monk of St. Agnes; and then we in England shall be able to realize more fully how Thomas à Kempis, the disciple of Gerard Groote and the most winning exponent of the great master's teaching, stands revealed to his countrymen in the "Imitation of Christ."

ART. VI.—THE LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS.

The Letters of Charles Dickens. Edited by his SISTER-IN-LAW and ELDEST DAUGHTER. London : Chapman and Hall. 1880.

AMONG the tens of thousands who have read, known, and formed an intelligent judgment upon the novels of Charles Dickens, there are many different attitudes of mind with regard to the novelist himself. There are those who look back upon him with an admiration amounting to personal regard; they feel with answering sympathy what was expressed by Jeffrey, "the Critic-Laureate"—that in the magic of his success his heart was his talisman. There are others who think of him as a social reformer; leaving out of account his precise theories, they take Carlyle's superlative praise of him, and endorse its blunt force and its capitals—"He was an Honest Man."

Others, again—and they are the most numerous class—have appreciated his buoyant, hearty humour above everything else; they own a kindly liking for the man who left this hard-worked world so rich a legacy of laughter. And there are multitudes who, yielding warm praise to his inimitable work, find their enthusiasm tempered by a sense of the defects and mistakes into which he was led by his very popularity. They have their points of difference from him, but they have far more points of contact with his mind and heart; they relish his wit and enjoy his company through the medium of those imaginary beings with which he peopled the well-known world; they have a tender memory for the one great reality—the human life of him who first suffered and then sought far to win the experience bound up in all those unreal lives; who gathered and invented them, laboriously wrought them out, enjoyed and realised them as they were never enjoyed and realised even by his most fiction-blinded reader. There are others who criticise for criticism's sake, and make a point of being at variance with the vulgar vote; they are of a different order from the critics who refuse to count his work the best of its kind; they go farther, and declare it to be entirely a delusion, and his success nothing better than a literary sleight-of-hand trick, which placed the man himself in a false position with regard to the crowd that worshipped him. In answer to all such sweeping condemnation we can only say, that to have spoken to the crowd, to have given to the masses a fund of genial thought and innocent mirth, is a grander thing than to have pleased the hypercritical few; and if they fail to see this, they have no connection with him whatever, either in praise or dispraise, for he never wrote for those who could sympathise so little with human nature. Lastly, there is another class of readers, whom it is still more difficult to understand. They are those who have followed his stories through hours and days of interest and delight, and yet have no interest whatever in hearing of the writer himself, no sudden attraction of curiosity or sense of gratification when by some chance they come across things that concerned him, or that belonged to him, or that throw a light upon his life and pursuits. In a word, of all the attitudes of intelligent readers towards the most popular of all books of fiction and towards their writer, the one position that we are entirely at a loss to understand is that of the appreciators of the work who are utterly indifferent to its author. When his friend was writing his biography, an American told him that among the snows on the summit of the Sierra Nevada travellers had found a lonely dweller in a hut—a half-wild man, clad in wolf-skin and sacking; he seldom saw a human face, but he beguiled

his time with "Pickwick" and "Nickleby," which he kept in a barrel; and "he did not know, or seem to care, about the author." The persistently indifferent readers remind us of the denizen of the hut. They, too, have the spirit of self-isolation, and they want the common instinct that sends human minds in quest of the kindred origin of any wonderful human work.

But the truth is, that there was never a writer privileged with so wide a personal popularity. One reason may be, because its character was identical with his own, and he reflected his own self in his imaginations. His personality, once revealed, is the counterpart of the reader's conception of him from impersonal knowledge. There is hardly in the history of literature such another case of likeness between an author and his work; unless it be the case of one of that brilliant cluster of poets with whom the century opened, and there the likeness was England's loss and his; while, on the contrary, the similarity between the novelist in, and out of, his works, is a pleasure to his readers and an honour to himself. The second reason why his memory is linked with his fancies, is simply because it is a memory well known, and now wonderfully perpetuated in one of the most graphic biographies ever written. If Dickens had not been one of the most remarkable men of his time, his life would still have been worth placing on record; for it was as great a romance, and as full of silent suggestion, as anything he ever wrote. There are deeper things untold than told in that biography, written partly by his friend of thirty-three years, partly by his own unconscious hand; and the whole discloses a life as a life can seldom be disclosed. Every human history is wonderful; but private lives are for the most part sealed wonders. Here there is a seal broken, for his fame, for our gratification. And if, as was said by one* who knew humanity in its sole true aspect, "there is no poem in the world like a man's life," we may well be drawn with the highest motives to the study of a personal history at once so fully revealed, so strange in itself, and having for its subject a human unit so attractive to the rest. "A man's real life," it was well written, "is at once a bolder and a simpler thing than the creation of the poet. It is like a grand, heavenly recitative, which Providence itself pronounces as the years go on; from one point of view inventive as the improvisatore, from another, merely interpreting the waywardness of a man's own will." There is before us an addition to the revelation of a life already most singular in its fulness. Let the spirit of this high view haunt us; not that we would miss for a moment the contagion

* F. Faber.—"There is but one view of things which is true, and that is God's view of them."

of our humorist's pleasantry, or take an overshadowed survey of what was pre-eminently bright and genial; but we would bear in mind that there is a still unchanging background across which the central figure moves; it is the background of immutable truth, against which the whole world shows its shape.

We have said that the most popular of English novelists had in his own story as great a romance as anything he ever wrote. The "queer small boy" on the Kentish Road, wondering to hear his father say he might yet live at Gad's Hill if he worked hard—what does this remind us of, but that strangest episode of boyhood, the child of fallen fortunes lying by the Daylesford stream, thrilled with his first dream of ambition? But with the boy, Charles Dickens, there was not the ambition of power or wealth, but the hope of being "a learned and distinguished man;" and he himself has told us what misery the fading of that hope cost him in the hardest period of his early days. In that touching page of his life, we watch the "queer small boy," delicately sensitive, and helpless in his self-dependence, deep in daily drudgery at the warehouse window in Chandos Street, or with empty pockets taking a turn in Covent Garden Market, and staring at the pineapples, or going homeward in the twilight through the double current of wayfarers on Blackfriars Bridge. Who has not wondered at the connection between that story and the sequel—the boy passing from a common-place school to a lawyer's office, thence by his own exertion to the first place in the reporters' gallery at Westminster, and from that by one bold step to the first place in popular literature? We see him visiting America, to make through the States a progress likened to that of La Fayette; returning home to reap new success, sometimes mixed with partial failure, sometimes amazing in its completeness even to himself; next visiting France, Italy, Switzerland, to gratify every wish prompted by restless genius or by natural refinement; then setting forth on a new path, with the dramatic readings, and, urged by their success at home, crossing the Atlantic once more to live in an atmosphere of fame and flattery, such as few men's better nature could survive; lastly coming back in the height of his triumph only to sink suddenly amid such universal regret as never followed the death of any writer. This was in outline the romance of reality, that ended under the grey stone in the Abbey. It is easy to trace in such a career the source of his characteristic sympathy with every form of labour, suffering, and need; his determination to see and show the best side even of the roughness and oddities of the less fortune-favoured classes; his interest in the simplest and most homely concerns of every-day life. We can trace, too, the self-reliant,

ever-confident energy which was necessary to his success, but which, in achieving that success so completely, was but too apt to degenerate into a rash self-confidence and a fierce strength of resolution. And in his possession of unfailing animal spirits and overflowing humour, we recognise the gifts that helped him through his early trials, and still more we perceive there a condition of mind which is not unfrequent when a strong and ardent nature has felt life's burdens heavily and very soon, and in their lightening has risen up by the elasticity of youth to enjoy with a sense of childlike freshness the beginning of life's happier chances. That remarkable character, and the career that half formed it, and half was formed by it, are nowhere so wonderfully illustrated as in his own letters. His biographer gave his view of him, and it guided the world's opinion; but his own view of his own life is of greater interest than either that of Mr. Forster or of the critical world at large. That view may be found, written as the years went by, in the letters now published to form a supplement to the well-known biography.

Some objectors will declare that the canons of good letter writing, according to the Macaulay, Gray, and Cowper style, are not observed here; that the letters do not deal largely in description, or discourse often on subjects of general and abiding interest; that few other eminent lives are illustrated by them; that they are filled with bygone trivialities, and savour of egotism. There is ground for some of these objections, but it is narrow ground. The days are gone when there was an art that ought to have been called by the heavy name of epistolary composition. Sir Rowland Hill did a good deal to give it the *coup de grace*; and there is no shadow of the dead art here, though some of the letters were written before modern facilities for letter writing created the newer and better art of written speech. Nor would anyone come to the letters of Charles Dickens for Sevigné or Walpole compositions; nor, turning to a nearer time, ought anyone seek here depth such as that of Macaulay or Wilberforce, or thoughtfulness like that of the novelist's own friend, Jeffrey. His letters are simply like himself, and it is known beforehand that he was essentially different from all these types of mind. All we want him to illustrate is, not the men and things and social state of his time, which is our own time still, but his own self, since he is here no longer. And nothing illustrates a life so well as its smallest incidents; just as it is from lines, and shades, and distinctions inappreciably little, that every face takes its individuality. Such letters as these are a character-sketch and life-sketch of himself, drawn by the man's own hand; and their interest is

of far greater degree, but the same in kind, as that attaching to a portrait. Viewed in this light there is no egotism in the letters except that which is legitimate in all letter-writing, and, perhaps, in that alone. And since it is true that when Dickens conversed with most life, and heart, and brilliance, there was but little for listeners to bring away, no fault need ever again be found with his biographer for not letting readers have a chance of hearing him talk as Johnson talked through Boswell.

The letters are arranged in order of time, with a brief and excellently terse explanation, entitled "Narrative," before each period. Instead of glancing at them in their order in the two volumes, it may be of interest to look at their fourfold revelation of the writer:—in his home circle and in his personal experiences; as an author; as a public reader; and in the mission he assumed as a social reformer.

In telling little incidents or speaking of matters concerning only the near relatives addressed, there is in the letters a hearty colloquial style, and they catch from it some of his own wonderful vivacity. His very modes of address reflect his own leaning towards all things playful or ludicrous. The artist, Mr. Cattermole, one of his first illustrators, at times becomes "Kittenmoles." Stanfield, the sea-painter—a friend unsurpassed in his esteem—is generally known as "Stanny," and is once saluted in a nautical letter with "Yoho! old Salt;" while the veteran actor Macready, whom Dickens had first seen as a boy, is addressed by the Dickens of after years both as "my dear old Parr," and solemnly as "Young Man!" As for the names bestowed on his home-circle, even those familiar with child-names in his novels will not be prepared to find his own children dubbed the Chickenstalker and the Plornishghenter, the latter name, indeed, adhering to its victim until the letter (given by Mr. Forster also) of solemn and kindly advice on parting with his son bound for Australia, began as we find it here, "My dearest Plorn." Anyone who has looked into the published letters of Jeffrey, to the undercurrent beneath their thoughtful seriousness, will be reminded by the Dickens letters of some of his charming glimpses of the home at Craigcrook, and his grandchild, Tarley, studying the pictures with business-like patience, as a lawyer would a code. Perhaps the best thing that shows in this present correspondence is the writer's warm trustful constancy to his friends. The very opposite comes to our mind from the Moore correspondence, in such an instance as his writing to Lady Donegal, that in the long time ere he can see her, he dreads she will care less and less for him every day. With Dickens, his friends of Lausanne were never forgotten; and through years we trace his letters to them,

exulting in friendship with the Watsons of Rockingham, or expressing a yearning to return for another look at the old scenes with those who remained in Switzerland. The amateur theatricals at the house of the Hon. Mr. and Mrs. Watson are the subject of many letters, and some of the most amusing pages in the book are taken up with matters theatrical, whether with the doings of his dramatic club, or with his descriptions of the French-Englishmen who figured in Parisian dramas, or, better still, with his allusions to the Tavistock House plays begun for the Christmas amusement of his children. In the midst of preparations for one of those last-named entertainments he gives an odd glimpse of himself at his literary work; when the house was full of carpenters, painters, gas-fitters, and costume-makers, while Stanfield had been incessantly on top of scaffoldings for the last two months, "and your friend has been writing *Little Dorrit*, &c., &c., in corners, like the Sultan's groom who was turned upside down by the genii." There is something pleasant made out of his very troubles, when Tavistock House first became his, and like all new abodes seemed to be destined never to let the workmen out and its master in. One of his arrangements there was the supplying of book-backs for the empty spaces in the library, and the list of names alone would have shown whose house it was, for he furnished such titles as "*Captain Cook's Life of Savage*," 3 vols.; "*History of the Middling Ages*," 6 vols.; "*Captain Parry's Virtues of Cold Tar*;" "*Kant's Ancient Humbugs*," 10 vols.; "*The Quarrelly Review*," 4 vols.; "*On the Use of Mercury by the Ancient Poets*;" "*Commonplace Book of the Oldest Inhabitant*;" "*King Henry the Eighth's Evidences of Christianity*," 5 vols.; "*Hansard's Guide to Refreshing Sleep*—as many volumes as possible." Domestic arrangements at his last residence, Gad's Hill Place, will be found equally abundant for the gratification of those readers whose personal feeling may magnify them to importance; but there are few who will not feel some little interest in the sad event close before him, when in the last autumn of his life he wrote inviting his then aged friend Macready, and playing triumphantly with his pride in the last and greatest improvement that he only lived to complete—"You are not expected to admire, but there *is* a conservatory building—be still, my soul!" In many of the letters, which from an ordinary writer would contain nothing but a few commonplace words, there is a quaint turn that shows how good it is not to be content with brief formalities. Thus, inviting Layard, of Nineveh fame, to dine with them at his choice, he is asked casually to come and begin to dig them out some day; and when he has forgotten to thank Professor Owen for

his treatise on "the Gorilla," he writes a characteristic apology—"This is to bear witness to my blushes and repentance. If you knew how much interest it has awakened in me, and how often it has set me a-thinking, you would consider me a more thankless beast than any gorilla that ever lived. But happily you do *not* know, and I am not going to tell you." Still better is his answer in a case where the ordinary form of reply would have been only a friendly note of regret. To a lady who had made the request, explained by the letter, he says :—

After the profoundest cogitation, I come reluctantly to the conclusion, that I do not know that orphan. If you were the lady in want of him, I should certainly offer *myself*. But as you are not, I will not hear of the situation. It is wonderful to think how many charming little people there must be to whom this proposal would be like a revelation from Heaven. Why don't I know one, and come to Kensington, boy in hand, as if I had walked [I wish to God I had] out of a fairy tale! But no, I do *not* know that orphan. He is crying somewhere by himself at this moment. I can't dry his eyes. He is being neglected by some ogress of a nurse. I can't rescue him.

Most people who look through these volumes will seek for some page unmistakably from Charles Dickens, at his best. We commend to them a certain schoolboy picnic on the river, the description of which is the next best thing to having been present; or can there be a doubt that it was the novelist of gay exaggeration who thus sketched September wanderings in London?—

The other day I was in town. In case you should not have heard of the condition of that deserted village, I think it worth mentioning. All the streets of any note were unpaved, mountains high, and all the omnibuses were sliding down alleys and looking into the upper windows of small houses. At eleven o'clock one morning I was positively alone in Bond Street. I went to one of my tailors, and he was at Brighton. A smutty-faced woman, among some gorgeous regimentals half-finished, had not the least idea when he would be back. I went to another of my tailors, and he was in an upper room, with open windows and surrounded by mignonette boxes, playing the piano in the bosom of his family. I went to my hosier's, and two of the least presentable of the "young men" of that elegant establishment were playing at draughts in the back shop. [Likewise I beheld a porter-pot hastily concealed under a Turkish dressing-gown of a golden pattern.] I then went wandering about to look for some ingenious portmanteau, and near the corner of St. James' Street, saw a solitary being sitting in a trunk shop, absorbed in a book, which, on close inspection, I found to be "*Bleak House*." I thought this looked well, and went in. And he really was more interested in seeing me, when he knew who I was, than any face I had seen in any house, every house I knew being occupied by painters, including my own. I went to the Athenæum that same night,

to get my dinner, and it was shut up for repairs. I went home late, and had forgotten the key, and was locked out.

To the same correspondent he wrote in more thoughtful vein, a few words better worth keeping, on hearing of the mental decay of a mutual friend whom both had known years before in Switzerland. The friend is the same Haldimand whose argumentative turns had formed the subject of many a jest and pleasant memory in other letters.

Poor dear Haldimand, I have thought of him so often. That kind of decay is so inexpressibly affecting and piteous to me, that I have no words to express my compassion and sorrow. When I was at Abbotsford, I saw in a vile glass case the last clothes Scott wore. Among them an old white hat, which seemed to be tumbled, and bent, and broken, by the uneasy purposeless wandering hither and thither of his heavy head. It so embodied Lockhart's pathetic description of him, when he tried to write and laid down his pen and cried, that it associated itself in my mind with broken powers and mental weakness from that hour. I fancy Haldimand in such another, going listlessly about that beautiful place; and remembering the happy hours we have passed with him, and his goodness and truth, I think what a dream we live in, until it seems for the moment the saddest dream that ever was dreamed. Pray tell me if you hear more of him. We really loved him.

Among the many revelations of character in the familiar letters, there is one too rare in these days and too pleasing to be passed over. It is his care for his servants. In the hurry and work of his readings in Ireland he found time and had thought for the message, "Tell the servants that I remember them, and hope they will live with us many years." And during his American readings—when there was enthusiasm and flattery enough to have deprived another man not alone of his common sense, but, still sooner, of his unselfishness—the beginning of one of his letters was filled with instructions for the assistance of a former servant, who had long ago left his service, and whose troubles seemed for the moment to have overclouded his own enjoyment of fortune. Other *traits* of character are not revealed unconsciously, but told; for the most part they are those known already by inference. Thus he writes to one of his sons, "I should never have made my success in life if I had been shy of taking pains;" and in all the letters there is nothing more remarkable than the heart-whole energy which he brought to bear upon any work that was to be done, whether it was the getting-up of a Twelfth-Night Play for his children or the writing of a book, the welcome for a friend or the entertainment of thousands. He was right also in noting his power of "accumulating young feelings in short

pauses." And when he felt that he would never rest much while his faculties lasted, he was making a prediction which could not be more true of any man; he accomplished thereby a vast amount of work, but it had a lamentable sequel one June day at Gad's Hill.

As an author, his whole career is illustrated by the letters. At first there are welcome lights thrown upon his early books. He describes scenes minutely for the artists, first from *Nell and Barnaby Rudge*, and afterwards from many another book of his, each scene having evidently in his mind vivid detail enough to justify his boast, that even when he was on the Continent, writing "*Dombey*," he could see every step in the staircase of the Wooden Midshipman, and every bed in the dormitory at Doctor Blimber's. We have also here an account of his journey into Yorkshire in quest of the Yorkshire schools that his "*Nickleby*" swept away; and there is a gem of a letter to a little boy who wanted poetical justice done in an unpoetical manner to the characters of that story—a desire which Dickens gratified in imagination, reporting the effect to the juvenile "*Respected Sir*," with a captivating relish of the joke. In later days, he snatches time for correspondence, "*bobbing up corkwise from a sea of Hard Times*;" or when he is in Paris, after finishing that novel, he wonders at feeling "*used up*"—"perhaps because I intended to do nothing in that way for a year, when the idea laid hold of me by the throat in a very violent manner." There, in Paris, he found his fame had arrived before him. Even in the shops his name brought the recognition, "*Mais! je suis honoré et intéressé de voir Monsieur Dick-in. Je lis un des livres de Monsieur tous les jours*"—in the *Moniteur*. Or the man who delivered and unpacked his purchases would discourse of the "*caractères si spirituellement tournées*." "*Cette Madame Tojare*" (*Todgers*) "*ah! qu'elle est drôle et précisément comme une dame que je connais à Calais*." His sight-seeing in the French capital was part of his study as an author; and there, as in London, he was to be found not only among the crowds at popular amusements, but in as many of the dark and out-of-the-way corners of life as he could find. He sought, as possible subjects, the prisons and the guillotine itself, the catacombs under the city, and the Morgue until it gave him the sudden shock of horror which he has commemorated in one of his writings. In London his studies led him over similar ground; and there is a letter here referring to subject-seeking in a proposed night at Bow Street, a sight of the arrivals and a visit to the cells. Nor is there wanting mention of his long night-walks through the London streets, wanderings in which he observed and laid the plan of future

fictions, and when he came, as he himself has told, across the old scenes of a boyish experience sad enough to cause shrinking even in manhood. Far away from the great city, he always kept the longing to devote himself to the one old study—the people—rather than to see new scenes. Thus there is a great deal of his inclination told in a very few words, when he writes home from Naples, giving a more telling hint of the fishermen's language than he could have given of the aspect of their coast itself.

I have got to understand the low life of Naples (among the fishermen and idlers) almost as well as I understand the do. do. of my own country, always excepting the language, which is very peculiar and extremely difficult, and would require a year's constant practice at least. It is no more like Italian than English is to Welsh. And as they don't say half of what they mean, but make a wink or a kick stand for a whole sentence, it's a marvel to me how they comprehend each other.

Reference is often made to his editorship of *Household Words*, and then of its new form, *All the Year Round*. It was only part of his system of doing all things thoroughly, when he gave such care to every number, every article, and every writer in particular, that the labour must have been a prodigious strain even upon such energy as his. His appreciation of the work of others was utterly free from the prejudice traditional among fellow-workers in the same craft; his criticism was at once expert and keen, but kindly; his dispraise substantiated by reasons; his praise warm and generous. In one letter he condemns writing of the Newgate Calendar class as unwholesome for publication in any way; in another he shows that the greatest situations of a novel are described too much as in an index or a playbill, and not with the deeply impressed detail which could not be wanting if they had been witnessed; or, again, he points out the mistake of studied "smartness" in writing, and of effort at brilliant description alone—"Airiness and good spirits are always delightful, and are inseparable from notes of a cheerful trip; but they should sympathise with many things as well as see them in a lively way. It is but a word or touch that expresses this humanity, but without that little embellishment of good nature, there is no such thing as humour." Another wise remark of his, is to the effect that even in the most masterly showing of disagreeable characters, too much of them shown makes the story itself seem to assume their nature, and the reader is apt to feel it disagreeable too. We could wish he himself had acted up to that precept always. The effect produced at last by such characters as Grandfather Smallweed is to make the reader dread their company. His

sudden arrival, borne Guy-Fawkes-like in his chair, causes to the witness of the story more dire dismay than to anyone in the story itself.

Among the letters from Dickens as an editor, is his delighted and amazed recognition of a writer to whom we are bound by closer sympathies than even an admiration for very graceful verse nobly inspired. Adelaide Anne Proctor, wishing not to embarrass him as her friend while she ventured to make him her editor, had sent her first poems under an assumed name. An amusing dialogue between him and his manager shows how they conjectured the drollest absurdities over the office fire. But at last the name was disclosed—the name of the well-known daughter of an old and dear friend, Mr. Proctor, called by the literary world Barry Cornwall. The letter, written immediately by Charles Dickens to the young poetess, acknowledges how the verses had deeply stirred his heart; and then ending with one of his own bright touches, he makes reference to the Watts Charity, with its lodging for “six poor travellers, not being rogues or proctors,” by giving her the blessing of Richard Watts—“though I am afraid you come under both his conditions of exclusion.” It was not often that so pleasant a task as that letter fell to his lot; and in one addressed to Mr. Wills, his manager, we see the opposite extreme of experience, when every contribution is full of blunders, and there is a hard-worked day, upon work which others supposed already well done. He describes the editorial torture—“If my mind could have been materialised, and drawn along all the tops of all the spikes on the outside of the Queen’s Bench prison, it could not have been more agonized.”

We shall not have much to say of him in the third aspect—as a reader; although the letters are copious on that subject, and though, while we do not forget that the readings were chiefly a commercial speculation, we recognise in that part of his life the possession of exceptional gifts and a success legitimate and unique. It is, indeed, a fact to be remembered in looking over these letters, that while his position was sufficient to deceive any man by its enthusiasm of flattery, and to carry him out of himself by its excitement, there was still solid ground for his regarding it as a triumph, and his correspondence would have been unnatural if it had not dealt continually and warmly with the subject which for himself and his intimate friends was first in importance at the time. The small number of his selections for public reading is one of the most wonderful evidences of his habit of doing his best and his best alone, as far as preparation and energy could secure it. The working men of his audience had a large share of his thoughts. He

could hardly do without "the roaring sea of the gallery." Sheffield and Birmingham he enjoyed for that reason; Newcastle he called "rough but tender;" and at Liverpool the workmen in the streets and at the docks caught sight of his well-known face, and came to ask a clasp of his hand. At Edinburgh the culture of his audience gave him pleasure. Canterbury, with its constant attraction for himself and his pen, he called the finest of provincial towns. And at Cambridge he had the highest and lowest of the University before him in one appreciative throng. The Irish letters tell how the stream of people, turned away from the Rotunda doors, met him a mile off as he came out of his hotel; how his men were squeezed against the wall by the excited crowds, the glass of the pay-boxes broken in the crush, and eleven bank notes at once thrust at the hand of the mobbed ticket-seller. We hear him report the order and neatness of the whitewashed cottages, and the picturesque and varied character of the country as he travelled from Dublin to Belfast. There the audience was demonstrative beyond measure, as we find from his report, and the warmth of feeling astonished him. When he read Paul Dombey's death, the men sobbed undisguisedly, shedding tears as freely as the women; and during his comic reading, he wrote, "it was just one roar with me and them; for they made me laugh so that sometimes I *could not* compose my face to go on." Irish voices in the streets stopped him with blessings, and begged a grasp of the readily-given hand, and he learned their unsurpassable word of recognition, "God love your face, sir!" Last, not least, he and his business manager brought home two jaunting cars; and he wrote afterwards to offer a friend the first spill on one of the Kentish roads.

The American reading tour is fully described, the climax of his success as a dramatic reader. The excitement of the people is scarcely to be imagined, and it takes him to describe it. He wrote of Brooklyn:—

The sale of tickets there was an amazing scene. The noble army of speculators are now furnished (this is literally true, and I am quite serious) each man with a straw mattress, a little bag of bread and meat, two blankets and a bottle of whisky. With this outfit, *they lie down in line on the pavement*, the whole night before the tickets are sold, generally taking up their position at about ten. It being severely cold at Brooklyn, they made an immense bonfire in the street—a narrow street of wooden houses!—which the police turned out to extinguish. A general fight then took place, out of which the people farthest off in the line rushed bleeding when they saw a chance of displacing others near the door, and put their mattresses in those places, and then held on by the iron rails. At eight in the morning, Dolby appeared with the tickets in a portmanteau.

From beyond the Atlantic he brought home a rich harvest of treasure. But the long battle against illness and fatigue was the beginning of the end. His last triumphs in England as a reader led nearer towards it; and the gradual deepening of the shadow, his refusal to recognise it, and his sheer energy and joyousness of heart keeping life in full vigour till the last—these are touches of darkness, as saddening as any merely human woes that a dead hand ever left traced not told. It is worthy of note that the high spirits and humour of the man never fade out of the American letters, even when he was threatened with exhaustion or illness. The messages sent home are full of buoyant glee and enjoyment of life, even when he was physically all but prostrate. We give one more extract from what he wrote at this time, not alone because it shows him in his drollest frame of mind, but because it is Dickens at his best, whether it occurred in book or letter. We only preface it by a wish that it had not concerned any religious service whatever; but we take it as he meant it, as describing a humorous situation too good to be lost, the ludicrous consisting, of course, not in what happens, but in how it happens.

One of the most comical spectacles I have ever seen in my life was "church" with a heavy sea on, in the saloon of the Cunard steamer coming out. The officiating minister, an extremely modest young man, was brought in between two big stewards, exactly as if he were coming up to the scratch in a prize-fight. The ship was rolling and pitching so, that the two big stewards had to stop and watch their opportunity of making a dart at the reading desk with their reverend charge, during which pause he held on now by one steward, and now by the other, with the feeblest expression of countenance and no legs whatever. At length they made a dart at the wrong moment, and one steward was immediately beheld alone in the extreme perspective, while the other and the reverend gentleman *held on by the mast* in the middle of the saloon—which the latter embraced with both arms as if it were his wife. All this time the congregation was breaking up into sects, and sliding away; every sect, as in nature, pounding the other sect. And when at last the reverend gentleman had been tumbled into his place, the desk (a loose one put upon the dining table) deserted from the church bodily, and went over to the purser. The scene was so extraordinarily ridiculous, and was made so much more so by the exemplary gravity of all concerned in it, that I was obliged to leave before the service began.

Turning to Charles Dickens seen in a fourth aspect—as a reformer—we find him working out a mission to his discharge of which he attributed the greatest importance. Others flattered him, and he flattered himself; there was exaggeration on

all sides. But for all that he worked a certain amount of good, which would be much more deserving of note if it had not been magnified too much already. In his "Life," Mr. Forster defines briefly the objects of reform which he advocated in his novels, and following him, we may say that the first book exposed prison abuses, "Oliver Twist," parish wrongs; "Nickleby," Yorkshire schools; "Chuzzlewit," hypocritical humbug; "Bleak House," Chancery abuses; "Little Dorrit," administrative incompetence; "Hard Times," politico-economic shortcomings; "Our Mutual Friend," social flunkeyism. In fact, the novelist sprang up to possess not only fame and fortune, but a wide hearing as well; and he began at once to make war upon social evils. Almost always he exaggerated and dragged in caricature, and, as Mr. Ruskin declared of "Hard Times," regretfully, his most serious meaning was discredited thereby. But all the same he fought on, now rash even to foolishness, now powerless and self-deceived, now imagining, and exaggerating, and charging headlong again. There were times when he was another Don Quixote, without the rueful countenance. An American statesman was found to declare that Dickens had done more than all the Parliament together to ameliorate the condition of the English poor. Such absurd laudation ruins itself; but it has been repeated in various modified forms. Perhaps the golden mean will be struck by believing that the success of Charles Dickens in this assumed mission was and is greatly overstated; but that, for the most part, his objects were of the best, and therefore his efforts in themselves were praiseworthy, and the same may be said of his limited degree of success—limited not only in extent, but because others had their share in what he helped to further. The triple weapons he held were his power in fiction, his weekly magazine, with its serious social articles, and lastly, his personal influence. With these three he assailed a numberless host of abuses, from slavery, "that accursed and detested system," down to Chancery, "that den of iniquity;" from public executions to ill-managed prisons; from pauperism and ignorance down to the window tax, which kept out health and instruction by keeping out light; and in one letter (given in his biography) he was as strongly in favour of temperance through improved and orderly homes for the poor, as he was against it unconsciously and unfortunately in his first book. The education of the working classes was seldom in his mind confounded with the unsuitable learning, false ambitions, and consequent social restlessness and political speechifying, which is sometimes supposed to be implied in the education of the people. He was very watchful of their habits of mind, and there is a great deal of study of the men and

thought of their amusement implied in such a chance word as that regarding the Manchester Museum, where he said all was too still after their lives passed among whirling and noisy presences : there should be some motion, even if it were but the life of a fountain. In his idea of a working-men's club, which he gives in a letter to Mr. Ollier to form the subject of an article in *All the Year Round* he takes a far too confident survey of human nature, basing it, of course, upon his usual belief in human nature raising itself. But there is a useful suggestion at the end, when he says the article is "to encourage them to declare to themselves and their fellow working-men that they want social rest and social recreation for themselves and their families ; and that these clubs are intended for that laudable and necessary purpose, and do not need educational pretences or flourishes. Do not let them be afraid or ashamed of wanting to be amused or pleased." The very name to which this letter is addressed will indicate in accordance with what views the working classes were to be delivered from all evil. His letter regarding strikes is an example of a plausible but most dangerous theory, with a sufficient modicum of sense to set it afloat, and without enough to balance it in men's minds, or to keep in view the practically bad working of the theory ; while the disadvantage of strikes in lessening the actual productive wealth of the country (and therefore of the men themselves) is left out of account altogether :—

I should like Morley to do a Strike article—he wrote—and to work into it the greater part of what is here. But I cannot represent myself as holding the opinion that all strikes among this unhappy class of society, who find it so difficult to get a peaceful hearing, are always necessarily wrong. To open a discussion of the question by saying that the men are "*of course* entirely and painfully in the wrong" surely would be monstrous in any one. Show them to be in the wrong here, but in the name of the eternal heavens show why, upon the merits of this question. Nor can I possibly adopt the representation that these men are wrong, because by throwing themselves out of work, they throw other people, possibly without their consent. If such a principle had anything in it, there could have been no civil war, no raising by Hampden of a troop of horse to the detriment of Buckinghamshire agriculture, no self-sacrifice in the political world. And, O good God, when — treats of the suffering wife and children, can he suppose that these mistaken men don't feel it in the depths of their hearts, and don't honestly and honourably, most devoutly and faithfully, believe that for those very children they are bearing all these miseries now.

The last sentence is as perfect an example as could be, of the sanguine manner in which Dickens was accustomed to generalise and then to believe in human nature because of the

persuasive manner of his own generalisation. There are questions where a respect for experience and a glance at a few statistics are a safer guide than argument that by its style carries off its matter. The one work of reform in which we like Charles Dickens best is far different from these vexed questions. It is one of the saddest signs of our time that between the classes there are gaps so wide that they have been called chasms. The common humanity is there; but the community of merit and virtue, the common capacity for loving, for suffering, for seeking rest and comfort—all this is too often tacitly denied, and each class left to the rancour of holding its own. In the works of Dickens there is much that disposes many an individual mind to throw chance bridges across the chasm between class and class. He loved to find something pleasant under physical disadvantages, something worthy in lowliness, something to make us bear with oddities and to cancel meanness of birth; and in all he wrote there is pictured the gracious justice of a mingling of the classes, such as the real world thinks scarcely consistent with its dignity. This, then, of his teaching, is what comes most to our heart; and there is no picture of him so worthy as that letter telling of his night-walk, where the seven bundles of rags lay homeless in Whitechapel by the workhouse wall; no saying of his so good as that which he ejaculates after the Bleak House scene, where the brick-maker's wife bends over her dead child, and is comforted by the "ugly woman very poorly clothed."—"I think the best side of such people is almost hidden from us. What the poor are to the poor is little known, excepting to themselves and God."

In most published letters of eminent men, there is reason to look for some political opinions worth reflection, or some impression of the events that change the surface of the world, some faithful copy of at least a few details of a stirring time. But there are few who will seek any of this in the letters of Dickens, and the few who may seek have but little to find. In 1846 he was in Switzerland, full of Swiss Radicalism, making shallow observations upon the social state of the Catholic and the Protestant cantons; and, with all his detestation of cant, writing the greatest cant that he could have picked up from the crowd, the politico-religious cant against the "Jesuit-ridden kings below the Alps." In 1848, he was ambitious to call himself the "*Citizen* Charles Dickens." In 1854 and the two succeeding years the great topic of the Crimean War began to struggle into his letters. "The absorption of the English mind in the war" was at first the object of his complaint and ridicule; but he immediately added, thereby implying the incon-

sistency into which he was led by a habit of leaving out of account the course taken by a theory in resolving itself into practice:—"For all this, it is an indubitable fact, I conceive, that Russia must be stopped, and that the future peace of the world renders the war imperative upon us." If the future peace of the world was involved—and what stronger word could he have risked?—it was surely not without reason that all eyes looked out beyond the narrowing sea-wall, and that vestry politics were out of favour for once. A little later he wrote:—

There is nothing in the present time at once so galling and so alarming to me, as the alienation of the people from their own public affairs. I have no difficulty in understanding it. They have had so little to do with the game through all these years of Parliamentary reform, that they have sullenly laid down their cards, and taken to looking on. The players who are left at the table do not see beyond it, conceive that gain and loss and all the interests of the play are in their hands, and will never be wiser until they, and the table, and the lights, and the money, are all overturned together. And I believe the discontent to be so much the worse for smouldering, instead of blazing openly, that it is extremely like the general mind of France before the breaking out of the first Revolution, and is in danger of being turned by any one of a thousand accidents—a bad harvest—the last strain too much of aristocratic insolence or incapacity—a defeat abroad—a mere chance at home—with such a devil of a conflagration as never has been beheld since.

Here he is generalising again, and risking bold language with more than his accustomed rashness. It was such want of profundity of thought and consistency of views that kept him from the possibility of ever leading men on a purely political question. The evils that knit themselves into one cruel knot in 1789 had no counterpart in the England of 1855; and the country itself, in the essentials of habit and temperament, though a careless look likened it to France, was no more like in nature or possible production than a Kentish hop-ground is like a southern vineyard.

While the Crimean War went on, the feeling of Dickens was divided between "admiration of our valiant men," animosity towards Russia,* "and something like despair to see how the old cannon-smoke and blood-mists obscure the wrongs and sufferings of the people at home." The last idea was predominant with him; and in like manner, looking above all things to

* Political motives led him to publish at that time the history of the Polish nuns of Minsk under the Czar Nicholas, told according to the experience of the sole survivor, the Abbess Makrena—a narrative of Catholic suffering and constancy, never to be forgotten by anyone who has read it. See *Household Words*, May 13th, 1854.

English interest, when he referred to the Jamaica insurrection and the terrible suppression which still many an Englishman shudders to remember, he was betrayed into declaring himself driven stark wild by "platform sympathy with the black—or the native or the devil—afar off. . . . Only the other day there was a meeting of jawbones of asses at Manchester, to censure the Jamaica Governor for his manner of putting down the insurrection! So we are badgered about New Zealanders and Hottentots, as if they were identical with men in clean shirts at Camberwell, and were to be bound by pen and ink accordingly." His ultra-Liberalism is, of course, everywhere apparent in treating of Home affairs, but there are many independent of party who will see some grain of truth in his protest against "our ignorance of what is going on under our Government. What will future generations think of that enormous Indian mutiny being ripened without suspicion until whole regiments arose and killed their officers?" And of all his remarks there is none made so telling of truth by an exaggerating touch, as the saying that we have no middle class, "for though we are perpetually bragging of it as our safety, it is nothing but a poor fringe on the mantle of the upper." We have said that there is little to illustrate the popular feeling while the events of his time were passing; but there is one faithful picture of the state of mind to which the ordinary citizen in nine cases out of ten is reduced by war news; and as he describes it in his best style, and is himself the citizen in question in his villa outside Boulogne, we may close with it our glance at matters political—only remarking that his good humour is more flattered by it than his intelligence in watching foreign affairs. He wrote across the Channel:—

Everything that happens here we suppose to be an announcement of the taking of Sebastopol. When a church-clock strikes, we think it is the joy-bell, and fly out of the house in a burst of nationality—to sneak in again. If they practise firing at the camp, we are sure it is the artillery celebrating the fall of the Russian, and we become enthusiastic in a moment. I live in constant readiness to illuminate the whole house. Whatever anybody says, I believe; everybody says every day that Sebastopol is in flames. Sometimes the Commander-in-Chief has blown himself up with seventy-five thousand men. Sometimes he has "cut" his way through Lord Raglan, and has fallen back on the advancing body of the Russians, one hundred and forty-two thousand strong, whom he is going to "bring up" (I don't know where from, or how, or when, or why) for the destruction of the Allies. All these things, in the words of the Catechism, "I steadfastly believe," until I become a mere driveller, a moonstruck, babbling, staring, credulous, imbecile, greedy, gaping, wooden-headed, addle-brained, wool-gathering, dreary, vacant, obstinate civilian.

Of public political life he knew nothing, having no nearer practical acquaintance with it than the part he took once in an Administrative Reform meeting. One of his most fixed habits of mind was to have a supreme self-opinionated contempt for the House of Commons. But had he accepted any one of the chances of public life that he was offered, he would have learned there, in seeing every possible side of any one measure, that every reform must needs be a far slower and more patient business than the preaching of its theories. He was all energy and impetuosity; he was as sanguine as no one could be who had not judged all things by the experience of such a triumph as his. He took no meaning from the fact that it has been the toil of lives, and it has taken the judgment of years of trial, for men to make for the multitude one law that can lift them up without causing worse confusion, one system of lightening their burdens without disturbing the balance of a whole community. Again, in his novels the same too-sanguine spirit shows itself in many merely domestic characters; though, in truth, we own to a weakness for preferring to be deluded with the brighter view of mankind rather than deceived in the other direction by sweeping satires upon all the world's hollowness. Whatever was bright and hopeful had a special attraction for Dickens. In the short narrative that finishes the Letters with a sketch of his life's close, we are told that his love of fresh air, light, and flowers amounted almost to a passion. It is a counterpart of his being drawn to dwell upon the pleasant and sunny side of life. "The comfort is," he wrote once, on hearing painful news, "that all the strange and terrible things come uppermost, and that the good and pleasant things are mixed up with every moment of our existence so plentifully that we scarcely heed them." The chance expression covers much of his philosophy of the world, and it holds a great deal of comforting truth. But when he went so far as to work with hot impulse in the confidence that human things were righting themselves easily, swiftly, through mere human wisdom and cheery good-nature, then it was that his philosophy failed him. Witness the sanguine view he took of the work that was to be done by his weekly magazine, with its gospel of good-fellowship and its campaign of reforms, to be worked by means of unearthing and denouncing all abuses, and recommending a cheerful hand-in-hand system of providing for the people. His object, he wrote, was "the raising up of those that are down, and the general improvement of our social condition." This sounds very well, if there had not been added in another letter the avowal of the self-reliant system:—"We hope to do some solid good, and we mean to be as cheery and pleasant as we can." The magazine

was a pecuniary success and nothing else, and the proposed motive has sunk out of sight years ago. The first hopefulness was much the same as that which prompted him to say to Lord Lytton, regarding the Guild of Literature and Art, that they held in hand "the peace and honour of men of letters for centuries to come;" and yet it ended only in a bitter disappointment. He carried the same too-rash confidence into the philosophy advocated by his novels. It is far too often of the earth, earthy; of endowing attractive characters with a liking for showing generosity in convivial pleasures, or making them work out noble ends by means and from motives utterly human. We have before now dwelt on the almost total want of any recognition there of the doctrine of grace. It is the great mistake of the novels, that the shrinking of their author from any public religious avowal caused him to draw bright pictures of purely natural goodness, teaching thereby that most mischievous fallacy, that earthly duty-doing may become a substitute for religion, and God and His grace need not be borne in mind. It is an impossible theory, on which the world is always making one long experiment, like a gambler's desperate game, with effort prolonged, and ruin at the end of it. There can no more be human goodness without grace, than there can be colour without light. Those who know nothing of physical science will maintain that they themselves and the objects round them preserve their natural colours in darkness. The belief in natural goodness without the presence of grace shows an equal confusion and ignorance with regard to the queen of sciences. And the more we feel from the perusal of his letters how deep his religious instinct was, the more we regret the erroneous form it took, and the false notion that such questions should be kept in the background, to be disposed of as secretly and conveniently as possible; as if, forsooth, religion was to be treated as a confused shadow, that would interfere with the cheery brightness that forms for mankind so poor a substitute for it. Seen in its true light, the greatest elevating power for the poor whom he loved, their strongest social bond with all higher ranks, the very poetry of their prosaic lives, is this religion that was the one thing he jealously hid from them. Without its full splendour falling on his life, or showing him theirs, well might he write to a friend the few bitter words that he penned in a moment of weariness, even in his triumph:—"What a dream it is, this work and strife, and how little we do in the dream after all."

Those amongst us who feel an interest in the letters of the novelist, will not fail to seek in them something deeper than glimpses of Charles Dickens among his friends, or as an author,

or as a reader, or before the world as a Radical reformer or a politician of shallow views and ultra-Liberal prejudice. They will be eager to find traces of his inner life, to supplement the little already known of his views on the one supreme subject. But there is in these letters little to add to what his biography made known, and the letter to his youngest son (published there first and reproduced here) contains still the clearest expression of his own belief. A letter to another son at parting repeats the same thing in other words:—"You know that you have never been hampered with religious forms of restraint, and that with mere unmeaning forms I have no sympathy. But I most strongly and affectionately impress upon you the priceless value of the New Testament, and the study of that book as the one unfailing guide in life. Deeply respecting it, and bowing down before the character of our Saviour, as separated from the vain constructions and inventions of men, you cannot go very wrong, and will always preserve at heart a true spirit of veneration and humility." The first article of his creed, then, was free interpretation, a belief bred in him, no doubt, by family tradition, and fostered by his habit of self-confidence; but the result predicted of such self-teaching, the safeguard it is infallibly to be, is as rash a conclusion as he ever sprang to. The world's chaos shows the real result of the experiment; yet there are thousands who stand always in this frame of mind, and we might call it less unreasonable than many a sect, if it were not folly to count any degree of near or far, when truth is missed even by the infinite difference that men call a hair's breadth. Another word of advice to his sons, regarded daily prayer night and morning, from which he himself had found assistance all his life. And he reminds them, too, how he had written the New Testament history in simple words for them, that they might learn it in earliest childhood.* Nothing could better explain his feeling towards High Church principles, than his saying to a friend that he did not know what he should do if his son were "to get hold of any Conservative or High Church notions;" but for the deepest depth at the opposite extreme of the scale he had, not dislike, but disgust, and he showed it freely by making Stiggins and Chadband walk out of his novels bodily into the world to be typical for evermore. Offence was taken and explanation rendered necessary when he was writing of "the Shepherd," who took refreshment only after condemning all taps as "wanities," and in whose defeat the author revelled as much as Sam Weller

* This narrative, written expressly for his own children only, is never to be published; therefore the "Letters" are the last possible book from his hand.

himself. The explanation given by Dickens is a sound truth tersely told :—

Permit me to say, in reply to your letter, that you do not understand the intention (I daresay the fault is mine) of that passage in the *Pickwick Papers* which has given you offence. The design of "the Shepherd," and of this and every other allusion to him, is to show how sacred things are degraded, vulgarised, and rendered absurd, when persons who are utterly incompetent to teach the commonest things take upon themselves to expound such mysteries, and how in making mere cant phrases of divine words, these persons miss the spirit in which they had their origin.

Similar umbrage was often taken to other things; and courteous explanations abound. The distinction of Fagin as "the Jew," was accounted for to an indignant Jewish lady; the novelist declaring that it referred to nationality and not religion, just as it would be unpardonable to call a Spanish Fagin-like character the Roman Catholic, but permissible to distinguish him as "the Spaniard." It may be of interest to add that the lady was not satisfied. A third explanation had to be given to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, that body being irritated at the ignorant ragged "Jo" having sat upon their step and afterwards swept it for thanks. Dickens did not give in an inch in his answer. His outcry was always for the education and comfort of the poor at home, in place of the sending of religious enlightenment (or rather of English money and bibles) abroad. He had faith in compulsory education, but its ten first years leave still many a Jo gaping at the hieroglyphs over the shops, a mere homeless animal but for the gift of speech, and as ignorant of soul, virtue, God—as of Sanscrit.* There is a power, of which he knew nothing, but which has done more for the poor of the great cities than all the ragged schools, philanthropical societies, and Government Bills put together. Only the Church can effectually reach, soothe and save those pariahs of our rich civilisation; but the work of the Church is silent in the intricate byways or in the crowded orphanages; it is labour unobserved, because continual and not new; and its statistics are left to another world, rather than vaunted in this.

We have digressed, but it is never a long journey back from the subject of the poor to Charles Dickens himself. The traces of his own habitual feeling in religion are found in his many letters of sympathy or condolence. Trust in God and the

* Not two months ago, in the year of grace 1880, two vagrant boys, found sleeping under the Covent Garden portico, were questioned at Bow Street; and to enquiries about religion they knew no answer, till one of them stammered out, "The Strand, sir."

thought of immortality he aptly names the "the two harbours of a shipwrecked heart." A beautiful expression occurs too in a letter to his sister, when he is "heartily glad" that even in her sorrow she has gone out in the open air—"There is a soothing influence in the sight of the earth and sky, which God put into them for our relief, when He made the world in which we are all to suffer, and strive, and die." Again, he writes to console his old friend Macready for domestic loss, dwelling on the comfort of a steady trust in God, and hoping that the spirits that have gone before may, "from the regions of mercy to which they have been called, smooth the path you have to tread alone." If the words were not words only, he must have been influenced by that instinct of our nature which in many cases is like the reflection of existing truths. There was the doctrine of prayer and intercession glimmering in the mind of the writer; unless, indeed, he would do what an Oxford dignitary denounces in a certain fiction—shelter himself behind that subtle distinction between invocation and intercession. His ideas were always vague regarding departed souls; he doubts whether the grief of the living may trouble them in their unknown abiding place; or, when he is aglow with joy at the grandeur of American scenery, he thinks of his youngest sister-in-law, Mary, whose memory was always dear to him, and first wishes that she could share his enjoyment, and then recollects that doubtless she has visited that scene many times already. These make up his ideas of spirit life, if we add to them a few more ordinarily found outside the Church, such as the transformation of beatified souls into angels.

A suggestive touch of sadness comes into one letter, that is otherwise blithe enough. It reveals a thirst for something, without which the vexed course of his life was hopelessly unsatisfying,—an undefinable longing under which, in his religion of the blue sky and jovial humanity, he gave himself a stone for bread. "This," he wrote, "is one of what I call my wandering days before I fall to work. I seem to be always looking at such times for something I have not found in life, but possibly may come to, a few thousands of years hence, in some other part of some other system. God knows. At all events, I won't put your pastoral pipe out of tune by talking about it. I'll go and look for it on the Canterbury road, among the hop-gardens and orchards." However much of worldly disappointment and its restlessness is written here, there is a sense, too, of a void needing something more than this world's repose to fill it.

If we turn back to the Italian letters, in quest of more of those half-defined spirit-footprints, we shall see less than in the letters already published by Mr. Forster. In fact, in many ways,

the present letters from the Continent are not so interesting as those printed in his *Life*; and the most brilliant description here, addressed to Maclise, and bright with colour even through pen and ink, is one of the letters that everyone has before now read in full elsewhere. We have already touched upon his sentiments regarding Italy, and we do not wish to dwell again upon the great blemish that spoiled his "Pictures," the one harsh prejudice that lowers their whole tone. We shall pass it over where it occurs, and that is but seldom, in the letters. In these he never lets drop any happy remark that lives in recollection, like that wonderful saying of Rogers, said in a letter, too, that at Naples we see most with the eye, at Rome with the memory, at Venice with the imagination; nor with all his fantastic touches of description does he ever with any word give anything better than a London sight-seer's impression of Italy; the poet, already referred to, gave a nobler glimpse of our Lake District than he of Italy, when he wrote that he had rambled with Wordsworth, "and the mists and sunbeams gave revelations of Heaven." Now, Charles Dickens in the Italian churches, was exactly the same as he was in the open air of Italy; his letters home gave no evidence that he saw anything with a spiritual appreciation, that he looked backward to history, or beyond externals to a hidden meaning. Catholic ritual was a mere senseless pageant to him, nor did he even discover its beauty through an æsthetic sense. He noted the ornamentation of the walls, the draught-swept curtains by the door, the women's fans and veils; but how those walls had risen, and why pomp and splendour were sought, were subjects as indifferent to him as the trivial custom of carrying veil or fan. He watched "the queerest figures kneeling against pillars, and the strangest people passing in and out;" but in what worship they knelt, and why they passed in and out, and for how many centuries their forefathers had done the same—all these vital questions do not seem to have got uppermost in his mind. It is all shown in one chance sentence, where he wrote that the day after he reached Rome they were "making a saint," and it is quite clear that the saint and the doctrine were forgotten in hitting off a facetious remark about the wax candles. In fact, in the churches he saw only with his eyes, and etherealised no earthly thought. This, coupled with the national prejudices he brought with him, forms the most probable reason why what he saw in Italy did not produce any deep effect, in any direction, upon his mind. Yet that some effect was produced, at least at one time when he was in Genoa, is certain from the fact that in his dreams his thoughts turned anxiously to the question of religion. Otherwise there is no accounting for one

of the most remarkable pages in Mr. Forster's book, the description of the dream in the Peschiere. It is not reproduced in the present volumes, but every reader of the "Life of Dickens" will be able to call the passage to mind;* and, however lightly we may look upon dreams, this one is acknowledged at least to have the same value as a straw in the wind. Mr. Forster says, "it strengthens other evidences—of which there are many in his life—of his not having escaped those trying regions of reflection which most men of thought and all men of genius have at some time to pass through," and he adds that in the two subsequent years Dickens turned to studying the "Life of Arnold" with the greatest admiration. The nature of the dream may be briefly called to mind here, merely as a witness to the strong effect that waking thoughts and realities had clearly taken beforehand upon the dreamer's mind. He slept in the Palazzo Peschiere, in a room which had been once a chapel, and where still the old altar stood, with above it a mark where a picture had once hung; and he had wondered what the picture might have been, and what was the face. Nearly all night he had lain awake, hearing at intervals the ringing of convent bells. And these were the sources from which the dream may have been evolved: but it had no confusion or hurry, his feelings during it were most ardent and animated, and on awaking he repeated it over and over that afterwards nothing might be added or changed unconsciously. "In an indistinct place," he wrote to his friend, "which was quite sublime in its indistinctness, I was visited by a Spirit. I could not make out the face, nor do I recollect that I desired to do so. It wore a blue drapery, as the Madonna might in a picture by Raphael; and bore no resemblance to any one I have known except in stature." He felt that it was his young sister Mary; and knowing in some indefinable way her compassion for him, he was "cut to the heart" by its intensity, and, sobbing, asked a sign that she had really come. A wish was then named and agreed upon.

"But answer me one other question," I said, in an agony of entreaty lest it should leave me. "What is the True religion?" As it paused a moment without replying, I said—good God, in such an agony of haste lest it should go away!—"You think, as I do, that the form of religion does not so greatly matter, if we try to do good? or," I said, observing that it still hesitated and was moved with the greatest compassion for me, "perhaps the Roman Catholic is the best? perhaps it makes one think of God oftener and believe in Him more steadily?" "For you," said the Spirit, full of such heavenly tenderness for me that I felt as if my heart would break "for you it is the best!" Then I

* See "Life of Charles Dickens," vol. i. p. 387.

awoke, with the tears running down my face, and myself in exactly the condition of the dream. It was just dawn.

It is only sufficient to add that the young girl whom he questioned in the dream had, during her life, been of his own belief; and it will be clear that the origin of his entreaties lay in some previous conflict within his mind; and this gives a mysterious weight to his words—"perhaps it makes one think of God oftener, and believe in Him more steadily." The whole true story of his experience is as beautiful a tale as he ever told; but, like many a touching tale, it bears a meaning sadder than itself.

With such constant activity of mind, it is not wonderful to discover that Charles Dickens might have been credited with being a seer of strange sights. Taking into account the power of his nervous and mental energy, some inexplicable experiences of his, and above all his attraction to all weird tales and fancies, it is surprising that he was never allured towards the snare of spiritualism. Mr. Forster credits him with a religious belief founded on depth of sentiment rather than clearness of faith. If his anchor was so frail a thing as even the deepest sentiment, it is a still greater wonder that he did not drag it towards that mirage of a false spiritual world. He was steadied, possibly, by the great and varied amount of serious enterprise in which he was always engaged: possibly by his innate hatred of "hum-bugs," and the transparent phenomena that must have been brought out more plentifully during the early days of the movement in its modern form. Without any doubt, he was of the mental constitution to do wonders in the sect, if he chose; but there is as little doubt that, through his distaste for it, he was saved from the untimely shattering of the nervous energy that carried him through life. His attraction towards the marvellous is well known; there is proof of it in his Christmas stories with their goblin element, and in the character of many of his own shorter tales, and of his readiness to accept ghostly experiences for his Magazine, or to make up its Christmas Number with a name suggestive of unearthly tales told in the winter firelight. Of his own experiences the strangest mentioned is that of his dreaming beforehand of the name of an unknown lady and the most notable colour worn by her, and his recognition of her the next night, when he was introduced to the very same individual after one of his readings. There is another instance almost equally striking, where, in one of these letters from Folkestone, he relates how he walked out on a rainy day, observing the dulness of the streets; and the very instant after he had wondered what could possibly assemble fifty people, a pair of runaway horses dashed into sight, and in

a moment the place was full of the uproar of a crowd. Add to such instances of presentiment, and such a leaning towards all mysteries, the fact that he possessed, but rarely exercised, strong mesmeric powers, and then will be readily seen the possibility of his having let slip his simple Broad Church views, if once that shadowy creed of shadows had won him as an experimentalist. Our speculations on this point may close with a most excellent note of his written to Mrs. Trollope, and embodying his very sensible notions of entertainment by spiritualism :

I was out of town on Sunday, or I should have answered your note immediately on its arrival. I cannot have the pleasure of seeing the famous "medium" to-night, for I have some theatricals at home. But I fear I shall not in any case be a good subject for the purpose, as I altogether want faith in the thing. I have not the least belief in the awful unseen world being available for evening parties at so much per night; and although I should be ready to receive enlightenment from any source, I must say I have very little hope of it from the spirits who express themselves through mediums, as I have never yet observed them to talk anything but nonsense, of which (as Carlyle would say) there is probably enough in these days of ours and in all days among mere mortality.

Another, but an incomparably greater and wider peril, was as completely escaped; and with results that were not only happy for himself but for his unnumbered readers. Towards free-thinking on the fundamental doctrine of faith, towards the ripe atheism of our days, he never wavered. In his letters the expressed dependence on God's permission for his work or movements, the word of gratitude for health, or for the success of his books, or for the fruitfulness of his fancy, come with such ease of habit as to pass for mere chance phrases; and yet we believe they had for him some weight. However much the supernatural order is ignored in his books, it is by no means out of sight in his letters. And the words that tell his belief in it throw a touching light upon his wonderful life-history. "I know I do not exaggerate," he had once written of that period of his own boyhood which he afterwards, not without shrinking pain, gave to a fictitious hero; "I know that, but for the mercy of God, I might easily have been for any care that was taken of me, a little robber or a little vagabond." And just as that sad but grateful avowal would not strike home to the heart but for its thought of Divine mercy; so in the letters of this man of genial humour, and brilliant prosperity, and high fame, there is no touch like the touch upon eternal things to realise for us the true, human, sympathy-craving personality of him who lived in such a world of fancies.

"Think of me at my best!" are the parting words he places

upon the lips of a character in his favourite story—a character unutterably below and directly opposite to his own in every way, unless, indeed, in that personal influence which is the undefined possession of a gifted few, and which, like every other gift of Heaven, is basely misused by some, and most nobly used by others. If ever there was a man who with good reason could plead to be thought of at his best, it is Charles Dickens himself; and thinking of him at his best alone, we shall close the volume of his letters. At such a moment many thoughts crowd upon us, and foremost is the sense of thankfulness that such great power as his was used in sending forth for the world's eager enjoyment so very much that was bright, refreshing, and worthy—so very little that we would wish retracted. And to realise what kindly feeling we owe to such a memory, and what gratitude to the Giver of all good thought and noble purpose, we may glance at what might have happened had another risen in his place, or had such unprecedented power been carelessly or badly used. Three thoughts will suggest the awful possibilities of what could have been; but since it was not, we refrain from looking upon so dark a picture otherwise than by briefest suggestion. What if such a man, persuading so vast an audience, had been not only ultra-Liberal, but dyed with Radicalism of another hue? What if this fiction, that through forty years has overflowed the home countries and the New World, had been a gradual descent to such literature as vitiates the taste of France; such romance as pretends to attack the follies of each era, and only aggravates the evils it professes to cry down? The effect would not have ended with his works; imitators would have perpetuated it, as they try to perpetuate his style; and the whole literature of fiction might have been degraded. Lastly, what if those novels had carried with them the spirit of scepticism, made as insidious as only works of imagination can make it? In one case we should have had to call their tone Socialism; in the second, immorality; in the third, atheism for the people. Of course, in all three cases they would not have enjoyed so hearty a welcome, not even with the attractive element of twice as much humour. But a certain amount of popularity they would have attained. The evil would have been not only secretly incalculable, but appreciable outwardly. For in so brief a time no other books ever commended themselves so widely, to high and low, to the upper classes as well as to those who, barely able to read them, can understand every word, and can see the sympathy with such lives as theirs. But the great evil has been averted. Providence ruled it so, and it was a willing hand that was guided.

And, putting aside those more terrible possibilities, we may ponder how sad a loss there would have been had not this active mind been characterised by that care for the poor—a tenderness for all human obscurity and lowliness. One of the poets has versified an Arab story, wherein is told how an angel wrote in a resplendent book the names of those that loved his Master; but the chief to whom he came in vision did not know the Lord of the angel, and he begged to have his name written as one who loved his fellow-men; and lo! when the angel brightened the tent again and showed the golden book, his name stood first. Perhaps the legend finds a secret interpretation before the last slow parting between these shadows and the great reality beyond. Well do we know there can neither be safe rest, nor acceptable worship, nor perfect duty, without truth; but there can be nothing whatever without charity.

ART. VII.—TEXT-BOOKS OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. *Summa Philosophica, in usum scholarum.* Auctore P. F. THOMA MARIA ZIGLIARA. Tom. tres. Lugduni, Briday. 1878.
2. *Elementa Philosophiæ Christianæ.* Auctore P. F. ALBERTO LEPIDI. Tom. tres. Parisiis, Lethielleux. 1875-80.
3. *Philosophia Elementaria ad usum Academicæ ac præsertim Ecclesiasticæ Juventutis.* Opera et studio R. P. FR. ZEPHYRINI GONZALES, O.P. Tom. tres. Malriti, Lopez. 1868.
4. *De Intellectualismo, juxta mentem Syllabi Vaticanique Concilii adversus errores philosophicos præcipue Rationalismum, Positivismum et Novam Criticæ.* Auctore P. M. BRIN, Presbytero, Philosophiæ in Majori Seminario Constantiensi Professore. Tom. tres. Parisiis, Bray et Retaux. 1874.
5. *Institutiones Philosophicæ quas tradebat in Collegio Romano.* DOMINICUS PALMIERI, S.J. Tom. tres. Romæ, Cuggiani Santini. 1874.
6. *Quæstiones Philosophicæ,* auctore Sylvestro Mauro. Editio novissima. Tom. tres. Cenomani, Leguicheux-Gallienne. 1875.
7. *Lezioni di Filosofia Scolastica.* Di G. M. CORNOLDI, D.C.D.G. Secunda ed. Ferrata, Tipografia Sociale. 1875.
8. *Institutiones Philosophiæ Speculativæ ad mentem S. Thomæ Aquinatis.* Auctore J. M. CORNOLDI, S.J. In Latinum versæ a Dominico Agostini, Venetiarum patriarchâ. Bononiæ, ex officinâ Pontificiâ Mareggianâ. 1878.
9. *The Metaphysics of the School.* By THOMAS HARPER, S.J. Vol. I. London, Macmillan. 1879.
10. *Métaphysique d'Aristote.* Traduite en Français, avec des notes perpétuelles. Par J. BARTHELEMY-SAINT-HILAIRE. Tomes 3. Paris. 1879.

IT is to be expected that the very decisive pronouncement of Pope Leo XIII. in favour of the Philosophy and Theology of St. Thomas of Aquin will give a considerable impulse to the production of Text-books of Scholastic Philosophy. Perhaps it is hardly correct to say that any new elementary texts have actually been produced since the appearance of the Encyclical *Æterni Patris*, on St. Dominic's day of last year. Father Harper has published his elaborate and remarkable book since

that date ; Father Albert Lepidi, the distinguished Dominican professor of Louvain, has sent out the third volume of his "Elements." These are, perhaps, the only publications which are actually new, or which can in any sense be said to owe their origin to the late Encyclical. But it is now perceived by those who deal in abstract philosophy—by the world of professors and the world of students—that more than one Text-book which came out on the eve of the appearance of the Encyclical itself, must have been prompted and inspired by the same spirit which has urged both Pius IX. and the present Sovereign Pontiff to make the series of pronouncements which have culminated in the recent solemn Pontifical Act. It used to be difficult to find a Text-book of any kind. Students of only five-and-twenty years ago will recollect how the choice lay between such writers (excellent in many points) as Goudin and Roselli, and manuscript notes of various degrees of authenticity, authority, and legibility. Now, it would almost appear that we are threatened with too many. Not only have we Jesuit authors of various shades—Liberatore, Palmieri, Tongiorgi, Cornoldi—but no less than three admirable manuals by the greatest lights of the Order which possess the truest Thomistic tradition, the "Elementa" of Father Lepidi, the "Philosophia Elementaria" of Father Gonzales, and the "Summa Philosophica" of Cardinal Zigliara. If the Scholastic Philosophy is to flourish again, and to influence the thought of the world at large, it is of the last importance to have good Text-books. Few seminaries or schools, and not very many universities, can hope to possess in every generation a teacher whose native force and genius are such as to enable his hearers to learn, and learn thoroughly, from himself alone. The Text-book is, no doubt, a modern invention. A very respectable and obstinate tradition has opposed Text-books down to our own times. It is by no means certain that there are not, at this hour, seminaries and colleges where the students are still painfully writing out the "dictates" of a professor who has spent, on his own part, much needless labour in elaborating, as if they were original, matters which have been done to his hand, and infinitely better done, for many a year. There is room for originality in a professor, no matter how eminent have been the writers who have been beforehand with him. And there is also a place for the dictation of notes. All this is so true, that a teacher of philosophy who merely construed a Text-book would not be worth his salt. But Text-books are modern conveniences, and, rightly used, are of the greatest assistance. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire a little, at the present moment, into the qualities and characteristics which ought to distinguish a good Text-book.

Abbé Brin, in an introduction to the philosophical hand-book to which he has given the unhappy name of "De Intellectualismo," expresses his opinion that, considering what Text-books were (in 1874), it was no wonder that the young student of philosophy began his studies with distaste and prosecuted them without interest. The writers of Courses, he declares—excepting, however, from his sweeping denunciation Liberatore and Sanseverino, and, by an afterthought in a note, "many others"—waste their space in the exposition of their various systems, pick out controversies, difficulties, and idle questions, and treat them at length, whilst the true principles are touched on very lightly indeed. Philosophic introductions "accommodated" to the use of beginners are deficient in order, in method, and in clearness; they "indulge" too much in false systems of antiquity or pernicious errors of the moderns; and they are every one sadly deficient in the exposition and confutation of the errors of the present day. Abbé Brin adds, in another note, that this description applies to the Text-books in use in most colleges. And if his words are applicable to France, we have, in the words of Padre Cornoldi, S.J., an equally lamentable picture of what is true of Italy. Writing in 1872, that is eight years ago, P. Cornoldi declares, in the introduction to his "*Filosofia Scolastica*," that he was led to write his short hand-book simply because he could find none already existing, worthy of the name, which could be put into the hands of youths studying at the universities, and at once prepare their minds for deeper studies, and protect them intellectually against the errors of the times.

From every European University (he says) Philosophy is either banished altogether, or else it is given in so meagre and incoherent a way that it cannot be called Philosophy. And if, as rarely happens, there is some show made of studying it seriously, there is such *variety and diversity* among the views put forth, that you cannot take up one without flatly contradicting another. The divergence which exists in the schools of the present day is so general, that I should hardly be able to find two professors of the same branch, in the same institution, who agreed, I will not say completely, but on first principles. And as a natural consequence no one teaches the same doctrine for ten years consecutively, but there is perpetual contradiction and change. . . . What was I to do? Not being able to embrace any Philosophy current in our times, and being most unwilling to abandon my purpose and so to play into the hands of those who desire to see Philosophy driven from human society, I could only do one of two things; I must either follow some great light of the present day and make a Philosophy out of other men's labours, or make up my mind at once to follow that which was venerated of old, and which for twenty centuries had prevailed in the schools, whose adherents and upholders have been some

of the greatest geniuses of whom our race can boast, and which, even in our own days, the humble and strenuous lovers of truth have jealously preserved, like sacred fire, from profane eyes and carefully defended and propagated (p. xiii.).

If only one half of this was true six or eight years ago, there was certainly plenty of room for Text-books. Yet Text-books, and fairly good ones, there undoubtedly were, at the time those words were written. Not to mention older names, there were at least Liberatore and Prisco. One cannot doubt, from the testimony of such men as Brin and Cornoldi, that in spite of what had gone on for thirty or forty years, the scholastic philosophy was hardly known in the greater part of even the seminaries of France and Italy; that Text-books or dictatcs were used such as here described—poor, contradictory, and dull; and that, therefore, there was ample reason for the Encyclical of August 4th, 1879.

The more fortunate generation which is now in the schools, or about to enter them, is better supplied. They have only to choose. Yet the choice of a Text-book is not such an easy matter. We may begin by saying, as every one will say, that there is no such thing as an absolute Text-book. Introductions to Philosophy, like other aids and instruments, must be judged by their fitness for those who have to use them. In judging, therefore, of a Text-book, we have to take into consideration the age and the previous preparation of the youths who are to profit by them, the time at the disposal of the class, and also the *milieu* in which the student is to live and use his Philosophy. Then would come the question of what Philosophy to choose, if that question were not now practically decided for us; and in any case there is the consideration of the division, arrangement, and method of the Text-book.

There can be little hesitation in admitting that the generality of our students of Philosophy begin to study it too soon.* There may be a hundred reasons for this, with which we have nothing to do at present; but it is quite certain that a certain maturity of mind and fulness of acquirement is necessary in order to engage with profit in studies so abstract as logic and metaphysics. Mere grammatical work, and the short literary flights which unfledged minds make in their course of "humanities" are a poor preparation for dealing with the deepest questions of life and being. A strong and extended course of mathematics, a well-grounded facility in every sort of analysis, and a familiarity with the abstract principles of poesy and rhetorical effect

* It is not pleasant to have to admit that, practically, none but students destined for the ecclesiastical state do study "Philosophy" in England and Ireland.

—these are absolutely essential as a training for metaphysics proper. And such preparation cannot be made in a year or two, and cannot be attained at all unless the mind is suffered to assimilate slowly and gradually its training and its experiences, as the body grows with the nourishment which is given to it. Then, success in the acquisition of abstract Philosophy depends essentially on the intelligent interest with which the student takes it up. Grammar, history, literature, even mathematics, may be portioned out, set as tasks, tested by results, and the results, when unsatisfactory, improved by energetic measures on the part of teachers. But Philosophy must be learnt with the will, or it is not learnt at all. There is, no doubt, a certain amount of the terminology and of the mechanical apparatus which can be impressed on the unwilling or the sluggish mind. But metaphysical problems must be read from the inner side of consciousness, or they are never deciphered at all. A day soon comes to the learner when the words of his author or his teacher seem to labour, to stammer, and to fail. Hitherto, words have fairly conveyed a sense of reality; now, there is either a strange, undreamt of reality looming through the haze of explanation, or else there is fog and nothing else. It is at this moment that the metal of a student shows itself. If he is one who is not destined to succeed, he no sooner feels the unaccustomed darkness than he gives in: he looks again, perhaps, fails to see any the more clearly, and becomes passive, disheartened, acquiescent in failure. A few more such experiences, as world after world of the great ideal universe rolls past within reach of his intelligence, and he settles down to the conviction that Philosophy is obscure, unreal, and impalpable; and he looks forward to the day of his release. But the other sort of learner, when he feels for the first time the presence of some mighty idea, then first begins to feel his courage called upon and his temper challenged. The feeble parts of speech are there before his eyes, and the spoken words come and go; all his efforts only serve, at first, to bring him face to face with incoherence or blank nothing—as when some anxious searcher, watching for portents in the sky, fails to make his mechanism find the focus. But as he settles into silence, and memory fixes certain outlines, and imagination, quickened with effort, succeeds in blocking out the mysterious presence in something like its real shape, then by degrees that native and perennial light within him, by which we are in God's image, illuminates that shadowy thing, and it is bright as the day. The effort may be long and even painful; the obtrusive associations of distracting thought, the want of custom in knowing where to look, the physical difficulty of rousing the brain to the full exercise of its preliminary work,

all this is hard upon the beginner. But it is worth the labour, for he has taken his first step in the realms of abstract thought; he has "realized" one of those mighty foundations of the mental universe which are more firm and everlasting than any Alps or Andes. It was such apparitions from a spiritual world which came to Plato as he lay with dreamy eyes upon the banks of the Ilissus, which thrilled the heart and sense of Augustine when the pen of his "Confessions" stood still in midnights in Africa, which came and went in tranquil splendour in the cell of Thomas of Aquin. To have seen one of them once is to have it for ever. No want of use, no heaviness of sense will ever altogether banish it again. And as other views open themselves and deeper truths are subdued and conquered, Philosophy begins to be a light, a climate, and an atmosphere in the mind of the learner. So some men learn Philosophy, whilst others learn it not. But until the intelligence has found the secret and the joy of unveiling principles for itself and by its interior effort, the student only sits at the portals of the temple. He has not entered in.

It is for reasons like this that the best instructors so strongly advise that the study of abstract science be reserved for years when the mind is as mature as may be. It is very difficult to state, even approximately, the age when it would benefit a youth to begin Philosophy. It is clear that the number of his years must count for little in comparison with the question of his real education. Then, as to maturity of education, temperament goes for much, and regular training from childhood goes for more. Some boys will delight in abstract thought from the first moment they look into Euclid, or face the deductions of comparative philology, or make acquaintance with the sonorous generalizations of Cicero. Again, a youth who begins study late in life will often bring to his work such intelligent energy of will, such a mature appreciation of problems to be solved and ends to be achieved, that he is very soon fit to grapple with a philosophic Text-book. On the other hand, there are nearly always practical reasons for not waiting too long. First of all there is the undoubted fact that, the moment a youthful mind begins to take to serious thought, it is time to provide that mind with the best material and the truest guidance. Young men are very impressionable and very receptive; modern thought, repeated in a thousand shapes, penetrates everywhere; and any derelict intelligence found floating on the ocean of intellectual life is quickly seized and refitted in some dockyard of the enemy. Then, with the vast majority of students, Philosophy is a means to an end; it is a preparation for Theology; and since the requirements of the missions hurry on the study of Theology, so the requirements of Theology hasten the years of

Philosophy. To speak, however, with as near an approximation as possible to what will generally hold true, it may be asserted that youths under sixteen lose their time in beginning Philosophy; and that even up to the age of seventeen or eighteen no one is fit to undertake that study who has not gone through a steady course equivalent to the six or seven years of the curriculum of a well-conducted college. The late Bishop Dupanloup, who had such a wide experience as an educator, thus speaks of the folly of what he calls "precipitating" boys into Philosophy before their time:

Nothing can be more fatal. It is to disgust them with Philosophy for life, and to condemn them to a course of simple torture. From an educational point of view, I know nothing more cruelly absurd. It is to require from immature and feeble minds an effort of which they are incapable, and which crushes them. Besides, the general weakness of classical studies is such, that many of them have only half done their humanities and their rhetoric. These previous studies have neither developed nor strengthened, as they should have done, the faculties which should now grapple seriously and profitably with philosophic science. Philosophy completes, fortifies, and crowns literary study; but only on one condition—that literary studies have been really made, and well made. Philosophy is a preparation for scientific study; but, again, only on the condition that the intellect be sufficiently mature to undertake it. If I had the honour to be a Professor of Philosophy, I would never receive into my class a student who, on account of defective previous studies, was incapable of doing any good in it. And to those who pressed me not to reject a candidate, I would say with St. Augustine, "*Filius tuus cœpit jam philosophari; ego eum reprimo ut disciplinis necessariis prius excultus vigentior et firmior insurgat.*" ("Contra Academic," ii. 8.)*

When we consider, ever so superficially, the questions and problems of which abstract philosophy treats, these words will certainly appear none too strong. Indeed, the strange thing would seem to be, not that youths of sixteen or seventeen are often poorly prepared for philosophic study, but that the greater part of Philosophy can ever be seriously put before any students whatever who are not really matured and cultured to begin with. The student of Philosophy has not to learn a grammar or to master a new branch of mathematics. Grammar, however great a triumph for the genius who first draws up or completes its generalizations, is not difficult to take in and remember. Mathematics, even in its highest flights, preserves a family likeness in all its generations and families that powerfully assists the imagination which has once taken the mathematical impress, to seize the key of each mystery as it rises in

* De la haute Education intellectuelle, T. ii. p. 211.

its turn. But Philosophy not only deals with the highest abstractions, but with abstract questions in which absolute demonstration is difficult to attain, and in regard of which the greatest minds of which the human race can boast have not only argued for years and centuries, but have marked every century, and almost every year, by profound and irreconcilable disagreements. It would take, not a clever schoolboy, but a thoughtful and deeply-read man, to appreciate at their proper value even the preliminary discussions in ideas, judgments, and reasoning, considered merely as mental instruments. Who but a trained thinker could hope to arrive, by true native process of thought, at any conclusion worth having on the immortality of the soul, on the manner in which mind understands matter, on the argument for and against Free Will? If Plato, and Anselm, and Thomas, and Cajetan, spent days and nights of ever-deepening thought on Being and its categories, on finite and infinite, on essence and existence, what mental product is to be expected from the conscientious but far from brilliant "philosopher" who takes these great questions in his morning's work, and gets them up in business form between his breakfast and the mid-day Angelus? If he knew what he was about he would almost, as it seems, shrink back in a fearful reverence from the great names which recur so often in the pages he gets so coolly by heart. If he did but know it, he is like a man standing on some plain of Babylon, where great cities lie buried, or like a climber of mountain ranges where seams and fissures are the marks of fires that once flowed, and where sometimes the marred outline of a towering hill reminds the gazer where a mighty landslip happened long ago. Plato and Porphyry are mentioned, blamed in a sentence, and applauded in half-a-dozen lines. Kant has two paragraphs, one to explain his "system" and the second to demolish it. Descartes, like an uneasy ghost, pervades the pages of psychology, ever coming back to be chidden for his rash and sinful formula. If these, and many another name, as great and as mistaken, are hastily summoned, and hastily dismissed, and made to appear at one time as mere headings for a string of unreasonable opinions, at another as singularly shallow and transparent tyros of a time gone by, this is, perhaps, neither the fault of the student nor of the compiler of his Text-book. Philosophy is too large and too wide for Text-books. Systems do not easily lend themselves to be boiled down into abstracts. The conclusions of a philosophic mind are not unfrequently the least valuable part of what he leaves behind him, and few geniuses come out well when a compiler, pressed for space, formulates great books in a sentence apiece, and spits the formulas together. Yet no one can blame

the compiler. And Text-books, with all their drawbacks, are a necessity; whilst the students who use them, poor as the result may be of the year's or the two-years' course, must make that course. He may console himself with the knowledge that, provided he comes decently prepared, he will learn a great deal, even if he cannot be said, in any proper sense of the word, to have learnt Philosophy.

One reason, though by no means the only one, why the study of Philosophy should be preceded by a full course of humanities is, that the Text-books are written in Latin, and those who use them should know how to use Latin almost as a living language. In these times of physical science and modern languages, it is not at all a matter of course that a boy comes to the end of his collegiate classes with a well-grounded facility in the use of Latin. A hundred years ago, and less, three times the number of hours were given to Latin which can be spared now. The result is that boys, even of the upper classes of schools, who may be exceedingly well prepared in Horace or in Cicero's Orations, are generally unable to read with comfort and ease, at first sight, even works which are much less difficult in their subject-matter than Text-books of Philosophy. Latin is taught and learnt in a very narrow groove. The route taken lies, no doubt, through the very best country. But when a man has to spend so much of his after-life in homelier regions, it would seem advisable that he should be made acquainted with the roads and the method of travel which will there be required. To read Latin fluently, boys should have both more words at command and more practice in idiomatic variety. The difficulty of Catholic Colleges in these countries in regard to this is, that the whole tendency of the best classical education of the country is to use to the utmost those diminished hours which modern requirements have left for classics for the purpose of attaining great excellence in minute scholarship rather than a real living command of Latin as a language. Abroad, in Germany for instance, it is not so. Mr. Matthew Arnold, in his interesting notes on classical studies in Berlin,* thus speaks of a lesson which he heard Dr. Ranke, brother of the historian, give to the first class (the highest) in the *Friedrich-Wilhelms Gymnasium*, on the "Philoctetes" of Sophocles:

He spoke Latin to his class and his class spoke Latin in answer; this is still a common practice in the German schools, though not so common as formerly. The German boys have certainly acquired through this practice a surprising command of Latin; Dr. Schopen's lesson at Bonn to his *prima* in extemporaneous translation into Latin

* Higher Schools and Universities in Germany.

. . . . I heard with astonishment; a much wider command of the Latin vocabulary than our boys have, and a more ready management of the language, the Germans certainly succeed in acquiring (p. 115).

It is not probable, perhaps not advisable, that in England the classes of Philosophy, or even of Theology, should, at the present day, be held in Latin. On this point we shall have something to say presently. But it is to be hoped that the hour is far off when we shall have recourse to vernacular Text-books. There are many reasons why a Text-book should be in Latin. One most excellent reason is, that there are none in English that are worthy of the name. But the substantial and standing reason why we must have Latin texts is, that the use of Latin is an admirable and even an essential means of securing unity in philosophic teaching. There are, no doubt, many drawbacks in a Latin text. There is the want of familiarity with the language—and there is more in this than at first appears, for the mere power of construing a dead language is very far from enabling a reader to take in its force and its lights and shades. There is the danger of learning Philosophy by rote, and of repeating cabalistic formularies instead of assimilating intellectual life. There is the danger of what may be called a break of continuity between one's philosophy and the remainder of one's culture; of philosophy occupying a region apart, with terms and definitions of its own, and with few points of contact with the drift and speculations of current intellectual thought. The evil of this is easily understood when we remember that philosophy, to be true philosophy, must colour and dominate our whole mental constitution. If a man has one set of mental views for his study, and another for his conversation and his general reading, he is only a beast of burden and not a really cultured man. And the use of Latin words in the schools, whilst we use English everywhere else, certainly tends to encourage this defect. But, in spite of all this, we cannot do without Latin Text-books, not to say Latin philosophical treatises at large. Unity in philosophic teaching is of the first importance. The philosophy of Aristotle and of St. Thomas—which we here assume with the present Sovereign Pontiff to be synonymous with intellectual truth—is the precious inheritance of the Catholic clergy and laity, and that Philosophy they must have in its pure form and from its fountain head. It would be very different if, on the one hand, our principal philosophic task were to search for truth—to weigh the speculations of great teachers and the merits of hostile schools; or if, on the other, there were such a thing as “national” Philosophy, and each country had a right to enthrone its own eminent thinkers in the highest seats of abstract science. But it is not so, and

no one, it may be confidently affirmed, ever thinks of maintaining the claims of any of the great names who have immortalized their thoughts in English, French, German, or Italian, to be the Catholic Philosopher by excellence. The Catholic Philosophy has been written in Latin. It is true, as an objector might here remind us, that its source is the Greek of Aristotle, and that, therefore, it might be said that our books should be in Greek. But the answer to this is easy. Aristotle is the source of Catholic Philosophy only in the same way that Saxo Grammaticus was the author of *Hamlet*, or Holinshed of *Henry the Fifth*. Without making any comparison between transcendent geniuses—and it would be difficult to assert that the philosophic achievements of Aristotle have ever been surpassed—it is indisputably true that Scholastic Philosophy owes its form, its comparative completeness, its harmony with revelation, and the subtle illumination which it derives everywhere from revelation, to St. Thomas of Aquin. And what he, in Latin, began, his successors and disciples have, in Latin, continued. St. Thomas may almost be said to have invented a new dialect of Latin. Without denying the power and influence of those who preceded him, and especially of Blessed Albert the Great—who would have been a worthy leader and patron of the great Dominican school had there been no Thomas to succeed him—it may be said with perfect truth that he formed a language, somewhat in the sense in which the “*Divina Commedia*” formed a language. The Latin of the “*Summa Theologica*” is as remote from the Latin of Cicero, or even of Seneca, as is Italian or Spanish. But it is a true language, having a body of terms, a regular and unique construction, a perfect flexibility, and, above all—what may be considered the test of a cultured language—an altogether marvellous capacity for the deft expression of abstract thought and speculation. It is a language, moreover, which, by the very necessity of the case, is in great measure untranslatable. You can only render it into English by taking its own terms, and altering their terminations. *Forma* is “form,” *materia* is “matter,” *actus purus* is “pure act,” *intellectivus passivus* is “the passive intellect,” and so of a hundred other words and phrases. The things which these and other terms signify are at once the deepest and truest generalizations of the best science and the technical terms of Catholic Philosophy. Therefore they are at the same time untranslatable and indispensable. And since they must be explained, in whatever form they present themselves, it seems as easy to explain them in their Latin form as in their vernacular, and nearly as easy to make out a book which treats them in Latin as a book which offers a slight modification of them and

pretends that they are English. We do not, however, by any means intend to deny that great good may be done, and much light thrown on the Catholic Philosophy, by dissertations and formal treatises in the vernacular. A master of English can make the English language do almost anything ; and as Father Harper so well points out, in a book which would go far to prove any one wrong who said that scholastic science could not be given in English, no one has a right to object to, or to reject as barbarous, those necessary and consecrated technical terms which are as much the property of the Scholastic Philosophy as those of any science are the property of that science. What is here insisted on is, that, for a beginner, an English version is not of very much advantage as far as regards easiness of comprehension. In most other respects it is a positive drawback. A Text-book in English must translate terms, forms, and phrases ; but a translation always implies a gloss ; no one can translate an obscure or abstruse treatise without giving to his work the colour of his own interpretation. It would be needful, therefore, in order to preserve unity, either to have an authoritative version, or else to print the Latin original, side by side with the translation. But either of these alternatives would be inconvenient. Then, how would a translator set about his work ? A Text-book is not a large literary exercitation, like Father Harper's new work. It is by its nature brief, somewhat dry and very technical. Is the translator to preserve its technical form in a scrupulously literal version, and so produce a book which calls itself English, but is really no language at all—a monster among books, disagreeable to the English ear, and useless to every one but the untutored Englishman ? Or is he to give us version for version, good and pure English for good Latin, a vernacular work of art for a work of art in a dead language, and to effect this by laying under contribution the best abstract writers of the day, and adapting their phraseology to the scholastic metaphysics ? If he adopt the latter plan, no doubt he may produce a readable book ; but it will have about as much relation to Scholastic Philosophy, as Mr. Ruskin's "Ethics of the Dust" has to the Nichomachæan Ethics of Aristotle. A learner would have no more chance of learning Philosophy from such a "good English" Text, than of learning geology from a popular article in a "Boy's Annual." For these reasons—now more than ever—it is necessary to adhere to our Latin Text-books. It is the only way to preserve from generation to generation the genuine expression of the Catholic Philosophy.

There are many kinds of Text-books, however, and many different ways of using them. In order to arrive at a just idea of what a Text-book should be, it will be useful, first of all, to

consider what is the end and purpose of the curriculum of mental Philosophy.

A man reasons long before he enters the school of philosophy, and he continues to reason, and probably advances in all his reasoning powers, after he has left that school far behind, up to the time when the day declines and the curtain is drawn over his intelligence, and he dies or becomes a child again. Philosophy is both a universal science and a special science. It is universal, because all men use its principles, and all but the rudest men have a smattering of its reflex operations. It is special, because it may be made the object of a special study and training, carried out with method, and resulting in the greater clearness, precision, and rapidity of all those mental processes which are its subject-matter. It is this special study of Philosophy which youths undertake who enter on what is called their "course of Philosophy." No doubt they often begin—and even finish, let it be whispered—without a very definite idea what it is meant to effect or produce in their mental life. Some have the idea that it is intended to prepare them to read with profit the scholastic theologians; others that it will help them to resist the infidel and materialistic science of the day; others, again, that there are matters in Philosophy which everybody should know something about; and others, finally, that it will perform the operation vaguely called "opening the mind." If the beginner turns to his manuals to find out what his new science will do for him, he is often met, it must be confessed, with the vaguest of declamation. Father Gonzales, for instance, for whose Text-book we have the highest admiration, has a paragraph on the "dignity and utility" of Philosophy, which reads more like a theme or exercise composed by one of his youngest and most unprecise beginners than the description of a tried professor. Cicero, Plato, Clement of Alexandria, Horace, are invoked to say that Philosophy is the mother of the arts, the guide of life, the foundress of cities, the inventress of laws, the prop of the Faith, the enemy of heresy, the constant ally of the Church, and innumerable other things. In some Text-books we are told that Philosophy cultivates the "nobler part of man;" that it enables us to understand better our "duties" to God, to our neighbour, and to ourself; that it helps us to defeat error and to understand truth. But it may be deliberately said that we find nowhere in the Text-books any such analysis of the benefits and advantages of abstract science as we find in Cardinal Newman's *University Lectures*. No one, certainly, would expect in a compendium one tithe of the elaborate exposition set down in those immortal essays; but what is meant is, that one scarcely meets, in the books in question, with

any well-argued statement of the immediate end of philosophic study—the training of the intellect as such, and the informing it with absolute truth. There is, doubtless, more than one good or plausible reason why the more remote purposes of Mental Philosophy are dwelt upon rather than the immediate object. From the beginning, since Clement of Alexandria advised the Christian student to make himself acquainted with all the learning of the Greeks, Christian writers have dwelt strongly on the ethical purposes of learning. With the ancient Fathers and scholastic founders, there was a great world beyond the world of Philosophy. It mattered little that you could reason, unless you reasoned for your soul's good and that of the Church. To be able to analyse the composition of man or the act of intelligence was of little value unless you ordered both body and soul, and all the acts of every power, to your last end. In these modern days it is difficult to say that one should not still insist on these views, as paramount and not to be passed over, and most of the Text-books have preserved the tradition, and give the student abundant moral reasons why he should make himself intellectually proficient. But we cannot help insisting that it is a drawback not to be told, at the outset, what intellectual proficiency really means.

The immediate aim, then, of a "course" of Philosophy is to accustom the mind to intellectual action, and to inform the mind with intellectual truth. The two members of this description do not mean quite the same thing, though they are very closely connected. Philosophy is, in fact, both a discipline and a growth in mental knowledge. It teaches us *how* to reason, but, also, *what* the truth is on the deepest of human questions. Other sciences are, in their measure, disciplines of the mind; such as, for instance, mathematics, philology, and the several branches of physics. But in no science, save Philosophy, are the subjects themselves of that deep, absolute, ultimate, and abstract character which causes them to be, not only most essential to be studied and learnt, but of all matters the best fitted for mental training and for the discipline of man's proper or peculiar powers. Setting on one side, for a moment, the question of the matter of Philosophy, let us observe that Philosophy, as a training, ought to aim at accustoming the mind to reasoning—that is, enabling it to travel quickly, accurately, and far, from idea to idea. There is no better or simpler description of mental accomplishment* than this. The power of abstraction is based

* "In default of a recognised term I have called *the perfection or virtue of the intellect* by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination."—Newman's "Idea of a University," p. 125.

on the ready ability to see the same thing in a multitude of instances, or else to separate idea from idea; and both processes are the passage from thought to thought. Acuteness of perception really means rapidity of discourse—quickness in taking steps or leaps—the arriving at a given point before another mind arrives there. In one word, the excellence of human mental operation means the excellence of “discourse,” or the perfection with which the human mind accomplishes that distinguishing process by which it differs, on the one hand, from the intuition of the angel, and, on the other, from the blind instinct of the brute. There are minds in whom discourse is so slow and rudimentary, that it is difficult to perceive that they reason at all; and there are intellects in whom it is so rapid and perfect, that it seems to leap rather than go step by step; and this is the gift which we call genius. With most minds the perfection of the reasoning power depends on the education it receives. It is possible, by careful and continuous discipline, to give it strength and accuracy, as we can give strength and accuracy to any other power, physical or mental; to give it, in some degree, that rapidity, ease, and unfailing precision which marks the operations of Nature herself. For training induces a second nature.

The discipline, then, which a course of Philosophy should give, may perhaps be summarized, roughly, under three heads: it should teach distinction, abstraction, and reasoning proper. By distinction, it is meant that the study of Philosophy should inure the mind of the beginner to distinguish accurately between ideas. Hence, all the array of definitions, of divisions, and of technical terms with which the pages of a Compendium or Text-book must necessarily be filled. No one who is familiar with the style of St. Thomas of Aquin will have failed to notice the clearness, the happiness, and the luminousness, almost miraculous, with which he draws his distinctions; distinctions which often seem to settle the question definitively, as with a sudden shock or gush of light, before the argument begins. Most of the defining and dividing which is found in the Text-books has long been done to the hands of compilers, and there is little room for originality left. We may venture, however, to mention, as an example of minute and accurate defining and distinguishing (and also of much more), the splendid argument in the new volume of Father Alberto Lepidi’s “*Elementa*,” on the composition of Corporeal Substance (p. 32, seq.). It is well known to all thinkers that a definition or distinction is far from being a mere formula intended to load the memory of the learner. True and good definitions are as a spark applied to inflammable vapour; they bring into objective existence (to speak loosely)

the latent heat and light of the intellect. Once stated, they flash with the brightness of intuitions, and once seen, they become for evermore a part and a shape of mental consciousness. The second criterion of a good Text-book is its power of imparting the discipline of abstraction. The power of abstraction is more than the power of seeing only one thing at a time. It is also the power of seeing the modes of things apart from the thing, and the ideal through and in the concrete. The first step in abstraction which the beginner practically makes, may be said to be the realization of things from a "logical" point of view—that is, when he learns to consider "man," for instance, as an idea, or the composing element of a judgment; when he can consider statements of fact and opinion in the light of mere "propositions," and when he so fastens the grip of his mind on an argument as to eliminate all its sense and significance, except merely its conclusiveness as a syllogism. To the ignorant this will always seem a barren triumph, and to the beginner it is often weariness and discouragement. But it is a step which must be taken, just as the builder must dig down and build underground before his house can safely rise. The second step is taken when the learner knows how to *universalize*; when the component ideas of a concrete, under the influence of imagination and intelligence, seem to shuffle off the individual bands which limit and confine them, and to fly abroad over all the universe; when the imprisoned ideal bursts from its confinement, like the genius in the Arab legend, and swells into a category, filling all the space from earth to sky. For an elaborate exposition of what a universal is, and what it is not—how far it is in the mind, and how far it is objective—what is to be said of nominalism, conceptualism, realism—the student may be referred to Cardinal Zigliara's "*Summa Philosophica*" (vol. i. p. 316, seq.); and in the process of following that admirable argumentative statement, his mind will have a fair chance of making out, amid what at first is only fog and mist, the eternal forms of all-pervading truths. There is a third degree of abstraction, which, if it does not specifically differ in substance from the second, differs very materially in degree. It is the abstraction whereby the mind tries to isolate, if we may so speak, a spiritual or immaterial notion, so as to seize its exact nature. Thus, the philosopher tries to see the soul disembodied, the intellect at its actual contact with the presentments of the sense, the constitution of primary matter, the deepest root of the individualism of whatever is individual. These questions are called idle by Utilitarians and Positivists; but their pursuit is the very highest of the natural operations of the intellect. In their solution, the imagination, which must

always attend on intellect, is strained to the utmost; but the intellect itself is never so calm and serene as when that faithful attendant has managed for a moment to keep away intrusive images, and to fix the exact forms of some almost unseizable aspect of truth. The labour is great; it is like digging holes in the sand, which instantly fall in on every side; it is like making marks in the water or in the air, which close up again in a moment. But the result is worth the labour; and it is not too much to say that the facility of sustained reasoning depends on the facility of abstraction. Let the student read the argument of Father Harper on "the Foundation of Individual Unity in material and immaterial substances" (p. 224, seq.), and he will arise from its study a weary, perhaps, but a satisfied man; that is to say, if he disagrees with him in his conclusion, as we do, and has satisfactorily seen his way through the reasoning with which he tries to uphold it. For there is nothing that rouses the holding power of the imagination so effectually as a slight glimpse of a sophism; and opposition, whether it end in your taking up a position of your own, or in yielding yourself an unwilling captive to the logical bow and spear of your adversary, is the very best stimulus to the thorough understanding of the details of an intellectual contest.

The third mark of a good Philosophical Text-book is the degree in which it accustoms the mind of the beginner to consecutive reasoning. Distinction and abstraction are very important; but they are important chiefly as a starting-point, as a good view of the road, is important. The proper function of the intellect is "discourse," and the proper office of a Text-book is to teach the intellect to move and be at home in the work for which it is made. A mere hand-book of definitions and explanations is, therefore, of little use. Anything in the shape of a dictionary of terms, however valuable such a work may be in its proper place, is valueless as a substitute for an introduction to Philosophy. There is a tendency, at the present moment, to compress science into hand-books. These books are generally compiled on the principle of giving clear explanations and correct, but easy and popular, statements of theory; of avoiding all controversy; of omitting what is abstruse or obscure, and of rounding off the rugged edges of partially-explored ground at some expense to the sacredness of truth and fact. This feature in contemporary literature is well adapted to produce smatterers; and as long as a smattering is not passed off as something better, there is no harm in it. Small books on great subjects are almost necessarily false, by reason of their omissions, if not of their assertions; but as long as those who read them are modestly aware that they are as far from know-

ing a science because they have read a hand-book, as a man who wears a nautical costume and uses a telescope on shore is from being a sailor, such books may well be tolerated as a superior form of amusement. Philosophy in a hand-book is a worse evil than any other science so treated. No doubt, a certain amount of Philosophical information may be acquired by reading over mere assertions and brief expositions. But, in the first place, Philosophical information is, of all kinds, the most difficult to acquire by a mere statement—seeing that (as we have before insisted) the views of Philosophy never even dawn on the mind unless the mind manages to view them from within itself; and, in the second place, mere information is by no means what is intended to be acquired by a course of Philosophy. Hand-books are as little able to discipline the intellect as they are to rouse it to the using of its own eyes. The danger, on this head, is by no means imaginary. There have appeared, during the last twenty-five years, Text-books—it is not necessary to name them now—which have compressed Philosophy so ruthlessly as to be utterly unworthy to be used in the schools. And there is a tendency on the part, not of professors, but—may we say it?—sometimes of persons who have the direction of professors, so to shorten the time allowed for Philosophy as to lay the unfortunate professor under the necessity of cutting down even the scanty Text-book which he has. All the Text-books, even the most irreproachable, are obliged to be nervous about what are called so glibly “useless questions.” “*Questiones inutiles*,” says Cardinal Zigliara, “*sedulo devito*.” “Sterile and jejune questions, useless questions and vain,” says Father Lepidi, “we have let alone. . . . Into minute matters, which overtax the powers, we have not descended; questions of controversy, subtle and dark, we have not, with immoderate curiosity, discussed.” This, no doubt, is quite as it should be. But there are persons less competent to decide than these two lights of the Dominican Order as to what questions are useless and otiose. No one can pretend to draw an exact line and say that every Text-book must contain such and such questions and ignore such others. Each author has his own method, and each his own peculiarities of view and treatment. But two things may be safely said. First, it would seem to be better to leave out, bodily, a considerable part of the usual Philosophic course, than to cut down the treatment of every question to the scale of a hand-book. Omissions may be made good, and gaps filled up in happier times, if the philosophic insight is once excited, and the philosophic ardour once aroused. But a treatment which only skirts the shores or skims the surface of the great deep of abstract science, leaves

the mind unlifted and unaltered, with hardly a consciousness of what divine Philosophy can be. Secondly—and as a corollary of the same thought—we should look, even in a Text-book for philosophic arguments *de longue haleine*. We should expect that whenever a great subject comes up, or one of those root questions appears from which scholastic science springs, there should be a leisurely and elaborate demonstration. No summary, no bare statement should suffice here. The author should make it his business, by the use of all his scientific machinery—definition, distinction, syllogism on syllogism, answers to difficulties from every quarter of the compass—so to force the student to take in the whole length and breadth, height and depth, of the question, that it may become once and for ever a part of his mind's furniture—a part of his mental life. It must be confessed that most of the modern Text-books are a little unsatisfactory on this point. Cardinal Zigliara, for instance, is clear, full, and also argumentative; but his exposition of great questions seems too slightly developed. The very look of his "Summa," divided into innumerable paragraphs, each with its neat heading in thicker type, is too much after the heart of the makers of hand-books. True, this is more apparent than real, for it often happens that what looks like several independent paragraphs is really the development of one exposition. But one sometimes looks back with regret to a remote time when leisure seemed to be more abundant and Text-books longer. We have before us the "Quæstiones Philosophicæ," of Father Sylvester Mauro, S.J., written in the seventeenth century, about the time that Locke was producing the "Human Understanding." Mauro is not a strict Thomist on every point, and his three volumes, as lately reprinted with a letter of recommendation from Father Liberatore, are both encumbered with obsolete physics, and also are too long for most classes in these days. But his method is perfect. He does not waste time on definitions, annotations, monitions, or observations, but leads off, loud and bold, with a "question" or proposition. A large and substantial question once before the learner's view, he begins its elucidation, plainly stating the conclusion he is going to lead up to. Then comes the demonstration. Like the true Aristotelian he was, he seeks the demonstration in definition; he links the parts of his conclusion together by syllogisms resting on definitions; he pursues a difficult minor from one hiding-place to another, until he brings it to bay with a first principle behind it; during all this process, distinctions, explanations, elucidations of one sort or another, spring into view on every side, and, not being aimless but being imperatively required, are welcomed and scrutinized

instead of being glanced at and forgotten. Then, after a demonstration of a page or two, brought at last to a full and triumphant close, like the first part of a symphony, the work is by no means over. The second part of a classical symphony is often ushered in with curious distortions and degradations of the original theme, with sinister minor progressions and defiant contrary movements. So the "difficulties" follow the demonstration; or rather, indeed, the indication of them had already preceded, and now they are to be disposed of. In this process, fresh distinctions and new explanations are given; the proposition is taken in all round; every protesting combatant is made in the end to swear allegiance to the truth; every cloud in its dissolution and dispersal shows the light shining on some hitherto unsuspected harmony of relation; and as the dust and confusion of the contest subside, the original proposition is found to be standing solid and four-square against the sky, never again to fade out of the landscape. As examples of this, the student is referred, in Father Mauro's work, to the exposition of the composition of Corporeal Substance, to the proof that the soul is the form of the body, and to the long argument on the nature of the Intellectus Agens. It is by the patient following out and mastering such exertations as these that the mind becomes habituated to long and sustained efforts of reasoning, whilst at the same time taking in absolute and immutable truth.

Such are the qualifications, as they occur to us, of books that are worthy to be used as Text-books in our schools of Philosophy. They have been treated chiefly from the point of view that Philosophy is a discipline or training of the mind. It is true, no doubt, that a Philosophical course is more than this, as has already been remarked. The student is expected not only to be trained but to be informed. Such questions as the composition of the material universe, the existence and the spirituality of the soul, the origin of ideas, and the objectiveness of things, afford well nigh the most important information that any intellect can acquire. As to this, however, there is not much difference among Catholic Text-books. Whether one use Zigliara or Lepidi, Gonzales or Palmieri, one may hope, in the end, to get right ideas about the world, the senses, the soul, and the Author of all things. There are one or two matters, however, connected with the question of "information" which it may be useful to mention. The statement, discussion, and refutation of erroneous systems has always occupied much room in Text-books, and given much trouble to professors and to students. It cannot be doubted that it is absolutely necessary to make the learner acquainted with the chief land-marks of Philosophical error. No one has shown himself more earnest than St. Thomas

himself in quoting and setting forth, for the purpose of refutation, the wrong or inadequate teaching of the ancients and of his own contemporaries. But it must be confessed that, in these days, there is a difficulty in dealing with such systems which St. Thomas had not to meet; and it is simply that there are so many of them—and they are so complicated and elaborate, that each one would almost require a Text-book to itself. To discuss and dismiss such names as Plato, Epicurus, Averrhoes, Spinoza, Des Cartes, Locke, and Kant in two paragraphs each, is to leave them as they were—names and nothing more; and it is, moreover, to excite the uneasy suspicion in the mind of the reader that men who have made, for good or for evil, so much noise in the world, must have something more to show for themselves than appears from the summary and off-hand criticism of the Text-book. Besides, the special value of the exposition of false systems, over and above that of mere biography, is that, by their opposition to the truth, they serve to illustrate the truth, and that, in virtue of that portion of truth to which they owe their vitality, they demonstrate the truth. It becomes very difficult, therefore, in a Text-book, to draw the line between a too superficial and a too extended treatment of the “systems” of the philosophers. Yet, all things considered, the prudent professor will probably incline to the Text-book which gives very few, but those few thoroughly representative; which avoids a crowd of names, but discusses with fairly developed completeness the “epoch-making” names which it does undertake to notice. A complete and exhaustive “dictionary” of systems is doubtless a most important *subsidiary* to the class work. Perhaps no better model of such a book could be proposed than Cousin’s translation of Tennemann’s “History of Philosophy.” But the wise compiler of a Philosophic Text will not be led into the temptation of making his book a dictionary. How nearly the best Text-writers do fall into this snare may be seen from an instructive page in the first volume of Father Gonzales. He comes to treat the intellect; and before he states and demonstrates the doctrine of St. Thomas, he gives his “tyros” twenty pages of “systems.” He says he is led to do this, not only by the desire to add to the culture of young beginners and to their zeal for truth, but also for the sake of bringing out into fuller and clearer evidence the Christian theory, which is the same thing as truth and common sense. Then, dismissing the “ancients,” he begins with Plato, and recapitulates, under fourteen separate names, what those fourteen philosophers have thought regarding the nature of the intellect, until he ends with Rosmini. Each of these master-names has a page and a fraction to himself, in which room has

to be found for a few hasty comments from the author ; under each head the words "intellect," "reason," "sense," "idea," and the like, are repeated in different order and varying combination ; and at the end of it all the author declares that he has no space to discuss the views given, much less to refute them, but trusts that his readers will understand what to say or think by the time he has mastered the true exposition which is now to follow. The obvious objections to such a catalogue as this are, first, that for want of a grasp of the true theory, the student will fail to take in the "points" of the systems passed in review ; secondly, that the attention is a limited faculty, and that fourteen picture galleries in one morning, or fourteen Italian tours in one season, are trifles compared with fourteen systems of the intellect in one class-lesson. No stress is laid on the fact that the systems themselves are not treated fairly—that is, not treated so as to show what intellectual significance belonged to each. This could not be otherwise, in the space given. But it may be pointed out that some dozen out of the fourteen names might have been omitted as far as the "tyros" are concerned. It is not important to a beginner to learn by heart—for he cannot grasp it any other way—what Plotinus, or Leibnitz, or Cousin, or Père Gratry, or Hegel ("omissis Fichte et Schelling"), or Jacobi, or Rosmini, thought about the nature of man's intellectual powers. These names might have been reserved. Plato, Malebranche, Kant, Gioberti—these, as the author could not come down to Herbert Spencer, would have been very fair representatives of the most important schools of erroneous thought on this subject. And perhaps the plan of treating "systems" by singling out men who may in the truest sense be called leaders, or by grouping names together according to their leading views, would be practically the best that can be devised. A comparison of the way in which Cardinal Zigliara treats the same matter as that which has been referred to in Father Gonzales, will show how carefully the former distributes over a dozen articles the various theories on ideas and intellect ; taking occasion from the matter in hand to discuss Fichte in one article, Des Cartes in another, Plato in a third, Rosmini in a fourth, and Locke, Kant, Cousin, respectively, in subsequent ones.

One of the most important considerations in regard to a Text-book still remains ; and that is its proper length. But this is a subject on which a single word must suffice. There are only two Text-books of any weight which could be taught in a single year ; and these are the "Compendium" of Father Liberatore and the "Filosofia Scolastica" of Father Cornoldi, with its Latin version by Archbishop Agostini. The former manual is

too well known to require description. Father Cornoldi has written, in the volume of 700 pages here referred to, an excellent compendious introduction to Scholastic Philosophy. To gain space he has steadily resisted the temptation to describe systems. He is anxious to impress virgin minds with the truth, and he has a firm confidence that if they are thoroughly imbued with Aristotle and St. Thomas, supplemented by Dante and St. Bonaventura, the Babel of modern thought will afterwards fail to corrupt them. This is a view for which there is much to be said. Probably, now that the "wisdom" of St. Thomas is authoritatively proposed to Catholic schools as the rule of teaching, there will be less anxiety to take up time with the incomplete systems of other thinkers. The great names will still have to be presented, but the minor ones will be passed over; and even the careers of the leaders will be used more as illustrations of principle than as monumental facts in the history of Philosophy. This may look like obscurantism; but it is not so. What great light of philosophy or science has ever stopped at every page to summarize and refute his predecessors? Not Des Cartes, not John Locke, not Kant, not Herbert Spencer. But the Catholic school has a Philosophy, and a true Philosophy. The important matter is, to teach and to learn that Philosophy. All other Philosophies are only either ancient history, or else, at best, a key to the aberrations of a generation which the Catholic Philosopher wishes to help and save. Therefore we may perhaps expect that manuals like that of Father Cornoldi will now be more or less the rule. But a year—if, indeed, his manual could be thoroughly got through in a year—will be held to be too short. It takes young students six months to gain a footing in abstract science. And now, with every new Text-book, more and more of Aristotle and St. Thomas will be set forth and explained. It is well known that the practice of the best schools is to give two years at least to the course of Philosophy; and we may take for granted that no Text-book will now adapt itself to any shorter time. The best Texts already published, as we need not say, are meant for a three years' course. It is unhappily true, that uncontrollable circumstances frequently interfere to prevent anxious heads of colleges and conscientious professors from giving a course of Philosophy of adequate length. With that, however, we have nothing to do, except to hope for the day when those circumstances may disappear.

It has been said in various forms, by the organs of English and Continental opinion, that the summons of the Encyclical *Æterni Patris* is a summons to Catholics to cut themselves off from the intellectual life of the age they live in, and to devote

their intellectual power, not to lay hold of the world, but to cultivate a small enclosure where the chief growth is abstractions and idle questions. We can only reply to this, that time will show. If truth has any power left, we expect to tighten our hold upon the world by the study of the Thomistic Philosophy. Catholics have now a prospect of unity in abstract science such as they have not had since Erasmus began to denounce mediæval "barbarism." They ought to believe in the might and efficacy of their principles; and they do believe in them. At the same time, it is a great mistake to suppose that we are going to retire within the walls of lecture-rooms and pore exclusively over Latin texts. At first, no doubt, the revival of Scholastic Philosophy—which is not, however, so recent as some think—will chiefly affect the inner circle of Catholicism. The present generation of students, clergy, and laity, too, as far as the laity study Philosophy, must be thoroughly imbued with the "wisdom" of St. Thomas. But, little by little, we may hope to make the world listen to us. This is a result which can only come by degrees. In order to bring it about, one thing seems of the first importance, after a thorough acquisition of the master, and that is the power of transferring scholastic science into the vernacular tongue. Great names, great writers, will arise in time, when a whole generation has been cultured. A genius in Philosophic Science, as in other sciences, does not burst on the world as an isolated phenomenon. He must have been prepared and rendered possible. Before Aristotle there was a culture which began with Thales and came down to Plato; before Thomas there was a generation which culminated in Albert the Great. Professors must expound their Text-books, but must also teach their students to think and talk Philosophy in their mother tongue. They must keep a wary eye on what is going on outside their class-rooms; and without confusing beginners with the speculations of the many-volumed system-weavers, or of the brilliant theorists of the day, they must habituate them to take ground which will stand fast when the rush comes. By what degrees the public thought is to be prepared for scholastic truth, and how quickly that preparation will go on, it is not easy to say. But one thing should be an augury of success. If the name of Thomas is but slightly regarded by the non-Catholic culture of the age, the name of Aristotle is honoured and powerful. His ethical and literary treatises have long been made familiar, by admirable translation, both to students and to general readers. Last year, M. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire finished his fine translation of the whole fourteen books of the *Metaphysics*, illustrated by a perpetual commentary, full of valuable learning, and introduced by

a long preface, not by any means so valuable, but still most useful to a student of the great master. If there is a public for the three elaborate volumes of Saint-Hilaire, as it cannot be doubted there is, it is quite certain that only real learning and a cultured style are required in order that a hearing may be obtained for any part of the Thomistic Philosophy. Father Harper's admirable volume, "The Metaphysics of the School," is a splendid venture in a cause that is sure to succeed some day. We call it a venture, because we have no means of knowing whether the time has come when a sufficient number of readers can be counted on for such a book. But however it is received by the outside public, for whom it is chiefly intended, it is a great acquisition to Catholic Philosophy, and a grand monument of the learning, the power, and the patience of one man. Father Harper's volume, goodly as it is, no doubt looks small compared with the Disputations of a Suarez; even when the five volumes of the work are finished—and we judge from certain stray indications that the second volume at least is nearly completed—they will not show very large beside those gigantic tomes which years of patient labour in peaceful Spanish convents or Italian colleges gradually built up. But, if we mistake not, every line of Father Harper's book has cost him twice or thrice the trouble which he would have had to undergo had he lived in the Spain of Suarez, or the Italy of Cardinal Gotti. He has not only made the attempt to speak Scholastic Philosophy in English, and in good, genuine English, but he has fairly and truly succeeded. Probably only those who have tried to do this can appreciate the amount of labour involved. The volume now given to the world is not a Text-book, but it is a lesson, on a great scale, on how to make Text-books useful. It treats, principally, the question of Being. The whole subject of Ontology—Being in itself and its attributes, essence, existence, unity, truth, goodness—this is the fertile country through which he leads the reader. If the volume were of no other use than to afford thoroughly worked-out examples of elaborate and sustained argumentation, it would be a treasure and a prize. But to the student it is in many other ways most valuable. It will help him to "translate" his Philosophy into current speech; it will assist him in correcting his slovenly and slipshod English; it will make him ashamed of unnecessary barbarisms; and it will not unfrequently kindle a spark of true philosophic fire by the keen and nervous "rally" of its responses, or the solid and vigorous phrasing of its demonstration. The book contains many things which might be criticized, and there are matters of some importance to which exception might be taken. But we decline to do anything more at the present moment than

to welcome a noble work. We can only recommend professors, students, and cultured readers of all sorts to study it, and to try to master it. Its pages will brace, like sea air in October, those wits which are apt to grow so flaccid in the atmosphere of "articles" and of science made easy. And then, when the book has been read and taken in, the author will, we do not doubt, be the first and the readiest to welcome intelligent criticism.



ART. VIII.—THE DISTRESS IN IRELAND.

1. *Correspondence Relative to Measures for the Relief of Distress in Ireland, 1879-80.* Presented to Parliament by command of Her Majesty. 1880.
2. *Preliminary Report on the Returns of Agricultural Produce in Ireland, in 1879, with Tables.* Presented to Parliament by command of Her Majesty. 1880.
3. *The Irish Land Question and English Public Opinion.* By R. BARRY O'BRIEN. London and Dublin. 1880.

WE are in possession of too many facts to doubt the existence in Ireland of wide-spread hunger, want, and disease. One word would express all these, but we hesitate to employ it; for "famine" has, in Ireland, such dread associations as to forbid the application of that word except to the last phase of national disaster. The culminating horrors of forty-seven are so vividly remembered, that the expression "the Irish famine" must still be appropriated to the terrible events of that year; while under the name of "distress" are included almost all degrees of suffering short of actual death from starvation. Poverty, cold, hunger, with the epidemics that always follow in their train, afflict the people throughout a wide area of the country. In many a cabin there is neither money, fuel, nor food—nay, not even bedding, or coverlet; and, too often, the broken roof exposes the diseased and emaciated inmate to the inclemency of the weather. Fever and dysentery have already appeared, and cannot fail to gather in the harvest of death with fearful rapidity, where the sole nourishment for the sick consists of a ration of Indian meal, or the fragments of half-rotten potatoes. We are told that no death has taken place from starvation; and down to the end of last year the Registrar-General has vouched for the accuracy of the statement; but if we consider how the sick-room ought to be stocked with delicate nourishment, and

how much convalescence depends upon the proper adaptation of tempting diet to the needs of the patient, we cannot ignore starvation as a preponderating factor in cases officially ascribed to various forms of disease. We have no desire to exaggerate the magnitude of Ireland's misfortune; but it is right that our readers, who may not be familiar with the phases of Irish life, should comprehend the full extent of the prevailing distress. It must not be supposed that it merely means a few luxuries the less, for with luxuries, alas! the poor fishermen of the Western islands, and the labourers of Donegal, Mayo, Connemara, and Kerry, have but slight acquaintance. The margin dividing many of them, even in prosperous times, from starvation or the workhouse is terribly narrow; and when the pressure of a bad harvest comes upon them there is little room for retrenchment except in the *quantity* of their food. Potatoes are replaced by Indian meal earlier than usual, the milk or buttermilk which makes the gritty cake palatable has next to be abandoned, and finally the stock runs so low that the family is reduced to a single meal per diem. On this minimum of nutriment we believe that hundreds of thousands of the poor inhabitants of the West are now subsisting. Many have exhausted all their resources; the stock of potatoes is consumed, the little money they possessed has been spent, all their available articles of furniture have been pawned, and the shopkeepers will no longer give them credit for the necessaries of life. For their single meal they are dependent on the dole of charity, and the anguish of uncertainty embitters their miserable lot. We have to lament not only a deficiency in food, but also a scarcity of fuel. The persistent rains of last summer made it next to impossible to dry the turf, and many a hearth is dark and cold in consequence. And such a hearth! Let the reader picture to himself a mud cabin protected but partially by decayed thatch from the dropping of the rain, with no windows, a low door approached by a causeway between two reeking cess-pools, a damp earthen floor, a bundle of fetid straw the only bed, not a chair or table, but a bench and two or three low wooden stools, and such few domestic utensils as are absolutely necessary, and he will see the condition of a typical Irish hovel. Let him people it with a woe-begone man, his head resting on his hands, a gaunt and haggard woman, a troop of half-clad children, and too often a moaning victim of the fever in some dark corner, and the full meaning of Irish distress will become painfully apparent. This is no fanciful picture. There is not a league of the coast from Malin Head to Cape Clear which could not supply the original of the sketch. We do not conjure up these visions of misery to harrow unnecessarily the feelings of our readers, but

in the interest of truth, that they may appreciate the sufferings which their charity is called upon to alleviate. There are, indeed, few years in which the condition of certain districts along the Atlantic coast does not approach closely to what we have described. But the extreme distress lasts for only a short time, and in a few of the most desolate regions : the inhabitants suffer in silence, and are sustained by the hopes of the coming harvest. It is only when, as in the present year, such distress prevails extensively and prematurely that the great outside world hears the low moan of a starving people. We need scarcely say that we have been speaking of the poorest class in the kingdom, we might almost say in the world, men whose condition marks the zero of the social scale; for below this depth of poverty it is impossible to sink and live. The present distress, however, extends far beyond the limits of that class whose extreme destitution we have attempted to describe. The labourer who pays in farm work the rent of his quarter acre, the cottier who supplements the produce of his holding by his earnings in the harvest fields of England, and the tenant who is generally far removed from want, are now alike involved in indistinguishable ruin.

Lest this lugubrious picture should be judged to be overwrought, we shall adduce evidence of its painful reality; but let us first endeavour to give some idea of the geographical distribution of the distress. This is not an easy task, for there is no county of Ireland which does not suffer more or less from the failure of the crops,* and there are few that do not contain some Union where the cry for relief has been raised. A general idea of the prevalence of actual want may be derived by drawing a line on the map from Londonderry to Cork. That line divides Ireland into almost equal areas, but the eastern half contains a million more inhabitants than the western, and its valuation is more than double, while its commerce and manufactures are vastly in excess of the less favoured moiety of the country. It is not surprising, then, that the latter should include all the districts where the suffering is most intense. If the map were shaded in proportion to the poverty of the inhabitants, so as to express to the eye the destitution of each locality, it would be found that a dense black band would border the Atlantic, that its darkness would gradually diminish from the coast inwards, and that to the east of the line which we have mentioned,

* On the 29th February, twenty-nine out of the thirty-two counties in Ireland had received grants from the Mansion House Fund; but more than half the total sum had been given to the four counties, Galway, Mayo, Cork, and Kerry.

though there might be a sombre tinge of grey, there would be but few specks of absolute blackness.

In the Report of the Local Government Board to the Irish Executive on the 18th November, 1879, the following passage occurs, which illustrates the extent of the distress at that early time :—

As the want of employment is general throughout Ireland, it is difficult at present to define the particular districts in which the labouring population are especially in need of assistance, but, taking the reports of their Inspectors, as well as the amount of the poor rates, and other circumstances into consideration, the Board think that the whole of the Province of Connaught—the County Donegal in Ulster—and the Counties Clare, Kerry, and West Riding of Cork in Munster, might at present be deemed distressed districts.

And in the list of “distressed unions,” published on the 13th January, 1880, as a Schedule to the Board of Works Notice, only four out of seventy unions lie in the eastern half of the country.

These facts give statistical confirmation of our statement that the urgent pressure of want is to be found only in the western half of Ireland. We must now present to our readers the testimony of eye-witnesses as to the nature of the distress. Mr. Mitchell Henry, M.P., an Englishman and a Protestant, who has shown what can be effected by capital and industry in the reclamation of the barren wastes of Galway, thus describes the condition of the peasantry about Kylemore :

The people (he says) have neither food, nor clothes, nor credit to buy them, nor work to earn them. Blank despair is settling down upon the district, and the efforts of the few in this locality who can give a little employment, are but as a drop in the ocean of misery around.

The same gentleman, in the debate on the Address, asserted that “if it had not been for the action of private charity, thousands of persons would have died from famine in Ireland.” A statement which was corroborated by many other Irish members, and which, indeed, no one was prepared to controvert. Numberless instances of extreme destitution were adduced, sufficient to startle demure legislators from the dream of the satisfactory working of economic laws, into the belief that something should be done to avert impending famine.

Colonel Colthurst, one of the Members for Cork, speaking in the same debate, gave a deplorable account of what he had himself seen in the parishes of East and West Skull, a barren district lying in the west of the county which he represents :

He found in each of those two parishes, not less than 300 families

on the verge of starvation, having no food, no money, and no credit. They had been living on one meal a day, and that of Indian meal. Holding a small portion of land, they were disqualified from receiving out-door relief under the poor-law. The Workhouse was built to hold 1000, and there were only 150 inmates.

Mr. Blennerhassett, M.P., described a district in the County of Kerry containing some thirty or forty square miles of mountainous country, where a population of 20,000 had been slowly starving for several months. Why multiply instances? 'The same dolorous cry was sent forth by almost every Irish Member who spoke in that debate. With the policy of their demands we are not now dealing; it is enough for our present purpose that they furnished conclusive evidence of widespread destitution, and were unanimous in their appeal for Government assistance.

If we turn to another set of witnesses, the special correspondents of the various papers, English and Irish, Liberal, Conservative, and Nationalist, we find the same sad story repeated without substantial variation. Here and there we may detect some trace of imaginative colouring, or an indication that the visitor was helped to his conclusions by a judicious representation of the worst cases. An incident which occurred in the autumn of 1846 may serve to explain how this is possible. In that season of threatened famine it was deemed expedient to collect authentic information as to the failure of the crops. Accordingly, commissioners were despatched into the rural districts to make the necessary inquiries. One of these gentlemen applied to a local landowner for assistance, and the latter, too busy to accompany him in person on his rounds, handed him over to one of the principal tenants, Paddy Mahoney, who was to act as *cicerone*. "And now be sure, Paddy," said the landlord, "to show this gentleman from the Government over the land, and tell him everything you know." With obsequious bows, and an expression of the utmost stolidity, Paddy promised obedience to the minute directions which he received. No sooner, however, had he quitted the room with the Saxon visitor, than he darted back, the assumed veil of stolidity swept off, his grey eyes sparkling with malicious roguery, every line in his face expressive of fun and cunning, and whispered to his landlord—"Wisha, yer honor, is it the truth I'll tell him, or will I make it a little bit worse?" In spite of the indignant reply which he received, it is said that the reports of that district were not easily recognised by the inhabitants when they were subsequently published by "the gentleman from the Government."

But we believe that, except in perhaps a few cases, the special correspondents visited really representative villages, and dis-

passionately described the scenes of suffering which they witnessed ; and that their reports may, therefore, be accepted as substantially accurate accounts of the condition of the country. The gratitude of Ireland is, at any rate, due to them for the extensive publication of her woes, and advertisement of her necessities.

There is still another source of information to which we turn with the greatest confidence, the Reports of the Local Relief Committees. They are furnished by persons well acquainted with each district, under the full sense of responsibility, and controlled by the necessity of keeping rigidly accurate accounts of their expenditure, and by the occasional visits of inspectors from the central committees. The extent of distress revealed by these reports seems to increase day by day ; and therefore the figures which we give cannot be taken as representing more than the condition of the districts to which they refer towards the end of February. From the Relief Committee in Donegal we learn that there were in that county 12,700 families, or 66,000 persons in actual want, and in receipt of relief. These numbers represent one-third of the total population. An equally high rate of destitution prevailed in some parts of Mayo ; for example, there were 10,000 cases of urgent distress in Claremorris, and 5613 persons had been relieved during one week in Castlebar ; while 850 families were destitute in Loughrea (Co. Galway) ; 2000 families were in great distress in Manorhamilton (Co. Leitrim) ; and no less than 4000 persons in the immediate vicinity of Athlone. These instances might be increased almost indefinitely ; we shall add but one taken from the extreme south-west of the County of Cork. The Local Committee of Castletown, Berehaven, write :—

Hundreds of families that did not need relief three weeks ago are now wildly crying to the Committee for food, and so persistent are they in their appeals, that it is impossible to distribute to them the rations of meal without the assistance of the police. Bere Island has a population of about one thousand, of whom twenty-two families, or about 110 individuals, are supposed to be able to live without relief for one month.*

This approaches very near to famine ; and we can only hope that its development will be stayed by some means, whether by the efforts of private charity, or the organized action of the Government.

There is one circumstance which cannot fail to astonish the English reader who is but partially acquainted with Irish life, and render him sceptical as to the existence of actual want—

* "Freeman's Journal," Feb. 18, 1880.

namely, that the workhouses are not full. Although there is at the present time an increase of some 20,000 persons in receipt of Poor Law Relief, as compared with the same period of last year, yet the vast establishments which offer gratuitous food and shelter to the destitute are still far from being fully occupied. How is this fact consistent with the misery which we have described? Nothing is more characteristic of the Celt than his detestation of becoming a pauper. It involves social degradation, the disruption of his family, the loss of personal liberty, and separation from the home, to which, though wretched, he clings with extraordinary devotion. Hunger, cold and nakedness cannot always conquer his natural repugnance to the livery of destitution, and the discipline of the detested "House;" and many a man deliberately faces the horrors of slow starvation rather than seek an asylum where he is separated from all he loves. There are two conditions, moreover, which limit the efficacy of the Poor Law in dealing with a time of trial like the present; one is that outdoor relief cannot be given to the able-bodied while there is room for them in the workhouse; the other precludes the holder of more than a rood of land from obtaining such relief. This "quarter acre clause" especially tends to withdraw from the most deserving the only form of assistance which they can avail themselves of, and to place the poverty-stricken occupier of a little patch of land in the predicament of either surrendering his holding for ever, or being excluded from all relief. It is these small holders who at present swell the lists of distress, and are most worthy of assistance, since by a little timely aid they may be able to tide over the crisis of adversity.

If we turn from the actual condition of the people to the proximate cause of this distress, we find it fully accounted for in the Agricultural Returns prefixed to this Article. Accompanying these Returns is a Meteorological Report disclosing such a condition of the elements during 1879 as explains the disastrous harvest. We learn that the mean temperature of every one of the first nine months of the year was considerably below the average, while the amount of cloud and the rain-fall were in corresponding excess. In February, June, and July, the quantity of rain was double what the observations of years would lead us to expect; and thus wet and cold combined their malignant influences to thwart the bountiful efforts of Nature. The result of these atmospheric conditions is a row of figures which are simply appalling. The estimated produce of every crop shows an alarming deficiency. Potatoes, still the staple food of a large proportion of the population, are set down as 1,113,676 tons, against 2,526,504 tons in 1878; and of turnips

there are but 2,057,804 tons as compared with 4,686,226 tons. In each of these cases the produce is less than half what it was in the preceding year. In fact, the yield of potatoes is only about one-third of the average. The cereal crops have also suffered, though not to so great an extent. The loss in money value to the country from this unfavourable harvest is estimated at upwards of ten millions sterling as compared with 1878—a stupendous loss for so poor a country as Ireland to be called upon to bear in one year! The Registrar-General writes:

The great bulk of the money loss is on the potato crop, in which the diminution of value is 4,238,484*l.* as compared with 1878, and 5,771,927*l.* as compared with the average value of the crops for ten years.

This loss is distributed very evenly over the entire country; but its effect has been only to impoverish the usually prosperous counties, while it has reduced to starvation those districts entirely dependent on this precarious article of food.

The reader who appreciates these figures at their full value will no longer doubt the existence of real distress; but may possibly feel surprise that it is not more widely spread and more disastrous in its results, especially if he remembers that Ireland is almost wholly dependent upon her agricultural produce for the maintenance of her population. England was deluged by the same floods of rain: the sun displayed no partiality for her green and sodden corn, and when the story of her harvest comes to be written it will, we believe, be not more encouraging than that of Ireland. How comes it that what is ruin to one country is only comparative discomfort to the other? The answer is that agriculture is Ireland's sole resource, while in England it is only one of several branches of national revenue. A purely agricultural country must produce food enough to support its inhabitants, else they must starve or beg. If either England or Ireland had been cut off last autumn from all communication with the rest of the world, and the blockade effectively maintained till next harvest, famine must inevitably have resulted, and a large number of the inhabitants perished through starvation. Now, this represents the normal condition of England. She is the workshop of the world, not its granary; and from the ends of the earth the food of her children is supplied in exchange for manufactures which depend equally upon her industry and her wonderful subterranean resources. Mines beneath the surface, and factories raised upon it contribute equally with her corn and cattle to support her population. She possesses the ample accommodation of a house built in three storeys. Poor Ireland, however, has nothing but her superficial vesture. In some

counties, indeed, coal is worked ; but the total supply is less than one-thousandth part of that produced annually by England. In like manner her copper, lead, and iron bear a completely insignificant proportion to the quantities extracted from English mines. On the wild shores of Roaring Water Bay—one of the poorest districts in Ireland—gold is mixed with the quartz, and the outcrop of copper ore is so tempting as to have lured many speculators to their ruin. The gold does not pay for crushing the quartz, the copper lodes fade away as the explorer follows them into the bowels of the earth, so that the mines have to be abandoned, or worked at a rapidly diminishing rate of profit. The manufactures of Ireland offer an equally painful contrast. Linen, indeed, may be regarded as an exception ; for the export value of this commodity amounts annually to a very large sum ; but this is almost confined to the Province of Ulster, and may in part account for its relative prosperity. Two hundred years ago the woollen trade was so flourishing that Irish wools enjoyed a high reputation all over Europe. Now it furnishes employment to less than 2000 persons. Almost all the exports consist of bacon, butter, and live stock—that is to say, of agricultural produce. These must pay not only for what she imports, but also for her quota towards the imperial expenditure, and the interest upon English capital invested in her railways and other public works. It is only what is left after these deductions that is available for the support of her population.

Ireland is, then, a purely agricultural country ; and her welfare may be said to depend on the thermometer and the rain-gauge. In such a country there is manifestly a limit to the number of persons who can obtain food from the soil. It is not for the well-being of society that the actual number should closely approach that limit ; for a multitude of discontented, under-fed peasants, ever engaged in a bitter struggle for mere existence, can scarcely be regarded as constituting a happy community. It would be well if the population were determined by the *minimum* of production, leaving a margin of prosperity in favourable years ; while in seasons of disaster like the present they could, at all events, support life without the aid of international charity.

The crop, too, on which they stake their existence is essentially a precarious one. If we cast our eyes down the line of figures representing the produce of that crop for the last twenty years, we cannot fail to be struck by its extraordinary vicissitudes. Four times in that period has it produced upwards of four million tons, four times has it fallen below *half* that quantity. And it is the food of the people, the necessary support of life which is thus the sport of the elements ! To rely

wholly, or chiefly, on this treacherous root is to gamble for human lives ; and is altogether indefensible since the experience of that terrible year (1846) when the entire sustenance of nearly nine millions of people was consumed in a single night. The angel of death seemed to have passed over the land ; the flowering garden became a mass of blackened and putrid vegetation ; the noxious odour tainted every breath of wind ; and on the faces of the peasantry was written the mournful presage of impending famine.

It is a mischievous illusion that the people of Ireland were before that signal visitation prosperous and comfortable. The Duke of Wellington, speaking in the House of Lords in 1838 on the Poor Law Bill, stated :

That from the year 1806, down to the present time, a year has not passed in which the Government have not been called on to give assistance to relieve the poverty and distress which prevailed in Ireland.

In 1823, and again in 1831, famine occurred, and large sums of money were granted by Parliament, and subscribed by individuals to save the people from starvation ; and in almost every year from 1835 there had been such a failure as to produce local distress. Since that time considerable changes have been effected in the condition of the country. The potato has been partially replaced by less remunerative, but also less hazardous crops ; while the population has dwindled from nine to little more than five millions. Still, we fear that the poorer districts are, even at the present time, too densely populated. A high authority has stated that in some parts of the West of Ireland there are three times as many people as the soil can be legitimately expected to support. We believe this to be by no means an extravagant estimate. While we feel the deepest sympathy with these poor cottiers, we should wish to see their numbers gradually diminished, so that squalid poverty might be replaced by cottages, gardens, well-kept farms, and comfortable living. Any change in this respect must necessarily be of slow growth, and must depend upon the diffusion of a higher standard of comfort, and the cultivation of taste, rather than upon direct efforts for the improvement of the material condition of the people.

We now return to the crying necessity of the hour, and the measures which have been taken for its relief ; and we must, in the first place, consider what the Government has done, and how far its policy is worthy of approval. If they have erred, it has not been from ignorance of the condition of the country, which was repeatedly and earnestly brought under the notice of

the authorities by the most influential persons. The Catholic Bishops, the Irish Members of Parliament, Boards of Guardians throughout the country—all told the same tale; and, even if they were inclined to disregard such evidence, the Report of the Local Government Board on the 28th October placed the Irish Executive in full privy with the wants of the people. The potato crop is described in that Report “as almost everywhere deficient in quantity, inferior in quality, and affected by blight, and not likely to be more than half an average crop.” The general harvest, with the exception of oats, “appeared to be inferior, and the crop deficient;” and as to the supply of turf, the Board concludes that “it is everywhere greatly deficient, and much suffering and sickness is anticipated from this cause.” On the general condition of the country the statements were not more auspicious. The prices of cattle were low, the once-flourishing kelp trade was almost extinct, the banks refused further credit, the farmers were deeply in debt to money-lenders and shopkeepers, and there was already an alarming increase in the number of persons receiving Poor-Law Relief. The action of the Government was reduced to the very minimum of interference. A circular was sent to all the Boards of Guardians warning them to make due provision for “the possible contingencies of the season;” and the Board of Works sought to stimulate private expenditure by the offer of loans on advantageous terms: they were not such, however, as to procure a general rush for the division of spoil, and on the 12th January a further notice offered a more alluring bait. The total remission of interest for two years, and a subsequent rate of only one per cent. produced the desired effect; and before the 29th of February, the time limited for the expiration of the notice, applications had been received for advances to a far larger amount than the Government will probably sanction.

Another expedient was adopted to induce the country to exert itself for its own support. Extraordinary Baronial Sessions were called together for the purpose of “presenting” any useful engineering works which could be immediately undertaken with advantage; and, in order to relieve the Baronies from all financial difficulty, loans were, at the same time, offered by the Government on very favourable terms both as to interest and time of repayment. But the constitution of the bodies to whom the initiation of these works has been entrusted, is such as to lead us to suppose that the powers conferred will be but slightly made use of. The magistrates and associated cess-payers represent the interests of *property*; and relieving distress by presentment—for that is what is intended—amounts to a further tax on the already heavily-burthened land. Moreover,

after an application has been approved of by the Presentment Sessions, it has still to run the gauntlet of official criticism. It must be sanctioned by the Board of Works on financial grounds, and by the Executive Government as pertaining to a sufficiently distressed district. It is to be hoped that the "survival of the fittest" may apply in this case, and that after three expurgations jobbery and corruption may be banished from these works.

No one will accuse the Government of having done too much; and its position has been strictly one of reserve while other agencies were found capable of sustaining the conflict. Indeed, the loans which have been authorised have not yet filtered, even in the minutest drops, into the empty pockets of the labourers. The machinery of the Improvement Acts and Presentment Sessions is somewhat slow in being set in motion. Preliminary surveys, plans, and estimates have to be made and duly approved before a single instalment becomes available for the relief of the district; and it must be admitted that but for private charity many deaths from starvation would have assuredly taken place.

Cautious as the action of the Government undoubtedly was, it was nevertheless in excess of their powers; and they had accordingly, on the meeting of Parliament, to apply for "a covering authority." The Relief Bill, which was introduced partly to indemnify for the past, partly to justify future action on the same lines, contained some important provisions which it is necessary briefly to mention. This measure, which obtained the Royal assent on the 15th of March amends the Poor Law by suspending "the Gregory" clause during the present year, thus enabling the Guardians to administer outdoor relief in food and fuel to occupiers of land; and it also empowers them, with the sanction of the Local Government Board, to borrow money on the credit of the rates of distressed electoral divisions. It also defines the terms on which Government Loans are to be granted to individuals and public bodies; but the part of the Act which now more immediately concerns us is that which deals with the financial aspect of the question. A large, if not a highly enlightened, part of the community regard "the Government" very much in the light of those sullen but obedient genii who play so prominent a part in the "Arabian Nights." The friction of a ring, or the utterance of a mystic word, compels the attendance of the potent spirit, who is always able to produce unlimited stores of wealth without impoverishing any one. The analogy, we fear, extends no farther than the formality which is requisite in approaching the treasuries of both. The true position of the Government is that of trustees of the national funds, and however liberally the

expression "public good" may be interpreted, yet it is only in cases of extreme necessity and as a last resort that imperial funds should be devoted to the relief of local distress. That the circumstances in Ireland amounted to a case of extreme necessity, and justified a departure from the ordinary rules, is admitted as fully by a gift of interest as by the expenditure of capital. In order to keep the people from starving, work or food had to be provided, but no one was willing to borrow at the ordinary rates. Who was then to pay the difference? Under normal conditions the necessary moneys should be provided, as they were, in 1863, for the Lancashire operatives, out of the Consolidated Fund. But the disendowment of the Irish Church has perplexed the country with a fund which calls aloud for appropriation. She has come in for a fortune, and does not know how to spend it. The Parliament that created it laid down the rule that it should be used "for the relief of unavoidable calamity and suffering, yet not so as to cancel or impair the obligations now attached to property under the Acts for the relief of the poor." Of course this is not a law to all future Parliaments. It has been already twice beneficently violated by giving 1,000,000*l.* to intermediate education, and 1,300,000*l.* for pensions to national school teachers; and it is indeed difficult to imagine a case strictly satisfying both the positive and the negative requirements of the clause. But whatever purpose this money is devoted to should be a permanent benefit to the country, a monument for all time. To seize it for transitory relief in the first season of scarcity is to misappropriate for the benefit of one generation the inalienable property of the nation. We shall have a word to say as to the application of this fund a little later on; but now we merely protest against its being charged with the cost of relieving the present distress—for, after being cleared of all the jugglery of finance, that is what is proposed by the Government measure. The Church Commissioners are to advance three-quarters of a million at low interest, but they, being merely reversioners after the lives of the existing incumbents, must raise the money themselves by ecclesiastical post obits. To facilitate the transaction the National Debt Commissioners are empowered to lend the requisite funds at the market rate; so that in the result the loss of interest is thrown upon the Church surplus. It may seem a small matter to dispute about; but the maxim *de minimis non curat lex* is a dangerous one in politics, and the precedent may be appealed to at some future time to justify improvident dispositions of the fund.

We pass with great pleasure from the description of the Government precautions to the noble efforts of private charity.

Not only in Ireland and England have large subscriptions been raised, but in almost every country in the world has the cry of suffering been heard, and responded to with generous sympathy. The United States and Canada have, both by public grants and private munificence, come forward with enthusiasm; Australia and New Zealand have sent to the Mansion House Fund 55,570*l.*; India and the Cape of Good Hope have not been backward; in a word, wherever the English language is spoken the suffering poor of Ireland have been charitably remembered. Nor has the feeling been confined within the limits of race and language; Catholic France has shown, as might have been expected, the most lively sympathy with Catholic Ireland; and special committees have been organized in Paris and other cities for the collection of subscriptions.

Independently of the money disbursed unofficially by the bishops and clergy as the almoners of private charity, the sum that has been raised in less than two months from all sources amounts to 359,000*l.* In the receipt and distribution of this large fund no fewer than four charitable organizations are already engaged; and it is evident that unless the most stringent precautions are observed, there is great danger in this independent action of demoralizing the people by indiscriminate charity.

It was only one week before Christmas that the letter of the Duchess of Marlborough appeared in the *Times*, and startled all England by begging for subscriptions, in the most earnest terms, for the relief of distress. Her committee was organized almost immediately, and shortly afterwards another committee was constituted under the Presidency of the Lord Mayor of Dublin. These two bodies seem to have done as much as could be expected by interchanging reports to avert the dangers of a dual system; and they deserve the highest praise for the energy with which they entered upon the noble rivalry of good works. Up to the 4th of March 78,315*l.* had been received by the Duchess of Marlborough and 100,647*l.* by the Lord Mayor; and of these sums, about half had been expended in grants to distressed districts. Although the mode of operation of these two committees is dissimilar in some details, the general plans on which they proceed are alike in these respects, that they work through local committees, and that relief is only furnished in food, fuel, and clothing. The Duchess of Marlborough's Committee is in communication with fifty central committees, and they again have numerous sub-committees in each district. The Mansion House Committee, on the contrary, communicates directly with its parish committees, which are six hundred in number. It may be safely asserted that thousands of the inhabitants of the West owe their lives to the benevolent and

timely intervention of these two bodies. This consolatory reflection and the ample recognition which their labours receive in Ireland must be an abundant compensation for the malignant attacks to which they have recently been exposed in America. We do not wish to dwell on this painful episode, nor have we sufficiently authentic accounts before us to say what measure of success has attended the attempt to raise a mixed fund for relief and agitation.

If charity has not altogether escaped from political animosities, it has with one exception avoided sectarian strife. The Catholic and Protestant Archbishops of Dublin meet at the Board of the Mansion House Committee; the parish priest and the rector vie with each other in the endeavour to feed the hungry, and neither dreams of insisting on a doctrinal qualification for the receipt of meal. The exception to which we allude occurred in one of the most needy spots in Ireland, Clifden, in the County of Galway, and was due to the uncompromising action of the members of the Church Mission Society. In that wretched district, where thousands of poor creatures did not know where to look for their next meal, the Duchess of Marlborough was constrained to dissolve her committee because the members of the Church Missions refused to give a pledge that they would not use the funds for proselytizing purposes. It is said that under the pressure of a common peril the fiercest animals lay aside their habitual animosities, and couch together in perfect peace. But it seems that the Irish Church Missionaries possess a stock of sectarian ferocity which is not exhausted by famine and desolation; in fact, these constitute their season of harvest, or, to use the words of the rector of Clifden himself, it is a time "so encouraging in the prospects of Missionary enterprise" that they feel bound to redouble their exertions. To offer food and false doctrine to a famishing peasant on condition of his accepting both or neither, differs in no respect from the alternative presented to the Roman Martyrs of death or sacrifice. It is only in the "encouraging times" of general starvation that a few proselytes are won over to a show of conformity. "If the potatoes grow again, 'tis the sheep will be kept there," was the remark of a Cape Clear fisherman, pointing to a neat church which had been built in the island during the famine years. The rude phrase of the boatman expresses the general feeling of the people. There is no name more odious in the ears of an Irishman than "souper," the familiar term by which they stigmatize one who changes his religion for gastronomical reasons.

We have enumerated the principal measures which have, up to the present time, been taken for the relief of distress; and

taking into account that Ireland has lost ten millions sterling through the deficiency of the last harvest, it is evident that those measures must still leave a great void to be supplied ; and that it is too probable that the season of trial has not yet attained to its maximum of severity. There are two sources of grave uneasiness in the present condition of the country. One, that labour may be diverted from the ordinary agricultural operations by the superior attractions of immediate wages on the works that are about to be undertaken ; the other, that a deficiency in seed may leave large tracts of ground absolutely unproductive in the next harvest. But even if the coming autumn should furnish an abundant supply of food, it will not be available until the middle of August. In the meantime the people have to rely upon extraneous aid. The labourers, indeed, might support themselves on their earnings for the next few months, if the farmers were in a position to pay wages ; but the smaller class of farmers, and those labourers who give work in return for their crop, cannot look for assistance in this direction. It is, therefore, to be feared, that the months of June and July will see even more widespread destitution than now prevails. It would be well that the problem of supplying the necessities of the people during those months should be boldly faced. We learn from the past ; our own blunders instruct the future ; and one lesson which has been taught by the former famine is that relief works, that is to say, public works undertaken without regard to their utility, but merely for the purpose of applying a labour test for the receipt of relief, are a fatal mistake. In condemnation of them it is almost sufficient to point out that where want is spread over the whole country, centres of industry are of no avail. The relief must be brought to each man's door, or at least within easy reach. In 1847 numbers perished on the roads in seeking to reach the works from their distant homes ; and their daily journeys must have been a fearful tax on their enfeebled frames. The labour of famine-stricken men is a mockery, and whether the work is executed by task or by contract, it fails to give efficient relief to the really destitute. The plan which successfully grappled with the terrible crisis of 1847 consisted in the gratuitous administration of food by local committees : the expenses being defrayed by the rates, by free grants from the Treasury in cases of urgent necessity, and by private subscriptions. By these means nearly 3,000,000 persons were daily fed from the closing of the relief works in April to the middle of August. If our mournful anticipations should prove correct, some such scheme will, we fear, have to be now adopted ; but, of course, not to the same extent as was necessary on the former occasion.

We have attempted to describe the nature and extent of the present distress, and the measures which have been taken for its alleviation; but we should be fulfilling only part of our duty if we refrained from considering the more permanent evils from which Ireland suffers. The scanty harvest of 1879 will be soon forgotten, but the causes which have produced poverty, discontent, and disloyalty in the past still threaten the future.

The Celt has a retentive memory for wrongs, and the confiscations, oppressions, and legislative outrages of centuries are still a living reality to his mind.* Inflammatory anniversaries are celebrated with an ardour that too frequently terminates in bloodshed; and the relations of landlord and tenant are embittered by political agitation.

Nearly three hundred years ago the poet Spenser wrote of Ireland the following sentence:—

There have beene divers good plottes devised, and wise Counsellors cast allready about reformation of that realme; but they say, it is the fatall desteny of that land, that noe purposes, whatsoever are meant for her good, will prosper or take good effect.

But as the "good plottes" consisted for the most part in a policy of extermination, and keeping "still the souldiours on theyr necke," perhaps we ought not to be surprised at their want of success. Centuries of misgovernment by a dominant class are still producing their baleful fruit; and, though justice and toleration are now the guiding principles of English rule, we must remember that the change has only been effected in comparatively recent times. We do not believe in any sudden transformation to a condition of peace and prosperity being produced by legislative measures. Social changes are of slow growth, especially in the direction of improvement; yet our hope for Ireland rests altogether on the establishment of healthy relations between the classes of society, and a wise oblivion of the past. Never in the history of the country did such a consummation seem more remote. In the autumn of last year Mr. Parnell and other members of Parliament commenced a systematic campaign against the rights of property. Meetings were convened in almost every county of Ireland, and were largely attended by the neighbouring peasantry. The avowed purpose of this vehement agitation was to encourage the tenants to resist the payment of "unjust rents;" but, as the tenant himself was to be the judge of what was "unjust," it is not surprising that the more simple doctrine of not paying *any* rent met with very general approval.

* For a resumé of Ireland's grievances in the past, see "The Irish Land Question and English Public Opinion."

We would not, in condemning this anti-rent agitation, be understood as questioning the right of all classes to assemble in a peaceable and orderly manner for the representation of their grievances: but a serious responsibility is incurred by those who initiate such a movement among an excitable people, and stimulate their passions almost to madness by rhetorical absurdities. Some of Mr. Parnell's hearers seem clearly to have "burst the curb," and put their own interpretation upon his advice, "to keep a firm grip of their homesteads" by shouting, "Shoot the landlords," "Give them an ounce of lead," and other equally significant phrases. Nothing is more melancholy in the history of this anti-rent movement than the toleration which these utterances met with, not only among the crowd, but also on the platform. On one occasion, indeed, the chairman interposed to deprecate a resort to violence, when the speaker, Mr. Killen, is reported to have replied, "I do not recommend force, but I would be glad to see every peasant carrying a rifle, and knowing how to use it." At another meeting Mr. Parnell is credited with the astounding explosion—"I am not in favour of shooting landlords, but lead proved very useful once before, and the time might come when it would again." This dangerous seed was sown broadcast over the country; how can we avoid the conclusion that the plentiful crop of agrarian outrages which shortly followed was in truth its natural growth? The pernicious nature of the doctrines deliberately promulgated over and over again at these meetings may be understood from one or two extracts. "Rent" is described as "in any circumstances, in prosperous times or bad times, an unjust and immoral tax upon the industry of the people." Another speaker recommended them "to pay no one—except the shopkeepers whom they might want again;" and at the Tipperary meeting Mr. Parnell is reported to have said:

It was, therefore, incumbent on them to stand together, and ask for a reasonable reduction of rent; and if such reasonable reduction were not granted, it was their duty to pay no rent at all. (A voice:—"That's coming to it." Laughter.) If they were determined, they had the game in their own hands. Let them band together and strengthen those among them who were weak, and let them organize themselves, and refuse to take farms from which tenants had been evicted. Providence was on their side, and even the elements that day were fighting for them. (Loud applause.)

The allusion in the last sentence was to the torrents of rain which were then falling; and it is certainly an extraordinary example of wrong-headedness that an assemblage should be found capable of cheering the destruction of their harvest. It will be no surprise to our readers to learn that the Communistic

doctrines of the anti-rent agitation met with the disapproval of the Catholic Hierarchy. The following passage is extracted from a pastoral of the Archbishop of Dublin, which was read in the churches of that city on the 23rd November:—

It has pleased Divine Providence to visit our country with a succession of unfavourable harvests, resulting in deep distress in many parts of the land. No class in Ireland will escape the effects of this visitation, and all must be prepared to take their part in bearing the common burthen. But we must take care not to render these trials intolerable, driving God from our side by the violation of His eternal law. Unfortunately, men proclaiming their sympathy for the people in their deep distress are going through the country disseminating doctrines, which, pushed to their logical conclusion, would strike at the root of that good faith and mutual confidence which are the foundation of social life. These doctrines have already produced their evil results. The enemies of our people employ them as arguments against our just demands for aid. Half-hearted friends are driven away in despair, and real friends of the people are weakened in their advocacy of the rights of the country. Very reverend fathers, while standing forward to support our flocks in this their dark hour of distress, we must not fear to raise our voices to warn them against the results of faults or mistakes. Our principle must be to give to Cæsar what Cæsar justly claims, else we cannot give to God what God commands. If just debts fairly demanded be not honestly discharged, a principle fatal to the prosperity of our country will be established; and, sooner or later, it will recoil on the heads of those who to-day may seem to be gainers by its adoption. But let us pray that the day may be far distant, when Irishmen, who in olden times were renowned for their love of impartial justice, should set to the world an example of faith disregarded.

These noble words must have struck a chord in the hearts of many, and recalled them to a correct judgment of the immoral doctrines that they had listened to. If Irishmen would conform to this teaching, and live up to their glorious traditions of faith and purity, the day could not be far distant that would dawn upon a land of comfort and contentment.

Over and above the distinctive doctrine of the “repudiation of rent,” we find in the resolutions passed at these land meetings two distinct schemes for the settlement of the Irish land question—“fixity of tenure” and “peasant proprietors.” The latter is not to be confounded with the moderate and constitutional measure which we shall presently discuss, but is meant to be a wholesale transfer to the tenant, upon highly favourable terms, of the interest of the landlord; so that the present occupier may be converted into the *sole* owner of the land. It is necessary briefly to advert to these two proposals, as they have become catchwords of party, and are flippantly

made use of by many persons who do not appreciate the difficulties with which the schemes are beset. We shall show that they are impracticable and unjust, or rather that they are impracticable because they are unjust.

“Fixity of tenure” means that the tenant is not to be evicted from his holding so long as he pays his rent. But, what rent? Not that which he is at present liable to pay. The last thing which the agitators desire is fixity at the present rent: it must first be determined, once and for ever, at a *reasonable* figure. This is the insuperable difficulty: who is to determine what is reasonable? Not the parties to the contract, for they have already agreed, *ex hypothesi*, upon an unreasonable amount; not one of them alone, for that would be to abolish contract altogether; and the most paternal Government could scarcely undertake the office of land valuer between the parties. They may certainly adopt the machinery of arbitration, but that requires no legislative license. The essential part of a contract is that it is voluntary; and no enactment can enlarge the rights of absolute freedom. If it imposes limitations, it must be to the prejudice of one side or the other. But we do not hesitate to affirm that the Irish tenant does at the present day practically enjoy “fixity of tenure” at the rent which he has contracted to pay. The Land Act of 1870 has placed so heavy a fine on capricious evictions, that the landlords could not afford to put in force the power, which is nominally theirs, of recovering possession, except for non-payment of rent. Compensation for disturbance, amounting in some cases to seven years’ rent, has conferred on the occupier a practical freehold. The advocates of “fixity of tenure” at a *fair* rent are driven to the humiliating confession that under the pressure of extraordinary competition the tenant will agree to pay a rent which he knows he cannot pay, and which he is determined to withhold; and that he is not morally bound to carry out a contract which was the result of extortion. The weak side of this contention is, that the tenant wishes to retain the advantage, while he repudiates the burthen of the contract—to keep possession, and get rid of the rent.

Tenant-right is a subject closely connected with “fixity of tenure.” Under the Ulster custom, a tenant, though nominally holding from year to year, possesses an interest in his farm which occasionally fetches in the market as much as the value of the fee-simple. He is, in a sense, joint owner with his landlord. The full dominion over the land can only be acquired by paying purchase-money to the landlord for his rent, and to the tenant for his occupancy. Now, we wish to point out that, although this is a great gain to the particular tenant who first acquires the right, it is no permanent advantage to the subsequent

occupiers. When the farm changes hands, the incoming tenant has to pay a large sum to his predecessor, and is in a worse position than if he had retained his capital and paid a higher rent. Too frequently he has raised the requisite fine through the agency of usurers, and enters upon the cultivation of his farm, not only without capital, but encumbered with an oppressive load of debt.

Fixity of tenure is, indeed, to the most ardent spirits, but another name for fixity of landlords, and they accordingly embrace the scheme for establishing through the length and breadth of Ireland a system of peasant proprietors. This is the crowning absurdity of these revolutionary agitators. The landlords, or as they prefer to say "landlordism" (adding one more to the long list of terrible "isms") must be completely eradicated. The peasant has a natural right to live in the country where he was born, and the cultivator shall be the sole proprietor of the soil which he tills. Get rid of "landlordism" and all will go well. It matters little by what agency it is effected, so that it is done quickly and thoroughly. But we miss in this scheme any consideration for the labourer, who certainly possesses an equal right with the tenant to live in the country of his birth, and to seize his share of the confiscated interests. Curious questions might also arise after a time, in the event of the new proprietors letting the lands which they acquired. We suspect that they would bitterly resent a second transfer of the soil to the occupiers who had derived title for themselves. The means by which this revolution is to be effected vary according to the more or less "advanced" opinions of its advocates. Some would bid the landlords begone! and be thankful for having been permitted so long to enjoy their ill-gotten revenues; others, more moderate, would merely give them notice to quit on receipt of a fair compensation. How that compensation should be provided is a financial problem which weighs lightly on these upholders of the rights of man. A State loan on a magnificent scale to buy out the "tyrants" could, they think, be easily raised. It would be repaid by the new proprietors in a term of years, or it might even be presented to them as a free gift.

Hope sickens with extravagance,

and it is well-nigh sick unto death in the hearts of Ireland's practical friends, when they hear such monstrous absurdities advocated as feasible plans.

There are many persons who attribute to the operation of the Land Laws all the agrarian evils from which the country suffers; yet we find that in England, where the laws are not more favourable to the tenant, threatening notices, outrages

and murders, are not familiar incidents of tenure. No human law can be devised to make men really just in all the relations of life. The world would be scarcely bearable if every one acted up to the extreme limit of his legal rights, and this is especially true in the case of landlords. We believe that in the vast majority of cases where the landlord is considerate, and the tenant industrious, the most amicable feelings subsist between them. An example of how well the present system may work under favourable circumstances was recently supplied by the special correspondent of the *Times*, in a letter published in that journal on the 6th February last. It is descriptive of the prize farm of Charles Sampey in the County Roscommon. The careful husbandry, the comfortable homestead, the neat garden, and the thrifty habits of the occupier are set forth in graphic detail; but what is most insisted on is that it has all been created by his own industry—"By thirty years of hard work he dug away peat for fuel from off the entire surface of what is now his farm, removing in most places a thickness of five feet which covered the area, including the present site of his house, buildings and garden."

It would, indeed, be an outrage on all our feelings of natural justice if a landlord, after watching the gradual creation of a fertile soil through the labour of a tenant, were to wrest it from him under colour of a legal right. But in the case which we have described, the tenant reposed confidence in the honour of his landlord, and his rent remains at 3*l.* per annum, the sum at which it was originally fixed. If all Irish tenants were as thrifty and industrious as Charles Sampey, and if all landlords were as just as his, we should hear very little of "fixity of tenure" or "rents by arbitration." For the general diffusion of such happy relations we can only look to time, and such social measures as will gradually ameliorate the condition of the tenant.

One of the most serious obstacles to a happy understanding between landlord and tenant in Ireland is the prevalence of absenteeism. It will be readily admitted that, from an economical or political point of view, no injury is done to the nation as a whole by territorial revenues being expended in a remote province, or even in the metropolis of the kingdom; and that to compel every landowner to reside in the parish where his property is situate would be an act of impracticable tyranny. But the remedy of the evil is one thing, its recognition as a powerful factor in augmenting social animosity is another. The classes of society are knit together by something stronger than mere legal obligation. In too many instances in Ireland the landlord's connection with his property is confined to the pay-

ment of rates, and the receipt of rents through an agent. His tenants are to him no more than his shares in a company, the fluctuations of their harvests than good or bad traffic returns. Their struggle for life is translated into a balance sheet, and its unfavourable figures are a source of annoyance not a stimulus to action. He is beyond the reach of sympathy: the cry of suffering is no longer audible. He has ceased to move among the people with friendly greeting, or considerate counsel. He no longer exhibits any interest in their affairs, or keeps his memory green in their hearts by assisting in local charity. After a time he becomes to them as impersonal as an abstract idea, as relentless as a tax-gatherer. Can we wonder, then, that the result is disastrous? It is notorious that it is upon properties managed through agents that almost all the serious agrarian outrages occur, and that resident landlords as a rule find no difficulty in dealing with their tenants.

As the most prominent among the measures of social reform we must notice one for the partial establishment of peasant proprietors; and there can be little doubt that the example of thrifty farmers, belonging to their own class, might act as an effective stimulus to the tenants throughout the country.

Two attempts have already been made in this direction, and not with any marked success. The first was under the Church Disestablishment Act of 1869, by which the Commissioners in whom the Church property was vested were directed, in selling the glebe lands, to give a preference to the occupying tenants, and to permit three-fourths of the purchase-money to remain on mortgage at 4 per cent., the instalments for payment extending over thirty-two years.

The landed property thus available consisted of 108,000 acres in the occupation of 8432 tenants, occupying on the average about 13 acres each, and paying a rent of less than one pound per acre. By the end of the year 1877, 5243 of these holdings had been transferred to the occupiers; but of these about 500 were merely cottages, while in 800 cases the intending purchasers were compelled by want of means to transfer their bargains to local capitalists, and to resume their position as tenants of the men to whom they had sold.

Under the Land Act of 1870 another effort was made in the same direction. The Board of Works was authorised to advance to purchasing tenants two-thirds of the purchase money, repayable by half-yearly instalments in thirty-five years, each instalment being five pounds for every hundred advanced, which is equivalent to a loan at 3½ per cent. These provisions, however, have not proved as efficacious as was expected. Of the

million which the Treasury was empowered to provide, not one-half had, on the 31st March, 1879, been actually issued; and only 753 tenants had by this means been assisted in the purchase of their holdings. If we examine these sales more particularly we cannot fail to be struck by the fact, that the benefit does not reach the really poor class of farmers, but is practically confined to those who are very well off already. Of the entire number of 753 tenants who have purchased under these clauses, 380, or more than half, are occupiers of more than 30 acres. The total number of agricultural holdings in Ireland is 592,590, and of these 498,000 or about five-sixths are from one to fifty acres, while the number of tenant purchasers holding more than 50 acres exceeds one-third of the whole number. These figures prove that the minority of large farmers furnished a relatively large proportion of the buyers.

The failure of these clauses is attributed chiefly to the difficulty felt by the Landed Estates Court in dividing the properties into lots to suit the intending purchasers. If a higher price can be obtained by selling the property as a whole than in small lots, the duty of the court is to sell it in that way so as to obtain the best price for the vendor. Again, most properties are subject to rent-charges, or annuities, to the payment of which the whole estate is liable. Upon the sale of such a property very great difficulties arise in apportioning the charges among a number of small holdings. And the result has proved that unless all the tenants of an estate are able to take concerted action, they derive no benefit from the Act.

The Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the operation of the Land Act in this respect reported in 1878 "that it is very desirable that further facilities should be given for the purchase by tenants of the fee-simple of under their holdings;" and that, in order to avoid the difficulty the present system of dividing properties in suitable lots:—

An independent body should be constituted, specially charged with the duty of superintending and facilitating the purchase of their several farms by the occupying tenants. Your committee are of opinion that the body thus constituted should put themselves into communication with the tenants of properties offered for sale in the Landed Estates Court, should explain to them the facilities offered by the Act, should represent their interests before the Court in lotting of properties or otherwise, and should only purchase and re-sell properties in lots as aforesaid, when satisfied that such a proportion of the tenants are prepared to buy as will prevent any loss to the funds at their disposal.

Now, there are a few observations which we wish to make upon this scheme. The first is, that as a measure to relieve distress

it cannot be expected to work efficaciously. Experience proves that it is the well-to-do farmer of fifty acres, not the slovenly occupier of five, who desires to buy, and is able to find even the small fraction of the purchase-money that has to be paid down. Secondly, in thus inaugurating a system of peasant proprietorship we deprive it of one of its principal chances of success—the independence of an owner. What has proved in all countries the bane of such a system is the facility with which the owner falls into debt, and burthens the land with the claims of the usurer. Here, we start him on his career with a load of debt already weighing him down. Thirdly, we fear that this Land Commission would not be self-supporting ; that, in fact, it would be a heavy loser by having unsold lots left on its hands, by re-sales to the tenants, and by the non-payment of the instalments of purchase money. And, lastly, we must express a strong opinion against the suitability, even under the most favourable circumstances, of a system of peasant proprietorship to a country like Ireland, where the farming operations occupy only a small part of the year. The essential condition of successful peasant culture is that there should be such a variety of avocations that the time of the small owner should be fully devoted to the minute culture of his farm. With such crops as potatoes and oats, the preparation of the ground, the sowing of the seed, and the gathering of the harvest are necessarily crowded into short periods of time ; and the owner has not the opportunity, even if he had the desire, of developing habits of persistent industry. We think that if a peasant is to succeed in managing his own small property, he should first show that he is capable of successfully farming the ground which he occupies ; and that he should be required, as a condition of his purchase, to save the larger part of the money before he is constituted a peasant proprietor. In other words, thrift should precede ownership, instead of owner being made a term synonymous with debtor.

Another favourite scheme for the relief of Ireland consists in emigration, assisted by Government funds. That the current has set very strongly in this direction without artificial stimulus is proved by the fact that since the 1st May, 1851, upwards of two and a half millions of Irish-born persons have emigrated from Ireland. This vast exodus is a natural effort to relieve the country of its superabundant population ; and, as might be expected, with a diminishing population the proportion of emigrants has also decreased. Thus, in the decennial period ending with the 1st May, 1861, the number was 1,227,710, while in the next ten years it amounted to but 819,903. The annual returns exhibit very considerable fluctuations, ranging

from 190,000 in 1852, to 37,587 in 1876. Since that year the number has risen gradually to 47,065 in the year 1879. There are two statistical facts of prime importance in estimating the effect of emigration on the condition of Ireland. (1). That from the relatively flourishing province of Ulster, a larger proportion of emigrants is furnished than from Connaught, where the population is admittedly overcrowded. (2). That seventy per cent. of these exiles are between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five; and it is thus the flower of Ireland's manhood that is exported from her shores. It appears to follow from these facts that, so far as any benefit to the country is concerned, emigration removes the wrong people, and from the wrong places. Famine and pestilence gather their victims from the old and feeble, or at least strike with impartial fury; but emigration takes from the population those who are the hope and strength of the country, and leaves the old man and the infant to encumber her workhouses.

As for the emigrants themselves, it is very doubtful how much they gain by leaving the land of their birth. It is true there are now large and flourishing provinces of the Catholic Church in America and Australia which owe their existence to the Irish immigration. It is true also that large sums of money come back every year to the assistance of those left behind. But thousands have lost their faith; thousands have been swamped and swallowed up in the turbid licence of American cities; and even, with those who are Catholics still, it may be feared that the counsel and the reproof of the priest have lost much of their power, and that democratic manners, which never yet benefited a Celtic people, have deprived them of reverence without accustoming them to self-restraint.

We have already referred to the Church surplus as a fortune which has unexpectedly devolved upon the country. This does not express the entire truth, for the fund is not a gift but an act of restitution; and we expect that in its application some regard should be paid to the purposes for which it was originally intended. The tithe, like every other revenue of the Catholic Church, was a trust fund for the support of the clergy, the building and repair of churches, and the relief of the poor; and we can imagine no investment which, without hurting the susceptibilities of any class in the community, would approach more closely to a general compliance with these trusts than the building of convenient glebe houses for the Catholic priests. They are sadly needed, and money could scarcely be expended to better advantage or for a more truly national purpose than in thus giving decent dwellings to the teachers of the people. It is, moreover, an act of the strictest justice, since the clergy of

the Disestablished Church were suffered to retain their glebe houses and churches at a ridiculously inadequate figure. Nor are we asking persons who object to concurrent endowment to give a penny from imperial resources. Here is a fund purely religious in its character, purely Irish in its origin, available for the purpose of supplying a very serious want. It is not only just but expedient also. The Catholic priests have ever been on the side of law and order. It is not too much to say that the English Government is more indebted to them for the maintenance of peace than to flying columns and armies of police. And it is only natural to suppose that their beneficial influence would be strengthened, their love of peace intensified by the possession of a home. This scheme has been recently supported by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*,* to whose able Article we have much pleasure in admitting our obligations. There are many topics to which, if our space were unlimited, we would gladly refer as bearing more or less directly upon the prosperity of the country. University education, the establishment of manufactories, cottage industries, the encouragement of planting, the reclamation of waste lands, the improvement of the dwellings of the people, and many other subjects crowd before our minds in connection with the possible future of Ireland. But we are satisfied to have presented to our readers her present wretchedness, and a brief outline of one or two of the principal measures which have been proposed for its relief. We can expect from them little more than the alleviation of her poverty. It would be absurd to suppose that by the most beneficent laws Ireland could be changed into a land as rich as England. Do we desire it? Had we the power, by an effort of will, to replace her green fields by crowded mills and factories, her simple peasants by pale and sickly operatives, we should hesitate to exercise it. It is an affecting spectacle to behold a country periodically stretching forth her hands for food; and her benefactors no doubt feel a gratifying sense of superior respectability as they administer it. Yet we tell them that poor and in rags, with the tears on her cheeks, she is more glorious than they. Where is the nation in Europe that has not at some time wavered in its allegiance to the Catholic faith? She alone,

Still constant in a wondrous excellence,

has preserved with fervour and simplicity, through the shock of changing creeds, through persecutions, confiscations and famines, the same unalterable faith that she received from her great

* See "Ireland, her Present and her Future."—*Edinburgh Review*, January, 1880.

apostle. This is the distinctive feature of her nationality; this is the hope of her future, as it is the glory of her past. She is unlike all other countries in this respect, that hitherto religion has been the first object of her national life. We trust that the day is far distant when vain aspirations for an unattainable ideal will succeed in drawing her into the perilous path of international strife. Let other peoples toil and struggle for wealth, or desecrate the world with warfare, or become famous in learning and arts of so-called civilization; Ireland will have accomplished her glorious mission if she retain her religious greatness, and her claim to be still called "the Island of Saints."



ENCYCLICAL OF POPE LEO XIII.

ON

CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE.

*Venerabilibus Fratribus Patriarchis Primatibus Archiepiscopis et
Episcopis Universis Catholici Orbis, gratiam et communionem
cum Apostolica Sede habentibus.*

LEO PP. XIII.

VENERABILES FRATRES SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

ARCANUM divinae sapientiae consilium, quod Salvator hominum Iesus Christus in terris erat perfecturus, eo spectavit, ut mundum, quasi vetustate senescentem, Ipse per se et in se divinitus instauraret. Quod splendida et grandi sententia complexus est Paullus Apostolus, cum ad Ephesios ita scriberet : *Sacramentum voluntatis suae instaurare omnia in Christo, quae in coelis et quae in terra sunt.**—Revera cum Christus Dominus mandatum facere instituit quod dederat illi Pater, continuo novam quamdam formam ac speciem rebus omnibus impertiit, vetustate depulsa. Quae enim vulnera piaculum primi parentis humanae naturae imposuerat, Ipse sanavit : homines universos, natura filios irae, in gratiam cum Deo restituit ; diuturnis fatigatos erroribus ad veritatis lumen traduxit ; omni impuritate confectos ad omnem virtutem innovavit ; redonatisque hereditati beatitudinis sempiternae spem certam fecit, ipsum eorum corpus, mortale et caducum, immortalitatis et gloriae caelestis particeps aliquando futurum. Quo vero tam singularia beneficia, quamdiu essent homines, tamdiu in terris permanerent, Ecclesiam constituit vicariam muneris sui, eamque iussit, in futurum prospiciens, si quid esset in hominum societate perturbatum, ordinare ; si quid collapsum, restituere.

Quamquam vero divina haec instauratio, quam diximus, praecipue et directo homines attigit in ordine gratiae supernaturali constitutos, tamen pretiosi ac salutare eiusdem fructus in ordinem quoque naturalem largiter permanarunt ; quamobrem non mediocrem perfectionem in omnes partes acceperunt cum singuli homines, tum humani generis societas universa. Etenim, christiano rerum ordine semel condito, hominibus singulis feliciter contigit, ut ediscerent atque adsuescerent in paterna Dei providentia conquiescere, et spem alere, quae non confundit, caelestium auxiliorum ; quibus ex rebus fortitudo, moderatio, constantia, aequabilitas pacati animi, plures denique praeclaras virtutes et egregia facta consequuntur.—Societati vero domesticae et civili mirum est quantum dignitatis, quantum firmitudinis et honestatis accesserit. Aequior et sanctior effecta principum auctoritas ; propensior et faciliior populorum obtemperatio ; arctior civium coniunctio ; tutiora iura dominii. Omnino rebus omnibus, quae in civitate

* Ad Eph. I. 9-10.

habentur utiles, religio christiana consuluit et providit; ita quidem, ut, auctore S. Augustino, plus ipsa afferre momenti ad bene beateque vivendum non potuisse videatur, si esset parandis vel augendis mortalis vitae commodis et utilitatibus unice nata.

Verum de hoc genere toto non est Nobis propositum modo singula enumerare; volumus autem de convictu domestico eloqui, cuius est in *matrimonio* principium et fundamentum.

Constat inter omnes, Venerabiles Fratres, quae vera sit matrimonii origo.—Quamvis enim fidei christianae vituperatores perpetuam hac de re doctrinam Ecclesiae fugiant agnoscere, et memoriam omnium gentium, omnium saeculorum delere iamdiu contendant, vim tamen lucemque veritatis nec extinguere nec debilitare potuerunt. Nota omnibus et nemini dubia commemoramus: posteaquam sexto creationis die formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, sociam illi voluit adiungere, quam de latere viri ipsius dormientis mirabiliter eduxit. Qua in re hoc voluit providentissimus Deus, ut illud par coniugum esset cunctorum hominum naturale principium, ex quo scilicet propagari humanum genus, et, numquam intermissis procreationibus, conservari in omne tempus oporteret. Atque illa viri et mulieris coniunctio, quo sapientissimis Dei consiliis responderet aptius, vel ex eo tempore duas potissimum, easque in primis nobiles, quasi alte impressas et insculptas prae se tulit proprietates, nimirum unitatem et perpetuitatem.—Idque declaratum aperteque confirmatum ex Evangelio perspicimus divina Iesu Christi auctoritate; qui Iudaeis et Apostolis testatus est, matrimonium ex ipsa institutione sui dumtaxat inter duos esse debere, scilicet virum inter et mulierem; ex duobus unam veluti carnem fieri; et nuptiale vinculum sic esse Dei voluntate intime vehementerque nexum, ut a quopiam inter homines dissolvi, aut distrahi nequeat. *Adhaerebit (homo) uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una. Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet.**

Verum haec coniugii forma, tam excellens atque praestans, sensim corrumpi et interire apud ethnicos populos coepit; et penes ipsum Hebraeorum genus quasi obnubilari atque obscurari visa.—Nam apud hos de uxoribus susceperat consuetudo communis, ut singulis viris habere plus una liceret; post autem, cum *ad duritiam cordis*† eorum indulgenter permisisset Moyses repudiorum potestatem, ad divortium factus est aditus.—In societate vero ethnicorum vix credibile videatur, quantam corruptelam et demutationem nuptiae contraxerint, quippe quae obiectae fluctibus essent errorum uniuscuiusque populi et cupiditatum turpissimarum. Cunctae plus minus gentes dediscere notionem germanamque originem matrimonii visae sunt; eamque ob caussam de coniugiis passim ferebantur leges, quae esse e republica viderentur, non quas natura postularet. Sollemnes ritus, arbitrio legumlatorum inventi, efficiebant ut honestum uxoris, aut turpe concubinae nomen mulieres nanciscerentur; quin eo ventum erat, ut auctoritate principum reipublicae caveretur, quibus esset permissum inire nuptias, et quibus non esset, multum legibus contra aequitatem contendentibus, multum pro

* Matth. xix. 5, 6.

† Matth. xix. 8.

iniuria. Praeterea polygania, polyandria, divortium caussae fuerunt, quamobrem nuptiale vinculum magnopere relaxaretur. Summa quoque in mutuis coniugum iuribus et officiis perturbatio extitit, cum vir dominium uxoris acquireret, eamque suas sibi res habere, nulla saepe iusta causa, iuberet; sibi vero ad effrenatam et indomitam libidinem praecipiti impune liceret *excurrere per lupanaria et ancillas, quasi culpam dignitas faciat, non voluntas*.^{*} Exsuperante viri licentia, nihil erat uxore miserius, in tantam humilitatem deiecta, ut instrumentum pene haberetur ad explendam libidinem, vel gignendam sobolem comparatum. Nec pudor fuit, collocandas in matrimonium emi vendi, in rerum corporearum similitudinem,[†] data interdum parenti maritoque facultate extremum supplicium de uxore sumendi. Talibus familiam ortam connubiis necesse erat aut in bonis reipublicae esse, aut in mancipio patrifamilias,[‡] cui leges hoc quoque posse dederant, non modo liberorum conficere et dirimere arbitrato suo nuptias, verum etiam in eisdem exercere vitae necisque immanem potestatem.

Sed tot vitiis, tantisque ignominiiis, quibus erant inquinata coniugia, sublevatio tandem et medicina divinitus quaesita est; quandoquidem restitutor dignitatis humanae legumque mosaicarum perfectior Iesus Christus non exiguum, neque postremam de matrimonio curam adhibuit. Etenim nuptias in Cana Galilaeae Ipse praesentia sua nobilitavit, primoque ex prodigiis a se editis fecit memorabiles; § quibus caussis vel ex eo die in hominum coniugia novae cuiusdam sanctitudinis initia videntur esse profecta. Deinde matrimonium revocavit ad primaevae originis nobilitatem, cum Hebraeorum mores improbando, quod et multitudine uxorum et repudii facultate abuterentur; tum maxime praecipiendo, ne quis dissolvere auderet quod perpetuo coniunctionis vinculo Deus ipse constrinxisset. Quapropter cum difficultates diluisset ab institutis mosaicis in medium allatas, supremi legislatoris suscepta persona, haec de coniugibus sanxit: *Dico autem vobis, quia quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, nisi ob fornicationem, et aliam duxerit, moechatur; et qui dimissam duxerit, moechatur*.||

Veram quae auctoritate Dei de coniugiis decreta et constituta sunt, ea nuntii divinarum legum Apostoli plenius et enucleatius memoriae litterisque prodiderunt. Iamvero Apostolis magistris accepta referenda sunt, quae *sancti Patres nostri, Concilia et universalis Ecclesiae traditio semper docuerunt*, ¶ nimirum Christum Dominum ad Sacramenti dignitatem evexisse matrimonium; simulque effecisse ut coniuges, coelesti gratia quam merita eius pepererunt septi ac muniti, sanctitatem in ipso coniugio adipiscerentur: atque in eo, ad exemplar mystici connubii sui cum Ecclesia mire conformato, et amorem qui est naturae consentaneus perfecisse,** et viri ac mulieris individuum suapte naturae societatem divinae caritatis vinculo validius coniunxisse. *Viri Paulus* inquit ad Ephesios, *diligite uxores vestras, sicut et Christus dilexit Ecclesiam et seipsum tradidit pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret Viri debent diligere uxores suas ut corpora sua nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit; sed nutrit et fovet eam, sicut et Christus*

* Hieronym. Oper. tom. i. col. 455.

† Arnob. *adv. Gent.* 4.

‡ Dionys. Halicar. lib. ii. c. 26, 27.

§ Ioan. ii.

|| Matth. xix. 9.

¶ Trid. sess. xxiv. in pr.

** Trid. sess. xxiv. cap. 1 de reform. matr.

Ecclesiam; quia membra sumus corporis eius, de carne eius et de ossibus eius. Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem suam et adhaerebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una. Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia.—*Similiter Apostolis auctoribus didicimus unitatem, perpetuamque firmitatem, quae ab ipsa requirebatur nuptiarum origine, sanctam esse et nullo tempore violabilem Christum iussisse. *Iis qui matrimonio iuncti sunt, idem Paullus ait, praecipio non ego, sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere; quod si discesserit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari.† Et rursus: Mulier alligata est legi, quanto tempore vir eius vivit: quod si dormierit vir eius liberata est.‡—*Hisce igitur caussis matrimonium extitit sacramentum magnum,§ honorabile in omnibus,|| pium, castum, rerum altissimarum imagine et significatione verendum.

Neque iis dumtaxat quae commemorata sunt, christiana eius perfectio absolutioque continetur. Nam primo quidem nuptiali societati excelsius quiddam et nobilius propositum est, quam antea fuisset; ea enim spectare iussa est non modo ad propagandum genus humanum, sed ad ingenerandam Ecclesiae sobolem, *cives Sanctorum et domesticos Dei;¶ ut nimirum populus ad veri Dei et Salvatoris nostri Christi cultum et religionem procrearetur atque educaretur.**—*Secundo loco sua utrique coniugum sunt officia definita, sua iura integre descripta. eos scilicet ipsos necesse est sic esse animo semper affectos, ut amorem maximum, constantem fidem, sollers assiduamque praesidium alteri alterum debere intelligant.—Vir est familiae princeps, et caput mulieris; quae tamen, quia caro est de carne illius et os de ossibus eius, subiiciatur pareatque viro, in morem non ancillae, sed sociae; ut scilicet obedientiae praestitae nec honestas, nec dignitas absit. In eo autem qui praeest, et in hac quae paret, cum imaginem uterque referant alter Christi, altera Ecclesiae, divina caritas esto perpetua moderatrix officii. Nam *vir caput est mulieris, sicut Christus caput est Ecclesiae Sed sicut Ecclesia subiecta est Christo, ita et mulieres viris suis in omnibus.††—*Ad liberos quod pertinet, subesse et obtemperare parentibus, hisque honorem adhibere propter conscientiam debent; et vicissim in liberis tuendis atque ad virtutem potissimum informandis omnes parentum curas cogitationesque evigilare necesse est: *Patres educate illos (filios) in disciplina et correptione Domini.‡‡* Ex quo intelligitur, nec pauca esse coniugum officia, neque levia; ea tamen coniugibus bonis ob virtutem quae Sacramento percipitur, non modo tolerabilia fiunt, verum etiam iucunda.

Christus igitur, cum ad talem ac tantam excellentiam matrimonia renovavisset, totam ipsorum disciplinam Ecclesiae credidit et commendavit. Quae potestatem in coniugia christianorum omni cum tempore, tum loco exercuit, atque ita exercuit, ut illam propriam eius esse appareret, nec hominum concessu quaesitam, sed auctoris sui voluntate divinitus adeptam.—Quot vero et quam vigiles curas in retinenda sanctitate nuptiarum collocarit, ut sua his incolumitas

* Ad. Ephes. v. 25 et seqq.

† 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.

‡ Ibid. v. 39.

§ Ad. Eph. v. 32.

|| Ad Hebr. xiii. 4.

¶ Ad Eph. ii. 19.

** Catech. Rom. cap. viii.

†† Ad Eph. v. 23, 24.

‡‡ Ad Eph. vi. 4.

maneret, plus est cognitum quam ut demonstrari debeat.—Et sane improbatos novimus Concilii Heirosolymitani sententia amores solutos et liberos;* civem Corinthium incesti damnatum beati Pauli auctoritate;† propulsatos ac reiectos eodem semper tenore fortitudinis conatus plurimorum, matrimonium christianum hostiliter petentium, videlicet Gnosticorum, Manichaeorum, Montanistarum sub ipsa rei christinae primordia; nostra autem memoria Mormonum, Sansimonianorum, Phalansterianorum, Communistarum.—Simili modo ius matrimonii aequabile inter omnes atque unum omnibus est constitutum, vetere inter servos et ingenuos sublato discrimine;‡ exaequata viri et uxoris iura; etenim, ut aiebat Hieronymus,§ *apud nos quod non licet feminis, aequè non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur*: atque illa eadem iura ob remunerationem benevolentiae et vicissitudinem officiorum stabiliter firmata; adserta et vindicta mulierum dignitas; vetitum viro poenam capitis de adultera sumere,|| iuratamque fidem libidinosae atque impudicae violare.—Atque illud etiam magnum est quod de potestate patrumfamilias Ecclesia, quantum oportuit, limitaverit ne filiis et filiabus coniugii cupidis quidquam de iusta libertate minueretur;¶ quod nuptias inter cognatos et affines certis gradibus nullas esse posse decreverit,** ut nimirum supernaturalis coniugum amor latiore se campo diffunderet; quod errorem et vim et fraudem, quantum potuit, a nuptiis prohibenda curaverit;†† quod sanctam pudicitiam thalami, quod securitatem personarum,‡‡ quod coniugiorum decus,§§ quod religionis incolumitatem|||| sacra tecta esse voluerit. Denique tanta vi, tanta providentia legum divinum istud institutum communiit, ut nemo sit rerum aequus existimator, quin intelligat, hoc etiam ex capite quod ad coniugia refertur, optimam esse humani generis custodem ac vindicem Ecclesiam; cuius sapientia et fugam temporum, et iniurias hominum, et rerum publicarum vicissitudines innumerabiles victrix evasit.

Sed, adnitente humani generis hoste, non desunt qui, sicut cetera redemptionis beneficia ingrate repudiant, sic restitutionem perfectionemque matrimonii aut spernunt, aut omnino non agnoscunt.—Flagitium nonnullorum veterum est, inimicos fuisse nuptiis in aliqua ipsarum parte; sed multo aetate nostra peccant prenciosius qui earum naturam, perfectam expletamque omnibus suis numeris et partibus malunt funditus pervertere. Atque huius rei causa in ea praecipue sita est, quod imbuti falsae philosophiae opinionibus corruptaque consuetudine animi plurimorum, nihil tam moleste ferunt, quam subesse et parere; acerrimeque laborant, ut non modo singuli homines, sed etiam familiae atque omnis humana societas imperium Dei superbe contemnant.—Cum vero et familiae et totius humanae societatis in

* Act xv. 29. † 1 Cor. v. 5. ‡ Cap. 1 de coniug. serv.
 § Oper. tom. i. col. 455. || Can. *Interfectores*, et Can. *Admonere*, quæst. 2.
 ¶ Cap. 30, quæst. 3, cap. 3 de cognat. spirit.
 ** Cap. 8 de consang. et affn.; cap. 1 de cognat. legali.
 †† Cap. 26 de sponsal.; capp. 13, 15, 29 de sponsal. et matrim., et alib.
 ‡‡ Cap. 1 de convers. infid.; capp. 5 et 6 de eo qui duxit in matr.
 §§ Capp. 3, 5 et 8 de sponsal. et matr.—Trid sess. xxiv, cap. 3 de reform. matr.
 ||| Cap. 7 de divort.

matrimonio fons et origo consistat, illud ipsum iurisdictioni Ecclesiae subesse nullo modo patiuntur; imo deiicere ab omni sanctitate contendunt, et in illarum rerum exiguum sane gyrum compellere, quae auctoribus hominibus institutae sunt, et iure civili populorum reguntur atque administrantur. Unde sequi necesse erat, ut principibus reipublicae ius in connubia omne tribuerent, nullum Ecclesiae esse decernerent; quae si quando potestatem eius generis exercuit, id ipsum esse aut indulgentia principum, aut iniuria factum. Sed iam tempus esse inquirunt, ut qui rempublicam gerunt, iidem sua iura fortiter vindicent, ætque omnem coniugiorum rationem arbitrio suo moderari aggrediantur.—Hinc illa nata, quae *matrimonia civilia* vulgo appellantur; hinc scitae leges de caussis, quae coniugiis impedimento sint; hinc iudiciales sententiae de contractibus coniugalibus, iure ne initi fuerint, an vitio. Postremo omnem facultatem in hoc genere iuris constituendi et dicundi videmus Ecclesiae catholicae praereptam tanto studio, ut nulla iam ratio habeatur nec divinae potestatis eius, nec providarum legum, quibus tamdiu vixere gentes, ad quas urbanitatis lumen cum christiana sapientia pervenisset.

Attamen *Naturalistae* iique omnes, qui reipublicae numen se maxime colere profitentes, malis hasce doctrinis totas civitates miscere nituntur, non possunt reprehensionem falsitatis effugere. Etenim cum matrimonium habeat Deum auctorem, fueritque vel a principio quaedam Incarnationis Verbi Dei adumbratio, idcirco inest in eo sacrum et religiosum quiddam, non adventitium, sed ingentum, non ab hominibus acceptum, sed natura insitum. Quocirca Innocentius III,* et Honorius III,† decessores Nostri, non iniuria nec temere affirmare potuerunt, *apud fideles et infideles existere Sacramentum coniugii*. Testamur et monumenta antiquitatis, et mores atque instituta populorum, qui ad humanitatem magis accesserant et exquisitiore iuris et aequitatis cognitione praestiterant: quorum omnium mentibus informatum anticipatumque fuisse constat, ut cum de matrimonio cogitarent, forma occurreret rei cum religione et sanctitate coniunctae. Hanc ob causam nuptiae apud illos non sine caerimoniis religionum, auctoritate pontificum, ministerio sacerdotum fieri saepe consueverunt.—Ita magnam in animis coelesti doctrina carentibus vim habuit natura rerum, memoria originum, conscientia generis humani!—Igitur cum matrimonium sit sua vi, sua natura, sua sponte sacrum, consentaneum est, ut regatur ac temperetur non principum imperio, sed divina auctoritate Ecclesiae, quae rerum sacrarum sola habet magisterium.—Deinde considerata sacramenti dignitas est, cuius accessione matrimonia christianorum evasere longe nobilissima. De sacramentis autem statuere et praecipere, ita, ex voluntate Christi, sola potest et debet Ecclesia, ut absonum sit plane potestatis eius vel minimam partem ad gubernatores rei civilis velle esse translatam.—Postremo magnum pondus est, magna vis historiae, qua luculenter docemur, potestatem legiferam et iudicalem, de qua loquimur, libere constanterque ab Ecclesia usurpari consuevisse iis etiam temporibus, quando principes reipublicae consentientes fuisse aut conniventes in ea re,

* Cap. 8 de divort.

† Cap. 11 de ransact.

inepte et stulte fingeretur. Illud enim quam incredibile, quam absurdum, Christum Dominum damnasse polygamiae repudiique inveteratam consuetudinem delegata sibi a procuratore provinciae vel a principe Iudaeorum potestate; similiter Paullum Apostolum divortia incestasque nuptias edixisse non licere, cedentibus aut tacite mandantibus Tiberio, Caligola, Nerone! Neque illud unquam homini sanae mentis potest persuaderi, de sanctitate et firmitudine coniugii,* de nuptiis servos inter et ingenuas,† tot esse ab Ecclesia conditas leges, impetrata facultate ab Imperatoribus romanis, inimicissimis nomini christiano, quibus nihil tam fuit propositum, quam vi et caede religionem Christi opprimere adolescentem: praesertim cum ius illud ab Ecclesia profectum a civili iure interdum adeo dissideret, ut Ignatius Martyr,‡ Iustinus,§ Athenagoras|| et Tertullianus,¶ tamquam iniustas vel adulterinas publice traducerent nonnullorum nuptias, quibus tamen imperatoriae leges favebant. — Postea vero quam ad christianos Imperatores potentatus omnis reciderat, Pontifices maximi et Episcopi in Concilia congregati, eadem semper cum libertate conscientiaeque iuris sui, de matrimoniis iubere vetare perseverarunt quod utile esse, quod expedire temporibus censuissent, utcumque discrepans ab institutis civilibus videretur. Nemo ignorat quam multa de impedimentis ligaminis, voti, disparitatis cultus, consanguinitatis, criminis, publicae honestatis in Conciliis Illiberitano,** Arelatensi,†† Chalcedonensi,‡‡ Milevitano II.§§ aliisque, fuerint ab Ecclesiae praesulibus constituta, quae a decretis iure imperatorio sancitis longe saepe distarent. — Quin tantum abfuit, ut viri principes sibi adsciscerent in matrimonia christiana potestatem, ut potius eam, quanta est, penes Ecclesiam esse agnoscerent et declararent. Revera Honorius, Theodosius iunior, Iustinianus||| fateri non dubitarunt, in iis rebus quae nuptias attingant, non amplius quam custodibus et defensoribus sacrorum canonum sibi esse licere. Et de connubiorum impedimentis si quid per edicta sanxerunt, causam docuerunt non inviti, nimirum id sibi sumpsisse ex Ecclesiae permissu atque auctoritate;¶¶ cuius ipsius iudicium exquirere et reverenter accipere consueverunt in controversiis de honestate natalium,*** de divortiiis,††† denique de rebus omnibus cum coniugali vinculo necessitudinem quoquo modo habentibus.††† — Igitur iure optimo in Concilio Tridentino definitum est in Ecclesiae potestate esse *impedimenta matrimonium dirimentia constituere, §§§ et causas matrimoniales ad iudices ecclesiasticos spectare.*||||

Nec quemquam movent illa tantopere a Regalistis praedicata distinctio, vi cuius contractum nuptialem a Sacramento disiungunt, eo sane consilio, ut, Ecclesiae reservatis sacramenti rationibus, contractum tradant in potestatem arbitriumque principum civitatis. — Etenim non

* Can. Apost. 16-18.

† Philosophum. Oxon. 1861.

‡ Epist. ad Polycarp. cap. 5.

§ Apolog. mai. n. 15.

|| Legat. pro Christian. nr. 32, 33.

¶ De coron. milit. cap. 13.

** De Aguirre, Conc. Hispan. tom. i. can. 13, 15-17.

†† Harduin., Act. Concil. tom. I. can. 11. ‡‡ Ibid. can. 16. §§ Ibid. can. 17.

||| Novell. 137. ¶¶ Fejer *Matrim. ex instit. Christ.* Pesth, 1835.

*** Cap. 3 de ordin. cognit.

††† Cap. 3 de divort.

††† Cap. 18 qui filii sint legit. §§§ Trid. sess. xxiv. can. 4. |||| Ibid. can. 12.

potest huiusmodi distinctio, seu verius distractio, probari; cum exploratum sit in matrimonio christiano contractum a sacramento non esse dissociabilem; atque ideo non posse contractum verum et legitimum consistere, quin sit eo ipso sacramentum. Nam Christus Dominus dignitate sacramenti auxit matrimonium; matrimonium autem est ipse contractus, si modo sit factus iure.—Huc accedit, quod ob hanc causam matrimonium est sacramentum, quia est sacrum signum et efficiens gratiam, et imaginem referens mysticarum nuptiarum Christi cum Ecclesia. Istarum autem forma ac figura illo ipso exprimitur summae coniunctionis vinculo, quo vir et mulier inter se conligantur, quodque aliud nihil est, nisi ipsum matrimonium. Itaque apparet, omne inter christianos iustum coniugium in se et per se esse sacramentum: nihilque magis abhorrere a veritate, quam esse sacramentum decus quoddam adiunctum, aut proprietatem allapsam extrinsecus, quae a contractu disiungi ac disparari hominum arbitratu queat.—Quapropter nec ratione efficitur, nec teste temporum historia comprobatur potestatem in matrimonia christianorum ad principes reipublicae esse iure traductam. Quod si hac in re alienum violatum ius est, nemo profecto dixerit esse ab Ecclesia violatum.

Utinam vero Naturalistarum oracula, ut sunt plena falsitatis et iniustitiae, ita non etiam essent fecunda detrimentorum et calamitatum. Sed facile est pervidere quantam profanata coniugia perniciem attulerint; quantam allatura sint universae hominum communitati.—Principio quidem lex est provisa divinitus, ut quae Deo et natura auctoribus instituta sunt, ea tanto plus utilia ac salutaria experiamur, quanto magis statu nativo manent integra atque incommutabilia; quandoquidem procreator rerum omnium Deus probe novit quid singularum institutioni et conservationi expediret, cunctasque voluntate et mente sua sic ordinavit, ut suum unaquaeque exitum convenienter habitura sit. At si rerum ordinem providentissime constitutum immutare et perturbare hominum temeritas aut improbitas velit, tum vero etiam sapientissime atque utilissime instituta aut obesse incipiunt, aut prodesse desinunt, vel quod vim iuvandae mutatione amiserint, vel quod tales Deus ipse poenas malit de mortalium superbia atque audacia sumere. Iamvero qui sacrum esse matrimonium negant, atque omni despoliatum sanctitate in rerum profanarum coniiciunt genus, ii pervertunt fundamenta naturae, et divinae providentiae tum consiliis repugnant, tum instituta, quantum potest, demoliuntur. Quapropter mirum esse non debet, ex huiusmodi conatibus insanis atque impiis eam generari malorum segetem, qua nihil est saluti animorum incolumitati reipublicae perniciosius.

Si consideretur quorsum matrimoniorum pertineat divina institutio, id erit evidentissimum, includere in illis voluisse Deum utilitatis et salutis publicae uberrimos fontes. Et sane, praeter quam quod propagationi generis humani prospiciunt, illuc quoque pertinent, ut meliorem vitam coniugum beatioremque efficiant; idque pluribus causis, nempe mutuo ad necessitates sublevandas adiumento, amore constanti et fideli, communione omnium bonorum, gratia caelestis, quae a sacramento profiscitur. Eadem vero plurimum possunt ad familiarum salutem; nam matrimonia quamdiu sint congruentia naturae

Deique consiliis apte convenient, firmare profecto valebunt animorum concordiam inter parentes, tueri bonam institutionem liberorum, temperare patriam potestatem, proposito divinae potestatis exemplo, filios parentibus, famulos heris facere obedientes. Ab eiusmodi autem coniugiis expectare civitates iure possunt genus et sobolem civium qui probe animati sint, Deique reverentia atque amore assueti, sui officii esse ducant iuste et legitime imperantibus obtemperare, cunctos diligere, laedere neminem.

Hos fructus tantos ac tam praeclaros tamdiu matrimonium revera genuit, quamdiu munera sanctitatis, unitatis, perpetuitatisque retinuit a quibus vim omnem accipit frugiferam et salutarem; neque est dubitandum similes paresque ingeneraturum fuisse, si semper et ubique in potestatem fidemque fuisset Ecclesiae, quae illorum munerum est fidissima conservatrix et vindex.—Sed quia modo passim libuit humanum ius in locum naturalis et divini supponere, deleri non solum coepit matrimonii species ac notio praestantissima, quam in animis hominum impresserat et quasi consignaverat natura; sed in ipsis etiam Christianorum coniugiis, hominum vitio, multum vis illa debilitata est magnorum bonorum procreatrix. Quid est enim boni quod nuptiales afferre possint societates, unde abscedere christiana religio iubetur, quae parens est omnium bonorum, maximasque alit virtutes, excitans et impellens ad decus omne generosi animi atque excelsi? Illa igitur semota ac reiecta, redigi nuptias oportet in servitutem vitiosae hominum naturae et pessimarum dominarum cupiditatum, honestatis naturalis parum valido defensas patrocinio. Hoc fonte multiplex derivata perniciēs, non modo in privatas familias, sed etiam in civitates influxit. Etenim salutari depulso Dei metu, sublataque curarum levatione, quae nusquam alibi est quam in religione christiana maior, persaepe fit, quod est factu proclive, ut vix ferenda matrimonii munera et officia videantur; et liberari nimis multi vinculum velint, quod iure humano et sponte nexum putant, si dissimilitudo ingeniorum, aut discordia, aut fides ab alterutro violata, aut utriusque consensus, aliaeve causae liberari suadeant oportere. Et si forte fieri procacitati voluntatum lege prohibeatur, tum iniquas clamant esse leges, inhumanas, cum iure civium liberorum pugnantes; quapropter omnino videndum ut, illis antiquatis abrogatisque, licere divortia humaniore lege decernatur.

Nostrorum autem temporum legumlatores, cum eorundem iuris principiorum tenaces se ac studiosos profiteantur, ab illa hominum improbitate, quam diximus, se tueri non possunt, etiamsi maxime velint: quare cedendum temporibus ac divortiorum concedenda facultas.—Quod historia idem ipsa declaret. Ut enim alia praetereamus, exeunte saeculo superiore, in illa non tam perturbatione quam deflagratione Galliarum, cum societas omnis, amoto Deo, profanaretur, tum demum placuit ratis legibus esse coniugum discessionem. Easdem autem leges renovari hoc tempore multi cupiunt, propterea quod Deum et Ecclesiam pelli e medio ac submoveri volunt a societate coniunctionis humanae; stulte putantes extremum grassanti morum corruptelae remedium ob eiusmodi legibus esse quaerendum.

At vero quanti materiam mali in se divortia contineant, vix attinet

dicere. Eorum enim caussa fiunt maritalia foedera mutabilia; extenuatur mutua benevolentia; infidelitati pernicioso incitamenta suppeditantur; tuitioni atque institutioni liberorum nocetur; dissuendis societatibus domesticis praebetur occasio; discordiarum inter familias semina sparguntur; minuitur ac deprimitur dignitas mulierum, quae in periculum veniunt ne, cum libidini virorum inservierint, pro derelictis habeantur.—Et quoniam ad perdendas familias, frangendasque regnorum opes nihil tam valet, quam corruptela morum, facile perspicitur, prosperitati familiarum ac civitatum maxime inimica esse divortia, quae a depravatis populorum moribus nascuntur, ac, teste rerum usu, ad vitiosiores vitae privatae et publicae consuetudines aditum ianuamque patefaciunt.—Multoque esse graviora haec mala constabit si consideretur, frenos, nullos futuros tantos qui concessam semel divortiorum valeant intra certos, aut ante provisos, limites coercere. Magna prorsus est vis exemplorum, maior cupiditatum: hisce incitamentis fieri debet, ut divortiorum libido latius quotidie serpens plurimorum animos invadat, quasi morbus contagione vulgatus, aut agmen aquarum, superatis aggeribus, exundans.

Haec certe sunt omnia per se clara; sed renovanda rerum gestarum memoria fiunt clariora.—Simul ac iter divortiis tutum lege praestari coepit, dissidia, similitates, secessiones plurimum crevere; et tanta est vivendi turpitudine consecuta, ut eos ipsos, qui fuerant talium discessionum defensores, facti poenituerit; qui nisi contraria lege remedium mature quaesissent, timendum erat, ne praeceps in suam ipsa perniciem respublica dilaberetur.—Romani veteres prima divortiorum exempla dicuntur inhorruisse; sed non longa mora sensus honestatis in animis obstupescere, moderator cupiditatis pudor interire, fidesque nuptialis tanta cum licentia violari coepit, ut magnam veri similitudinem habere videatur quod a nonnullis scriptum legimus, mulieres non mutatione consulum, sed maritorum enumerare annos consuevisse.—Pari modo apud Protestantes principio quidem leges sanxerant, ut divortia fieri liceret certis de causis, iisque non sane multis: istas tamen propter rerum similitudinem affinitatem, compertum est in tantam multitudinem excrevisse apud Germanos, Americanos, aliosque, ut qui non stulte sapuissent, magnopere defendendam putarint infinitam morum depravationem, atque intolerandam legum temeritatem.—Neque aliter se res habuit in civitatibus catholici nominis: in quibus si quando datus est coniugiorum dissidiis locus, incommodorum, quae consecuta sunt, multitudo opinionem legislatorum longe vicit. Nam scelus plurimorum fuit, ad omnem malitiam fraudemque versare mentem, ac per saevitiam adhibitam, per iniurias, per adulteria fingere causas ad illud impune dissolvendum, cuius pertaesum esset, coniunctionis maritalis vinculum: idque cum tanto publicae honestatis detrimento, ut operam emendandis legibus quamprimum dari omnes iudicaverint oportere.—Et quisquam dubitabit, quin exitus aequè miseros et calamitosos habiturae sint leges divortiorum faatrices, sicuti forte in usum aetate nostra revocentur? Non est profecto in hominum commentis vel decretis facultas tanta, ut immutare rerum naturalem indolem conformationemque possint: quapropter parum sapienter publicam felicitatem interpretantur, qui germanam matrimonii

rationem impune perverti posse putant; et, qualibet sanctitate cum religionis tum Sacramenti posthabita, diffingere ac deformare coniugia ac deformare coniugia turpius velle videntur, quam ipsa ethnicorum instituta consuevissent. Ideoque nisi consilia mutantur, perpetuo sibi metuere familiae et societas humana debebunt, ne miserrime coniiciantur in illud rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen, quod est Socialistarum ac Communistarum flagitiosis gregibus iamdiu propositum.—Unde liquet quam absonum et absurdum sit publicam salutem a divortiis expectare, quae potius in certam societatis perniciem sunt evasura.

Igitur confitendum est, de communi omnium populorum bono meruisse optime Ecclesiam catholicam, sanctitati et perpetuitati coniugiorum tuendae semper intentam; nec exiguam ipsi gratiam deberi, quod legibus civicis centum iam annos in hoc genere multa peccantibus palam reclamaverit;* quod haeresim deterrimam Protestantium de divortiis et repudiis anathemate perculerit;† quod usitatum graecis diremptionem matrimoniorum multis modis damnaverit;‡ quod irritas esse nuptias decreverit ea conditione initas, ut aliquando dissolvantur;§ quod demum vel a prima aetate leges imperatorias repudiavit, quae divortiis et repudiis perniciose favissent.¶ —Pontifices vero maximi quoties resisterunt principibus potentissimis, divortia a se facta ut rata Ecclesiae essent minaciter petentibus, toties existimandi sunt non modo pro incolumitate religionis, sed etiam pro humanitate gentium propugnasse. Quam ad rem omnis admirabitur posteritas invicti animi documenta a Nicolao I edita adversus Lotharium; ab Urbano II et Paschali II adversus Philippum I regem Galliarum; a Caelestino III et Innocentio III adversus Philippum II principem Galliarum; a Clemente VII et Paulo III adversus Henricum VIII; denique a Pio VII sanctissimo fortissimoque Pontifice adversus Napoleonem I, secundis rebus et magnitudine imperii exultantem.

Quae cum ita sint, omnes gubernatores administratoresque rerum publicarum, si rationem sequi, si sapientiam, si ipsam populorum utilitatem voluissent, malle debuerant sacras de matrimonio leges intactas manere, oblatumque Ecclesiae adiumentum in tutelam morum prosperitatemque familiarum adhibere, quam ipsam vocare Ecclesiam in suspicionem inimicitiae, et in falsam atque iniquam violati iuris civilis insimulationem.

Eoque magis, quod Ecclesia catholica, ut in re nulla potest ab religione officii et defensione iuris sui declinare, ita maxime solet esse ad benignitatem indulgentiamque proclivis in rebus omnibus, quae cum incolumitate iurium et sanctitate officiorum suorum possunt una

* Pius VI, epist. ad episc. Lucion. 28 Maii 1793—Pius VII, litter. encycl. die 17 Febr. 1809, et Const. dat. die 19 Iul. 1817.—Pius VIII, litt. encycl. die 29 Maii 1829.—Gregorius XVI, Const. dat. die 15 Augusti 1832.—Pius IX, alloc. habit. die 22 Sept. 1852.

† Trid. sess. xxiv, can. 5 et 7.

‡ Concil. Floren., et Instr. Eug. IV ad Armenos.—Bened. XIV, Const. *Etai pastoralis*, 6 Maii 1742.

§ Cap. 7 de condit. appos.

¶ Hieron., epist. 79 ad Ocean.—Ambros., lib. viii in cap. 16 Lucas, n. 5.—August., de nuptiis cap. 10.

consistere. Quam ob rem nihil unquam de matrimoniis statuit, quin respectum habuerit ad statum communitatis, ad conditiones populorum; nec semel suarum ipsa legum praescripta, quoad potuit, mitigavit, quando ut mitigaret caussae iustae et graves impulerunt.—Item non ipsa ignorat neque diffitetur, sacramentum matrimonii, cum ad conservationem quoque et incrementum societatis humanae dirigatur, cognitionem et necessitudinem habere cum rebus ipsis humanis, quae matrimonium quidem consequuntur, sed in genere civili versantur: de quibus rebus iure decernunt et cognoscunt qui rei publicae praesunt.

Nemo autem dubitat, quin Ecclesiae conditor Iesus Christus potestatem sacram voluerit esse a civili distinctam, et ad suas utramque res agendas liberam atque expeditam; hoc tamen adiuncto quod utrique expedit, et quod interest omnium hominum, ut coniunctio inter eas et concordia intercederet, in iisque rebus quae sint, diversa licet ratione, communis iuris et iudicii, altera, cui sunt humana tradita, opportune et congruenter ab altera penderet, cui sunt coelestia concredita. Huiusmodi autem compositione, ac fere harmonia, non solum utriusque potestatis optima ratio continetur, sed etiam opportunissimus atque efficacissimus modus iuvandi hominum genus in eo quod pertinet ad actionem vitae et ad spem salutis sempiternae. Etenim sicut hominum intelligentia, quemadmodum in superioribus Encyclicis Litteris ostendimus, si cum fide christiana conveniat, multum nobilitatur multoque evadit ad vitandos ac repellendos errores munitior, vicissimque fides non parum praesidii ab intelligentia mutuatur; sic pariter, si cum sacra Ecclesiae potestate civilis auctoritas amice congruat, magna utrique necesse est fiat utilitatis accessio. Alterius enim amplificatur dignitas, et, religione praeunte, numquam erit non iustum imperium: alteri vero adiumenta tutelae et defensionis in publicum fidelium bonum suppeditantur.

Nos igitur, harum rerum consideratione permoti, cum studiose alias, tum vehementer in praesenti viros principes in concordiam atque amicitiam iungendam iterum hortamur; iisdemque paterna cum benevolentia veluti dexteram primi porrigimus, oblato supremae potestatis Nostrae auxilio, quod tanto magis est hoc tempore necessarium, quanto ius imperandi plus est in opinione hominum, quasi accepto vulnere, debilitatum. Incensis iam procaci libertate animis, et omne imperii, vel maxime legitimi, iugum nefario ausu detrectantibus, salus publica postulat, ut vires utriusque potestatis consocientur ad prohibenda damna, quae non modo Ecclesiae, sed ipsi etiam civili societati impendent.

Sed cum amicam voluntatum coniunctionem valde suademus, precamurque Deum, principem pacis, ut amorem concordiae in animos cunctorum hominum iniiciat, tum temperare Nobis ipsi non possumus, quin Vestram industriam, Venerabiles Fratres, Vestrum studium ac vigilantiam, quae in Vobis summa esse intelligimus, magis ac magis hortando incitemus. Quantum contentione assequi, quantum auctoritate potestis, date operam, ut apud gentes fidei Vestrae commendatas integra atque incorrupta doctrina retineatur, quam Christus Dominus et coelestis voluntatis interpretes Apostoli

tradiderunt, quamque Ecclesia catholica religiose ipse servavit, et a Christifidelibus servari per omnes aetates iussit.

Praecipuas curas in id insumate, ut populi abundant praecipitis sapientiae christianae, semperque memoria teneant matrimonium non voluntate hominum, sed auctoritate nutuque Dei fuisse initio constitutum, et hac lege prorsus ut sit unus ad unam: Christum vero novi Foederis auctorem illud ipsum ex officio naturae in Sacramenta transtulisse, et quod ad vinculum spectat, legiferam et iudicalem Ecclesiae suae adtribuuisse potestatem. Quo in genere cavendum magnopere est, ne in errorem mentes inducantur a fallacibus conclusionibus adversariorum, qui eiusmodi potestatem ademptam Ecclesiae vellent.—Similiter omnibus exploratum esse debet, si qua coniunctio viri et mulieris inter Christifideles citra Sacramentum contrahatur, eam vi ac ratione iusti matrimonii carere; et quamvis convenienter legibus civicis facta sit, tamen plurius esse non posse, quam ritum aut morem, iure civili introductum; iure autem civili res tantummodo ordinari atque administrari posse, quas matrimonia efferunt ex sese in genere civili, et quas gigni non posse manifestum est, nisi vera et legitima illarum causa, scilicet nuptiale vinculum, existat.—Haec quidem omnia probe cognita habere maxime sponzorum refert, quibus etiam probata esse debent et notata animis, ut sibi liceat hac in remorem legibus genere; ipsa non abnuente Ecclesia, quae vult atque optat ut in omnes partes salva sint matrimoniorum effecta, et ne quid liberis detrimenti afferatur.—In tanta autem confusione sententiarum, quae serpunt quotidie longius, id quoque est cognitu necessarium, solve vinculum coniugii inter christianos rati et consummati nullius in potestate esse; ideoque manifesti criminis reos esse, si qui forte coniuges, quaecumque demum causa esse dicatur, novo se matrimonii nexu ante implicare velint, quam abrumpi primum morte contigerit.—Quod si res eo devenierint, ut convictus ferri diutius non posse videatur, tum vero Ecclesia sinit alterum ab altera seorsum agere, adhibendisque curis ac remediis ad coniugum conditionem accommodatis, lenire studet secessionis incommoda; nec umquam committit, ut de reconcilianda concordia aut non laboret aut desperet.—Verum haec extrema sunt; quo facile esset non descendere, si sponsi non cupiditate acti, sed praesumptis cogitatione tum officii coniugum, tum causis coniugiorum nobilissimis, ea qua aequum est mente ad matrimonium accederent; neque nuptias anteverterent continuatione quadam serieque flagitiorum, irato Deo. Et ut omnia paucis complectamur, tunc matrimonia placidam quietamque constantiam habitura sunt, si coniuges spiritum vitamque hauriant a virtute religionis, quae forti invictoque animo esse tribuit; quae efficit ut vitia, si qua sint in personis, ut distantia morum et ingeniorum, ut curarum maternas pondus, ut educationis liberorum operosa sollicitudo, ut comites vitae labores, ut casus adversi non solum moderate, sed etiam libenter perferantur.

Illud etiam cavendum est, ne scilicet coniugia facile appetantur cum alienis a catholico nomine: animos enim de disciplina religionis dissidentes vix sperari potest futuros esse cetera concordēs. Quin imo ab eiusmodi coniugiis ex eo maxime perspicitur esse abhorrendum,

quod occasionem praebeant vetitae societati et communicationi rerum sacrarum, periculum religioni creant coniugis catholici, impedimento sunt bonae institutioni liberorum, et persaepe animos impellunt, ut cunctarum religionum aequam habere rationem assuescant, sublato veri falsique discrimine.—Postremo loco, cum probe intelligamus, alienum esse a caritate Nostra neminem oportere, auctoritati fidei et pietati Vestrae, Venerabiles Fratres, illos commendamus, valde quidem miseros, qui aestu cupiditatum abrepti, et salutis suae plane immemores contra fas vivunt, haud legitimi matrimonii vinculo coniuncti. In his ad officium revocandis hominibus Vestra sollers industria versetur: et cum per Vos ipsi, tum interposita virorum bonorum opera, modis omnibus contendite, ut sentiant se flagitiose fecisse, agant nequitiae poenitentiam, et ad iustas nuptias ritu catholico ineundas animum inducant.

Haec de matrimonio christiano documenta ac praecepta, quae per has litteras Nostras Vobiscum, Venerabiles Fratres, communicanda censuimus, facile videtis, non minus ad conservationem civilis communitatis, quam ad salutem hominum sempiternam magnopere pertinere.—Faxit igitur Deus ut quanto plus habent illa momenti et ponderis, tanto dociles promptosque magis ad parendum animos ubique nanciscantur. Huius rei gratia, supplice atque humili prece omnes pariter opem imploremus beatæ Mariæ Virginis Immaculatae, quae, excitatis mentibus ad obediendum fidei, matrem se et adiutricem hominibus impertiat. Neque minore studio Petrum et Paullum obsecremus, Principes Apostolorum, domitores superstitionis, satores veritatis, ut ab eluvione renascentium errorum humanum genus firmissimo patrociniò tueantur.

Interea caelestium munerum auspicem et singularis benevolentiae Nostrae testem, Vobis omnibus, Venerabiles Fratres, et populis vigilantiae Vestrae commissis, Apostolicam Benedictionem ex animo impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum, die 10 Februarii an. 1880, Pontificatus Nostri Anno Secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

THE POPE'S EDITION OF THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN.

LEO PP. XIII.

Motu Proprio

PLACERE Nobis, omnia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera de integro publicare, superiore anno significavimus per Litteras Nostras idibus octobribus datas ad Cardinalem Praefectum Sacri Consilii studiis disciplinarum regundis. Eiusqua causam propositi hanc esse diximus, ut longe lateque fluat Angelici Doctoris excellens sapientia, qua opprimendis opinionibus perversis nostrorum temporum fere nihil est aptius, conservandæ veritati nihil efficacius. Nunc autem quia commodum videtur esse manum operi admove, discernenda Nobis

nonnulla esse censemus, quae spem laetam portendunt, futurum ut coepta Nostra ad exitus pervehantur optatos.

Primum itaque, ne Almae Urbi Nostrae haec pereat laus, editionem, quam supra diximus, reservatum esse volumus Officinae librariae Sacri Consilii Christiano nomini propagando, clarae iam ob alia magnae molis et laudati operis edita volumina.

Editioni autem curandae destinamus ac praecipua auctoritate praeesse volumus tres sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Cardinales; scilicet Antoninum de Luca Praefectum Sacri Consilii studiis regundis; Ioannem Simeoni Praefectum Sacri Consilii Christiano nomini propagando; Thomam Zigliara ex Familia Dominicianae, ad disciplinam S. Thomae apprime institutum atque eruditum. His autem ius et potestas esto statuendi ac discernendi Nostro nomine quidquid ad rem pertinere intellexerint. Quare prospiciant ut omnia ac singula Angelici Doctoris Opera integra prodeant, additis clarissimorum Interpretum Thomae de Vio Cardinalis Caietani in *Summam Theologicam* et Francisci de Sylvestris Ferrariensis in *Summam contra Gentiles* commentariia. Similiter curent et provideant ne literarum optima forma, ne accurata emendatio, ne intelligens in rerum singularum delectu iudicium desideretur; ac demum constituent quo ordine, quo tempore singula volumina in lucem oporteat proferri.

Quod vero ad expensas attinet, argenteorum italicorum CCC millia Nos ultro damus atque addicimus suppeditandis sumptibus in praesenti necessariis. Reliquo autem tempore necessarios suppeditari volumus ex eiusdem Sacri Consilii Fidei propagandae aerario: cui tamen quidquid erit vendendis exemplaribus redactum pecuniae, tamdiu in rem cedat, quoad par ratio fuerit acceptorum et expensorum. Si quidquam eidem accrevisse contingat, accrescentem pecuniam omnem insumi iubemus in lucubrationes eorum Scriptorum edendas, qui S. Thomae Aquinatis illustrandis operibus maxime excellent. Cui vero inter illos scriptores decerni primas oporteat, viderint ipsi Cardinales quos nominavimus: hoc tantum monemus, eos scriptores esse ceteris anteponeandos, quorum doctrina maiorem fructum ubertatem sit allatura, et temporum necessitatibus accomodatio esse videatur.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die 18 Ianuarii 1880. Pontificatus Nostri Anno Secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

Notices of Catholic Continental Periodicals.

GERMAN PERIODICALS.

(By Dr. BELLESHEIM, of Cologne.)

1. *Katholik*.

THE November issue contains an interesting dissertation by Professor Probst, of Breslau, on the so-called "Sacramentarium Leonianum." In 1735, Joseph Bianchini discovered in the library of Verona Cathedral a manuscript containing collects, secrets, prefaces, and other liturgical formularies, which he soon afterwards published under the name of "Codex Sacramentorum vetus S. Romanæ ecclesiæ a S. Leone papa confectus." Keen disputes soon began as to whether St. Leo had or had not compiled this collection, but all antiquarians agreed in calling it the oldest "Sacramentarium" of the Roman Church. The questions which Professor Probst seeks to answer are: Who was the pontiff in whose reign the collection appeared? Are any masses to be attributed to St. Damasus? Do these formularies agree with those of St. Gelasius and St. Gregory the Great? What masses are to be attributed to St. Leo? The author of this dissertation shows clearly that the collection, far from bearing an official character, is the work of a private person, and was brought out under Felix III. (483-492), St. Simplicius, his predecessor, being commemorated in one mass for the dead. That the collection belongs to the fifth century is also to be gathered from the fact of only a small number of "confessors" being admitted. The number of saints exhibited in the Sacramentarium is not large, and these for the most part are martyrs. The oldest part of the collection is shown by Dr. Probst to be attributed to St. Damasus (366-384). The reformation of the liturgy is known to belong to the second part of the fourth century. The time of persecutions having ceased, the liturgy began to bear a character very different from that of the pre-Constantinian time. A singularly striking example is supplied in the "Prefaces" of the reformed liturgy, which largely differ from the old prayers of thanksgiving for creation, providence, and redemption, and, on the contrary, lay the greatest stress on the celebration of the respective feasts and the commemoration of saints. From the history of the fourth century, it is clear that the reform of liturgy began in the time of Saints Basil, Ambrose, and Damasus. This fact seems to supply an obvious hint for inquiring whether the collection does not contain prayers which might be brought into connection with facts of Damasus's pontificate. That is really the case. St. Damasus was strongly opposed by the anti-Pope Ursicinus, or Ursinus, the number of whose partisans was not small, and it seems to be to these factious men that the preface of one mass (July) refers:—"Qui coelestibus

disciplinis nos instruens, qualiter a fidelibus tuis falsos fratres discernemus ostendens, Unigeniti tui voce pronuntias, ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos." "De his sunt inflati sensu carnis suae, et non tenentes caput . . . saepe subvertere conati sunt et conantur." These and other sentences make it very probable that at least these masses must be attributed to St. Damasus. Another striking fact is given in page 326 of our collection, where we find, for the Feast of St. John Baptist, four masses, the fourth being inscribed "ad fontem," indicating that the sacrament of baptism may be administered on that day. Comparing this with the well authenticated fact that Pope Siricius, the successor of Damasus, answered the question of Himerius of Tarragona, whether or not it was allowed to baptize on feasts of apostles and martyrs, by forbidding him to do so, except in case of urgent necessity, and reminding him of Easter and the fifty following days, when only baptism was to be given, we gather that in the reign of Damasus this sacrament began to be administered on the Feast of St. John, and hence may assign to his period the origin of the formulary. St. Leo III. has only a small share in the collection, but two prefaces, one for the Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul, the other for the month of July, convince an attentive reader that their author was the same person who wrote Sermon 84, attributed to St. Leo. III. In the same issue I contributed a succinct commentary on De Rossi's famous dissertation on the "Sancti quatuor Coronati." This topic is not less intricate than interesting, but was so thoroughly treated by the eminent Roman archæologist, that we may confidently now call it "causa finita." The acts of these saints, in the course of time, underwent, on the part of hagiologists and historiographers, no very favourable treatment. Surius declined to admit them in the "Vite probatorum Sanctorum;" Cardinal Baronius only gave vent to his desire of a more accurate text, and Tillemont did his utmost to deprive the acts of all kind of authority, calling them the offspring of barbarous times. But German Protestant antiquarians in our days have passed quite an opposite judgment on the text; and, complying with their desire, Commendatore de Rossi began to examine it with his well-known sagacity. If we reproduced his dissertation, we should trespass beyond the space assigned to us; it may suffice to touch briefly on the result of his inquiries. The actual text of the acts is made up of two separate parts, afterwards mixed up in the Middle Ages, the first originating in Pannonia (Hungary), the other being composed in Rome. The Pannonian part describes the works and martyrdom of five sculptors in the imperial mines of Pannonia, where they shaped the marble into "Victorias, cupidines, et conchas" for the imperial palaces. But, declining to sculpture the image of Aesculapius, the Emperor Diocletian commanded them to be put to death. It is excessively interesting to follow the subtle deductions of De Rossi, who employs, in support of the Acts, the most authentic results of modern German philology. It is principally the legislation on the imperial mines he makes an extensive use of. The same Emperor afterwards, in Rome, sentenced to death *four Christian soldiers* (cornicularii), and their martyrdom is described in the *second*

part of the Acts. These martyrs being anonymous, and having suffered on the same day, but not in the same year with the Pannonian sculptors, their feasts began to be celebrated together. It was Pope Melchisedes who so ordered, and the place where the commemoration used to be held was "tertio milliario via Labicana in comitatu ad duas lauros." The very important fact that the Almanack of Dionysius Furius Philocalus contains the names of our Pannonian saints is explained by Codex 93 in the Chapter Library of Verona, indicating that their relics, two years after the martyrdom, were brought from Pannonia to Rome and there entombed, together with the four Roman soldiers. It was Leo IV. (847-855) who, before he became Pope, held the title of the Ancient Church of the Caelian, and afterwards carried the holy relics of both groups of martyrs to this church, which henceforward was called "Ad SS. Quatuor Coronatos." The January issue contains a good treatise of Rev. Dr. Grube on the principles of the interpretation of Holy Scripture employed by St. Justin, who defended the Christian religion against the attacks of the Jews in his "Dialogue with Tryphon."

2. *Historisch-politische Blätter*.—The January issue has a Paper, contributed by Dr. von Schafhaentl, professor at Munich, which has a special interest for Scotland and Scottish Benedictines. When King Macbeth, in the eleventh century, expelled the Benedictines, they took refuge on the Continent, and settled, first in Cologne and afterwards in Ratisbon. The latter town soon became a centre for the missionary works of the Scottish monks, who spread all over Germany. Following their great traditions, they opened a higher school at Ratisbon, which, after the disastrous ecclesiastical revolution of Knox, supplied Scotland with many priests. There are still not a few priests in Scotland who were educated in the Benedictine convent at Ratisbon. In 1817 some of the Fathers brought back with them from Scotland young John Lamont, born, in 1803, near Aberdeen, the second son of a Catholic farmer. During his course of Philosophy, the intelligent youth gave ample proofs of his talents; but above all he manifested a special gift for mathematics and mechanical art, and as these sciences, in preference to all others, were cultivated by the prior, Father Deasson, he was especially favoured by him, and destined to higher studies. He became assistant to the observer in the Royal Observatory, Munich, and in course of time, by the vote of the President of the Royal Academy, Professor von Schelling (the philosopher), was appointed to be first observer. This gave origin to his "*Observationes Astronomice in Specula Regia Monacensi Institutae et Regio jussu publicis impensis editae* XV. vol." The minor dissertations on the science of astronomy which he wrote are almost numberless, and are not yet collected. In 1850 he began to observe the so-called "telescope" stars. He was a member of many literary societies, the Royal Society of London having elected him as early as 1843. After a long and painful illness, this eminent man expired August 6, 1879. Besides the admiration he may claim for the great services he rendered to the science of astronomy, he is still more to be venerated for his steadfast character, eminent moral virtues, and principally for his obedience and fidelity

as a son of the Catholic Church. The same issue has a long account of Prince Metternich's Memoirs.

3. *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*.—In the November issue Father Langhorst vindicates Cardinal Turre Cremata's doctrine about the origin of episcopal jurisdiction from an attack it had to suffer last year in Germany. His doctrine is, that bishops derive their jurisdiction immediately from the Pope: and this doctrine, strongly brought into prominence by the great Dominican Cardinal, was the common doctrine of the Mediæval Doctors, although neither the Council of Trent nor that of the Vatican passed any decision on the question. Cardinal Hergenröther, in his work, "The Catholic Church and the Christian State" (p. 880, German edit.), adduces for this doctrine ninety theologians and canonists. Father Ehrle contributes an exposition on the Encyclical "Aeterni Patris," in which Leo XIII. urges on the clergy the study of St. Thomas's works. Father Langhorst discusses the Punishment of Death as justified and supported by the principles of natural right; and Father Cathrein comments on the social condition of workmen in England.

4. The *Görres-Gesellschaft*, for cultivating Catholic science in Germany, started in January the first issue of a new Historical Review, under the name of "Historisches Jahrbuch," which will be published four times a year, and is intended to clear up the innumerable mistakes about Catholicism wilfully repeated by many non-Catholic modern historiographers. The first Number opens with an essay "from the Papers of the Cardinal of York," by Baron von Reumont. Twenty years ago the same learned author brought out, in two volumes, his work on the "Countess of Albany," describing the last Stuarts, Prince Charles and his brother, Henry Benedict, Cardinal of York. The Papers of the Cardinal were given, in 1817, by Cardinal Consalvi to the Prince Regent of England, afterwards George IV.; but some documents remained in Rome, where our author had occasion to become acquainted with them. Their interest is chiefly of a private nature. Baron von Reumont concludes his learned essay by remarking that in 1871, on a visit in Naples, he saw the Cardinal's portrait, painted by the great Roman artist Pompeo Batoni, a contemporary of Raphael Mengs, and urges that, "considering the twofold dignity of the last Stuart and King Henry IX., non consiliis hominum, sed Dei voluntate, the Cardinal's portrait ought not to be absent from the London National Gallery." The history of the Stuarts, just at this moment, is the subject of eager discussion in Germany. Dr. Onno Klopp has now published volumes seven and eight of his excellent work, "The Downfall of the House of Stuart and Succession of the House of Hanover in Great Britain and Ireland in connection with European Affairs." Onno Klopp, although more than once asked to put another title, more suggestive of the rich contents, on his book, constantly declined to do so. Departing from most historiographers, English as well as French, he intends describing principally the immense influence brought to bear on the settlement of European affairs by William III., of Great Britain. This monarch, together with the Emperor Leopold I., are the main figures in Klopp's work, and it is their immense services to Europe,

in checking the baneful politics of Louis XIV., that the author seeks to display to the world.

ITALIAN PERIODICALS.

La Civiltà Cattolica. 17 Gennaio, 7 Febbraio, 1880.

A Satanic School of Poetry.

IN the above Numbers of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, we have an account of a new school of poetry which has sprung up in Italy—if the name of school can be applied to the versification, in every possible form, with which it has been deluged for these last two or three years. In a preface to the “Nuove Poesie” of Giosuè Carducci, who seems to be recognised as the leader of the versifiers according to the new style, Panzacchi, himself one of the tribe, calls this poetical revival throughout the land “a new spring,” and “a literary re-blossoming,” but he concludes with observing that, apart from artistic merits, the new-born muse must not be too strictly interrogated as to the paths which it pursues, or the ends at which it aims. These, it seems, would be impertinent questions. As regards *art*, Panzacchi allows that it would be different; as if art could be regarded independently of its form and aims. The new poets of Italy, in fact, do not relish those two questions, for very obvious reasons—the shameless obscenity and demoniacal impiety with which their lucubrations are fraught. These expressions are by no means exaggerated, for it is not merely that their productions are occasionally open to this reproach, but that the most disgusting immorality and appalling atheism constitute their staple theme. In short, the new poetry may be described as the orgies of the human intellect, and the saturnalia of the fancy. Art, or all that as yet has been regarded as deserving of the name, is, indeed, as much set at defiance as religion and morality by these poetasters who seem to glory in treading under foot all the traditions bequeathed by the most sublime geniuses of the Italian Parnassus. The reviewer illustrates this last assertion by a few quotations from Carducci's poems. They are quite untranslatable, were they worth the labour, and outrage good taste and common sense so flagrantly that one may well wonder how poetic effusions, of which these passages form a specimen, can find acceptance with the public. The press, however, is inundated with little volumes, all twin brethren of Carducci's, in attractive covers, printed on delicate paper in minute characters, which seem ashamed of what they have to express—and well may they be—on pages with wide margins, so that two-thirds of the space are left empty. Such is the style in which these choice morsels are served up; and, unfortunately, there is a wide-spread, corrupt taste, which is able to relish them.

If such is the dress of the new school, what is its aim? Chiarini, one of their number, clearly states this in his Preface to Carducci's “*Odi Barbare*”—an appropriate title, it must be allowed. He is engaged in confuting the assertion of such as had reproached Carducci with resuscitating Paganism, which for centuries had descended

to the grave. "No," he says, "Paganism is not dead. . . . That which prevented the death of Paganism has a name more ancient and greater than that of Carducci, greater also than that of Christ; it is called Human Nature." Then, after many blasphemies, the infernal character of which he endeavours to disguise under elegant phraseology, and a show of scientific reasoning, he concludes thus:—"Let us humbly confess it; we are no longer Christians, we are Pagans; we wish to live and enjoy life, we wish to obey our nature thus fulfilling the law of our being." "Such," he says, "is the meaning of the complaints of Schiller, Leopardi, Swinburne, Carducci." "Yes," he repeats, "we are Pagans, and we may glory in it, because the Paganism of the 'Odi Barbare' is, as Alberto Mino judiciously observed, not merely the revindication of earth over heaven, not merely the abolition of all the mediæval darkness of Christianity—that inveterate plague of civil society—but the serene, the full, the satisfying possession of earthly life, a content which results from the acquisition of the key of its secrets and laws."

Naturalism, materialism, epicureanism, such form the scope of the new Italian poetry. It shamelessly confesses the same, and the apostate Professor Trezza, when lauding the "Odi Barbare," does not care to defend them from the charge of Epicureanism, but blasphemously adds that the author, musing on Rome, the creator of Mediterranean civilization, rebels against the Galilean, who cast a cross into his arms and said, "Take it, and serve." Against this service the modern conscience is rebelling; it was time, therefore, that lyric song should interpret it, and contemporary poets break away from an old faith whose sun has set for ever. The avowed end may well dub itself "barbarism;" it is the burning of the old cathedrals, the grinding to powder of old saints, the destruction of all the ancient glories of Italy, the annihilation of Christianity, theoretical and practical, and of all the art born of and fostered by it. Christ preached cruel doctrines, the mortification of the flesh, the subjugation of the senses, the submission of reason to faith, of nature to grace; doctrines whereby joy and laughter were banished from the earth, and fear and melancholy were engendered.

The new school, then, luxuriates in the rehabilitation of the flesh, in the victory of natural instincts, and in the triumph of Satan, who is to them the symbol of their rebellion, and to whom adulatory verses are not seldom addressed. In this, the ultimate aim of the revolution, the supreme object of the Masonic sects, all these poets coincide, although many—and these, indeed, constitute the majority—would dispense with the paraphernalia of heathen gods or goddesses, nymphs and dryads, in which Carducci delights, deeming them necessary poetic accessories and, as such, useful means to bring about the Satanic triumph, and rush straight to the most revolting license of the imagination and to the loathsome glorification of sensual indulgence. "Close my excommunicated book"—such is the exordium of one of these poets, addressing the critics of these scandalous exhibitions—"for it might tell you how fair sinful women are and how sweet is sin."

But every school must have a name; this school could not be

called Classicist, aiming, as do all its followers, at dethroning from their seats of honour, those who have been hitherto regarded as classic models, Dante, Tasso, Petrarch, and the rest. Romanticism they abhor, and they do not sufficiently agree to allow of their selecting any common representative name from amongst themselves; the school has, therefore, been distinguished by the appellation of "Verismo," on account of its professed homage to Truth, and its disciples have been styled Veristi (Verists), a name which some reject as calumnious, on what ground it is hard to say—although it might well be viewed as satirical. Let us, however, if any object to being called Verists, style them Realists, a name suitable to men who make war on idealism. They have, they say, "been awakened from ecstatic mediæval hallucinations and have thrown away the Manzonian husk"—an allusion to Manzoni, whom they abominate—in order to "launch themselves into society and purify themselves in the infinite bosom of Nature." With the so-called mediæval hallucinations and the husk à la Manzoni, they have, however, cast away all the true greatness and beauty of Italian poetry, and, indeed, of all poetry whatever. Religious belief and feeling were always among the chief inspirers of art, and with the loss of faith art has always sunk or degenerated. Moreover, the avowed object of art is to give pleasure, and when intellectual instruction and elevation are combined therewith, it attains the height of perfection. But what kind of pleasure is it to give? Surely not sensuous pleasure, which can never elevate the mind, and is proper for beasts rather than for men. The delight which it is the object of art to produce is a human delight, a delight decorous and moral in its character Aristotle said as much. But see how Guerrini and his competers scoff at those who reproach their licentious songs with outrageous morality!

Thus despoiled of the elements of true beauty, religion and morality, what can remain in the poetry of even one gifted with poetic talent but the deepest moral degradation or the hysterical utterance of melancholy and despair, such as was poured forth by poor Leopardi, who was made for better things had he not lost his faith? He sings, and his hymn is a groan of despair; he seems to smile, and he weeps; he seems to love, and he hates, curses, and imprecates. He curses himself, God, his fellow-creatures, Nature, everything. A heavy account lies at the door of the men who are striving to popularize among the rising generation of their country a poetry which destroys art and becomes to them an instrument of death, converting every youth of twenty into a sort of melancholy desperado, who tastes in the flower of his days all the bitterness of a miserable old age. It is a poetry which professes to sing only about reality, but which loses itself amidst the wildest and most fantastic dreams, repulsive to common sense, and divested of every true grace and pure enjoyment. All is then a lie in this poetry, and, being as it is, the child of the Revolution, it could not be ought save false and destructive. Its goal is a moral dunghill, and it can occasionally speak the truth by confessing as much. Witness the following strophe of Stecchetti :

Ma noi giacciamo nauseati e stracchi,
 Senza un affetto in cor, sul reo letame
 Di questa sozzo età. Noi siamo vigliacchi,

which may be thus rendered : " But we lie sickened and wearied, without an affection in the heart, on the wretched dunghill of this filthy age. We are vile creatures." True ; only the reviewer, quoting some words of Cavallotti, spoken on another occasion, adds, " Would he do us the favour to speak in the singular number ?"

FRENCH PERIODICALS.

Revue des Questions Historiques. Janvier, 1880. Paris.

Louis XIV. and Clement IX., in the Affair of the Two Marriages of Mary of Savoy, 1666-1668. By M. CH. GÉRIN.

THIS Article is the fruit of much reading amongst documents and "papers," and is interesting to theologians as illustrating Papal action with regard to Matrimonial Dispensations. Limited space allows us here only an outline of the Article: it bristles with quotations and references.

On the 27th June, 1666, Mary, the daughter of Charles Amadeus of Savoy, Duc de Nemours and d'Aumale, was married by proxy to Alphonsus VI., King of Portugal, and three days afterwards left France for Lisbon. Louis XIV. had disposed of her hand, hoping to rule Portugal against Spain through the young queen. Alphonsus is described as a "physical and moral monster"—he was imbecile and impotent. On 21st November, 1667, she entered a convent, declaring that she would remain there, and that the king knew their marriage was null, &c. After some blustering, Alphonsus admitted the charge, and, later on, signed the admission. The States were assembled, and he further consented that his brother, Don Pedro, should share in the government of the kingdom, of which he himself was incapable.

Alphonsus was put aside entirely, and Don Pedro made king; and on 31st March, 1668, the same Mary of Savoy was married to Don Pedro, the brother of her first husband. These are familiar facts. It has not been so clear as to whether the second marriage was regular; whether the nullity of the first was duly pronounced by competent ecclesiastical authority; what part the Pope took herein. The Article replies to these points of doubt. Voltaire's sneer is ("Siècle de Louis XIV." chap. x.) "that the surprising thing is not that the Pope should have given a Bull of Dispensation, but that such powerful persons should have needed it;" that the Vatican "had always two measures for the rights of kings and of subjects," &c.

It was both law and custom that the dispensations needed should be asked of Rome: the queen wished it to be so asked. But Louis XIV., for motives chiefly political, wished they should *not* be asked of Rome, and he carried his way. The Portuguese prelates pronounced on the nullity of the first marriage; and the King of France urged them also to grant the dispensation, as application to Rome necessitated long

delays, &c. They hesitated; when suddenly there arrived from Louis a dispensation granted by the Papal Legate in France in the Pope's name! Almost before the Portuguese bishops had time carefully to read it, the marriage was performed; and then, as soon as it was over, both prelates and princes, with uneasy consciences, read it again. It came from Cardinal de Vendôme. This man, at the age of fifty-five, and when still a layman, had been presented by the French king for the Cardinalate. He had neither knowledge nor aptitude, and during his stay in Rome was the laughing-stock of all, "even of the French Embassy." Ignorant and pliant, the king persuaded him that he had power as legate to grant the dispensation to a queen out of his jurisdiction of France. "Reversing the Gallican custom of disputing and restricting the powers of Pontifical envoys, Louis XIV. succeeded in still more deeply wounding the Holy See, by forcing a legate to an abuse of jurisdiction." Even this legate sent afterwards to Rome to justify himself that he had done it only because forced to it by the king.

The Queen insisted on the affair being honestly reported to Rome, and the due rectification being demanded from the Holy Father, in opposition to the King of France, who vehemently opposed anything more than a petition for the approval and confirmation from the Pope of what had been done. Louis, whose language to his ambassadors and agents is throughout painfully contemptuous towards the Pope's spiritual action, wrote, among many other letters, one to his ambassador, explaining that he had been *obliged to make* the legate use his powers in an affair of great importance, which could not wait for Rome to be written to, and expressed the hope that when this had been mentioned to the Pope he "would rest satisfied with this little affair." But the Pope would take no step until the whole case was properly submitted to him *ab initio*. Ambassadors, agents, priests used every effort: the Pope was firm against both intrigue and menace. He appointed a special congregation of nine members to try the cause, and, when finally all the details had been laid before him, declared the first marriage *non consummatum* and null, and granted the dispensation from the impediment *publicæ honestatis, in radice*, to the joy of the Queen, for her own honour's sake and that of her child soon to be born.

Revue Catholique. 15 Janvier, 1880. Louvain.

"UN prêtre civilisateur," an article by M. Henri Lefebvre, deserves to be made known. It records a noble work of regeneration accomplished in our own days by a priest who appears to have not a little of the energy and spirit of the Curé of Ars.

Jonkersville is the name of a hamlet of the Commune of Woumen, in the *Arrondissement* of Dixmude (in West Flanders). "Jonkersville was, a few years ago, the most savage, the least civilized place in all Belgium. Situated anciently in the midst of immense forests, the remains of which are still called '*Vrybosch*' (Free Wood), this hamlet was quite recently inhabited by a population among whom

misery and grossness disputed for supremacy with immorality. In darksome cabins lived some hundreds of beggars and robbers; for these wretched people were all of the one profession." They were the dread of the country round. "Yet it was in Belgium, and in the second half of the nineteenth century, so proud of its lights, that such degradation existed without any one attempting a remedy." Immorality was rife; the restraints of the nearest relationship were not respected; sixty-five per cent. of their children were illegitimate. The nearest churches were, it is fair to say, scarcely to be reached, from the state of the roads, during a great portion of the year; and both mass and the sacraments were quite neglected. It need not be added that their children were never seen at a school. Such was Jonkershove in 1862, when a zealous priest, finding himself (providentially) without a mission, went thither determined with God's help to convert its inhabitants.

This was M. Costenoble, a Belgian, who had gone out to Chili at twenty-two years of age. In Chili, Bolivia, the Argentine Republic, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, California, he worked for twelve years—giving Missions, rousing Catholics, making converts. The glimpses here given of his missionary and travelling experiences are highly interesting. Chili became his adopted country, and there he had hoped to live and die, but his arduous labours had broken down his health, and medical men said the only remedy was his native air. Reluctantly he bade adieu to the scenes of his apostolate and to his devoted spiritual children in the new world; his leaving them was not unlike St. Paul's departure from Miletus. Thus in 1862, and at thirty-six years of age, he found himself in Bruges, convalescent, and with means to live independently of work—thanks to the funds spontaneously made over to him by Chilean friends in grateful return for his self-sacrificing services to them. He looked around for a new field of service in his master's vineyard, and felt sure he saw it in Jonkersville. He went there, and began the building of a school for boys and girls, and a church in the midst of the people. This was opened in August, 1864, and he then took up his permanent residence next to it. These were material beginnings; for a spiritual change among such a population, an extraordinary charity and heroic zeal were needed, and they were forthcoming. At first there was declared hostility. "The inhabitants received their benefactor, with very much the amenity of wild animals towards the trainer entering their cage." They sullenly took his alms, but repelled his advances, refused to send their children to school; menaces were not wanting, and even recently some of the few who still held out tried to frighten him away,—but a long suffering, patient charity, has under God, triumphed over all resistance.

There is a population of some 200 households,—1400 souls in round numbers. Now everyone works, mendicity has been banished. The chief occupations are agricultural labour, clearing the woods of the "Vrybosch," and road-making. The six proprietors of that portion of country have helped the Curé, but neither Government nor Commune has co-operated in anything. The school attendance is

large in winter, sparse in summer, when many of the children are at field-work; the minimum attendance is 150 boys, and 120 girls. Nearly everyone can now read and write. Illegitimate births are now not one per cent. Masses are well attended. On one Sunday a month they go to Holy Communion, the men, women, boys, and girls having each their separate Sunday. They thus form four congregations, each one of which, on its own Communion Sunday, hears from the Curé a discourse addressed exclusively to itself, and bearing on the special duties and dangers of each. To these familiar instructions the great success of M. Costenoble is to be attributed. In the ceremonial of the greater feasts the people take special delight; they form a source of imaginative and spiritual pleasures that wonderfully aid them to rise above their former gross enjoyments. But, finally M. le Curé "does not forbid them worldly amusements. He encourages honest games, especially those which fatigue the body while they excite interest and emulation. On fête-days he offers prizes—objects of utility or comfort. In short, he neglects no occasion of turning all things to good." This change from vice and misery has been effected in less than twenty years by the strong will, aided by Divine grace, of one zealous priest. M. Henri Lefebvre recommends those who doubt any part of this story, to do as he did—go to Jonkersville and see for themselves.

Science Notices.

The Panama Canal.—From the various schemes laid before the Panama Canal Commission we select two, which are typical of the others. In the first plan proposed the length of the canal would be about forty-three miles, width twenty-four yards, and depth nine. The time to be employed in its construction was estimated at six years, and the cost about 20,000,000*l*. This scheme possessed the advantage of being the cheapest, but it laboured under the serious drawback of including a large number of locks in the route proposed. These would have necessitated a great waste of time in the passage of ships from one ocean to the other, besides the liability to go out of order, and the consequent block in the traffic. The second scheme obviated this objection by proposing a route which required no locks, but included other difficulties of a serious character—namely, the fluctuating depth of water in the channel, the rapid current caused by the inrush of the Pacific tide, and also the flooding of the canal by the river Chagres, which in this scheme has no other outlet to the Atlantic except through the canal. From calculations made by the Commission, and from personal observation of flowing tides in the neighbouring rivers, it was estimated that the current in the canal would reach a velocity of four or five knots an hour, and thus the friction on the banks would be so great that in a short time the channel would be choked up with the *débris*. A canal on the sea level is impossible, in the estimation of the

Commission, unless a large and strong barrier, or lock, be erected on the Pacific coast to regulate the admission of water into the channel. A harbour of large extent should also be constructed within this barrier, communicating with the sea by three outlets. This lock, in the estimation of the Commissioners, would be no serious obstacle to navigation, as it would be, in effect, docking, which vessels are subjected to in nearly all the large ports of the world. After the construction of a harbour on the Pacific coast, the frequent flooding of the river Chagres next engaged the attention of the Commission. It was estimated that an ordinary flood would raise the level of the water from fifteen to twenty-five feet, and thus necessitate a corresponding elevation of the banks. Besides, the current would, in a flood, acquire such force as totally to prevent all traffic. These facts led the Commission to conclude that the canal should at all cost be kept free from any communication with the river Chagres. Messrs. Wyse and Reclus, the authors of the scheme, attempted to overcome the difficulty by the following expedient :—They proposed a reservoir, to hold the overflow of the Chagres in flood-time, and so regulate the flow from it that the current would acquire but little fresh velocity. The Commissioners were, however, still of opinion that this increase of water, regulated as it was, taken in conjunction with the increased volume of water poured into the canal by other streams in flood-time, would cause a serious obstacle to the passage of ships. Besides, there was a continual danger of this enormous body of water bursting through any barriers, however strong, and causing great destruction of life and property. The projectors finally proposed to construct a completely independent channel for the Chagres at a cost of about 2,000,000*l*. The advantages of this second plan were that it obviated the necessity for locks. Excellent harbours already existed at both extremities of the canal; and the port of Colon and the Panama railway offered unusual facilities for the transport of all necessary materials. The work of construction is estimated to occupy twelve years, and cost about 48,000,000*l*. When finished, the time occupied in passing from one ocean to the other will be two days. The Commission approved, in substance, of this scheme.

Nordenskiöld's Expedition.—In this expedition, after exploring the mouth of the Lena, Professor Nordenskiöld directed his course to the Archipelago of New Siberia. This group of islands is peculiarly valuable in a scientific point of view, by reason of the enormous quantities of bones of various animals which they contain. Skeletons of the mammoth are so abundant that collectors come annually from the mainland to collect the ivory tusks, and return in the autumn laden with the spoil. Skeletons of the rhinoceros, the horse, and the bison, are common. The further exploration of these islands is destined to shed a great light on those vast scientific problems which are now demanding solution, regarding the distribution of animal life on the surface of the globe. Sailing towards the East he found his course blocked with ice, and was forced to take a northerly course. The inhabitants of an island near which the *Vega* anchored, came on

board, but unfortunately could not speak any European language. The people lived in large tents containing one or two spacious compartments or alcoves for beds. These alcoves were a species of inner tent, constructed of reindeer's skin, warmed and lighted by lamps of seal oil in summer, and in winter by a large wood fire in the centre of the outer tent. The children seem to be treated with great kindness and attention. When clothed they looked like a bundle of furs, but in the inner tent they ran about without any clothes. Professor Nordenskiöld saw them in this state run over the frozen ground from one tent to another at a temperature below zero. After touching at various points and collecting a large amount of eminently useful scientific information, and at the expense of much labour and hardship, the main object of the expedition was attained by the discovery of the North-west Passage.

Mr. Edison's Electric Lamp.—In our number for July of last year we said that no one had yet succeeded in bringing forward an electric light suitable for domestic purposes. The New York newspapers, of December last, announced that Mr. Edison had succeeded. The most interesting portion of Mr. Edison's discovery is his new lamp—"the contrivances of which are so absurdly simple as to seem almost an anti-climax to the laborious process of invention by which they were reached. A small glass globe, from which the air has been exhausted, two platinum wires, and a bit of charred paper"—this is the lamp.

It is generally known that electric lights have been produced on the following principle: When a strong electric current passes along a circuit, if it encounters in that circuit a small solution of continuity it will leap the chasm, and describe between the extremities of the solution a luminous curve known as the voltaic arc; or, if it encounters a less conductive body, it instantly heats up the last to luminosity, and this is called the light from an incandescent solid. In the former method the difficulty is to keep sufficiently near together the extremities of the separated wires which are destroyed by the heat. In the latter method the difficulty has been to find a solid capable of sustaining white heat without melting.

Mr. Edison's lamp is a form of incandescent solid. This lamp is a glass globe, rather over two inches in diameter, with a short stem resembling a large decanter stopper. Into the stem enters the wire which brings in the electric current, and opposite to it is a second wire by which the used current is discharged. The wires support a horse-shoe-shaped loop of carbonised paper, to each end of which they are fastened. When the current is sent into the lamp by the conducting wire, this narrow strip of charred paper becomes the incandescent solid, and gives light without being itself destroyed. This is the most marvellous feature in the whole discovery. The process by which paper is rendered serviceable for this purpose is simple. "The horse-shoe loops are cut from cardboard and placed in layers, within an iron box, with tissue-paper between; the box is hermetically sealed, and then raised to a red heat. Nothing remains but the carbon loops

and the carbonised tissue-paper. All other forms of carbon previously used had presented the difficulty of containing air or gas." When thus prepared the carbonised paper is found to be perfectly "homogeneous in structure, elastic, tough, and of an almost vitreous cleavage. It is strong enough to stand far more strain than will be put upon it in any ordinary use. If this paper were burned in air, or in a vacuum prepared by a common air-pump, it would, of course, be almost instantly destroyed. In a high vacuum it burns, but is never consumed. The small glass globe which holds the simple apparatus is exhausted of air by nearly the same combination of the Sprengel and Geissler mercury pumps used by Crookes in making his radiometer, or 'light mill,' and in his wonderful discovery of the phenomena of radiant matter in high vacuums, recently brought before the Royal Society." The horse-shoe form of this paper was adopted in order to approximate the shape of the light to that of a gas jet. Its size, too, is large enough to cause the edges of the shadows to be softened down; and thus it obviates the common objection to familiar forms of electric lighting.

"The difficulty of subdivision Mr. Edison has also overcome. In his method of illumination a number of separate lights can now be supplied from the same wire, and each one, being independent, can be lighted or extinguished without affecting those near it. Mr. Edison's idea of the electric light was that, in all respects, it should take the place of gas. As water is pumped into pipes which convey it under pressure to the point where it is to be used, so the electricity is to be forced into the wires and delivered under pressure at its destination. In the case of water, after being used, it flows away by means of a sewer-pipe and is lost. But it is easy to imagine that the water used in working machinery, for instance, instead of being lost, might be returned to the pumps, and used over and over again. With such a system as this we should have a perfect analogy to the Edison electric lighting system. The electricity, after being distributed under pressure and used, is returned to the central station. As the light results from no consumption of a material, but is mere transmutation of the energy exerted in the pumping process, it is therefore seen that all which is essential to an electric lighting system is the generator (or pump), the two lines of wire, one distributing the electricity, the other bringing it back, and a lamp which transmutes into light the energy carried by the electricity when it passes from one wire to the other, and in which the energy of the pressure expresses itself as the light. In Edison's invention the amount of electricity delivered in the lamp is determined by the size and resistance in the carbon, just as in water the amount of flow is determined by the size of the openings. As a great many small jets of water can be supplied from one pipe, so a great many lamps or small escapes for electricity can be furnished from one wire."

Mr. Edison has also invented a new generator, to be called, in honour of the great physicist, "the Faradic generator." He proposes to mass a number of these together in "central stations; each station will be enough to feed the lamps of a large district. Each of the

numerous generators in a central station will pump electricity from its own wire to a large common one, and this will conduct the current into sheets and houses. Before passing into the house, the electricity is carried into a sort of meter containing a safety-valve, by means of which it can be measured. This electricity meter is another discovery of Mr. Edison, and although very ingenious, does not appear to be so simple in its working as it will doubtless, if needed, eventually become.

The wires by which houses, &c., will be supplied with the food of their lamps will be laid in fascines or bundles under the edge of the sidewalk in a tight box. The object of this is to make them easy of access and easy to place in position. Nor is there need of putting them out of the reach of the frost, for they are continuous and not liable to leak from change in position. Even more important is the fact that the colder the wires are the less is the waste of electricity, thus giving a decided advantage over gas in winter, when most light is needed. It is proposed to colour the distributing wires red and the waste wires green. These two distinct wires will be carried all through the house, and every lamp will be so placed that the electricity will flow through it from one wire to the other. The electric light thus provided for is to cost less than gas, and the light of one of the small lamps described can be made equal in power to twelve gas jets.

In an account of the light in "Scribner's Monthly" for February, from which these details have been largely borrowed, and which has been approved of by Mr. Edison himself, there is not a suspicion breathed of any difficulties yet to be overcome. Yet difficulties neither light nor few are urged on all hands against the practicability of Mr. Edison's scheme. It is objected that the carbonised paper will eventually be consumed; that by the frequent dilatation and sudden cooling the glass globes will allow air to enter and mix with the carbon. A French electrician, M. du Moncel, who had made, before Edison, experiments with vegetable paper as an incandescent substance, treats the invention as an American *canard*. Two objections appear to be fatal—the fragility of the electrode of paper, and the difficulty of completely extracting air from the globes. With reference to the last named, it appears that Edison himself has stopped the manufacture of glass globes until he shall have conducted further experiments.

BOOKS OF SCIENCE AND TRAVEL.

A Few Months in New Guinea. By OCTAVIUS C. STONE, F.R.G.S.
Illustrated. London: Sampson Low. 1880.

EVEN now, little is known of New Guinea. Geographers now say that it is the largest island in the world, surpassing in size Borneo. According to Mr. Stone's calculations, which are as likely to be right as any other (p. 204), its population is under two and a half millions. "A Few Months in New Guinea" is not a profound work, nor a very startling one, but it strikes us as being as thoroughly truthful as it is

simple. And it adds something more to what was already known about New Guinea. During Mr. Stone's sojourn in New Guinea, he seems never to have got out of sight of Mount Owen Stanley, and to have confined his explorations to the south-eastern promontory. He visited some half-dozen or more tribes, and managed to make good friends with them. The volume before us contains his diary and adventures, and a good deal of information that will be useful to future travellers, and is very amusing to us sit-at-home travellers. The tribes he visited differ a good deal, but they are by no means so hopeless a race as some have depicted them. Many had never before seen a white man. When Mr. Stone had got about twenty-five miles inland, he fell in with a tribe, whose chief was called Koawagira.

I shall never forget (he says) with what glee he smacked his naked body with his right hand, as he saw his black face reflected in a looking-glass for the first time in his life. It was a most comical scene to witness. This peculiar bodily movement is a sign of joy, and an expressive one when accompanied by an exclamation or a burst of laughter. The glass was handed round to the others, who followed his example. Those who had been watching our movements from a distance, now began to cluster round us to see what was taking place, and to look at our white skins, which they seemed to think were black ones whitened over. On tucking up our trousers, and opening our shirts, to convince them we were not painted, a noise arose, resembling the sound of distant artillery. It was the outburst of their joy and admiration, indicated in the peculiar fashion above described (p. 160).

The natives appear all to be "total abstainers,"—they make no intoxicating drink, and would not touch claret, which they said was "like blood." "Tinned meats they imagined were human, and seemed disgusted at our eating them." But they are fond of biscuit, and have a perfect passion for tobacco. Mr. Stone has brought together a good deal of information that is new. He is also a good draughtsman, and his volume is full of excellent sketches from Nature, some exceedingly good and characteristic. The appendix contains matter to interest the student of languages—a long list of words in the Motu tongue, and a comparison of words in the dialects used by nine tribes; it also contains a list of the 116 species of birds which Mr. Stone collected between October and February; a collection that "has not been outdone in interest," says Mr. Bowdler Sharpe, of the British Museum, "by any collection made in New Guinea."

Up the Amazon and Madeira Rivers through Bolivia and Peru. By EDWARD D. MATHEWS. London: Sampson Low, 1879.

THOSE who take an interest in the opening out to commerce of Bolivia and the centre of South America by means of the navigation of the Amazon and Madeira rivers, and a railroad by the side of the rapids to Cochabamba, should read Mr. Mathews's pleasant book on the subject. The greater part of the volume is taken up with the author's journal as he travelled up these great rivers, and some part of it may, perhaps, be skipped over without very much loss to the general reader. Still, it portrays the life and its dangers, and gives

a fair idea of the country and its inhabitants. Among the many nuisances on the river are the flies. One species of these stings you, and after a few weeks, within a kind of boil which follows upon the sting, there is formed a maggot one and a half or two inches in size.

We must forgive Mr. Mathews if he is not always quite fair to the Catholic Church, for he seems to know nothing of the way in which she has been enslaved in many of the South American States, and deprived of her liberty of action. He gives, however, a few valuable proofs, and all the more valuable from their being given incidentally, of the action of the Church upon the native Indians.

I have seen (he says) many excellent writers among them (the Indians). All of those who had done service in the churches as sacristans and choristers are able to write; they also can read music, for which they use the ordinary five-line system. There are small schools in all the principal Indian villages, in which reading, writing, and Catholic prayers are taught in the Castilian tongue; and I was rather surprised to see the amount of rudimentary knowledge that is drilled into the Indians, who, as a race, are not at all deficient in natural intellect, being, I believe, of a much higher grade than the Brazilian negroes of African descent (p. 127).

In last century, 1749, there were 26,000 Indians in the fifteen missions in the Madeira Valley, but the total population there now has dwindled down to 8000.

Any one wishing to obtain a general idea of the state of society, so far as the ordinary Protestant Englishman comes in contact with it in Bolivia, should read this book. He will also get a very good notion of the immense riches of Bolivia, and of the importance of opening out the country to commerce. At present the commerce is carried on with the ports on the Pacific, at a great cost, across the barren Andes. The south-eastern side is bounded by the cheerless swamp called the Gran Chaco, so that this is still less a natural outlet for commerce. On the north-east is the Madeira and the Amazon route—and here also are the great agricultural riches of the country in the plains and slopes bending eastward—and this is the future route for commerce with Europe. The population of Bolivia is put down at 2,750,000.

Mr. Mathews, having ascended the Amazon and Madeira rivers, came home by Peru. His book, without being at all first-rate, will quite repay reading. It is printed in large type, and has many good illustrations and an excellent map.

Sporting Adventures in the Far West. By JOHN MORTIMER MURPHY.
London: Sampson Low & Co. 1879.

MR. MURPHY gives us in this volume an account of seven years which he spent wandering and hunting in the Far West. There are several good passages in the work, but the effect of the whole is not pleasing. Mr. Murphy expresses himself in a clumsy way, and also indulges in repetition. At p. 16 he writes that explosive bullets or shells, as at present made,

Cannot always be relied upon to explode when wanted, and they are

sometimes rather dangerous to the carrier. When well made, however, and not so sensitive as to explode on merely touching the animal, they are not only comparatively safe, but the most merciful and effective missiles known for killing heavy game, as they destroy them at once. Yet I would not recommend them.

This is useful information, but is it necessary to repeat it at p. 28 in the following words?—

Shells are also good ; but they are dangerous to handle, and are, in too many cases, ineffective, as they explode when they touch the body ; and even if they enter one cannot be sure of their bursting. They are, besides, difficult to procure, and are in my estimation almost as dangerous to the hunter as to the hunted.

Some of the sporting adventures, however, are both striking and interesting. The author's hints to sportsmen are very sensible, and his account of the modes of hunting the bear, cougar, wolf, buffalo, moose, wapiti, deer, goat, antelope, and other Western mammals deserves praise. Notwithstanding the spread of population in the country over which Mr. Murphy wandered, and in spite of the ravages of sportsmen and others, game still abounds, and, in some places, in very large numbers. Though we have been made familiar from other sources with the habits of most of the larger animals which roam in the forests and prairies of the Far West, still Mr. Murphy has been able to add something fresh to our knowledge. It may also be added that the book is written in a pleasant vein ; and that some of the stories, even as told in the author's own careless English, are well worth reading and remembering.

The Australian Abroad. By JAMES HINGSTON. London: Sampson Low. 1879.

IN this volume we have an account of a journey from California to New Zealand, made by the author during his vacation. The chief places of interest, *en route*, in Japan, China, Sumatra, Java, and Australia, are visited in turn and described with some minuteness and detail. The account is both interesting and pleasing, and though naturally somewhat superficial, gives one a very fair idea of how much may be seen by any enterprising traveller, even without notably diverging from the beaten track, and of the singular diversity of scene, climate and race to be met with, within comparatively narrow limits. The towns and villages, bays and harbours, the picturesque costumes and strange habiliments of the various peoples, together with their peculiarities and eccentricities, are painted with great freshness and dexterity, and the narrative generally is enlivened by a vein of humour, which now and then, however, bubbles over in somewhat feeble jokes. The author's opinions of men and manners are freely expressed, and without much indication of bias. The following may serve as a specimen of his style, his humour, and his hardly commendable impartiality. The Japanese is the subject of the paragraph :—

His religion is like his eating and drinking and smoking, a mild and cheerful thing. He stops at a temple and washes his hands at a small tank in front. He then ascends the steps, prostrates himself for four minutes, mutters a formula of prayer, and advances to a wooden trough in front of the image of his deity. Into this trough he drops two or three coins of value that go 200 to an English shilling. That done he pulls a rope that rings a bell, and calls the attention of the gods to his donation. The service is now ended. The lavation, the prostration, and the donation have taken six minutes only. He goes away light-hearted and happy. No Scotchman who has stood or sat through a sermon of an hour long could be happier. He that keeps the keys of all the creeds can alone say what form of worship, of all the thousand forms extant, is the right one. I will not judge, that I may not be judged.

Mr. Hingston admires and appreciates many things in the course of his travels; but his warmest admiration seems to be reserved for New Zealand and its people. He even utters the wish that his own mother had been a Maori!

We should have been good-looking to begin with. Our hair had been glossy, curly, dark; and as for quantity, saleable every two months or so, for chignons and back hair. . . . We should never have caught cold, never wanted our head wrapped up, or our throat swathed in bandages, nor hot water to our feet, and tallow to our nose at night. A chemist's shop would have been a curiosity to us, and the doctor but a dim imagination. We ne'er had wanted ear-trumpets, spectacles, or wigs.

For further particulars we must refer the inquirer to the book itself, which may be procured for fourteen shillings, well printed, copiously illustrated, and bound in a neat cloth cover. Two additional volumes are yet to be published, in which the author proposes to escort us on our imaginary journey round the remainder of the earth's circuit.

Modern Chromatics with applications to Art and Industry. By OGDEN N. ROOD, Professor of Physics in Columbia College. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1879.

THE power to perceive colour "is not one of the indispensable endowments of our race; deprived of its possession, we should be able not only to exist, but even to attain a high state of intellectual and æsthetic cultivation. Eyes gifted merely with a sense for light and shade would answer quite well for most practical purposes, and they would still reveal to us in the material universe an amount of beauty far transcending our capacity for reception. 'But over and above this we have received yet one more gift, something not quite necessary, a benediction, as it were, in our sense for and enjoyment of colour.'"

The concern of the present volume is with this benediction of colour that elevates nature above the cold monotony of a photograph—not with it as an enjoyable thing, but with the science underlying our spontaneous and artistic appreciation of it. The object of the author has been, he says, to present the "fundamental facts connected with our perception of colour, so far as they are at present known, or con-

cern the general or artistic reader." The volume has two especial titles to notice: it is "modern;" that is to say, it is founded on the most recently accepted, the "undulatory" theory of light, and it is a complete treatise on its special subject, with constant reference to painting, by a man who, besides his high scientific attainments, is himself an amateur artist, and familiar with the work and the difficulties of artists and designers. It ought to prove a very attractive and useful book to these latter, but will be read with interest by non-professional readers. It contains a brief explanation of the nature of light, and then dwells on the various ways in which colour is produced; on colour blindness, on the mixture, contrast, combination, &c., of colours, and concludes with a chapter on painting and decoration. The treatment of the above subjects is sufficiently scientific in form, but avoids technicalities as far as possible. The book is a most pleasant one to read; the style is clear, and the ability of the author to express abstract truths in terse and happy phraseology as conspicuous as his familiarity with the pure science of his subject. The more important statements are further illustrated by numerous diagrams: the greater portion of these are of coloured discs and various instruments of extremely simple construction, and by means of copies of them the student may practically test or illustrate the assertions of the author.

We think the author may most justly indulge in his anticipation that what he says of the æsthetic side of his subject—the science underlying the artist's use of colour—will "prevent ordinary persons, critics, and even painters, from talking and writing about colour in a loose, inaccurate, and not always rational manner." Much of his information will be practically useful to them, as, for example, the results of his experiments as to how far various pigments are injured by the action of light and air. It is interesting, too, to read his demolition of the theory, "almost universally believed by artists," that there are three fundamental kinds of *light*—red, yellow, and blue. But this is less practical, as it still remains true that various mixtures of red, yellow, and blue *paint* will produce other colours and shades needed for a picture. The colour of pigments is not so pure as that of light: a mixture of blue and yellow *light* produces a white, not a green, light. Brewster, therefore, who held this "fundamental" theory, must have been misled by employing an impure spectrum, or one not entirely free from white light. Then, further, if the wave theory of light be accepted, the impossibility of one colour being more fundamental than another is easily deduced from it. When the light vibrations impinge on the retina in waves of $\frac{1}{38000}$ of an inch in length, they produce the sensation of red: when the waves are $\frac{1}{41000}$ of an inch in length, they produce orange, and according as they are still further shortened, green or blue, or purple. Thus all variety of colour signifies merely a difference in the length of the waves by which its sensation is produced; or rather *chiefly* a difference in length; for there are other subtle causes supposed to operate therein, as, for example, the triple set of nerve fibres in each minute portion of the retina. The most recent experiments and opinions regarding this

interesting action of the retinal nerves are here clearly laid before the reader.

We quote the following from the author's expression of opinion as to the analogy between chromatics and music:

Attempts have been made from time to time to build up theories of colour based on analogies drawn from sound. The sensation of sound, however, is more particularly connected with time, that of sight with space; and these facts necessitate a fundamental difference in the organs devoted to the reception of sound-waves and of light-waves; and, on account of this difference between the eye and the ear, all such musical theories are quite worthless (p. 304).

History of Ancient Geography among the Greeks and Romans from the Earliest Times till the Fall of the Roman Empire. By E. H. BUNBURY, F.R.G.S. Two vols. London: J. Murray. 1879.

THIS valuable and learned book will be welcomed by English classical scholars as supplying a want in our literature. It is a work of very great erudition, and its criticisms are those of matured scholarship: we may add, too, that it is as far removed as can be from the dry-as-dust style in which classical erudition too frequently has expressed itself. It is, on the contrary, written in an agreeable style, clear and animated, which flows easily through the rocks and aridities of the most ancient Greek and Latin geographical lore, without strain on the attention or offence to purely English tastes. The more technical quotations and discussions are dealt with fully and learnedly in notes: doubtless many scholars will look upon these as the very plums of the pie.

The work is not a treatise on ancient geography—it can scarcely be said that there was a want of such, whether elementary or advanced; it is what its title professes, a history. Incidentally, much ancient geography is necessarily to be found in it, but its object is to present a “historical review” of ancient geography; to trace its gradual growth from the dim beginnings of pre-historic legends to the scientific developments of the Alexandrian geographers; to discuss critically the worth and character of the verbal maps, if we may say so, left in the writings of those older authors; to ascertain the nature of their geographical ideas and of their information, actual or acquired. To render a treatise of this nature authoritative and sufficient for the needs of the highest scholarship, the author, it is apparent, must join to a complete familiarity with the ancient writers in their original works, an acquaintance with all the results of modern travel, and critical classical study both of authorities and localities; for, as Mr. Bunbury remarks, “there is scarcely a disputed question in ancient geography upon which additional light has not been thrown by local researches and investigations within the last fifty years.” The author evidences at every step his thorough qualification by his easy and effective use of this double-sided knowledge. It guides him through bewildering masses of detail, and gives firmness to his judgment between the conflicting evidence of commentators and specialists. The author appears to have arrived at his own judgments on all the many vexed questions of

ancient geography by processes of investigation and deep thought, and with little bias from the external weight of authorities, however venerable and awe inspiring. He will not help to perpetuate an interpretation or appropriation because of the array of continuous authority supporting it: dissents from Greek and Latin sages when these show signs of being unduly prejudiced in favour of a favourite older author, and loses no time in striving to square a description with a known place, if it is plain enough that the author was describing no actual locality. This trait of independent judgment, based, however, on sound learning, and guided by strong common sense, is a most pleasing characteristic of Mr. Bunbury's book.

The ability and learning of this exhaustive work will quickly secure for it a position and authority of the highest character; it will become the necessary companion of a scholarly reading of the classical authors, and a ready means of ascertaining the extent of their own knowledge of the world in which they lived.

Eight Months in an Ox-Wagon. By E. F. SANDEMANN. London: Griffith and Farran. 1880.

THESE reminiscences of Boer life are very entertaining, and will gratify lawful curiosity as to the scenery and the roads, the game and the climate, of the Transvaal and the Free State, and the manners and customs of the Boers and Kafirs found within their borders. The travelling by wagon has the incidents, the joys and the discomforts which are inseparable from weather, flood, and beasts. There are a few dangerous and exciting adventures—a lioness now, and a boa-constrictor again, making their appearance to vary the monotony of shooting, eating, and “trekking.” Here is a story of a lion and bôk fight, which is as new as anything in the work:—

A swart-vitpense (Harris bôk, or sable antelope) lay crouched up in a heap, with what he recognised as its young one folded in a close embrace between its fore-legs; its horns were thrown back, and protecting its haunches. On either side of it stood a full-grown male lion, furiously enraged, its mane almost erect, and foaming at the mouth with impatient wrath. As either one or the other crouched down to spring, the bôk inclined its head so that the long, deadly horns must transfix the lion in its fall. If one of them moved round in front, the bôk veered its neck in the same direction, but always contriving to keep a look-out on the other at the same time, and on the first sign of a spring lowering its horns, but having them up again before the other dared to make an attack. For ten minutes the same positions were maintained, neither of the lions being willing to transfix himself for the other's benefit. At length the pair seemed to recognise that one must be wounded if they meant to kill the bôk at all, for both crouched down ready to spring at once, one on each side. The antelope remained motionless, with its horns almost straight up in the air. Both the lions moved a few feet further, and then crouched down again, as if collecting all their strength for a spring, and then, at the same instant, they launched themselves on their prey. For a few seconds all was one confused struggling heap, from which proceeded such fearful roars and agonizing moans as in the course of all his experience the hunter had never heard before. At last, with a convulsive struggle the bôk rolled half over on its back, and from between its legs

the young one darted out, apparently unhurt, and disappeared in the bush. To the hunter's intense amazement he then perceived that the lion which had been nearest to him was transfixed on the bôk's horn, which, entering between the fore-legs, protruded just to one side of the back-bone. The other lion lay alongside roaring horribly, but not attempting to touch the bôk, which was evidently at its last gasp. (P. 255.)

The hunter approached, and shot the surviving lion. Mr. Sandemann does not profess to have seen this heroic fight himself, but he vouches for the accuracy of the story.

Cetshwayo's Dutchman; being the Private Journal of a White Trader in Zululand during the British Invasion. By CORNELIUS VIJN. Translated from the Dutch, and edited, with Preface and Notes, by the Right Rev. J. W. COLENZO, Bishop of Natal. London: Longmans & Co. 1880.

THE interest of this little volume—and it is of very great interest—lies chiefly in Bishop Colenso's commentary and notes. It is well known that Dr. Colenso has very strong views about the late Zulu war. He has all along pronounced it to be an unjustifiable and cruel aggression on a noble-minded king and an unoffending people. He has now had an opportunity of putting before the public at length, not only his views, but a great deal of the materials on which his views have been formed. Mr. Cornelius Vijn is a young Dutchman—he is not more than twenty-three—who started on a trading tour in Zululand in the autumn of 1878, was detained by the Zulus about January 1, 1879, and was an eye-witness of many of the events in the war, especially of the battle of Ulundi and of the greater part of the pursuit of the king. It is not, however, for any fine descriptions of battle or march, or for any new ideas on the politics of South Africa, that the reader will find his journal valuable and interesting. It is poor in literary style, but simple, and seemingly trustworthy. The trader himself is not, by his own showing, a magnanimous man, though brave, cool, and shrewd; but his pages throw a vivid light on the character of Cetshwayo himself, and on the proceedings connected with the abortive negotiations for peace which took place between Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu king before the battle of Ulundi. It was Vijn who was sent for to interpret Lord Chelmsford's letter of June 4, 1879, and who had to write, in very indifferent English, three letters from Cetshwayo to the English general, two of which at least must now be in possession of the War Office. It was Vijn also, who after Ulundi came off to Sir Garnet Wolseley, by the king's own wish, with the message that the king had no longer an army, and was ready to submit. But the English leader wanted to get hold of the Zulu king, and at once offered the Dutchman 250*l.* if he would bring him in in two days. Vijn rode back to Cetshwayo and did his best to persuade him to go with him to the English head-quarters, but to no purpose. The king "was afraid;" he could not depend on the English; they "played crafty tricks." Accordingly, the envoy returned to the camp at Ulundi, and Sir Garnet Wolseley at once sent him

back, with 500 cavalry, under Major Barrow, to take Cetahwayo by force. The sequel is known; Vijn got 10*l.* for his work—though he was not present at the actual capture—and on representing that it was too little, he afterwards received 40*l.* more, and the office of interpreter at 1*l.* a day. It is this narrative which Bishop Colenso has translated, and used as a text for some exceedingly strong comments. The following extracts from the preface will show the spirit in which the “Notes” are written :

It has been terrible to see this great wave of wickedness rolling on, and to be powerless to help it, to be debarred all possibility of showing the injustice of the war, until it was too late—too late to prevent the shedding of innocent blood and the ravaging of a whole country—too late to save the lives of 2000 of our own soldiers and natives, and of 10,000 patriotic Zulus—too late to prevent the name of Englishman from becoming in the native mind the synonym for duplicity, treachery, and violence, instead of, as in days gone by, for truth, and justice, and righteousness.

And again :

I sympathise, in short, entirely with the words of a friend, who with full knowledge of the facts states his conviction that “the Zulu war, discreditable to our arms, disgraceful to our civilization, and injurious to our good name and to the discipline of our army, was not necessary, and therefore was without just cause”—who is “disgusted to hear (so calling themselves) Christians speak of cruel murders as if they were the finest feats of arms,” and who mournfully adds, “it makes one despair of ultimate good, to see such a saturnalia of wrong-doing and such an apotheosis of force in this lower world.”

BOOKS ON HOLY SCRIPTURE.

Das Hohelied Salomo's bei den Jüdischen Erklärern des Mittelalters ; nebst einem Anhang: Erklärung'sproben aus Handschriften. Von DR. SIEGMUND SALFELD. Berlin : Julius Benzian. 1879. (*The Canticles of Solomon, as treated by the Jewish Commentators of the Middle Ages ; with an Appendix containing Specimens of their Exposition from MSS.* By DR. SIGISMUND SALFELD. Berlin : Julius Benzian. 1879.)

THIS little book is the fruit of long and patient labour, and in reality it contains more than is indicated by the title. It notices briefly the Septuagint translation and the Targum or Chaldee paraphrase known as the Targum of the Canticles : it collects traces of the views prevalent regarding the Canticles from the older Midraschim and from the Talmud. Then, beginning with the earliest Jewish commentators, it gives a summary of the way in which some forty Jewish doctors interpreted the Song of Songs. Our readers may form some conception of the labour which such a work implies, when we add that, of the authorities quoted, about twenty exist only in manuscript. It is true the author has not toiled alone. Other scholars, among them the Abbé Perreau at Parma and Dr. Neubauer at Oxford, have given him valuable assistance.

What is the use, the reader may ask, of such labour ? Manifestly

it is labour which one man has to undertake for the sake of others; for the number of those who can toil through the Rabbinical commentators for themselves must be, and indeed ought to be, small. Yet we believe Dr. Salfeld's results are full of interest even for a wide circle, and that for the two following reasons:—

First, of all, the interpretation of the Canticles is a matter of theological importance, in the strictest sense of the word. Here is a book which looks at first sight like an Oriental love poem, and as such it is the fashion among a large school of Protestant scholars to expound it. They do not deny its extreme beauty or even the moral spirit in which it is written. But a Catholic is obliged to regard it as the work of the Holy Ghost; he is, as a necessary consequence, obliged to hold that the love of which it speaks has a mystical sense. And he naturally inquires, had the Jews any fixed idea as to its import? Has the Synagogue any settled tradition on the subject, and does it agree with that of the Church? The answer is "Yes," and Dr. Salfeld proves it. He thinks (and we believe rightly) that even the Septuagint translation, mere translation as it is, makes it at least probable that the translator interpreted the Canticles allegorically (see *Canticles* iv. 8 and vi. 3 in the LXX.). It is undoubted that the Chaldee paraphrase which, although in its present form it dates only from the seventh century, contains older elements, follows the same allegorical exegesis. And we know that from very early times the book of Canticles was read in the Synagogue, at the Pasch, and applied mystically to the redemption of Israel. All the Rabbinical doctors witness to the constancy of the Jewish tradition on this point. Even the Karaites, with their hatred of the Talmudical and Rabbinical doctrines, and their preference for the literal sense of Scripture, attribute an allegorical meaning to the Canticles. There is barely a trace of another interpretation, and no trace at all of a counter-tradition. Moreover, the special way in which an allegorical interpretation was given tells for the Catholic view. Putting aside some Peripatetic, Jewish scholars, who found the doctrine of Aristotle on the soul in the Song of Solomon, the Rabbins refer the love of which Solomon speaks to that which exists between God and His people, or, again, between the Messiah and His people. Dr. Salfeld has made all this more certain than it was before, because his investigations have been much wider than those of his predecessors, and also because he vindicates the famous Ibn Esra from the charge of rationalism with regard to the Canticles often made against him. Of course the weight of Jewish tradition becomes much greater when we reflect how often the prophets use human love as an image of God's love for His Church. The allegorical or typical interpretation is natural *a priori*, and the tradition of the Synagogue helps to clench the matter.

From a philological point of view, the opinions of the Rabbinical writers on the Canticles have a singular interest. Even the reader, who is ignorant of the original, can see how many words hard of interpretation occur in this little book of Scripture. There are names of flowers, of spices, of ornaments for the person, of furniture, some of which do not occur elsewhere, and all of which have an uncertain meaning.

After the ancient versions, Jewish tradition on these words give us the best help we can get. Dr. Salfeld has shown great skill in making selections on such matters.

There is a third difficulty about the Canticles, on which we had hoped to get some light, and on which we have been disappointed, though that is no fault of Dr. Salfeld's. Origen speaks of this divine poem as written "in modum dramatis," and this is evidently the case. It is more like a drama than anything else in Biblical literature: there is, indeed, only one other portion of the Hebrew Bible (the last two chapters of Micah) which has a dramatic character at all. But it is a drama in which for the most part the names of the speakers are not given, and students of the original know that every recent commentator has had a way of his own for dividing the speeches and fixing the changes of scene. But here we can learn nothing from the Rabbinical expositors.

Judas Maccabæus and the Jewish War of Independence. By CLAUDE REIGNIER CONDER, R.E. London: Marcus Ward. 1879.

WE have scarcely anything but praise for one half of this book, the half which treats of the subject given on the title-page. We need scarcely tell our readers that Mr. Conder is a first-rate authority on the topography of the Holy Land, and he tells us that he has been able to visit more than once each of the battle-fields of Judas. But Mr. Conder is much more than a mere topographer. He throws himself with an intelligent enthusiasm into his subject. He appreciates the unselfish greatness of Judas—the romantic daring which marked the beginning of the Jewish revolt, the consummate ability with which Judas selected his positions and won his victories against overwhelming odds, and then his tragic death which closed his heroic struggle for independence with apparent defeat, and kept him from seeing the glorious results which his ability, his prudence, his piety, no less than his dauntless courage had secured for his nation. The battles live in Mr. Conder's pages. Nothing can be more happy than the descriptions of the battle-grounds, or than the illustrations from later history, particularly from the history of the Holy Land. We only regret that even this part of the book is disfigured here and there by careless writing and even by gross inaccuracy. What can Mr. Conder mean by telling us, p. 142, that "Jesus the Son of Josadak" "came back with Esra?" Surely everybody who has read the Old Testament is aware that Jesus the Son of Josadak returned with Zorobabel (1 Esdras v. 2), while Esra did not go to Jerusalem till the reign of Artaxerxes, nearly a century later.

But it is with the portion of the book which has really little connection with the wars of Judas Maccabæus that we have serious fault to find. Mr. Conder gives an account of Jewish religion, polity and civilisation generally. It is written in the flowing style of those popular manuals which have come so much into vogue of late. It is eminently readable, and even in a degree instructive. But like most manuals of this sort it gives scarcely any reference to the

original sources. As a natural consequence we meet with a number of views stated briefly and in dogmatic language, which the author gives us no means of testing. This is provoking to the wary and misleading to the unwary reader, who is charmed to learn so much with such little pains. Nothing, for example, can be more unsatisfactory than Mr. Conder's account of the Messianic expectation among the later Jews. And when he tells us that the book of Wisdom teaches "the pre-existence of souls, the formation of the world from formless matter, the existence of a soul of the universe," he ought to give references in the first place and let his readers know in the second place that other interpretations are maintained. Further, when he goes on to say that this book contains no "distinct teaching as to the immortality of the soul," he contradicts himself. For in the same paragraph, he adds, "the righteous are promised eternal life:" which is distinct, although, of course, not full teaching on this head.

On one minor point we wish that Mr. Conder had done more to satisfy our curiosity. After stating what everybody knows that after the exile Aramaic or Chaldee replaced the old Hebrew, he asserts that this Chaldee "remains even now with but slight modification the language of the Fellahin in Palestine." Is this really so? We are aware that a very debased Syriac is spoken by the Christians and Jews of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. But in the usual Chaldee grammars (*e.g.*, in that of Winer and the recent Chaldee manual of Turpie), the Chaldee is said to have died out as a spoken language after the early Arabian conquests. It seems incredible that the peasants of Palestine still speak Chaldee, with but slight modification. But we should be very grateful for fuller information.

Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten. Nebst einer kritischen Textausgabe von des letzteren *Instituta regularia divinæ legis.* Von Dr. H. KIHN. Freiburg. 1880. (*Theodore of Mopsuestia and Junilius Africanus as Interpreters of Scripture.* By Dr. H. KIHN. Friburg. 1880.)

THE study of theology, and especially of the Scriptures, was in the first centuries chiefly encouraged and developed by two great schools of interpreters, the one known as the school of Alexandria, the other as that of Antioch. Pantaenus, Clement, and Origen are prominent names in the first, while Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, S. John Chrysostom, and others, have secured immortal fame for the second. Never in the history of the Church have there appeared such interpreters of Holy Writ, men who seem to have rested, like S. John, on the breast of Christ Himself, and to have imbibed, as it were, a part of His own virginal, holy spirit. They have the eagle view, the majestic depth of S. John, and their keen understanding of the divine word has never since been attained in spite of all the learning of our days. But it is also true that they did not always avoid the danger of going too exclusively or too far into either the allegorical-mystical or historical-grammatical interpretation of the Scriptures. This is clearly shown by the examples of Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

Kihn's book is divided into three parts. The first treats on Theodore of Mopsuestia, the second on Junilius Africanus, and his compendium of the introduction to the Bible; the third contains a comparison of the Biblical theology of Junilius with that of Theodore of Mopsuestia.

Our author gives us a very full and instructive account of Theodore, "the precursor of modern criticism," of his canon, his notions of inspiration, his hermeneutics, his anthropology and Christology. Theodore's boldness and presumption as an interpreter, his want of respect for the authority of others, especially of the Fathers, his wrong notions on several most important points of Christian doctrine—viz., his denial of original sin and his imputing, like Nestorius, two persons to Christ—are facts but too well established. As an interpreter of Holy Scripture, he made exclusive use of Greek translations, and especially of the Septuagint, which he considered to be a faultless and infallible version. Kihn (p. 44) calls him "a man of great talent, of great zeal for knowledge, and of universal learning, but no great thinker. He had not the qualities which distinguished his friend S. John Chrysostom—viz., piety and peace of mind, unwavering faith, and immovable firmness of character. His choleric disposition made him rash and precipitate. He took up hastily first one thing, then another; but his ardour soon abated." His theological errors are attributed by our author (p. 52) more to inconsiderateness and haste than to malice and bad intention. However, the Nestorians certainly held him as their great doctor, and as the interpreter of Scripture, whose authority they believed to be infallible (p. 334 sq.). Kihn gives a most interesting account of the famous Nestorian school at Nisibis, in Persia, and the plan of studies carried out there. At Nisibis, as well as at all the other Nestorian schools, Theodore's influence was predominant (pp. 198-212).

It has been generally said and accepted that Junilius Africanus was an African bishop, and that he was the writer of a book entitled, "Of the Parts of the Divine Law." This opinion is now proved to be wrong. Kihn has been the first to establish, by his elaborate researches and sagacious criticism, that Junilius was a layman, born in Africa. He translated and arranged the book at Constantinople, at a time when he held one of the highest and most influential offices of State. The argument is chiefly based on the following reasons:—The nine best manuscripts out of thirteen which contain the book of Junilius do not give him the title of bishop; nor is there any other positive argument in favour of his having held that dignity. That he was a layman is shown by the preface of his own work, and that he was a lawyer and in a very high position, by the fact that Fulgentius Ferrandus, a deacon of Carthage, addressed him, in a letter of recommendation, "Truly illustrious, &c. son of the Holy Mother the Catholic Church" (see the letter, in A. Reifferscheid, "Anecdota Casinensia," Wratisl., 1871). The last argument would seem more erudite than convincing. But the author was fortunate in finding the name of "Junilos, a man of African origin," mentioned in the anecdotes of Procopius (a writer of the sixth century), as occupying the position of "*quæstor sacri palatii*," the successor of the famous Trebonianus. Kihn thinks that he had charge

of this office from A.D. 545 to A.D. 552, and translated his book from the Greek into the Latin in the year 551. The author of the book was Paulus, afterwards Metropolitan of Nisibis, where it was used in the school as a class-book for the introduction to the study of the Scriptures. The proper title of the book, known as "Of the Parts of the Divine Law," is "Instituta regularia divinæ legis"—Rules for an introduction to the Divine Law. Junilius himself uses this title, which is also given to the book by the greater number, and the best, of the manuscripts. All this is contained in the second part of Kihn's work.

In the third part, he has not only proved the great influence which the Aristotelian philosophy had on the book, but also shown that it is founded on the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The similarity between Theodore's views and those of Junilius is most striking, especially in regard to the canon and the inspiration of the Scriptures. Junilius, lib. I. 7, distinguishes three classes of books, books of perfect authority, of medium, and of no authority. Baruch and Ecclesiasticus belong to the first, the other deutero-canonical books of the Old Testament as well as the two Books of Chronicles, Job, Esdras, Esther, the Canticle of Canticles to the second class. So also do the Second Epistle of S. Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of S. John, those of S. James and S. Jude, and the Revelation of S. John. This extraordinary canon was not that of an African bishop, nor of a Latin author at all, but it was the canon of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Theodore had distinguished between books written with the gift of prophecy and books written merely with the gift of wisdom. This distinction, says Kihn (p. 79), was constantly used by the Jews themselves. He also thinks that Theodore's canon agrees perfectly with the yet unascertained canon of Flavius Josephus. But the arguments given by our author in favour of his opinion do not seem to be sufficiently convincing.

The critical edition of the text of Junilius (pp. 465-528) is based on the use and comparison of the thirteen manuscripts, the best of which is in the "Codex rescriptus S. Galli, 908," and belongs to the later half of the sixth century. Professor Kihn's edition of Junilius's work, as well as his historical and exegetical explanation, deserves the greatest praise. No one will be able in future to speak of that work without consulting Kihn's book, either directly or indirectly. It is full of interesting and instructive matter, especially in regard to the canon, inspiration, and hermeneutics of the Sacred Scriptures.

Polychronius, Bruder Theodor's von Mopsuestia und Bischof von Apamea. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese. Von Dr. OTTO BARDENHEWER. Freiburg. 1879. (*Polychronius, brother of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Bishop of Apamea. A Study on the History of Exegesis.* By Dr. OTTO BARDENHEWER. Friburg. 1879.)

DR. BARDENHEWER, a young professor of the University of Munich, draws attention to one of the greatest ornaments of the school of Antioch. His book contains an account of the life and works

of Polychronius, his views on canon and inspiration, and his hermeneutic principles, to which is added a translation and explanation of some portions of his commentaries.

Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus,* praises Polychronius as a successful ruler of his diocese of Apamea, and as a man of graceful eloquence and virtuous life. This is about all that is known of his life with any degree of certainty. According to Cardinal Mai,† Polychronius seems to have written commentaries on almost the whole of the Old Testament. There are, however, only fragments of them preserved, and these chiefly belong to his commentaries on Job, Daniel, and Ezechiel.

Polychronius (says Dr. Bardenhewer, p. 5) has happily avoided the extravagances of his brother Theodore, though not quite all his faults. In real exegetical accuracy and conscientiousness he has surpassed all Antiochean interpreters; in knowledge of history and languages not one amongst them was equal to him, nor has any one entered with such love and keen understanding into the depth of the Biblical text, nor made such correct allowances for actual circumstances.

Of all his works, the best preserved are his very valuable scholia on the book of Daniel (published by Mai, l. c. P. ii. pp. 105-160). It is strange that he, like S. Ephrem, explains Daniel's prophecy of the four empires to mean, besides the Babylonian, Median, and Persian, the Macedonian (and not the Roman) empire. But he believed in the canonicity of all the deutero-canonical pieces of Daniel, perhaps with the exception of the Hymn of the Three Children in the fiery furnace. Bardenhewer gives us (pp. 63-65) some arguments for his opinion that Polychronius really denied the canonicity of Dan. iii. 25-90, Vulg. They rest on the passage: "This hymn is not found in the Hebrew and Syriac text. It is said to have been afterwards added by some one, and founded upon what is narrated in the book. I shall, therefore, abstain from explaining this part, in order to keep exclusively to the interpretation of the book." Granted, that Polychronius has written these words; but they only mention the doubts of others as a reason why Polychronius did not interpret the hymn.

It is clear from Dr. Bardenhewer's book that Polychronius is worthy of the greatest consideration. Dr. Bardenhewer is well able to appreciate him, and shows a well-trained judgment in handling critical questions, and a great taste for patristic and exegetical studies.

May the author continue to encourage, and to facilitate the study of the Fathers, and the interpretation of the Scriptures, by works similar to the one mentioned here.

* Eccl. Hist., v. 40.

† Scriptorum veterum nova collectio. Tom. I. Romae, 1825, *præf.* p. xxxi.

The Holy Bible, with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary and a Revision of the Translation. By Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by Canon Cook. New Testament. Vol. II. St. John—The Acts of the Apostles. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1880.

THE Speaker's Commentary, like a Bill in Parliament, advances very slowly. It is two years since the first volume of the New Testament appeared, and seventeen since the whole work was first taken in hand. In the meantime Dr. Ellicott's Commentary, a similar, if not superior, work has been begun and completed. Anglicanism is treating the Sacred Scriptures as it has treated the old Catholic Cathedrals. After centuries of neglect and decay, they are now busy under-pinning and buttressing-up the old walls, removing abominations of ugliness, and restoring what remains of ancient beauty. The Speaker's Commentary, like all the works of Anglicanism, is strongly marked with the spirit of compromise. There is a manifest desire to run with the hare of orthodoxy and to hunt with the hounds of "the higher criticism." It contains little devotion and less dogmatic teaching. The dignified pilots of Anglicanism give a wide berth to the rocks of controversy and hug the safer shores of platitude. Still, considering who the writers are, it must be confessed with gratitude that traditional Protestant glosses are abandoned and many candid admissions are made. The special value of the work lies in collecting together the best results of modern scholarship as applied to the defence of the Sacred Scriptures. It is difficult to tell what will be the effect on the mind of the general reader of this vast apparatus of textual criticism, if it is not to show him the folly of the Protestant principle of "the Bible, and Bible only," and make him say, with St. Augustine, that he would not believe the Gospels did not the authority of the Catholic Church compel him.

Canon Westcott's Introductory Treatise and Commentary on St. John's Gospel gives a special value to the present volume. His defence of St. John's authorship of the Fourth Gospel by direct and indirect evidence is very powerful. He considers that "it was written after the other three, in Asia, at the request of the Churches there, as a summary of the oral teaching of St. John upon the life of Christ, to meet a want which had grown up in the Church at the close of the Apostolic age:" that it assumes a knowledge of the other Gospels, which it supplements. In reply to the cavils against the historic character of St. John's Last Discourse of our Lord, he points to the power of a trained memory, disciplined to retain the spoken words of a Master, which make it easy to understand how a sympathetic hearer like St. John would bear them about with him till his experience of the life of the Church illuminated their meaning, when the promised Paraclete "taught him all things," and "brought all things to his remembrance which Christ had spoken." Canon Westcott sets the highest value on the Vatican Codex. A most careful examination, he says, leaves it in possession of the title to "supreme excellence," and he thinks it not unlikely that it represents the text preserved in the original Greek Church of Rome (p. lxxxix). His admission about the

value of the Vulgate is very candid. He quotes its renderings throughout the notes "in the hope of directing more attention to the study of it. "It seems to me," he says, "that we have lost much in every way from our neglect of a version which has influenced the theology of the West more profoundly than we know" (p. xcvi).

His treatment of the first chapter of St. John is very exhaustive, and in setting forth the theology of the Incarnation there is none of the timid reserve which characterises his comments upon the sixth and twentieth chapters. Commenting on our Lord's words to His Blessed Mother (ch. ii., v. 4) he says, "In the original there is not the least tinge of reproof or severity in the term (woman). The address is that of courteous respect—even of tenderness" (p. 36). And in another place he describes St. John as fulfilling his filial "office to the Mother of the Lord in his own home in Galilee to the last, gaining by that a fuller knowledge of the revelation of the Son of God, and bringing into a complete harmony the works which he had seen, and the words which he had heard" (p. xxxv). In ch. vi. 71, he adopts the reading, "Judas, son of Simon the Iscariot," which he holds to be a local name, derived from Kerieth, a town of Juda, and borne by father and son alike. St. John's Last Supper is proved to be identical with that of the Synoptist Gospels; and St. John's "sixth hour" (xix. 14) is harmonized with St. Mark's "third," by showing from other passages that St. John reckons time as we do, and not by the old Jewish method. The least satisfactory part of Canon Westcott's work is his treatment of the disputed passages, v. 3, 4, and viii. 3-12, both of which he rejects as marginal glosses. When "the angel" is driven from the text, he finds little difficulty in explaining the pool of Bethesda as a chalybeate spring! He thinks that the account of the woman taken in adultery is borrowed from Papias. In rejecting these and similar passages from the New Testament, Canon Westcott is mainly influenced by the three great Uncials. If they agree in omitting any passage, their judgment is final and infallible. If this be so, the converse ought surely to hold good—viz., that what these MSS. agree in admitting as Scripture, Canon Westcott ought to admit. And if so, why does he reject the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament?

Of the Acts of the Apostles we have but little space to speak. Canon Cook's Introduction is a valuable defence of their authenticity and of St. Luke's authorship. The objections of the author of "Supernatural Religion" against the speeches are very well met. Not much can be said of Dr. Jacobson's Commentary on the Acts, except perhaps to call attention to the smallness of such commenting as this on Acts xv. 7:—"St. Peter had not presided at this Council, which he neither convoked nor dismissed. And the advice which he gave was based, not on personal or official authority, but on acknowledged facts. The name of James is placed before those of Cephas and John," Gal. ii. 9 (p. 432).

A Handbook to the Bible; derived from Ancient Monuments and Modern Exploration. By F. R. CONDER, and C. R. CONDER, R.E.
London: Longmans. 1879.

THIS is certainly a most useful Bible Guide, and if the Palestine Exploration Expedition had brought forth nothing else, it would still deserve the thanks of all Scriptural students. It is a compendium of facts and results, with a good general index, by competent observers. A new Bible chronology is given, based upon Assyrian and Egyptian records, which agrees neither with the short nor the long system. In this system the creation would be B.C. 4810, and the birth of Abraham B.C. 2261. Another point of difference is that the Israelites are left in Egypt four hundred and thirty years. There is also much useful information about the Hebrew Ritual, the Temple services, Hebrew weights, measures, and coins. The second part of the book is merely geographical, and is a summary of the results of the Survey of Palestine, throwing a new light both on sacred history and geography. The site of Bethulia has been identified in the modern village of Mithilia (p. 289). This removes one of the greatest difficulties urged against the historical character of the Book of Judith. The animals and plants of Bible lands are enumerated, and many misconceptions corrected. For instance, the counterparts of the behemoth, leviathan, and unicorn (rim) which figure in the Book of Job are found in the hippopotamus, the crocodile, and the now extinct aurochs, so often sculptured in Assyrian bas-reliefs. The book is furnished with excellent maps and Temple plans.

The Life and Work of St. Paul. By F. W. FARRAR, D.D. 2 vols.
Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co. 1880.

CANON FARRAR'S special gift lies in his power of popularizing the results of Scripture study, in working up dry material into an interesting form, and in grouping minute details so as to make an attractive picture. Encouraged by his success in the "Life of Christ," he applies the same method to the Life and Epistles of St. Paul. The result is not altogether pleasing, especially to Catholic readers. There is too much of Renan's "ugly little Jew" theory, and too little spirituality. A man who has no higher ideal than a Wesley or Whitfield cannot do justice to St. Paul. To those who are familiar with Cardinal Newman's picture of the great Apostle, Canon Farrar's will appear like caricature; the one is of heaven, heavenly, the other, of the earth, earthly. Howson and Conybeare, and Mr. Lewin had already collected all that archæology or travel could produce to illustrate the travels of the Apostle. To this Canon Farrar has added copious rhetoric and poetical descriptions. Even here, at his strongest, he is not so happy as in his "Life of Christ," because he paints not from Nature, but from second-hand descriptions. It is to be regretted that he could not carry out his intention of visiting Asia Minor and Greece, just as he had previously visited the Holy Land. Whatever new lights are found in his work are brought from Rabbinical sources. Canon Farrar is strong in Talmudical

literature, and builds too much on so treacherous a foundation. For instance, he relies on certain passages of the Mishna to prove, contrary to all Catholic tradition and to St. Paul's own words (1. Cor. vii. 8.), that St. Paul was once married. He adopts the opinion that the thorn in the flesh was a very acute and repulsive form of ophthalmia, and sees evidence of this in the Epistle to the Galatians (iv. 13, vi. 11, 15), and in St. Paul's mistaking the high priest (Acts xxiii. 5). Another strange opinion expressed by Canon Farrar is that, despite St. Paul's express statement to the contrary (Gal. ii. 3), he so far yielded to the Judaizers as to circumcise Titus, who was born of Gentile parents. This, of course, makes St. Paul's subsequent rebuke of St. Peter's far less serious concession very inconsistent. The Epistle to the Hebrews is rejected, as being the work of Apollos. Still there are many good features in Canon Farrar's work. He has no mercy on those who separate St. Paul from St. Peter and the Twelve. He traces the once fashionable notion of Pauline and Petrine opposition to Ebionite slanders. Neither is he afraid to say what he thinks of the old Protestant rubbish about the Pope being the "man of sin" (2 Thess. ii. 3). "Can any sane man," he says, "of competent education seriously argue that it is the Papacy which pre-eminently arrays itself in superiority to, and antagonism against, every one who is called God, or every object of worship?" (p. 616, vol. 1). It is amusing to find that Dr. Wordsworth has taken to heart this assertion on his mental condition, and proved its justice by republishing his forgotten craze about the Pope being Antichrist. In the face of Protestant prejudice it is a mark of courage in Canon Farrar to admit that the Church of Rome "is, by the free acknowledgment of our own formularies, a Church, and a Christian Church, and has been pre-eminently a Mother of Saints, and many of her Popes have been good, and noble, and holy men, and vast benefactors of the world, and splendid maintainers of the Faith of Christ" (vol. i. p. 617, note).

Notices of Books.

The Foregleams of Christianity: an Essay on the Religious History of Antiquity. By CHARLES NEWTON SCOTT. London: Smith and Elder. 1877.

IT is a great subject which Mr. Scott approaches in this little work. He considers that the "Science of Religion" is already sufficiently advanced to demonstrate

Firstly, that the elements of truth, which lay scattered in the various religions and philosophies anterior to Christianity can only be satisfactorily harmonized in the creed of the Catholic Church. Secondly, that, apart from that creed, the more advanced in tone, the more pure in aspiration have been religions and philosophies, the less consistent were the doctrines of their several metaphysical systems either with facts or with each other. Thirdly, that the hand of God is manifest in the succession

of religious developments, which gradually prepared mankind for the revelation of Christianity in "the fulness of time" (p. 2).

In his book Mr. Scott seeks to collect and bind together within a small compass "admissions of some of the principal latest authorities" in support of these conclusions. The authorities whom Mr. Scott cites are very varied. Mr. Max Müller and Mr. Ruskin, Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Sewell, M. de Laprade and M. Lenormant, M. Beulé and M. Biot, Canon Farrar and Mr. Lewes, Dr. Pusey and Dr. William Smith, Mr. Maurice and Victor Cousin, figure side by side in curious juxtaposition. The author makes discriminating use of the varied sources to which he recurs, but his pages are no mere echoes of other men's thoughts. We do not say that he is strikingly original, but it is clear that he has not only read but reflected. Of the correctness of his main thesis there can be no doubt. The ancient philosophy was, in a real sense, a preparation for Christianity. Tertullian somewhere speaks of a kind of natural Christianity—"testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ," is the phrase he employs: and we know from St. Augustine's Confessions how that great Doctor found in Plato a schoolmaster to lead him to Christ. Our Blessed Lord was "the desire of the Gentiles." The rays of light which radiate from those "wise old spirits who preserved natural reason and religion in the midst of heathen darkness" (as Jeremy Taylor happily describes them) were but the foregleams of the Sun of Justice who was to arise with healing in his wings.

We are cordially at one, then, with Mr. Scott as to the point of view from which his book is written. And therefore we the more regret that his development of his theme has been marred by his imperfect appreciation of the work which Jesus Christ came to do. If anything is clear from the testimony of the Sacred Scriptures and the Holy Fathers it is that Jesus Christ came into the world to found a Church, to establish a Society, to set up a Visible Kingdom, which should last—*Lux Mundi*—until His coming again. If that kingdom has perished, the Divine Word has failed, and our faith is vain. If it has not perished, where is it? We wish Mr. Scott would weigh this question. It lies at the very root of the subject which he discusses in his book. As Cardinal Newman writes:

If all that has remained of it [*viz.*, the visible kingdom which Christ set up] is what can be discerned at Constantinople or Canterbury, I say it has disappeared; and either there was a radical corruption of Christianity from the first, or Christianity came to an end, in proportion as the type of the Nicene Church faded out of the world: for all that we know of Christianity, in ancient history, as a concrete fact, is the Church of Athanasius and his fellows: it is nothing else historically but that bundle of phenomena, that combination of claims, prerogatives, and corresponding acts. . . . There is no help for it; we cannot take as much as we please, and no more, of an institution which has a monadic existence. We must either give up the belief in the Church as a Divine institution altogether, or we must recognise it in that Communion of which the Pope is the head. With him alone and round about him are found the claims, the prerogatives, and duties which we identify with the kingdom set up by Christ. We must take things as they are;

to believe in a Church, is to believe in the Pope.—“Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.” § 3.

To which we may add that to a conscientious and philosophical student of history, as Mr. Scott clearly is, to believe in Christianity, is to believe in a Church. No fact is more certain, as we feel sure he would acknowledge, than that from the first the religion of Jesus Christ was distinctly ecclesiastical, sacerdotal, and hierarchial.

So much we venture to press upon Mr. Scott, in return for the pleasure and instruction we have derived from his pages. As a specimen of them we give the following recapitulation in which he sums up the first half of his volume :—

The Materialist perceives rightly the existence, qualities, and effects of matter; but it is wrong to conclude that nothing exists beyond matter, or no happiness beyond that which matter can afford.

The Fetishist perceives rightly that connected with the phenomena of matter there is something immeasurably greater than himself—the Divine; but is wrong to conclude that the substance of the Divine is not to be sought further than in matter.

The Pantheist perceives rightly that matter is connected with intelligent force, and that the Divine resides more in the latter than in the former; but is wrong to conclude that the connection between Spirit and Matter, or that between God and the World, is fatal or indissoluble, or that *all* life in the World is Divine.

The Polytheist perceives rightly that the manifestations of the Divine in Nature are various; but is wrong to conclude that Deity has not unity of substance or unity of purpose.

The Anthropomorphist perceives rightly that the Divine is more manifested in Man than in any other natural being familiarly known; but is wrong to conclude that the attributes of Deity differ only in degree from his own,

The Dualist perceives rightly that there is something in Man and in the rest of the World totally opposed to Divine Love, Wisdom, and Life; but is wrong to conclude that Evil or its cause is self-existent, or that Good is not more powerful than Evil, and the World or any part of it entirely in the power of Evil.

The Monotheist perceives rightly that all Good is derived from one centre—God; but is wrong to conclude that God exists only in one hypothesis, or that His manifestations are not various.

The Theist perceives rightly that all things but God have been created from nothing by God, and remain subject to his control; but is wrong to conclude that Evil has not acquired a positive existence, or that there is no more intimate link than that of dependence between God and the World.

The Mystic perceives rightly that there is a Life directly proceeding from eternal Love and Wisdom within himself, without being of himself; but is wrong to conclude that he is emancipated from the pressure of the World (the seat of Evil), or that his own nature is not more or less vitiated, and consequently exposing him to delusions of evil spirits or of his own imagination.

The Christian is taught by divinatorial revelation, and may be enabled by grace to perceive, that only through the Incarnation and Atonement of the Divine Word can the self-vitiated World be so united to the three Divine Persons of the Trinity that “God may be all in all,” and that, Divine permission of Evil through the free-will of creatures being necessary and solely intended for the complete satisfaction of Divine love, only

the sufferings of incarnate Deity could satisfy and sufficiently manifest Divine love of the World, the seat of Evil, and Divine abhorrence of Evil itself.

Owing, therefore, its three great fundamental doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement to divinatory revelation, Christian Theology can deduce therefrom the elements of a metaphysical system, which will reject the heresies and harmonize the truths of all other systems.

This seems to us to be, on the whole, very well put. It is, in fact, the working out of a thought of Pascal's: "Touts leurs principes sont vrais, des pyrrhoniens, des stoïques, des athées, &c. Mais leurs conclusions sont fausses parce que les principes opposés sont vrais aussi."—"Pensées," chap. xxv. 28.

The Life of St. Thomas of Hereford. By RICHARD STRANGE, S.J.
London: Burns & Oates. 1879.

THIS recent volume of the Quarterly Series is a newly-edited reprint of an old work, now very rarely to be met with, entitled "The Life and Gests of St. Thomas Cantilupe, Bishop of Hereford, &c. Collected by R. S., S. I. At Gant. Printed by Robert Walker at the signe of the Annuntiation of our B. Lady, 1674." A facsimile of this title-page is given: the remainder of Father Strange's book is reproduced, but with modernized spelling. The old "Life and Gests," too, is of a devotional rather than of a historical or critical character; and its meagreness of detail has been supplemented by an excellently compiled chapter of additional biographical matter.

We have read this reprint with unusual pleasure, and believe that it only needs to be known to be much esteemed. Whatever may be thought of the want of a more critical work on the Saint and his time, it would certainly have been a great pity if this real gem had been left in its obscurity because of its somewhat old-fashioned setting. These quaintly-built sentences, accumulations of epithet and figure, illustrations from a bygone science, and other tokens of old age do not detract from the influence of a charming book. The author's excellencies are above the mere conceits of style; his writing is full, too, of warm, simple piety, and forms an attractive book of spiritual reading.

Is not the concluding thought in the following passage as beautiful as it is simple?—

While he studied his philosophy at Paris, the window of his closet was a little at fault, and to set it right without trouble or the help of a workman he served himself of a stick or prop of a vine out of the next vineyard. The matter, God wot, so very inconsiderable to an ordinary conscience, would not have created any scruple at all; yet he, though otherwise not scrupulous, in his tenderness apprehended the transgression so deeply, that even then, for its expiation, he enjoined himself a seven years' penance, and each year with great remorse confessed the same. From whence we may gather how angelically pure that blessed soul was which checked so sensitively at so minute a thing, and how far it was from harbouring any great offence which it deemed the least heinous. A tender conscience is like a tender eye, which the least mote disturbs and

annoys, making it water to wash off the stain, and express regret that ever it came there (p. 35.)

Speaking of St. Thomas's early bringing up at Court, in consequence of his father's position, this happy reflection comes *en parenthèse* :—

The reputation of Courts hath ever been as of a place where virtue is laughed out of countenance and denied admittance as too coarsely clad for such fine company.

Indeed, Father Strange is fond of using *prosopopœia* : so, speaking of the Saint's humility, he says :—

It is proper to this virtue to empty ourselves of ourselves—that is, of self-love and self-ease, a lazy humour which sews a pillow to every elbow, and is always leaning homewards, that is, not to seek God and His greater glory, but itself.

The saints are for all times and lands ; but we cannot help feeling a strong interest and a glow of special pleasure in reading of this entirely English saint. And St. Thomas represents the thirteenth century of our history ; he was born within twenty years of its commencement, and died within twenty years of its close. Henry III., in 1265, made him Lord High Chancellor of England, but he was glad soon to resign his seal and burden, and flee to his beloved studies and quiet at Oxford. Here for a long time he was Chancellor of the University ; and, finally, in 1275, he was elected Bishop of Hereford. Like his namesake, Becket, Thomas of Hereford was a strenuous upholder of Church right against the might of an unruly time. Fearless of danger and heedless of threat, he resisted the intrusions and high-handed deeds of barons and earls : he even (though with more pain to himself) resisted the uncanonical ruling of his own Metropolitan, John Peccham. In this last conflict he spent his life. He had appealed to the Holy See ; had, in spite of his infirmities, undertaken the long journey to Rome ; had been received with marks of honour by Martin V.—but before his cause could be fully heard he died at Montefiascone in the August of 1282. He was canonized by Pope John XXII., in 1320, after earnest entreaties and prayer to Rome from all the English bishops and both the 1st and 2nd Edward.

Thus it came to pass that the canonization of the last (?) canonized saint of Catholic England was a great national event, brought about by the prayers of two kings, one archbishop, fifteen bishops, eleven earls, many lords and nobles, to the centre of Catholic unity, for the canonization of a bishop who died appealing to Rome to defend him against the injustice of the Metropolitan of Canterbury.

Workman and Soldier : A Tale of Paris Life during the Siege and the Rule of the Commune. By JAMES F. COBB. London : Griffith and Farran. 1880.

THIS is an interesting and most readable story, by a skilled author. The scene is laid in times which can never become commonplace, and whose fertility of incident is so great that their description in history can scarcely be overdone. The writer is not a Catholic,

but there is nothing in the work that is in any way offensive, although there is a tone of "goodness" which sometimes intrudes itself as not quite the genuine thing. This, however, will not prevent readers, especially young people, from enjoying the narrative; and the very fair illustrations which accompany the text will add to their appreciation of the story.

Per Crucem ad Lucem: The Result of a Life. By T. W. ALLIES, M.A.
In Two Vols. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

MR. ALLIES has here newly edited and gathered into one book several of his already-published articles and treatises which, together, illustrate the title he has chosen; the Cross being the immediate consequence of his discovery, some thirty years ago, that the Church of which he was a minister was not the Church of Christ—that tearing of himself "up by the roots from the community in which he had lived to middle age and with which all his hopes of prosperity in life were inextricably blended;" the light being that which he found in the Catholic Church. We are glad to see the contents of these two volumes, with the interesting introductions which the author has now added, placed in a position of greater prominence, and in a form which will help to their permanent adoption as an admirable English exponent of a cardinal point in the Catholic claim the authority of the Holy See. The assumption by Henry VIII. and Elizabeth of supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, that supremacy which had hitherto been a Papal claim, resting on Scripture proof, and was now a Royal claim, resting on the Royal proof of assertion, but "untenable and even anti-Christian," was the aspect of the Establishment which drove Mr. Allies from its midst. Naturally, therefore, the doctrine of the supreme doctrinal and moral authority of St. Peter's successor, together with its immediate bearings on dogma, life, and practice, has been his favourite (though by no means his only) study as a Catholic. These volumes give the results of his portion of this life's "thoughts, studies, and prayers;" his discovery of the fact of Royal supremacy; of the nature and effects of it; of the character of the Papal claim; of the foundation of the latter in Christ's own words and its continuous life and growth in history; of the opposite results of the one and the other claim in the daily working of the Catholic Church and of the Anglican Establishment.

Mr. Allies has been too long read, both of the Catholic and non-Catholic English public, to need any words of ours in his praise, whether for his cultivated and forcible style, or for his vast accumulation of reading, or for his happy use of the latter to illustrate his philosophic grasp of Catholic doctrine and view of its connections and consequences. It may be well to say, however, that the first edition of "The See of St. Peter," which forms part of the first of these volumes, was translated into Italian, and circulated by the order of his late Holiness Pius IX., a very high tribute indeed to both the learning and Catholic instincts of the author.

Although Mr. Allies's works were penned long before the date of the

Vatican Council, it is needless to say that they already contended for the infallibility which that Council decreed. This gift of *ex cathedra* inerrancy he had contended was bestowed by our Lord Himself on St. Peter in the three familiar texts from St. Matthew, St. Luke, and St. John; it has been claimed, from the beginning, by Popes, and acknowledged by their subjects; "the infallibility of the Papal See has been, at every great crisis of Church history, required in order to maintain the infallibility of the Church;" "lastly, every canonized saint, since the process of canonization has been instituted, has believed and professed the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. When was the instinct of saintliness known to fail?" Writing, therefore, since the Vatican decision, he naturally rejoices—

In the profound sense of security and delight which such a decision carries with it, the writer cannot but express his gratitude to the Divine Providence which has placed his life at such a time. He rejoices to behold the unequalled grandeur of the Church, assembled from the whole world, and bearing witness to the Rock on which it has been founded, and which through eighteen centuries has supported its weight.

We wish these two volumes of Mr. Allies the success which perhaps he most ardently desires—a large measure of influence in leading Romewards and light-wards those who in the Establishment find themselves in his own former sad state of anxiety and doubt. Many, even among the clergy, may have neither the leisure, nor the ability, nor the means to enter into the crucial question with Mr. Allies's erudition and mental power. May his work be, under God, the happy means of helping them to his own clear conclusions, even at the same cost—*per crucem ad lucem*.

The Institutes of English Law. By DAVID NASMITH, Esq., LL.B. In Four Vols. Vol. I., Public Law; Vols. II., III, Private Law; Vol. IV., Adjective Law. London: Butterworths. 1873-79.

MR. NASMITH has endeavoured, in these four small volumes, to satisfy a want which he himself felt, he tells us, when he commenced the study of English Law. "That want was a well-defined outline of the entire province of law, filled in with the leading principles of each section—a liberal but possible quantity, which, when mastered, would serve as the framework of a life's study." He has, we think, accomplished his endeavour with success. The volumes may be had separately, according to subjects, and each has full indices, analytical, alphabetical, and of "cases quoted," and is preceded by carefully constructed tables, giving analyses of the subject matter which show at a glance the connection of the various parts.

The volumes are designed for the professed law student, but will be also, we imagine, very useful to the hurried practitioner and the lay inquirer; giving them a not too jejune outline of the legal status and bearings of a question with references to more ample sources of information. They would be of service to priests, either in their studies, as of Canon Law and of several theological tracts, or in their frequent

duty of giving advice on points that involve both moral and legal consequences, however foreign to their immediate profession under the latter aspect, yet unavoidable in actual practice.

The volume on Public Law contains chapters on the origin of law—on the principles common to all legal systems; on Constitutional Law (which is a sketch of our English Constitution from the time of the Conqueror to the present); on International, and on Municipal Law. It might be advantageously studied by the historical and political, no less than by the legal student. The two volumes on Private Law (of persons and things respectively) contain an amount of information, sufficient for ordinary needs, on such subjects as successions and wills, mortgages, relations of landlord and tenant, insurances, husband and wife and divorces, contracts, bankruptcy, and numerous others. The last volume, on Adjective Law (which has for its object, briefly, to show whether a given individual has infringed a rule of the substantive law, and to measure evidence and damages), gives information under such headings as—facts as to which evidence is inadmissible, or unnecessary; facts which must be determined by the judge, and by the jury; the competency of witnesses, documentary evidence, and the like.

In a book dealing with the whole law, both its philosophy and practice, and those abstruse metaphysical questions raised under the former heading, have had to be expounded: a mighty task, demanding a union of the erudite lawyer, largely-read historian, and keen metaphysician. As to the correctness of the technical and practical portion we raise no question. The status and reputation of the author are a sufficient guarantee. We confess to having learned more, from a personal perusal of these volumes, of the condition and working of English law, and of the legal aspect of not a few cases, frequently occurring and indicating a conflict between the law of the Church and the law of the land, than we had done from repeated consultations of larger works on special points of legal practice.

The author has so frequently, by inverted commas, thrown the burden of responsibility as to metaphysics on popular authors, under such heads as—the nature of free-will, morality, positive and natural law, &c., that, dissenting as we do from much of what he quotes, we need do no more here than say so. The history, generally, whether quoted or otherwise, is of that popular kind, prejudiced without suspicion against Catholicism as a system which has so long held undisputed sway in England, but which is now disappearing very gradually and with almost reluctant steps before the light of recent and unbiassed critical study. The effective abolition of traditional side-views and misjudgments, especially when these are enshrined in the magnificent literature of two centuries, is slow work, and it is enough for us to note in passing that the Catholic theology and Canon Law of the "Dark Ages," and more recent times, would show to better advantage in the eyes of English lawyers if they had leisure to look at our own books and records, and would go so far as not to suppose our clergy (Jesuits included) to be preternaturally hypocritical, but, until sound history shows otherwise, believe them to have been actually

guided by the wise and holy rules and ordinances laid down by Pontiff, Council, and Theologian for their guidance.

Such descriptions as that of *casuistry*, quoted from Sir H. Maine, are as misleading in statement as they are objectionable in tone. Surely it only needs that a lawyer should put aside anti-Catholic (perhaps unconscious) bias to recognise that *casuistry* has existed through at least all Christianity, and that it is but a natural consequence of man's inability to place at once every event of life under its proper moral or legal obligation; and further, that if at one particular time men abused it, use and abuse are still distinct. Would the fact that there were at one time packed juries, say, in Ireland, justify a condemnation of the jury system in that country?

We assure Mr. Nasmith that a rational *casuistry* still forms part of every priest's moral theology, and bears to Canon and Divine Law much the same relation that his own Adjective does to Substantive Law; that its object is and ever has been neither to escape the consequences of sin, nor to aid the Catholic Church in the conflict with any sect—such allegations are puerile—but to enable the confessor to judge how far the penitent has been guilty and has incurred canonical or moral consequences; that to assume it is foolish to establish a distinction of sin into mortal and venial is offensive; that *casuistry* has not been ruined by Pascal or by anybody else; and that moralists of very large influence and sound credit still conduct its speculations—that, for example, St. Alfonso Liguori, Scavini, Cardinal Gousset, Gury, the Abbé Gaume, are very recent examples. The last named, indeed, has been translated into English and published for the use of the Anglican clergy; though it is not so much a book of *casuistry* as a guide to the *casuist*, i.e., the confessor.

Bating these defects which neither reflect on the author as a lawyer nor on his book as an exponent of English law, we beg to thank him for a very instructive and useful book, and to commend the book itself for its style, condensation, clearness, and technical accuracy.

Historical Sketch of the St. Louis University. By WALTER H. HILL, S. J. St. Louis: Fox. 1879.

FATHER HILL is Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the Catholic University in St. Louis, and he has done a very good work in presenting us with a sketch of its history, and an account of its fiftieth anniversary. The College of St. Louis, conducted by the Jesuit Fathers, was incorporated by Act of the Missouri Legislature in 1832. The number of its students, during the last ten years, seems to have averaged about 400. Father Hill's account is full of interest, of historical matter, of statistics, and of information as to the actual state of this great college. The book will afford invaluable materials to the future historian, and will be read with wonder and thankfulness by all who pray for the enlargement of the kingdom of God.

Esposizione ragionata della Filosofia di Antonio Rosmini. Two Vols. Bertolotti. 1878-79. (Consecutive Exposition of the Philosophy of Antonio Rosmini.)

THIS work, which is of very great importance, is an authoritative exposition of the logical, metaphysical, and ethical views of a man who has always inspired his friends with enthusiasm, and all thinkers with respect. Rosmini is one of the most eloquent of modern Italians. The key of his philosophy, as far as any simple explanation holds good, is his intense reaction against the materialistic and "common-sense" philosophy which he found in vogue, even in Catholic schools. He seized and pursued the idea of the intuition of Being—we will not now discuss how far—and his splendid eloquence derived from this prevailing bent of his mind a spiritual, poetical, and even somewhat idealistic tone such as we observe in men of kindred minds, like Fénelon, Thomassin, and Père Gratry. No one can read Rosmini without being purified and elevated. No Catholic philosopher can afford to be unacquainted with him. The present work, which is in two considerable volumes, is a useful guide to the twenty or thirty separate writings of the master. We think these writings of very unequal value. There are pages which are as good as can be; bright and powerful expositions of one or other of the great points of the Thomistic philosophy, and especially that branch in which St. Thomas's pregnant principles require the greatest amount of modern illustration—his Ontology. On the other hand, there is not a little which is laboured, feeble, and even fantastical—as, for instance, Rosmini's theory of corporeal substance. We shall have to return to these volumes.

The Catholic Birthday Book. Compiled by A LADY. London: Burns & Oates.

The Birthday Book of Quotations and Autograph Album. Second Edition. London: Griffith & Farran.

BIRTHDAY BOOKS belong to a class of literature which "sour-complexioned" persons would be inclined to call sentimental. There is no reason, however, why the natural inclination which asserts itself in human nature for marking and remembering one's birthday and the birthdays of one's friends, should not be made useful for culture and even for piety. A man's birthday, though of singularly small importance to the world at large, is not uninteresting to himself; but, if he has learnt to look on life aright, it should be kept rather as a day of solemn retirement than as a festival. It is probable, however, that as long as one has relations, the birthday will be considered an occasion for some rejoicing. Christianity, which has transformed natural feeling, has turned the old Pagan birthday feast into a half-sacred commemoration of baptism and of the acceptance of a saint's name. A good birthday-book, therefore, ought to remind us, at each day of the year, of some holy and supernatural association. It ought to raise the heart to heaven, and throw a gleam of light on the true path of the Christian wayfarer. The pretty book, just published by

Messrs. Burns and Oates, is a good example of such a birthday-book. Each day of the year is illustrated by the name of the saint or festival, by a pious motto, not from Holy Scripture, but from the writings of one of the saints, and by a devout "practice." The opposite page is left blank for names, dates, and even (in moderation) the "sentiments" of the owner or the owner's friends. The other book, at the head of this notice, is not devotional; but it is full of pretty, though sometimes too common-place, quotations and thoughts, expressed in English, in French, or in German.

Practical Notes on Moral Training: Especially Addressed to Parents and Teachers. With Preface by Father GALLWEY, S.J. London: Burns & Oates. 1879.

WE fail to discover in this little work the superlative excellence attributed to it by Father Gallwey in his preface. Nevertheless, it is certainly a sensible, sound, and well-written book. The authoress takes a number of subjects connected with the bringing up of young children—such as Instructions, Example, Discipline, Unselfishness, Temper, Timidity, True Principle, &c.—and explains the importance of attending to the development of character from the very earliest years, giving plain advice which it would be well if parents and teachers would take to heart. The deficiency of the book is that it has no plan, and very little order; and, what is worse for the effect on the reader, the compiler herself seems to have had no scientific ethical training whatever. Such words as Moral Discipline, Interior Life, Passion, Virtue, &c., have a most definite meaning in Christian ethics and a definite place in its development. It does not do, for instance, to define virtue as "supernatural strength given us by God" (p. 135), or the "supernatural life" as "simply that led by the Christian," with no attempt to explain it; to leave the important subject of "Passion" without a definition at all; or to write such a sentence as this:—"We know that the mere knowledge of the Divine law is not principle in the individual, and that it only becomes so when it is put in practice and observed undeviatingly." Some important matters are hardly treated of—for example, the subject of Punishment, and how pain can be made corrective. Then, again, we have nothing about the Sacraments, without which there is no Christian moral training worthy of the name. And, lastly, the whole book has an unfinished and dislocated effect from the absence of unity of idea. It should have been clearer to the readers and to the writer that the object of all training, for child and man, is to make them give their whole heart to God. This fundamental view of the end and object of training, together with the obstacles found in human nature, on the one hand, and the help derived from God, on the other, furnish the "topics" of what can be usefully said on Christian manners and progress.

Germany, Past and Present. By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. In Two Vols. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1879.

WE can hardly pronounce this to be a good book, although it is a book with a great deal of good matter in it. The truth is Mr. Baring-Gould has attempted too much both for his powers and for his space. To give an account of "Germany, her Institutions and Culture," not merely "recording observations," but "attempting to explain causes" (Pref. v), is a task of might to which the author is hardly equal. Nor could it possibly have been accomplished in a manner at all adequate within the limits to which he has confined himself. He displays, indeed, a consciousness of this in his preface.

Some of the subjects dealt with in these volumes (he writes) are of such importance that one class of readers may complain that I have treated them too cursorily. My purpose has not been to deal comprehensively with each—to say all that might, or indeed ought, to have been said on each—but to squeeze into single chapters just so much information as will give the reader a general outline and idea of the subject; and for the sake of specialists I have added an appendix of authors who will enable them to master the details of the matter they desire to study. Though each subject has been treated lightly, I trust it has not been dealt with superficially (Pref. p. vii).

Now, we are compelled to say that some of his subjects are treated by Mr. Baring-Gould very superficially. Take, for example, the chapter on the Labour Question in the second volume—one of the burning questions of the day in Germany, as elsewhere. It is a chapter of thirty pages, and might have presented an outline at all events of the main bearings of this great subject, as Teutonic thought views it, in its various aspects. Instead of that, Mr. Baring-Gould gives us a string of outworn commonplaces, and the thinnest leading article philosophy about the principles of trades unions, protection and free trade, seasoned with a quotation from Mr. Mill, and another from Professor Beesley, and varied by a very sketchy and hazy account of mediæval organization of labour. Again, in the chapter on Education in the first volume, out of forty-seven pages, twenty are devoted to a paper contributed by a German usher describing his experiences of certain low-class English schools—an interesting and instructive paper, it is true, but quite out of place in an account of education in Germany, and occupying space which the author was, as it were, under agreement with the reader to assign to very different matters. Once more, in the chapter on Culture, nearly fifty pages are filled with gossip about the German Court of the last century, almost all of which is already familiar enough to the English reader through Mr. Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," and other well-known volumes, and hardly worth repeating once more. With so great a subject and so little space, Mr. Baring-Gould's work ought to have been solid. But it is not. The critic who examines it—

Dignoscere cautus

Quid solidum crepet et pictæ tectoria linguæ,

is bound to pronounce that there is much of it which does not ring true. Nor is book-making the only offence with which Mr. Baring-

Gould is chargeable. His blunders are numerous and sometimes very gross, and induce a doubt as to his competency for any such work as that which he has undertaken. Thus, he speaks of the "Empire of Austria" as existing in the fifteenth century (vol. i. p. 10), while every schoolboy knows that the Austrian Empire has not been a hundred years in existence. He quotes from a writer whom he designates "the French poet, Diderot" (vol. i. p. 169); a way of describing the renowned encyclopædist, which is more than singular. He makes the astounding statement that "the Roman law saw no distinction between possession and property" (vol. i. p. 68); the truth being that the distinction in question is not only made by Roman law, but is of the highest importance in it. He describes "Joseph II. as a noble emperor, a worthy son of a great good mother" (vol. ii. p. 318); from which we infer that his knowledge of the principles and policy of these two sovereigns must be of the haziest kind. The praise of one of them is almost necessarily dispraise of the other. If Marie Therese was "great and good" as we believe, Joseph must have been little and bad, which we also believe. We give these instances of Mr. Baring-Gould's errors merely by way of specimen. His volume teems with similar mistakes.

So much may suffice by way of explanation why we cannot pronounce this to be a good book. On the other hand, as we have said, there is much good matter in it. The chapter on the German Army is excellently done. The chapter on Social Democracy is very well worth reading. So are the chapters on Music, Women, and the Upper and Lower Nobility. With the chapters on the *Kulturkampf* and Protestantism Mr. Baring-Gould has evidently taken especial pains, and they are full of interesting information. It should be noted, however, that especial caution is necessary with regard to any statements made by him respecting the Catholic Church; for, in addition to the natural inaccuracy of his mind and the superficial character of his knowledge, his strong prejudice as an Anglican clergyman here militates greatly against his trustworthiness. He is ever haunted by a phantom of "Ultramontanism"—we should like to make him define what he means by it; and like Cardinal Newman's prejudiced man he "sees Jesuits in everything." We should add that one very excellent feature of his work is the Appendix, in which the author subjoins the titles of books of authority upon the various subjects which he has handled. We could wish that he had made greater use of them himself.

Dom Jean Mabillon. Par HENRI JADART. Reims. 1879.

IN this slender octavo, M. Jadart, a magistrate of Rheims, and a member of the Academy of that city, gives a very interesting sketch of the life, labours, and memorials of his illustrious compatriot. He makes considerable use of the life written by Dom Ruinart, but adds many noteworthy details from the "Correspondence inédite," published by M. Valéry in 1847, and from the large mass of documents concerning Mabillon which are preserved in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* of Paris. Some of these are given at length in an Appendix.

We may mention, as of special interest, the account of the honours paid to the remains of Mabillon, Monfaucon, and Descartes, in 1799 and in 1819. At the suggestion of an ex-member of the Directory, and by order of the Minister of the Interior, the remains of John Mabillon, and of Bernard Montfaucon, religious of the *ci-devant* Abbey of St. Germain-des-Près, illustrious by their learned researches and luminous writings, were removed from the Lady Chapel of the Abbey, then used as a warehouse, to the Musée des Monuments Français (!). There they rested for twenty years, in company with Boileau, la Fontaine, Descartes, Molière, Jacques Rohaut, Abelard, and Heloise. In 1819 the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres obtained permission to transport the remains of Descartes, and of the two Benedictines, to the parish church of St. Germain-des-Près, where they now repose side by side. Last year the Academy of Rheims placed a memorial tablet in the Church of St. Pierremont, where Mabillon was baptized, and it was in order to celebrate this event that M. Jadart composed this volume.

Etude sur les Sarcophages Chrétiens Antiques de la Ville d'Arles. Par M. EDMOND LE BLANT. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale. 1878.

THOSE of our readers who are interested in Christian archæology, and especially in ancient Christian art, must often have desired to make a more intimate acquaintance with the sculptured sarcophagi of Arles, to which they will have met with such frequent reference. But, up to the publication of the present work, nothing short of a personal visit to the place would have given them the means of gratifying that desire.

It was not till towards the close of the last century that any attempt was made to bring together and preserve these ancient monuments even within the city itself. Before that time, they had been given away to antiquarians who cared to take them, or they had been built into the walls of churches, or of public and private buildings, or placed in the vestibule and portico of the Hôtel de Ville, the court of the archiepiscopal palace, or any other convenient space which would not refuse to give shelter to such cumbrous lumber. But, in the year 1784, Père Dumont, a Friar Minim, persuaded the municipal authorities to collect them in the nave of a ruined and roofless church, over the doorway of which was henceforth inscribed *Musée*. Unfortunately, this only served to make them a more conspicuous object, and a more easy prey to the fury of the Revolution which broke out ten years later, and was not likely to spare such venerable monuments of Christianity. In 1815, all that had survived those terrible days were again brought together into another desecrated church (of St. Anne), henceforth called the Museum; and here they have ever since remained, in company with Pagan monuments of various kinds.

The richness of even this miserable residue of the Early Christian monuments of Arles is not surpassed by any other collection out of Rome; and Christian archæologists have often expressed an earnest desire that some Bosio or Aringhi might be found to make them acces-

sible to the learned world generally by means of accurate copies. Before M. Le Blant, this had hardly been attempted. Millin, indeed, in his well-known "*Voyage dans les départements du Midi de la France*," had given copies of a few, but they were so wretchedly executed, and even, if we may trust M. Le Blant, so designedly tampered with by his unscrupulous draughtsman, that they were practically worthless. Perhaps it may not have been altogether the fault of the artist; something must be allowed to the general ignorance of the subjects represented, which was a characteristic of the age in which these copies were taken. With our present knowledge it is easy to laugh at the blunder which could see in the paralytic, carrying on his shoulders his upturned bedstead; a picture of Samson carrying the gates of Gaza; or in a boy holding a bird which pecks at a bunch of grapes, a picture of one of the twelve spies who brought back a branch with its cluster of grapes from the Promised Land. But we must not forget that the first of these mistakes was made also by Bosio's artists when the Catacombs were first re-discovered, and that the same persons failed to recognise Noah's Ark in the strange conventional form under which it appears in primitive Christian art, and not unnaturally conjectured that the scene before them was intended to represent some Christian priest or bishop preaching in a pulpit, whilst the Holy Spirit, under the form of a dove, inspires him what he shall say. However, whether the blunders of Millin's artist were the fruit of malice or of ignorance, at least they spoilt his work and rendered it absolutely useless. Nor were Père Dumont's endeavours much more successful; whilst Père Martin's, in more recent times, though leaving nothing to desire on the score of accuracy, were too limited in number to satisfy the demands of archæologists. We rejoice, therefore, that M. Le Blant has been able to publish, at the expense of the French Government, the present handsome volume, consisting of upwards of thirty good lithographs, illustrated by some seventy pages of text. It is published under the direction of the Minister of Public Instruction, as belonging to the Third (or Archæological) Section of the "*Collection des Monuments inédits sur l'Histoire de France*." It is only a selection after all; but M. Le Blant assures us that it contains all that is most valuable and interesting in the collection.

Even the most cursory glance at the pictures is sufficient to show the very close resemblance that existed between the Christian monumental sculpture of Arles and of Rome. The first impression is, that only the same subjects are treated, and only in the same way; and if a closer inspection reveals a few minor differences, at least it is quite clear that we may say of ancient Christian sculpture what has been said of ancient Christian epitaphs, that there is an absolute agreement in the general tone and sense and character of the whole, though there may be at the same time a certain preference given to one form before another in certain localities. But, in truth, between Arles and Rome there was hardly any difference at all worth speaking of. Only one important exception must be made to this remark. It had already been pointed out by De Rossi, and we observe that the remark is confirmed by Le Blant, that at the corners of the sarcophagi, where the Pagans

usually placed huge masks, and where the Roman Christians carved the heads of SS. Peter and Paul, the sculptors of Arles represented the head of a young beardless man, in whom it is obvious to recognise, by analogy, the special patron of Arles, its youthful martyr—*Genesius*.

M. Le Blant assigns the fourth and fifth centuries as the probable date of the monuments which he has published; and there can be no doubt that this is their real age; and, like their contemporaries in Rome, they represent our Blessed Lord, either alone, with a volume in His hand or giving the volume to one of His Apostles, or surrounded by them all; multiplying the loaves and fishes; changing the water into wine; giving sight to the blind, or healing the paralytic; raising to life the son of the widow of Nain, or healing the *Hæmorrhœssa*. To this M. Le Blant adds, in two or three instances, the giving of the keys to S. Peter; but he acknowledges that *Père Cahier* believes the objects in question to be fishes, not keys; and although our author assures us that he has perfectly satisfied himself upon the point by personal inspection, we must confess to a lingering doubt in our own minds. He says that he has seen the same subject on sarcophagi in Rome, Ravenna, and Pisa; but not, we think, on monuments of the same antiquity. There are also the usual subjects from the Old and New Testaments—Adam and Eve, the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, of Isaac, Moses receiving the Law, and striking the rock, Job and his wife, Daniel among the lions, or slaying the dragon by poison, the Three Children in the fiery furnace, the denial of our Lord by S. Peter and his arrest by the Jews, and the raising of Lazarus. M. Le Blant adds to these, the raising to life of *Tabitha*, or *Dorcas*, by S. Peter; but here again we are not quite sure that he has read his picture aright. No doubt, the actual figures in the scenes correspond better to the literal truth of that history than to any other which we can suggest; but then, as M. Le Blant himself freely acknowledges, or rather makes a great point of insisting upon, the Early Christian painters and sculptors were by no means particular in giving a faithful and literal translation into the language of their art, of the stories they selected for representation.

The most original and interesting portion of the present volume is to be found in the Preface, where, however, we cannot always recognise the authors whose theories are combated. Thus, M. Le Blant complains that, on the faith of a text of the eighth century, there seems to be a settled belief in the minds of some men that the Church of primitive times guided, as it were, the hand of the artist, and that therefore every detail of their work was intended to have a special significance and value; and he proceeds to urge very cogent arguments against this belief. But we cannot help thinking that he has here been setting up ninepins for the sake of the pleasure of knocking them down. We claim to have a tolerably extensive acquaintance with what has been written on this subject; and we have never come across any indications of this settled belief, nor can we call to mind any writer of name who insists on giving a mystical meaning to every detail in the works of Early Christian art. Certainly *De Rossi* does

not. On the contrary, he expressly discountenances such an idea, as his English epitomatize have taken care to inform us. They have themselves also condemned the language of some Protestant writers on the subject as exaggerated. Yet we observe that some critics, in their reviews of this volume, have seemed to insinuate that the school of De Rossi is precisely that which M. Le Blant is aiming at.

One of these Protestant critics has allowed himself to be so blinded by prejudice, as actually to set before his readers the following as a correct summary of Le Blant's views:—"Frankly accepting," he says, "the principle of symbolism as an acknowledged truth, he wisely restricts it to those scenes where it has either direct Scriptural warrant, or that of the Liturgies and Offices of the Primitive Church." We need hardly say that these conditions of restriction have been elicited from the inner consciousness of an Anglican reviewer, not unmindful of the Thirty-nine Articles. What M. Le Blant actually says is this: "To deny the introduction of symbolism into the ancient works of Christian art is far removed from my thoughts. The monuments themselves would suffice to establish the fact, even if the Gospel and the testimony of the Fathers did not oblige us to recognise it. I shall have occasion in the following pages to give examples of the application of a system so familiar to the faithful. But this will only be when the facts themselves impose it by their distinctness and their harmony, and when the proof of a mystical meaning is (so to speak) self-evident." It is obvious, however, to remark that this canon is capable of very various and shifting interpretations. What is self-evident to one man is far from being so clear to another; nay, the same person may make a different estimate of the degree of evidence at one time from what he does at another. Certainly Le Blant himself unhesitatingly admits several instances of symbolism, which we suspect his Protestant eulogist will fail to see, such as the Holy Eucharist under the symbols of ordinary food brought by the prophet Habacuc to Daniel in the lions' den, the substitution of S. Peter for Moses as "the leader of the new Israel," &c. Nay, in one place he does not hesitate to suggest that perhaps the figure of Moses taking off his shoe was used, solely because the psalm *In exitu Israel* was a part of the ancient funeral service.

This is his one special source of interpretation; and he has used it with great perseverance and success. He takes the *Ordo Commendationis Animæ*, and the prayers for the dying or the dead which occur in the most ancient liturgies; and in these, most especially in the former, he finds nearly all the most common subjects of Ancient Christian art. Anybody who will refer to the Ritual, and study the beautiful Litany, so to call it, in which the priest is there taught to call upon God to deliver the soul of the dying man, even as He had before times delivered these and those of His chosen servants out of special and extreme perils, will find, by the time he has finished it, that he has passed in review most of the histories which furnished subjects to the pencil or the chisel of Early Christians. Whether they be taken as containing salutary lessons of confident hope in God's assistance, or as faint types and figures of a future resurrection, the deliverance of Noe from the deluge, of Isaac from the altar of sacrifice, of Elias from

the common lot of men, of Daniel from the lions, of Susanna from her false accusers, of Jonas from the whale's belly, of the Three Children from the fiery furnace, and of S. Peter out of prison—all these are equally appropriate in prayers for the sick, and on monuments of the dead. Of course, there is nothing new in this suggestion of Le Blant's. It was pointed out by some of the earliest writers on the Catacombs that many of the principal subjects represented in them were brought together in a single passage of the Apostolical Constitutions, and there applied to the doctrine of the Resurrection. But M. Le Blant has pursued the idea more perseveringly than any of his predecessors, and with a proportionately greater success. It must not be supposed, however, as he himself acknowledges, that Christian artists followed only one idea; and perhaps our author shows an inclination to bear somewhat too exclusively on his favourite topic.

Another subject on which M. Le Blant writes sharply and, in our judgment, not quite justly, is the disposition which he detects in some authors to insist on a mystical or theological meaning in the order of arrangement of the several subjects carved on a sarcophagus or painted in the successive compartments of the vaulted ceiling of a *cubiculum*. He speaks of some German author, whom, however, he does not name, who read in the juxtaposition of the Adoration by the wise men, Noah's ark, and the story of Jonas, a mystical representation of the first calling of a Christian soul, its baptism, and then its resurrection to everlasting glory; in fact, a literal translation, in paint or stone, of those words of Our Blessed Lord, "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved." For ourselves, we think our choice between the French and the German interpretation would depend very materially on the order in which the subjects were really arranged by the artist. We cannot at this moment call to mind any instance in which they succeed one another in the order indicated. It would certainly be a most peculiar order to have selected; one which could not be justified as historical, whether we read it straightforward or backwards; but if this order has anywhere been actually adopted, we think it would be more charitable (and quite as likely to be true) to give the artist credit for knowing his Bible and Catechism, and for consciously expressing a true sequence of theological ideas, than to set him down as a clumsy artist and a shatter-brained ignoramus. We can more readily subscribe to another remark of M. Le Blant's—viz., that probably one principal aim of the Christian as of the Pagan artists was the happy composition of their work. They considered how they could best balance the several parts so as to produce an harmonious whole; yet even here we do not see why we should gratuitously attribute to the Christian artist an ignorance of his religion and of the interpretation of the several incidents of its history, which preachers were continually inculcating and which found its place both in the solemn offices of the Church and in the hymns sung by the people. Thus, whilst it is undeniable that the figure of Moses striking the rock forms a most convenient subject for one extremity of a sarcophagus and at the same time an admirable pendant to Lazarus standing up in his *heroum* at the other, we cannot think that it is necessary to believe that the artist failed to see

preciate the

theological fitness of the arrangement, whereby he was setting before the eyes of the faithful a sensible image of the "fountain of water," which was opened by the Gospel dispensation, and "sprang up into life everlasting." These ideas were of incessant recurrence in Christian sermons, and must needs have been quite familiar to the people. Why should the artist be excluded from their influence?

J. S. N.

Reflections delivered during Mid-Day Celebrations of Holy Communion in the Church of St. Mary-le-Strand. By ALFRED BOWEN EVANS, D.D., Rector. London: John Hodges. 1876.

THE late Dr. Evans was in his way a power in the Church of England. Beginning life, we believe, as a Dissenting minister in Wales, he, after a time, embraced Anglicanism, and enjoyed much fame for many years as a preacher at St. Andrew's, Wells Street, where he was Evening Lecturer. Seventeen years ago he obtained the small living of St. Mary-le-Strand, and there he remained until he died last year.

The volume before us is a collection of short addresses delivered at the celebration of the Anglican Communion in his church, where, as he tells us in the preface, an effort had been made, not without success, to render the Eucharist the service of the congregation. The fact that such an effort was made by him will be enough to indicate to those who did not know him the school of Anglicanism to which Dr. Evans belonged. He was one of the best specimens of it: not, strictly speaking, indeed, a learned man, but of considerable theological reading, and of wide general cultivation; earnestly religious and endowed with much hortatory power. His discourses are perhaps too rhetorical to satisfy a correct taste, and his fondness for antithesis sometimes carried him away. But they were doubtless effective when delivered, and are full of telling sayings, which dwell in the memory. Dr. Evans was of much service to many in guiding them towards the one Church which, alas! he himself never entered. Why did he not enter it? He gives an answer in one of his sermons which is so characteristic that we will quote it. He says:—

Now, there is but one Church, or one portion of the divided Church (for the fact of division is not to be overcome by *un-Churching*) which ventures to claim the allegiance of all Christian people; to wit, the Church in communion with the Bishop of Rome, the successor of St. Peter. She does put forth this claim, and admits of one, and but one, excuse for not yielding to it—viz., the plea of what it calls "invincible ignorance." Here we cannot but join issue. Suppose a man cannot, and will not, and, in duty to conscience and to God, dare not, plead such ignorance, or consent to have it pleaded for him, what then? Supposing it were said to me, or to one or other of you, not so ignorant as I am, "Nothing but 'invincible ignorance' hinders your becoming a member of the Roman Catholic Church;" I should reply, No; I plead no such ignorance, neither do I wish any one to plead it for me. It is not "invincible ignorance," unfortunately, that forbids my submission to your obedience, but, rather, invincible knowledge. Did I know less about her, I might submit to

your Church; knowing as much as I do, I cannot. Her history supports not her demand (p. 210).

We regret that Dr. Evans never drew out his historical argument against the Church, and we regret it for his sake. We cannot but think that had he done so, his naturally candid mind would have discerned that after all it was ignorance and not knowledge that stood in his way. It is notorious how many eminent German scholars have been led to the Church by the study of history; and to take an instance nearer home, "The great manifest historical phenomenon which converted" Cardinal Newman was, as we know from his own testimony, "the identity of the Catholicism of to-day with the Catholicism of antiquity" ("Ang. Difficulties," p. 321). The truth is that Dr. Evans can hardly be said to have believed in the Church in any true sense. This comes out in the sermon from which we are quoting, in the concluding portion of which he writes, "In her corporate capacity, alas! the Church is no longer an adequate witness for Christ. It is to the power of individual testimony that we must look." It is quite true that if the claim of Rome is unfounded, the Church not only is not an adequate witness for Christ, but cannot be said even to exist in a corporate capacity. As Cardinal Newman has said elsewhere, "To believe in a Church is to believe in the Pope" (Letter to the Duke of Norfolk). A letter written by Dr. Evans to a friend who had recently been received into the Catholic Church lies before us, and may perhaps be fittingly inserted here—it has never before been printed—as serving to illustrate the writer's state of mind:

June 10, 1877.

MY DEAR —,

From Mr. — I learned some little while since the step which you had been induced to take in relation to the Church. I cannot but regret that you had not had a little conversation with me on the subject previously. You would sure, I need scarcely say, to have found in me one able to sympathise with you in your difficulties, and one who would not have plied you with those dissuasives which, as they long since failed to have power with me, would not, I suppose, have been very powerful with you. It is somewhat singular that at the time I was informed of your change a gentleman whom I have long known should have sought me, under, I assume, perplexities similar to your own. You will have gained much probably and lost much by your transition.

We cannot help observing how refreshing the contrast is between the tone of this letter and that of a volume recently published with the imprimatur of a great Society, which may in some sort, we suppose, be regarded as a representative Anglican body. However much we may deplore the position Dr. Evans held, the note of good faith is as strongly upon his words as is the note of bad faith upon the diatribes of Dr. Littledale.

The Life of the Right Rev. Samuel Wilberforce, D.D.; with Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence. By A. R. ASHWELL, M.A. Vol. I. London: John Murray. 1880.

THE late Samuel Wilberforce was an able and successful Anglican minister, a skilful man of the world, and endowed with many

good qualities of mind and heart. The thing that grates on one's feelings, in this first instalment of his biography, is that he was called a Christian Bishop. He was a man who never had the smallest conception of what the Church of Christ really is. He never got beyond Anglicanism—an indescribable compound, made up of strong Protestantism, British patriotism, and accidental survivals of the Middle Ages—or, in other words, of opposition to the Pope, servility to the Crown, and several names and notions adhered to for no particular reason when England broke away from Rome. There is a charming letter in this volume written to Wilberforce when he had just been appointed Bishop of Oxford, by the late Prince Albert. The Prince, who to his many private virtues and public talents did not unite an acquaintance with elementary divinity, undertakes to instruct the newly-elected Bishop in the duties of his office. The letter is almost cynically plain spoken, and must have given Wilberforce—who fondly retained through life a vague idea that he had something in common with St. Ambrose, St. Anselm, and St. Charles Borromeo—an unpleasant sense of his position as a salaried servant of the State. It is to be regretted that we have no record of his reply to this letter. His answer would no doubt have brought out into yet clearer relief that “caution” and “moderation” which enabled him to ascend so agreeably from one preferment to another during his life; to become a high favourite at Court, to hang on to the skirts of the Oxford Tractarians, and to cultivate a fine, ignorant, but gentlemanly Toryism, while all the time he was always ready to revile the Pope, to extol the “glorious Reformation,” and to make sounding speeches about the virtues of the people. His biography, however, for these very reasons, is full of interest. This first volume—(the whole life will take up at least three)—brings us down to the end of the Hampden controversy. Canon Ashwell, who unfortunately died before the volume was out, has done his work with ability and with apparent honesty. There is, perhaps, too much “reflecting” and “summing up” in the book—too much calling attention to points which are perfectly obvious. And the letters might surely have been printed without keeping all the contractions which the writers used in the hurry of writing. But no one who cares for a picture of the stirring days from 1830 to 1846 will miss reading it right through. It is a picture in many respects different from any which has yet been given to the world. We have the comments of this shrewd, far-seeing man on the various phases of the Oxford movement, and on its leaders—comments which are often so rude and so indiscriminating that it is almost an indiscretion to publish them whilst the objects of them are still amongst us. We have Wilberforce's observations on Pusey, on Newman, on Ward (for whose deprivation of his degree he heartily voted), on the Jerusalem Bishopric (which he warmly supported, being then flatteringly intimate with Bunsen, and thinking the King of Prussia a noble ruler), and on the Hampden question. This latter is gone into at great length; but, exhaustive as the discussion is, there are one or two matters left out. Enough, however, is given to exhibit a gifted and not dishonest mind in the direst straits; to show a clever Anglican almost beside himself

with the difficulty of reconciling Anglicanism with Christianity. The more the Hampden question is known in all its bearings the more complete is the pulverization of the Anglican theory. Lord John Russell's cool and Mephistophelean letters alone are more effective than a dozen disputations of a new Bellarmine. We wish we had space to go into other useful matters treated in this biography. But when it is further advanced there will be other occasions of considering it.

Lectures on Ritualism. By Father GALLWEY, S.J. London :
Burns & Oates. 1880.

FATHER GALLWEY'S Lectures ought to be read by all Catholics who are desirous of doing spiritual good to the earnest-minded men who form the bulk of Ritualistic congregations. They will find in these pages a ready, and often a very homely answer, to the difficulties experienced by Anglicans, when the duty of submission to the authority of the Apostolic See is brought home to them. The personal goodness of their leaders, the assurance given them that in doctrinal teaching they are one with the Early Church, and above all their feeling of conviction that the ministers of the Establishment are really priests, hold them back and claim fidelity to Anglicanism. Father Gallwey devotes two or three lectures to each of these points, and shows how void are these arguments of reality and even plausibility. He proves that the supposed sanctity of the Ritualistic clergy can be no criterion of a Divine commission to teach men in Christ's name, and that the outcome of such a theory is the practical substitution of Naturalism for Divine Faith. This leads him in his second lecture to contrast the orthodox priest of God, though unfaithful, with the amiable but heterodox Ritualistic clergyman :

S. Paul's idea, then, of the priesthood, was not that they should be amiable men teaching each a gospel of his own, but rather that idea which the Holy Ghost sets before us by the mouth of the Prophet Malachi: "The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth." The Christian priest is to be not a leader followed for the sake of his personal qualities; he is one of the appointed body of apostles, who have a commission, and who through communion with the Vicar of Christ, partakes in the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and therefore is to be trusted. He is a nameless man, and has no followers. Consequently, brethren, though it is always a terrible calamity when a priest of God's Church scandalizes his flock by leading a life unworthy of his vocation, yet if it were unhappily necessary to choose between two evils, I am not afraid to say that an unfortunate priest who has been known occasionally to sin by intemperance or dishonesty or immorality, so long as he faithfully hands down sound doctrine, is not by any means so terrible a scourge as a refined clergyman, who has an appearance of godliness, but, day after day, not only teaches false doctrine, but utterly saps and destroys faith by teaching the very principle and essence of heresy—that is to say, by teaching the flock who trust him the fatal sin of choosing out for themselves such doctrines as please them, and rejecting others not convenient. Priest and people thus remain for

ever under the withering condemnation of St. Paul, they are "ever learning and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth" (pp. 54, 55).

Indifference to a Divine commission in the preacher, and an inordinate regard for personal merit, will sooner or later lead to a complete disregard for truth in dogmatic teaching. Three hundred years ago Protestants held certain positive doctrines. However erroneous these might be, yet they were often real convictions, and the very presence of those who called them heretical, roused the Reformers to fury and even cruel bloodshed. Now-a-days the Anglican is taught and trained to bear the doctrinal contradictions of his pulpit with a patience that affects heroic sanctity.

The most instructive of Father Gallwey's lectures are those that treat of the positive assurance the Ritualistic clergy give their flock, that by virtue of their study of the works of the Fathers, and by the soundness of their Patristic teaching, the people of England are being really saved from the errors of Romanism and brought back to the Christianity which was given to England by St. Augustine, its Apostle. These men profess a certain reverence for the successors of St. Gregory the Great in the Roman See, but with sad hearts they bewail their innovations in doctrine, and their unjust usurpation of spiritual authority. They live in hope that a Pontiff may yet arise who will virtually give up his supremacy, and agree to say nothing about either infallibility or Anglican Orders. Father Gallwey bids those who indulge in these day-dreams to look facts in the face, and not to shrink from the stern duty which honest inquiry must ever entail. If they reject the Protestant principle of private judgment they must believe in a living Church. The polity of that living Church must be sought in the Holy Gospels, and not in tracts issued by writers too often convicted of gross misrepresentations. In the fifth lecture they meet with remarks highly conducive to a fruitful perusal of certain important passages of the New Testament. If they be men of good-will a time must arrive when they will clearly see how vain is the claim of the Anglican Ritualists to be regarded as the true exponents of the doctrine and authority of the Early Church.

Father Gallwey appeals to ecclesiastical documents of no little importance, and shows what was the spiritual power wielded by the Roman Pontiffs in the age of the great Fathers of the Church, and what were the doctrines they taught as supreme teachers of the Universal Church. Popes St. Celestine, St. Leo the Great, and St. Gregory the Great are proved to be of one mind as to the office vested in the successor of St. Peter. Their exercise of power is found identical, when dealing with proud men who questioned or rejected their vicarious authority. Even the great patriarchs of the East had either to obey the decisions of the Bishop of Rome, or to be accounted guilty of schism, and struck with the sword of excommunication.

The fond conceit laid up in the Ritualistic bosom, that the purity of Patristic teaching is theirs, and is no longer to be found in the Apostolic See, or in that world-wide Church of which it is the centre, is treated by Father Gallwey in three excellent popular lectures. He repro-

duces in several extracts from the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon the faith and discipline common to the East and West. Nothing could be more unlike the Anglican Establishment even in its most advanced School of Ritualism. Almost every document to be met in the acts of the third and fourth General Councils undeniably testifies to the prerogatives of the See of St. Peter. Hence it is that Anglicans dare not trust themselves to the perusal and attentive study of these ancient records. Those who, like an eminent convert, give their whole heart and soul to the task, cannot fail to submit to that authority which all true Catholics must acknowledge and obey.

Faith in the Apostolic See fosters in the soul a ready and ever dutiful obedience. The light of this grace renders of merely secondary importance the reality of Anglican Orders. It is idle to make this issue the great and primary question between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion. Still more unreasonable is it to appeal to over-wrought feelings of devotional emotion as a safe and sure criterion of valid orders in the National Church. When the Ritualist has come to believe with St. Peter Chrysologus "that the Blessed Peter yet liveth in his own see, and giveth the true faith to all who seek it," he will, without any difficulty, acknowledge that so grave a question as the very existence of sacerdotal and episcopal powers in men, called priests and bishops, is one which can only be judged by him to whom the keys of authority have been delivered by Christ. Father Gallwey has done well to state in plain words these very simple truths.

Movements in Religious Thought.—I. *Romanism.* II. *Protestantism.*

III. *Agnosticism.* Three Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge in the Lent Term, 1879, by C. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D., Professor of Divinity in King's College, London. London: Macmillan. 1879.

IT is a large subject which Professor Plumptre has approached in these three sermons. The age, he discerns, is characterized by a floating, transitional, unsettled state of feeling. It is an age, as he truly says, in which we find a great number of people asking, Who will show us any good? with an earnestness which for many previous generations was but faintly displayed. Whether Professor Plumptre succeeded in these discourses in showing the University of Cambridge any good, we do not venture to determine. At all events, he has set forth with much ability on the whole—although, as we shall hereafter point out, with great want of accuracy in some respects—the leading characteristics, as they present themselves to his mind, of Catholicism, Protestantism, and what, for want of a better word, is called Agnosticism. It will be impossible for us, in the brief space at our command here, to follow him through all the matters upon which he touches in his hundred and twenty pages. We must confine our remarks to the first of his discourses, in which he considers the Catholic religion, or, as he terms it, Romanism.

And first we note with pleasure that he begins with a frank dis-

claimer of the foul virulence and blatterant abuse of the older Protestant controversialists. He admits that "the secret of the fascination Rome has exercised" lies in the fact that she alone claims to be able to satisfy the craving after truth of "one who would fain have something certain to rest on" (p. 16); and elsewhere he draws out the influences of another kind which she exercises over minds differently constituted from those of the inquirers who seek simply for intellectual certainty, influences which arise from—

the long history that stretches back into the remote past—the wide extent of her sway, and the apparent unity that rests on her central authority—the stately impressiveness of her ritual, affecting the imagination through the senses, and the emotions through the imagination—the provision which she makes for sin-burdened consciences by her system of confession and absolution—the hope which she offers to those who mourn for their dead of a remedial and purifying discipline after death, bringing to completeness the holiness without which no man shall see the Lord, and which, when their earthly course was finished, was but incomplete and almost rudimentary—the high ideal of saintly and self-devoted life which has been aimed at and not seldom realised, in her religious communities of men and women (p. 28).

Now, this is true. Catholicism alone, among the religions of the world, embraces all sides of a man's nature, satisfying his intellect and his affections, and guiding his life. And Mr. Plumptre deserves credit for stating it so frankly. Of course he holds there is a set-off, or he would not be where he is. But in the case which he makes against Catholicism there are so many misconceptions and mis-statements as to cause us to think that either he has given very small study to the subject, or that he had not a very high opinion of the critical powers of his hearers in the University of Cambridge. We do not profess to point out here all the errors into which he has fallen. There is hardly a page in this sermon on Romanism in which one or more may not be found. All we can do is to take a few at haphazard as specimens.

I. Professor Plumptre asserts that the Catholic Church assumes it to be the purpose of God "that each soul should have the means of attaining to an unerring judgment on all questions which the speculative intellect may raise as to the being of God and His dealings with mankind" (p. 16).

Whence can Professor Plumptre have derived this astounding thesis? Of course the Catholic Church assumes nothing of the kind. She is well aware with the Apostle that we know in part. "*Totum desinit in mysterium*" is a commonplace of her theologians.

II. Professor Plumptre states that the Catholic Church in her latest developments "abandons the appeal to an unbroken tradition, and to the authority of the Church as represented in her Councils" (p. 17).

The precise contrary is the truth. The method pursued by the Catholic Church in her latest developments is identical with that pursued in her earliest.

III. Professor Plumptre tells us that the claim of the Catholic Church to infallibility "resolves itself at last into the *a priori* assumption that there must be an infallible guide somewhere, and that the only

Church which assumes to be such a guide must, *ipso facto*, be warranted in its assumption" (p. 20).

This is a strange misrepresentation—or rather a ludicrous distortion—of the antecedent argument for an infallible arbiter of faith and morals, drawn out by Cardinal Newman with such power in his "Essay on Development." That argument, extending as it does through seventeen pages (pp. 75-92 in the last edition), is too long to be reproduced here. But we venture very earnestly to beg Professor Plumptre to peruse it carefully. We are sure he would rise from its study with little disposition to exhibit such a parody of it as that which we have quoted to a learned body.

IV. Professor Plumptre observes: "The well known *Bellum Papale* of the Sixtine and Clementine Editions of the Vulgate, each stamped with an *ex cathedra* authority, and containing some 3000 variations in their texts, remains as a witness that the claim [of Papal infallibility] which had by that time been made could not bear the test of even superficial criticism" (p. 24).

What does Professor Plumptre mean by talking of "editions of the Vulgate stamped with an *ex cathedra* authority?" The most superficial study of the elements of the question would suffice to show Professor Plumptre that "Papal infallibility" has no more to do than the man in the moon with the merits of the Sixtine and Clementine editions of the Vatican.

V. Professor Plumptre, animadverting upon what he is pleased to call "a monstrous growth of Mariolatry," observes:—

It is not without interest to note that the extracts given by Dr. Pusey from works published with more or less authority from Roman Catholic Bishops, and in wide use throughout their flocks, are enough to move even Dr. Newman to language almost as strong as any Protestant could desire: "I consider them calculated to prejudice inquirers, to frighten the unlearned, to unsettle consciences, to provoke blasphemies, to work the loss of souls. . . . I know not to what authority to go for them—to Scripture, or to the Holy Fathers, to the decrees of Councils, or to the consent of Schools, or to the tradition of the faithful, or to reason" (Letter to Dr. Pusey, pp. 120, 121).

Cardinal Newman has perhaps suffered more from misquotations than any man living. In the great majority of cases this may be due to ignorance. We will charitably hope it is. But whatever other excuse may be available for Professor Plumptre, *that* can hardly be urged. And indeed we know not what to say to his citation from Cardinal Newman of the words he quotes, without the very important limitations with which the Cardinal introduces them. "After such explanations," Cardinal Newman writes, "and with such authorities to clear my path, I put away from me, as you would wish, without hesitation, as matters in which my heart and reason have no part (*when taken in their literal and absolute sense, as any Protestant would naturally take them, and as the writer doubtless did not use them*), such sentences and phrases." The *italics* are ours. We use them merely for Professor Plumptre's benefit.

But we have said enough; nor should we have said so much had it not been for the reputation which Professor Plumptre enjoys and the

position he holds. It is disheartening to find a gentleman of such wide cultivation, who is a professed teacher of Divinity, betraying a recklessness or an ignorance in theological controversy which would be discreditable to the least advanced of his pupils.

Winds of Doctrine. Being an Examination of the Modern Theories of Automatism and Evolution. By CHARLES ELAM, M.D. Second Edition. Smith and Elder.

WE noticed this book at some length when it first appeared. We are glad to have an opportunity of again calling attention to it, for we know not where else to find, in so short a compass, so able an exposure of much presumptuous dogmatism which passes current under the name of Science. By way of specimen of Dr. Elam's book, we will here present the concluding portion of it:—

All that is said by Professor Huxley is very little more than an amplification of what was clearly and tersely set forth by Lamarck more than sixty years ago. Lamarck discerned with perfect clearness the strict logical dependence of Human Automatism upon a physical theory of life. It will be evident from a consideration of the following extracts from the Introduction to his "*Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres*," how little progress has been made in this department of biological science since his days:—"Every fact or phenomena that can be observed is essentially physical. . . . All movement or change, every acting force, and every effect whatever, are due necessarily to mechanical causes, governed by laws. . . . Every fact or phenomenon observed in a living body is at once a physical phenomenon and a product of organization" (Preface, p. 11, *et seq.*) He further refers to these physical phenomena as "constituting life" (p. 12), and to sensation and thought being due to changes in a "particular system of organs capable of giving rise to these physical, mechanical, and organic phenomena." From these general principles the conclusions are natural and inevitable, that "all living bodies or organisms are subject to the same natural laws as are lifeless or inorganic bodies; that the ideas and faculties of the mind generally are but manifestations of movements in the central nervous system;" and, finally, that "*the Will is in truth never free.*"

But, be the doctrine new or old, it cannot be denied that it is a strictly logical deduction from the postulate.

If man is but the product of the molecular forces of matter, from which he is evolved without the "intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes;" if he is merely a "co-ordinated term of Nature's great progression," or a result of "the interaction of organism and environment through cosmic ranges of time," then he is, indeed, hopelessly and helplessly, a mere automaton, with neither choice, will, nor responsibility. But if, on the other hand, it has been or can be proved that such doctrines find no support from science, from observation, from experiment, or from reason—and this, we may interpose, Dr. Elam seems to us to have satisfactorily established—then the doctrine of Human Automatism is relegated to the domain of all such "*figments of the imagination*," and man may trust implicitly to the consciousness which tells him that he is no mere machine, but a responsible free agent, with duties to perform to his God, his neighbour, and himself; and a conscience to prick him if he performs them not.

The Most Rev. James Macdevitt, D.D., Bishop of Raphoe: a Memoir.
By the Rev. JOHN MACDEVITT, D.D., &c. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

THE subject of this memoir was admired and beloved by a large circle of friends in his own country, and universally in his own diocese. Reasons are given us in the volume for thinking that a longer life was alone needed to have placed the Bishop of Raphoe in a much more prominent and leading position; indeed, we are told as much in a quotation from one of the Bench of Irish Bishops. This elevation would have been a recognition, not only of his intellectual powers—quite above the average—but still more of his singular goodness and modesty, and, we suspect also, of his practical abilities and business tact. In 1859, and at twenty-seven years of age, he became a professor in All Hallows' Missionary College, Dublin, and here he taught philosophy until, in 1871, he was appointed to the Bishopric of Raphoe. In his diocese he was occupied in the energetic pursuit of episcopal duties until his death at the close of 1878. There is consequently little of external incident to swell a biography; and the volume is largely made up of extracts from the Bishop's writings and conversations on philosophical, political, literary, and religious topics. His literary criticisms and pieces are good, and his letters to Lord Lifford on Catholic Education best of all. The chapters on his inner life, on his episcopal rule, and on his views as a patriot, are also pleasant reading. The volume is the work of an admiring brother, who makes little effort to be critical. But the record is that of a very pure and noble life, and deserves to be read beyond the circle of those who knew the subject of it.

The publishers' part of the production is excellent; but we have long noticed that the Messrs. Gill's books are conspicuous for their tasteful get up, and for careful printing.

Lectures for Boys. By the Very Rev. FRANCIS CUTHBERT DOYLE, O.S.B. London: Washbourne. 1879.

THE origin of these little lectures, or sermons, as we prefer to call them (for most of them are sermons), is as follows: As Prefect of Discipline at Douai College, their author was expected to take a large share in the work of moral training of the boys committed to his care; and he soon found that his labour would be in vain, unless he endeavoured to instil Christian principles into their hearts. But *how* to do this was the question. The spiritual books put into their hands were too often dry and abstract; and they did not address themselves to the boy-nature, nor deal with matters incidental to boy-life. The Prefect must himself do the work which he could not find done to hand. So he undertakes, every morning, to deliver to the boys a short "homily or lecture," on the subject of their duties as Christian schoolboys. "The result," he tells us, "fully answered my expectations. Their attention was arrested, their curiosity aroused, and it was gratifying to observe the earnestness with which they strove during the

day to practise the lesson they had been taught in the morning." We have read a fair number of these little discourses, and can readily believe that the writer has not exaggerated their general effect. No words of approval on the part of the critic could add to the satisfaction of such a result; but, as these sermons have not been merely preached but published, there is something else to be said.

For it by no means follows that, "because boy-nature is the same all the world over, what interested or benefited one school will, in all likelihood, interest and benefit many others."* How, in point of fact, is this larger result to be obtained? If the boys in other schools have these volumes given them to read as spiritual reading, in the times allotted to such reading, no doubt the matter will benefit them, but never as it would had they heard it from the fervent lips of the Douai Prefect. That they will read them—not, indeed, with the zest with which grown-up persons read Newman or Robertson—but for their own sake, at all, is a sanguine expectation. Or will the benefit be obtained by their being preached by other prefects? "I lent you my fiddle, but I did not lend you my fiddlestick," said the preacher, in an old story, to one who complained that the sermon he had borrowed had by no means produced the effect which it had achieved in the mouth of the lender. How, in what sense, can one preacher preach another's sermon? He may *read* it, but rarely indeed is reading an equivalent to preaching. He may commit it to memory; but very excellent must be the sermon which deserves such a labour to be bestowed on it, even if the preacher have time at command. But he may master its argument, or motive—if it have one such argument or motive, as its *raison d'être*; for then he has, not merely the material out of which to make a sermon, but a sermon ready made to hand; and he can retrench, or develop, or illustrate *ad libitum*, so as, in a sense, to make that other one's sermon to be his own. Or if, instead of one chief motive, it have two or three such "points" as they are called—if, that is to say, it be really three little sermons bound in one, so to speak—he may, with a little more mental effort, do the same. But if, on the other hand, it be merely a string of pious thoughts, one suggesting another, with more or less connection, it may do good for the time; it may be useful as suggesting matter for reflection; but it cannot live; it is not a logical whole; nobody will preach it, for nobody *can*. In short, a good sermon must have *matter* and *form*, or it is not, in the strictest sense of the word, a sermon.

Judging the sermons by such a standard (and surely published sermons ought to be judged by the highest standard), we think it no slight praise to say of sermons, one of which was delivered every day, that many of them fully, and many others more or less perfectly, realise our ideal, though others fail to do so, some of which, however, as being *textless*, do not claim to be considered as sermons at all; they are short dissertations, accompanied by suitable practical reflections, and excellent in their kind.

* Preface.

Of the sermons that are faulty, as compositions, we observe that many of them are top-heavy. Each sermon is divided into parts, which are numbered, as I., II., and III. respectively; but these numerals do not designate branches of the subject-matter, as they are always of uniform length, and seem to be mere chronometers. No. I. is often taken up with the introduction, so that a third of the sermon is exhausted before, in parliamentary phrase, there is any question before the House. This is surely a fault. The dominant idea need not, it is true, pervade the matter from head to tail, like the backbone of a fish, but it should make its presence felt, nevertheless, as the theme in a musical composition dominates the opening notes. It is what the preacher has *got to say for himself*, and whatever else is said should be said only for its sake.

Others of the sermons, again, when introduced, have not one but many kindred themes, whereby the effect is always weakened. Still, when all is said, the wonder is not that there are faults, but that, considering the daily demand, the quality of the supply should be so good as it is.

The Anglican Ministry; its Nature and Value in relation to the Catholic Priesthood. An Essay by ARTHUR WOLLASTON HUTTON, M.A., of the Oratory. With a Preface by His Eminence Cardinal NEWMAN. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1879.

THE author of this newest work on Anglican Orders, himself an eminent convert from that party in the Anglican Church called "Ritualists," publishes the book in the conviction that one of the chief obstacles which prevent Ritualists from submitting to the Catholic Church is their persuasion of the reality of the "Orders" of their clerical guides. This learned and elaborate Essay is, therefore, addressed to the "highest" portion of the Anglican Communion. It is, as Cardinal Newman remarks in his Preface, an *argumentum ad hominem*. The Ritualists hold doctrines which are unreasonable and practically blasphemous unless they possess a true Priesthood. That they have no true Priesthood is what Father Hutton has undertaken to demonstrate, from theology, from history, and from existing facts. The novelty of the book, apart from a certain freshness and literary power in putting well-known points, consists in the clearness with which the writer brings out the idea of the Christian *Sacerdotium*, its existence and its prominent position in the Church of Christ, and the complete suppression of its very notion in the Anglican heresy. As Cardinal Newman says:—

If the Catholic view of the *Sacerdotium*, as residing in the Christian ministry, be a truth of revelation; if, nevertheless, it is not, and never has been held by any Anglican minister, since Anglicanism existed, till the last thirty years; if Anglicans, I say, have neither believed in the existence of such a gift, nor professed to use it, nor taught and honoured it; if, rather, they have called it a "blasphemy,"—who shall say, without a great paradox, that suddenly a small minority of the Anglican body is possessed of it, while the main body persists not simply in ignoring it, or in being ignorant of it, but in knowing it too well as claimed by us

Catholics, and denying utterly that such a gift was ever made by our Lord to any one? Sacraments the Church of England has ever claimed, but never Sacrifice (p. x).

In his desire to bring into clearer relief the idea of the "Priesthood" or *Sacerdotium*, the writer has been betrayed into what he has already acknowledged* to be a looseness of language, which is all the more to be regretted because his case would have been quite as cogent without it. It is not accurate to say that the "reservation," to bishops of certain acts—(Confirmation and *Ordination* being apparently named)—is "a matter of ecclesiastical discipline rather than of divine institution" (p. 187). The distinction between bishops and priests, and therefore between their respective powers and functions, is certainly of divine institution at least as regards the conferring of the Priesthood. Father Hutton only meant that the Episcopate and the Priesthood are one sacrament, one Order, and one in many of their attributes—especially in this, that they have only equal powers as to the consecration of the Blessed Sacrament. His reason for insisting on this is obvious. A Church, which has ostentatiously renounced the "consecration" of the Holy Eucharist and the idea of a sacrifice, lies, first of all, under a *primâ facie* suspicion of having renounced the Priesthood altogether. In the next place, the renunciation of sacrificial truths and terminology goes a long way to vitiate a sacramental form which is already so vague as to be dependent on its surroundings for its true meaning. And, thirdly, if the validity of Anglican Orders depends on the acts of men who did not believe in a sacrificial power conferred by Orders, there is strong presumption those acts were not what they should have been. These views are drawn out at length. There is a cumulative force resulting from this argumentative process which at least effects one result—it throws the *onus probandi* on the Ritualist clergy themselves. No member of a Ritualist flock, who takes the trouble to follow Father Hutton, can now dispense himself from doubting, to say the least, the "Orders" of his pastor.

Doubtless, the historical argument is the only one which can be depended upon for the peremptory disproof of the Orders of the Anglican Church. This proof Father Hutton gives, also, at considerable length and with great impartiality. Catholics (he says) do not pretend to prove that Barlow was never a bishop; what they contend is, that there is nothing to show that he was. That being so, there is no proof that Parker was consecrated, either; and innumerable circumstances which combine to make us doubt. Therefore, before the world, and on every judicial and common-sense principle, Anglican Orders are practically disproved. But we confess that, although Father Hutton gives us a most useful *résumé* of all the historical evidence, not only epitomizing Canon Estcourt's invaluable labours, but giving a clear and tolerably complete account of the literature of the controversy, yet we feel that the book will make its mark by its treatment of the question of the *Sacerdotium*. Cardinal Newnham's preface is a masterly enforcement of the words already cited from it—the view that a Sacri-

* In a Letter to the *Tablet*, March 6, 1880.

ficing Priesthood has all along been repudiated by the Anglican Communion. Especially worthy of note, as a distinct addition to the materials of the discussion, is the passage from Waterland, in which that "very learned, careful, temperate" writer, "perhaps the greatest authority on a question of doctrine of all the Anglican divines," most decisively repudiates, on behalf of his Church, the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice.

The Life of Dom Bartholomew of the Martyrs, Religious of the Order of St. Dominic, Archbishop of Braga. Translated by Lady HERBERT. London: Richardson and Son. 1880.

THIS biography of an eminent servant of God will be welcomed by all devout Catholic readers. Dom Bartholomew was a bishop of the type of St. Charles Borromeo. It is too much the fashion to assume that apostolic bishops were rare exceptions in the age which immediately preceded the Council of Trent. That there were numbers of rich and free-living prelates forced on the Church by kings and secular lords, is only too true. But the names which we find in the lists of the great Council itself are such as prove beyond a doubt that the good and the faithful were found everywhere side by side with the less worthy. This work supplies us with a detailed life of one of the most prominent of the Fathers of Trent. Dom Bartholomew—who took his singular name, "de los Martyres," from a little church in Lisbon where he was baptised, and the title of which he chose when he received the religious habit—was a Portuguese, a Dominican friar, and finally Archbishop of Braga. His life is the life of a saint. But the present biography is chiefly occupied with tracing his character as a pastor and a warm reformer of pastors. His influence in his own diocese was not greater than that which he exercised over the Fathers of Trent, over the Cardinal of Lorraine, and over Paul IV. himself. It is hardly too much to say that the legislation of the Council on bishops and pastors of souls is owing to him as to its principal author. In his speeches and actions during the Council, and in his own diocesan work both before and after, we see the anticipation of St. Charles. He knew St. Charles. During a short visit to Rome which he paid whilst the Council was sitting, Dom Bartholomew met the saintly Archbishop of Milan, who was then very young. The latter was already given up wholly to the workings of the Holy Spirit; but his heart was strengthened and his insight deepened by the conversation and advice of a man whom all were already reverencing as an Ambrose or an Augustine. Dom Bartholomew placed in the hands of St. Charles the manuscript of his "Stimulus Pastorum," and ever afterwards St. Charles spoke of the Portuguese Archbishop as his teacher and his master.

We are fortunate in having the history of this great prelate in considerable detail. An account of his life was first written, whilst he was yet living, by his fellow religious and intimate friend, Father Louis of Granada, who died, however, before the Archbishop, and so left his history unfinished. Various other writers have supplemented Granada's devoutly-written narrative. The present translation is made from the French life, written, or edited, by the religious of the

general noviciate of the Dominicans in Paris, in 1663. The title page, indeed, says that it is translated from "his biographies written in Portuguese, French, and Spanish;" but we have not found that there is anything more in the book than a translation, somewhat free at times, of the French work here referred to. Indeed, it is difficult to see what else could have been done unless the really original Portuguese life of Louis de Souza had been carefully compared. The French compilers tell us they used the Spanish life by Muñoz; and Muñoz professes to translate de Souza. But Muñoz is one of those "elegant" writers of biography, more common in the seventeenth century than now, who were fond of embellishing their subjects, not only by writing original reflections, but also by inventing original facts. Doubtless, the salient facts in the life of Dom Bartholomew are given fairly enough; but he is credited with a whole series of highly ornate speeches which are evolved partly out of the very slender record of what he actually said, and partly from "Holy Scripture and the Fathers," and the writer's own idea of what he ought to have said. The French compilers avow that they had to cut down Muñoz in numberless places and try to go back to Granada. But they also confess that they themselves have embellished a little: "Et lors qu'il a falu nécessairement y suppléer quelque chose, nous l'avons pris autant qu'il nous a été possible, des paroles mesmes de l'écriture et des Saints Pères, que nous avons trouvées dans les Livres de ce Saint Prélat." Lady Herbert, curiously, omits these words, and only these words, from her rendering of the preface. But they are quite essential for the right understanding of this life. The long speeches put into the holy Prelate's mouth as delivered at the Council, or before the Pope, or to the king, or to St. Charles, are not much more authentic, as speeches, than those of Agricola or Catiline. That is no reason to regret or reject them. They are authentic in the much more important sense of being the true sentiments, and even the very words, written by the holy man on other occasions. A life like this must not be judged as if it were a secular biography. It is written for edifying reading. And the reader of a saint's life is glad of the saint's words and opinions, however they are reproduced. He will find in this volume a really vivid and interesting picture of Dom Bartholomew's own diocese, and of the Council of Trent; and the large and extended extracts from the Fathers and the best spiritual writers are well adapted to give to the clergy a high idea of their holy vocation, and plentiful matter for meditation.

Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority. Mostly Reprinted from the DUBLIN REVIEW. By W. G. WARD, Ph.D. London: Burns & Oates. 1880.

DR. WARD has followed up the volume of reprinted essays we noticed some time ago ("Essays on Doctrinal and Devotional Subjects") by a second volume, containing some dozen of those Papers which have appeared in a continuous series in the DUBLIN REVIEW during the time that it was in his hands. The book arrives so late that we can do no more than call attention to it at this moment; but we hope to return to it in July at considerable length. It need not be pointed out to any reader who has been acquainted with Dr. Ward's writings for

the last sixteen years that he has undertaken, and in great part accomplished, two most arduous works; the one, to lay down on solid basis of reason the foundations of Christian philosophy, the other, to develop and defend the true view of the extent of the Church's prerogative of unerring definition. The present volume reproduces some of the principal Articles in which he has combated the deadly "Gnosticism" of the *Home and Foreign Review*, and drawn out the true notion of the Church's magisterium alike against Anglican theories and undue domestic limitations. If, as some think, the "minimising" controversy is now a thing of the past, and the decisions of the Holy See are simply accepted by the English-speaking Catholics without discussion or reserve, it ought to be emphatically noted that such a result is largely due to Dr. Ward. It may not seem to be so on the surface, but those who have been in contact with the clergy and the instructed laity are well aware that many of both classes, although at any moment ready to die for the faith, have been in great danger of accepting speculative theological views which would have tended to introduce fatal division and partial paralysis into the Catholic body.

We had desired to reproduce some passages of the most interesting (new) preliminary essay, in which Dr. Ward explains his position, and vindicates the course he took as editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW; but it would be impossible to do it justice without printing the whole of it. We must therefore defer saying more for the present, trusting our readers will in the meantime read the book for themselves.

The Pan-Anglican Synod before S. Augustine's Chair. London :
Hardwicke and Bogue.

ARCHBISHOP TAIT, in his opening address to the members of the Lambeth Conference, gravely identified himself with S. Augustine, the Benedictine monk and apostle of this nation. "*We are here,*" he said, "*and I am addressing you from Augustine's Chair.*"

Had the good prelate been tutored from his youth in Ritualistic ways he would doubtless have supported his newly-assumed honours with more consistency and dignified grace. As it was, his Calvinistic prejudices got the better of him. Fearful lest such an avowal should in the least commit him to make common cause with the innovating school, he immediately cleared himself of all Tractarian imputations by congratulating his fellow-bishops upon the fact of their standing nearer to pure primitive Christianity than even their very Apostle stood!

Not satisfied with this, he went on to speak of the days of S. Anselm and of S. Thomas à Becket *as a time of semi-pagan Christianity*. He spoke of the shrine *behind* him, and sneered at the crowds of pilgrims of all nations who in those days flocked to the wonder-working tomb of Canterbury's glorious martyr. Then, with supercilious contempt for the Church's latest dogmatic definitions, as being merely *modern subtleties*, and with an irreverent allusion to the devotion of the Sacred Heart, he closed his address in words no Dissenting minister would object to make his own.

Two editors, one a Protestant and the other a Catholic, have published a well-timed pamphlet to show, by extracts from the works of Venerable Bede, the real character of the Christianity which was

preached to the Anglo-Saxons by S. Augustine and by his Catholic successors.

The extracts are given under four heads—viz., History, Papal Supremacy, Dogma, and Discipline.

The Catholic Church is now preaching to the English nation the very self-same doctrines it received from its Apostle. It enjoys unity in Faith and rightful jurisdiction, because, united with the See of S. Peter, it rests upon the rock of authority which our Blessed Lord has placed.

The heart of this nation has never altogether forgotten the gratitude it owes to S. Augustine and his companions. It even now has a sincere love for that great Order to which he belonged, and which he planted in the primitive Sec. Nay, in spite of three centuries of Protestantism, it has a lurking fondness for the old religion, which it is believed will yet be the national faith of England.

That Archbishop Tait should have even mentioned S. Augustine's chair with a certain feeling of gratitude and honest pride is, indeed, a sign of the times. Catholics will find it easy to forgive him for words which he uttered, no doubt, with perfect sincerity. There is one expression in that address which they hear with joy and with hope. Brief as it is, it speaks of progress in the right direction.

Hierarchia Catholica Pio IX. Pontifice Romano. Supplementum I. ad opus: Series Episcoporum ecclesiæ Catholicæ 1873 editum. Collegit P. PIUS BONIFACIUS GAMS, O.S.B. Monasterii: typis E. Stahl. 1879.

DURING 1879 Father Gams, of St. Boniface's, Munich, has enriched Catholic literature with two learned works. After a delay of several years he has published the last volume of his great "Ecclesiastical History of Spain," principally remarkable for the thorough treatment of the subject of the Inquisition. Moreover, he has brought out the above-mentioned "Supplementum primum" of the Series containing the Catholic Hierarchy throughout the world under Pius IX. The present Supplement presents a twofold aspect: it both corrects and adds to the main volume. The learned author, who well represents in our time the great French Maurists of the 17th and 18th centuries, lays before us the list of Bishops who have been elected, have lived, and have died between June 16, 1846, and April 18, 1879. Next to the ecclesiastical province presided over by the Pope himself, we find the young but flourishing Church of the United States. England is here with her new hierarchy, and Scotland likewise, whilst Ireland is reserved for the next Supplement, to be published within three years. Father Gams, though largely employing Dr. Maziere Brady's valuable book on the Episcopal Succession in England, Ireland, and Scotland, remarks that with regard to Ireland that work will have to be corrected in several places, and added to. Last, but not least important, come the notices of the Oriental Churches united with the Holy See. An excellent index concludes the Supplement. Every public library and student of Church history should be provided with it.

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